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‘Working Through’:  
An Inquiry into Work and Madness 
Jennifer Laws  
This interdisciplinary doctoral thesis represents the weaving together of several 
partially independent strands of research conducted by the author between 2008 and 
2011 in the field of madness, work and recovery.  The purpose of the thesis is, to 
borrow from Freud, to ‗work through‘ some of the rich and diverse links between work 
and mental health as they appear throughout time and space, and in particular in a 
climate where getting people with mental health problems back to work is a central 
political priority.  The first stream of the thesis is dedicated largely to an historical and 
philosophical analysis of the relation between work and madness, and especially the 
therapeutics of work.  Next, voices from contemporary mental health service-users—
drawn both from ethnographic work in spaces of ‗sheltered‘ employment and narrative 
research with individuals in mainstream paid employment—are introduced to offer a 
series of disruptions to common understandings of what it means to be mad at work.  
Finally, the thesis turns to policy and to an examination of the ‗what works‘ agenda in 
getting people with mental health difficulties back into paid employment.  Rather than 
add further to this evidence base, the thesis seeks instead to describe what may be lost 
when ‗what works‘ becomes the only way of thinking about recovery.  Recurring 
themes in the thesis include the tensions between therapeutic work and damaging 
work; between curing madness and embracing it; between the complex relations 
between work, employment and activity and their role in recovery; and between the 
competing epistemological positions of service-user centred perspectives and critical 
hermeneutics in understanding the relation between work and mental distress.  At their 
simplest, conclusions point to the need for a rich and plural theoretical landscape of 
work and mental health and to the need to resist overarching and inflexible policy 
interventions.  
  
  
 
   
 
  
  
   
 
 
‘Working Through’:  
An inquiry into work and 
madness 
 
 
Jennifer Laws 
 
Submission for Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Geography 
Durham University 
 
 
2012 
  
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  5 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Declarations....................................................................................................................... 8 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................. 9 
 
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 11 
Overview of the Thesis ........................................................................................... ..13 
Data and Methods ..................................................................................................... 16 
 
 
Chapter One: Crackpots and Basket Cases 
A History of Therapeutic Work .................................................................................... 21 
York, England, 1813 ................................................................................................. 24 
Massachusetts, USA, 1904 ....................................................................................... 27 
Post-war England & America, 1945– ....................................................................... 31 
Bristol, England & Maryland, USA, 1963–1979 ...................................................... 36 
Towards the Mainstream: The Recent History of Therapeutic Work ....................... 40 
Conclusion: The History and Future of Therapeutic Work ............................................. 45 
 
 
Chapter Two: Imaginary Planes 
Recovery and the Work of Madness ............................................................................ 49 
The Appearance of Work in Mental Health Narratives ................................................... 52 
Magical Work ........................................................................................................... 52 
Recovery Work ......................................................................................................... 58 
Mad Markets and Service-user Production ............................................................... 65 
Categorising Service-User Work ..................................................................................... 70 
Conclusion: Navigating Work Narratives ........................................................................ 76 
 
 
Chapter Three: An Ethics of Relation  
On Alienation and Liking One’s Work ........................................................................ 79 
The Theory of Work: A Relational Tradition .................................................................. 81 
Developing Connections .................................................................................................. 85 
  
 
6   
Relationality, Work and Mental Ill Health ................................................................ 96 
Suitable Work ............................................................................................................ 97 
Alienation/Desiring Connection .............................................................................. 101 
Questioning Vitalism .............................................................................................. 104 
The Right Relation .................................................................................................. 108 
Conclusion: Returning to Ethics .................................................................................... 111 
 
 
Chapter Four: Putting Madness to Work 
Mad Artists and Insider Industry ............................................................................... 116 
A Borrowed Muse: Madness and the Creative Professions .................................... 118 
Insider Industry: The Service-User Professionals ................................................... 127 
Insider Empathy and the Helping Professions ........................................................ 141 
Conclusion: Relating to Madness  .................................................................................. 150 
 
 
Chapter Five: What Works? 
 Plato’s Pharmacy and the ‘What Works’ Agenda ................................................... 158 
‗What Works‘ and the Evidence Agenda ....................................................................... 160 
Critical Reception .................................................................................................... 162 
What Works? .................................................................................................................. 168 
Hippocrates‘ Balance .............................................................................................. 176 
Plato‘s Pharmacy ..................................................................................................... 180 
Like Clockwork ....................................................................................................... 188 
 
 
Chapter Six: Magical Happenings 
Beyond the ‘What Works’ Paradigm ......................................................................... 199 
A Catalogue of Magic ............................................................................................. 203 
Magic and the Evidence Base: A Magical Realist Perspective ............................... 218 
Magic, Pragmatism, Social Research ...................................................................... 235 
Conclusion: Social Science and Magic ................................................................... 285 
 
Conclusion: Works in Progress ................................................................................... 242 
Work Undone .......................................................................................................... 246 
 
Epilogue ......................................................................................................................... 249 
 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 253 
 
Appendix ......................................................................................................................... 278 
  
  7 
 
List of Illustrations 
 
 
 
4.1 ‗Service-user only‘ positions: four service-user vacancies  ..................................... 131 
4.2 Position A, job description (anonymised)  ............................................................... 133 
4.3 Position A, advertisement for service-user training (anonymised)  ......................... 133 
4.4 Position D, job description and person specification  .............................................. 134 
 
 
5.1 Graph illustrating the prevalence of the term  
‗what works‘ in the Web of Knowledge database  ........................................................ 171 
5.2 Graph illustrating the prevalence of the term  
‗evidence base‘ in the Web of Knowledge database . .................................................... 171 
5.3 Example of a ‗considerably improved‘ TB  
case before and after streptomycin treatment  ............................................................... 175 
5.4 Example of a ‗moderately improved‘ TB  
case before and after streptomycin treatment  ............................................................... 175 
5.5 ‗Square gears‘  ......................................................................................................... 189 
  
  
 
8   
 
 
 
 
Declarations 
 
 
 
 
The material contained in the thesis has not previously been  
submitted for a degree in this or any other institution.  It is the sole work of  
the author, who takes full responsibility for any errors contained. 
 
 
© Copyright 2012 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author.  No quotation from  
it should be published without prior written consent and information  
derived from it should be acknowledged. 
  
  
  9 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
 
One blessing of writing a doctoral thesis slowly is that it gives more time for magic.  
My thanks go to Durham University, Department of Geography, for both academic and 
administrative support; to my students for exciting and critical debate; to my family for 
practical assistance in the final stages of writing and to my friends and colleagues in 
office 601 for camaraderie throughout; and, of course, above all, to the many generous 
organisations and individuals who brought my research to life and reminded me why it 
mattered.  Special thanks go to Robin Jamieson for his ongoing astute suggestions and 
critique, to Ladan Cockshut for proofreading support, and also to Joanne Cairns, 
Abigail McNiven, Wayne Medford, Sarah Royle, Nick Rush-Cooper, and Robert Shaw 
for specific contributions to the text.  My very warmest gratitude goes to my 
supervisors, Professors Joe Painter and Sarah Curtis, without whose exemplary support 
this research would not have been possible, and to my academic advisor, Professor 
Richard Smith, whose vision of a humane academy has underpinned this project from 
its conception to its end.  
 
The project was funded by the European Social Research Council with additional 
support for fieldwork and dissemination from Durham University, St John‘s College 
and the Royal Geographical Society.  Sections of the thesis have appeared, or are 
scheduled to appear, in Social Science & Medicine (2009, vol. 69, issue 12), History of 
the Human Sciences (2011, vol. 24, issue 2), Sociological Review (forthcoming) and 
Cuzzocrea and James‘ (eds) Valuing Work: Challenges and Opportunities 
(Interdisciplinary Press, in press).  Acknowledgements are due to the editors and 
reviewers for each of these publications for the strength they have added to my writing. 
 
  
  
 
10   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   11 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
The focus of this interdisciplinary thesis is the relation between work and so-called 
mental health/ ill-health in the context of post-industrialised and welfare-reformed 
Britain.  The stimulus for conducting this research was the release in June 2006 of the 
Government Green Paper, A New Deal for Welfare: Empowering People to Work, 
which detailed a number of interrelated strategies for job retention and employment-
focused rehabilitation for people with disabilities and other health problems, including 
mental health difficulties.  In this paper and the research it commissioned, problems 
with mental health were cited to be both the fastest growing categories of work 
incapacity and the most challenging to treat (DWP, 2006, p. 40), leading some media 
reporters to announce depression as the ‗new backache‘ for the welfare state.  For 
critics of the new plans, the report represented yet one more episode in an ongoing and 
paradoxical failure in government policy since the collapse of the golden age for 
Welfare Britain: despite continued reform to assist individuals with mental health 
difficulties to find and keep employment in the competitive labour market, more 
people than ever were finding themselves diagnosed with, and ‗signed off‘ and kept 
away from work because of, mental health difficulties (Furedi, 2004). 
 
In the final thesis that is presented here, ‗back to work‘ has proved less the focus of 
research and more its departure point.  In the face of significant other research 
contributions which have sought to evaluate back-to-work schemes, survey the health 
effects of returning to paid employment or canvas service-users‘ perspectives about 
ongoing welfare reform, the project seeks instead to place the lived connections 
between work and mental distress (madness, breakdown) in a broader and more 
holistic mesh of polysemous complexity—that is, at its most straightforward, to 
encounter and account for the richness and multiplicity of work and mental ill health as 
experienced in the lives of people living with psychiatric diagnoses.  In lay terms, the 
project is a liberation exercise—to de-limit work, madness and the relations between 
them from the constraining discourses of waged labour or psychobiological 
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pathology—and to release them instead into a broader research agenda for 
understanding the unstable relationality between work and being human.  
 
It will be apparent from the start that both work and madness are terms of considerable 
significance which have been addressed by a multiple body of scholarly literatures.  To 
highlight just a few which have had bearing on this thesis, we might mention 
psychotherapeutic perspectives which have sought to understand the therapeutic 
properties of work for people with mental health difficulties (Hall and Buck, 1915; 
Serrett, 1985; Kielhofner, 2004); research investigating the epidemiological relations 
between mental health, employment and unemployment (Jahoda, 1982; Curtis et al., 
2002; Warr, 2007; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010; Bambra, 2011); psychological, 
biogenetic and evolutionary perspectives stressing the relation between work, activity, 
and the origins of human selfhood and agency (Csikszentmihalyi, 1973; Kane, 1996; 
Tallis, 2003; Tallis, 2004); as well as critical approaches stressing the damaging 
potential of particular work forms for human flourishing (the foundations of Marxism, 
of course, but see also Sennett, 1998; Aguiar and Herod, 2006; Crawford, 2009) and 
the structural links between the industries of ‗psy‘, social regulation, and the labour 
needs of capitalism (Foucault, 1967; Deleuze and Guattari, 1972; Scull, 1993; Cohen 
and Timimi, 2008). 
 
The aim of this thesis is to engage actively, critically and creatively with the above 
literatures—in a way which encompasses the arts and humanities as well as the social 
and clinical sciences—and in a way which takes as its motto the importance of 
travelling across these different modes of talking about work and mental distress as 
well as travelling along them.  Whilst it is dangerous to make any claims to novelty in 
this already expansive literature, it is hoped that in bringing together some of these 
perspectives (or rather, to borrow Freud‘s phrase, in ‗working through‘ similar 
difficulties between different perspectives in parallel), at least two specific 
contributions to the field can be offered: first, by weaving together philosophical 
exploration with solid empirical research undertaken with people living with mental 
distress, addressing what some might see as a lack of connectivity between the 
disparate bodies of scholarship already acknowledged; second, in the face of ongoing 
changes to the structure and politics of academic research in which traditional 
philosophical inquiry often struggles to locate itself, defending a space for exploratory, 
creative and discursive approaches to the study of work and madness. 
  ~ Introduction ~ 13 
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I have suggested in several places already that this thesis is interdisciplinary.  Perhaps 
more precisely, it is simply ‗without discipline‘—although within such proclamation it 
is important to stress that geography, with its long affinity to idiographic inquiry and 
cross-disciplinary engagement, has provided an excellent administrative and 
intellectual home for the research.  To an extent, I think that this weak if not strong 
rejection of disciplinary boundedness is a requirement of the intellectual endeavour I 
describe here—that is, to chase meanings and established ways of viewing the world 
beyond traditional borders of knowledge (I am reminded of Derrida‘s assertion that ‗in 
nowhere‘ does writing reside [Derrida, 1972, p. 126]).  However, in these intersects 
and chases across borders I confess I am on foreign ground more often than not and 
that the omissions in theory and literature I have made will inevitably exceed by some 
volume the sources I have acknowledged.  It is hoped, however, that in bringing just 
some of these ideas together, a richer and more nuanced map of the unstable territory 
between work and ‗madness‘ can be provided.  
 
Overview of the Thesis  
 
In order to find some way of progressing in the vast project outlined above, in the final 
text that is presented below, the thesis is arranged as a series of six selective and semi-
autonomous explorations or expositions, each focused on a discrete and highly specific 
point of collision between work and madness.  Whilst to a large extent these chapters 
are offered as self-contained discussions (and ones with ‗sponge-like‘ qualities in that, 
upon their conclusion, the conceptual commitments of the thesis resume their earlier 
form), a number of themes nevertheless recur throughout the text.  In a theme which 
runs throughout the text, a recurring refrain is that of the diversity and polysemy of 
work, both in terms of the multiple meanings of work (see particularly chapters two 
and five) and the related fragility of concepts such as ‗good‘ or ‗therapeutic‘ 
occupation (chapters one and three).  Again running through the thesis—both as a 
substantive and methodological theme—commitment is offered to the 
phenomenological texture of madness in preference to purely clinical accounts of 
mental distress (for some, this will suggest connections to ‗service-user led‘ research, 
or even ‗anti-psychiatric‘ research, although I use neither term in my own project).  
Finally, in an argument that becomes more explicit in the second half of the thesis, an 
emphasis is placed on the locatedness of work and recovery always already in an 
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ethical network of semantic interpretation.  Conclusions point in addition to these 
themes to the need for attending to the discrete and the concrete and to recognising the 
radically unstable relation between work and madness. 
 
Further theoretical and methodological discussion will be saved for the chapters 
themselves, however, it is worth pulling out within these themes two intellectual 
influences which will help locate this thesis and its analytic outlook in the broader 
literature.  First, in a research milieu where the empirical social sciences may be seen 
to be prized above all others, is the conviction that many of the most important 
questions about work and mental health are at their heart not matters of empirics but 
philosophy—that is to say, are always already engaged with particular semantic and 
ethical commitments to the world.  (For examples of such questions we might think: 
What is the connection between our work and humanity?  What counts as good work?  
What version of mental wellbeing should we, as a society, be working towards?)  In 
what might be seen as a return to the older philosophical project set out by authors 
such as Collingwood (1933), Winch (1951), Wittgenstein (1953), etc., the thesis seeks 
to demonstrate how philosophy is not just the ‗dead hand‘ of social inquiry valid only 
for sweeping away linguistic ambiguities (the so-called Lockean or ‗under-labourer‘ 
conception of philosophy) but rather that thoughtful philosophical inquiry is itself a 
fertile intellectual terrain capable of enriching our understanding of social concerns 
such as work and mental distress (see Winch, 1951; also Burbules and Smith, 2005; 
Smeyers, 2006; and Hutchinson, 2008, for evidence of the ongoing relevance of 
Winchean methodologies at the start of the twenty-first century).  The task of course is 
not to abandon empirical engagement with the world (and it will become in evident in 
the following paragraph that this thesis has been committed to much real-world 
engagement) but rather, in Winch‘s pithy expression, to argue how much of what is 
interesting and important about such engagements are less matters of empiricism 
themselves but are rather conceptual matters of ‗what it makes sense to say‘ (Winch, 
1951, p. 67). 
 
The second influence (with a rather different heritage) is to join with many other 
engagements in current academic research to take seriously the potentials of 
individuals with mental health difficulties themselves to contribute to the production of 
knowledge about madness and mental distress (Reed and Reynolds, 1996; Nelson et 
al., 1998; Beresford, 2003; Morrow et al., 2012).  Compared to other writers who have 
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gone further down the ‗participatory‘ route in research with psychiatric survivors 
(Bailey, 2005; Parr, 2007; Church et al., 2008), my success in this regard is modest and 
my indebtedness to more traditional modes of ethnographic inquiry more notable than 
a true ‗participatory‘ approach.  Nevertheless, an input to this agenda which persists 
throughout the thesis is my ongoing insistence on the tendencies of so-called ‗lay‘ 
people (by which we mean here simply those who are actually living with mental 
distress) as well as scholars, physicians and therapists, to build complex philosophical 
frameworks about the nature of their condition.  (To an extent I refer here to the classic 
‗double hermeneutic‘ described by Giddens [1987] whereby technical insights from the 
social and clinical sciences become adopted as navigational concepts in the lives of 
‗ordinary‘ people—and yet I take this further to see participants and narrators also as 
theory builders and interpreters as well as just owners of experience and insight.)  
Whilst tensions between these approaches can be identified, it is noteworthy how such 
perspectives also converge in their insistence upon producing argument which ‗is 
supported throughout its texture by cross-reference to experience‘ (Collingwood, 1933, 
p. 51; see also proponents of ‗grounded theory‘, which may be seen to offer an 
alternative expression of a similar concern)—and it is in this light that the empirical 
examples which I shall shortly introduce should be conceptualised. 
 
In the first chapter, the thesis begins with an historical analysis of work as a kind of 
therapy (that is, the longstanding fascination with the therapeutic properties of work for 
people with mental health difficulties), written largely to expose a broader complexity 
in our beliefs about work and madness.  In the second chapter, the reverse of this 
equation—i.e., therapy as a kind of work—is introduced, alongside numerous other 
marginal work forms encountered in being ill and getting better.  In chapter three, the 
possibility of work as a health determinant is addressed (a traditional concern for 
geographers and sociologists of health), through the somewhat alternative gaze of a 
philosophical exposition of our human connectedness to work and what such healthful 
connections might constitute.  An important idea introduced in this chapter is that of an 
ethics of relation, which will be carried forward into the remaining chapters.  The ideas 
of chapter three are extended in chapter four in which the specific instance of ‗putting 
madness to work‘ is considered: that is, the ways in which madness can be utilised in 
the workplace.  The chapter includes cases of mad artists and mad scientists as well as 
service-user researchers and peer-to-peer support workers, with specific focus on how 
such experiences fit into ordinary discourses of work and employment.  In the final 
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chapters, five and six, broader philosophical issues of what it means ‗to work‘ (as 
opposed to being broken) are examined with specific regard to the ‗what works‘ 
literature in mental health care and beyond.  In chapter five, taking a temporary step 
away from my empirical case studies, the discussion follows a deconstructive reading 
of the multiple meanings of ‗work‘.  In the final chapter, six, the literary concept of 
magic is introduced as both a means of responding to a world beyond the rationalism of 
‗what works‘ and as a means for describing the rich, marvellous and irreducible 
experiences of the workaday world that are often found to be missing from more 
conventional evidence bases. 
 
Data and Methods 
 
Empirical examples used in this thesis are taken from an extended period of 
ethnographic and interview-based research with individuals living with or recovering 
from mental distress in the North East of England (a location not without significance 
due to its historic connotations as a region of industrial decline and above-national 
levels of unemployment and illness [Townsend et al., 1988; Shucksmith et al., 2010]).  
Primary research sites included three community-based mental health projects which 
were chosen for their divergent positions towards work-oriented recovery: an 
occupation-focused community project, which I have here called the Plumtree Centre, 
which housed a sheltered workshop, catering firm and an allotment gardening project; 
a Training and Enterprise Centre which supported service-users in seeking mainstream 
employment or establishing independent social enterprises; and a more traditional 
mental health daycentre, Walter House (another pseudonym), which provided 
‗therapeutic activities‘ such as handicrafts, trips out and cookery classes to keep users 
mentally and physically active.  Additional sites that appear throughout the thesis 
include ‗The Network‘, a service-user-led organisation co-ordinating a range of mental 
health projects across the region, and an inner-city women‘s project which had a 
particular ‗in-reach‘ function of going into psychiatric hospitals to make contact with 
vulnerable women.  The fieldwork spanned a seventeen-month period (May 2008–
October 2009) during which time I visited the centres, as participant observer and 
informal ‗helper‘, once or twice weekly, supplementing observation with numerous 
conversations and informal interviews with service-users and staff.   
 
The second strand of data from which I have drawn heavily was generated through in-
depth, open-ended interviews with around fifty working-age adults with self-identified 
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experiences of mental ill health, who were either currently in, or who were trying to 
return to, mainstream paid employment.  These individuals were recruited through a 
combination of general calls for participation in local media and by word of mouth 
from participants and gatekeepers already involved in the research.  To allow for the 
wide-ranging backgrounds and interests of the participants, interview schedules were 
generally directed by the individual (although see the note on page 116 regarding the 
interviewing style for chapter four); however, most interviewees spent the first 
interview relating a fairly sequential life narrative before moving on to more thematic 
discussions in subsequent encounters.
1
  Alongside traditional interviews, where invited 
to do so, I also visited participants at work, attended back-to-work training or jobcentre 
appointments with them, or in a couple of instances talked with support workers, 
colleagues or families to get a different perspective on participants‘ experiences (a full 
summary of participant profiles and a more detailed account of my research contact 
with them is provided in the appendix to this manuscript).  An added richness to the 
data—although one which is largely lost in the final presentation of the text—is that 
many individuals also knew each other and on occasion interviews were conducted 
collectively, creating a wonderfully thick web of interlinking narratives.   
 
Research extracts as they appear in the thesis have been analysed through careful re-
reading of field-notes and interview transcripts and through regular return visits to the 
field sites to ‗check out‘ the validity of emerging themes with participants (particular 
thanks go to the participants I have here called Steph, Karen and Benji in this regard).  
Anecdotes and quotations are drawn from a combination of verbatim interview 
transcripts, notes from unrecorded discussions and from close consultation with field-
notes (all indented quotations are from verbatim transcripts or from handwritten notes 
made during discussions).  It should be noted however that extracts have been selected 
to demonstrate the range of possibilities for individual experience (what it makes sense 
                                                     
1 Interviews and group discussions generally started thus: I would introduce myself and talk a little about 
the project.  I would state I was interested in people‘s stories and ideas about ‗mental health and work‘ 
(wording specific: not the impact of their health on work, or of their work on health or anything else I felt 
would ‗sway‘ the discussion).  I would perhaps relate this to policy or to the immediate interview 
environment (the daycentre or Trade Union meeting or wherever we were that day) or, later in the project, 
feedback the sorts of things the project had achieved to date.  And then I would say—usually whilst 
fumbling with the Dictaphone and confirming for the last time that everyone was okay with me using the 
recorder—‗And that‘s about it really.  Well, I‘ll hand over to you‘.  And then there would be a gap when I 
hoped people would talk—and nearly always they did.  After this somewhat routinised beginning (which I 
felt at the time was slightly eccentric but is probably not so far from what most qualitative researchers are 
doing in their interviews anyway), I would just allow conversations to unfold naturally, interjecting when I 
hadn‘t understood or when I wanted to know more—but generally just letting the speakers direct the 
conversation.  In case of ‗emergencies‘ (less talkative interviewees, or people who were having particular 
difficulties in focusing) I had a few broad prompts and questions to get the conversation going (e.g., 
concerning work histories or hopes for the future).  In fact, these were really used. 
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to say) rather than to represent what is always a consensus point in the mental health 
community.  Pseudonyms are used throughout; in a small handful of occasions, more 
substantial changes to a story have been made to protect identity further—especially 
where the details of a narrator‘s occupation or ‗illness trajectory‘ have posed particular 
challenges to anonymity.  Approval for the fieldwork was granted by the research 
ethics committee of my own institution, under the guidance of the relevant National 
Health Service Research Ethics Committee and the British Sociological Association‘s 
recommendations for working with ‗vulnerable‘ populations.  However, as shall unfold 
in the main body of the thesis, it is far from the case that all participants were 
‗vulnerable‘ in classic senses applied to psychiatric populations—including with regard 
to ‗traditional‘ researcher/participant dynamics—and indeed one purpose of the thesis 
might be conceived as challenging traditional conceptions of vulnerability with regard 
to mental ill health.   
 
Readers already familiar with the field will scarcely need reminding that when 
researching and writing about mental distress/ illness/ madness choice of language and 
terminologies is a contentious issue.  Part of the project (as above) has been to work 
with this ambiguity and to explore how in different contexts it becomes sensible to 
speak in different ways about the same subject matter.  Elsewhere, it has been more 
important to adopt either the emic vocabularies of a situation (participants‘ self-
descriptions, for example), or—in order to let other aspects of the argument flourish—
simply to use a language of convenience which ‗allows the sentence to flow‘.  It should 
be noted that the terms madness, mental illness, mental health service-use and 
psychiatric survivorship all have their supporters and detractors within the mental 
health community and the academy alike—and certainly, in my own writing, I show 
fidelity to none of these options exclusively.
2
  Exploring the multiple meanings of 
                                                     
2 Beyond such comments (and in contrast to some other writers in the field), I also maintain that there is 
no universal advantage to any of these terms individually—for whilst it has become somewhat of a 
tradition in recent person-centred mental health research to reject the terms ‗mental illness‘ and ‗mental 
health patient‘ for their overly clinical connotations and disempowering politics, talking about illness as an 
experience of ill health nevertheless seems a defensible project—and, as a colleague and fellow consumer 
of mental health services recently pointed out, the term ‗patient‘ has negative connotations only when we 
have already accepted a stigmatised/stigmatising framework of mental distress (for users of an asthma 
clinic or dental practice or some other branch of physical medicine are regularly referred to as patients 
without further ado).  Likewise, whilst in many publications, the term ‗mental health service-user‘ has 
become the term of choice, among many of the mental health groups in my own research, this term was 
appraised negatively; in either case it should be stressed that for many of the people in this thesis who 
might be described as service-users, such service ‗use‘ extended to maybe just one or two twenty-minute 
appointments in a six month period, thus bringing into question the helpfulness of the term as a central 
identity-marker.  Along with numerous other writers in the past ten years, frequently in my research I talk 
of ‗madness‘—as Parr suggests, to signify a Foucauldian point about ir/rationality and the medical gaze 
(2008, p. 29); but also to capture the frequent eccentricity and idiosyncrasy of breakdown and recovery 
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work is a more explicit theme throughout the thesis, and thus word choice is discussed 
within the text.  To avoid confusions between the terms ‗work‘ and ‗labour‘, however, 
the latter term has been avoided, apart from in compound uses such as the ‗labour 
movement‘. 
 
Finally, two final comments should be added to this introduction before moving 
directly to the first chapter. The first regards boredom, fieldwork practice, and 
sampling strategy.  A conventional strategy for determining sample size in naturalistic 
research is that of data or theoretical saturation—i.e., the point at which the rate of 
learning from each new research encounter has fallen to the extent that engaging with 
additional participants or making return trips to the research site no longer generate 
demonstrable advances in knowledge or understanding (Glaser, 1967; Bowen, 2008).  
It should be clear that this strategy was never going to work for the kind of research 
that this project constituted—for if my principal conclusions about the radical 
individuality and idiography of mad experience are sound, then such point of saturation 
would be indefinitely unreachable;  moreover, since we never really expect all people 
to be the same, such individuality was never so much a case for empirical testing, but 
rather formed a basal philosophic starting point which was taken as given.  At the level 
of the emotional practice of doing research, however, it is worth saying that as a 
researcher I never felt saturated and never felt bored (although I often felt 
overwhelmed, which would provide an interesting alternative starting point for a theory 
of fieldwork saturation) and whilst—as I suggest in the thesis—a salient feature of the 
lives of some of my participants was indeed stasis and boredom, such observation was 
always counterbalanced by an enduring captivation of other people‘s lives and of 
unfathomable, unaccounted-for otherness.  It is with these comments in mind that I 
make the somewhat humdrum statement that the chapters presented here, and the 
stories within them, constitute just a tiny proportion of the many possible lines of 
inquiry that could have been included. 
 
The second concerns the question I have often been asked about my own positionality 
with regard to the individuals and topics I engage with, and about my qualifications to 
                                                                                                                                             
(which are often lost when talking about mental health ‗difficulties‘ alone).  There are both philosophical 
and clinical problems with the psychiatric classification of diseases of which I am aware and sympathetic 
(Szasz, 1961; Rosenhan, 1973; Bentall, 2003; Appignanesi, 2009; Leader, 2011a) and it should be noted 
that in the primarily non-medical settings of my own research, medical diagnoses were not a standard 
means of talking about clients/users/members.  For these reasons, psychiatric diagnoses of participants 
were not routinely collected in this research and are only used in the text where they offer specific 
information or where they formed explicit elements of a participant‘s own self-narrative. 
20  ‗Working Through‘: An Inquiry into Work and Madness  
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
establish access to and rapport with a population who are often considered ‗hard to 
reach‘ in traditional academic research.  A simple statement of my own ‗researcher 
positionality‘ is that I come to this topic with both a history of paid employment within 
the broad field of occupational therapy and rehabilitation and as someone who lives 
with a mental health diagnosis and who has experienced acute mental health services 
from a user‘s perspective—elements of my personal identity which formed living 
aspects of my relations with the people in my research.  Whilst acknowledging the 
potential for extended methodological discussion on this point (and I return in part to 
these ideas in chapter four) my general strategy here is to acknowledge but also gently 
move away from ideas about any automatic advantage (or limitation!) that this quasi-
‗insider‘ status has granted, and hope instead that if the reader insists upon placing 
significance on this positionality, it can be taken simply as a soft guarantor of good 
faith and solidarity to the events and people that appear in my work. 
 
   21 
 
Chapter One  
 
Crackpots and Basket Cases  
A History of Therapeutic Work  
 
 
  
It has been recognised for many years that mentally disturbed and depressed people are 
better off and get well more quickly if their faculties can be used in some simple and 
effective way.  Very lately it has been realised that patients who cannot be interested in 
more common pursuits will find interest and development in some of the handicrafts, 
such as weaving, knitting, and basket making.  The idea of occupation for the 
handicapped has progressed far enough in this country so that it is now rare to find any 
institution for chronic patients where there is general idleness.  (Hall and Buck, 1915, 
pp. x–xi)  
 
Love and work are the cornerstones of human happiness.  (Widely attributed to 
Sigmund Freud)
3
 
 
 
Since Galen‘s oft-cited proclamation (c. AD 170) that work is ‗nature‘s physician‘, 
western history has revealed a longstanding fascination with the therapeutic properties 
of work for people with mental health difficulties.  Whilst such heritage is often 
referenced (particularly in texts aimed at the rehabilitative professions), rarely is the 
                                                     
3 Probably one of the most famous quotations about work and mental health, and one of the best loved 
‗ghost references‘ in academia also.  The most reliable history of the quotation is its appearance in 
conference proceedings by Eric Erikson who was taught by Anna Freud, who apparently told her students 
that her father would make such remarks over the breakfast table (Erikson, 1980, p. 43).  Freud‘s most 
prolonged discussion of work appears in Civilisation and its Discontents (1929), where he also states in a 
footnote that he would liked to have written more about work, if only there had been time. See also the 
second chapter of this thesis for an extended discussion. 
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notion of work itself the central focus of historical accounts.  From asylum farms and 
hospital factories to expressionist art studios and therapeutic communities, the history 
and philosophy of therapeutic work are therefore the focus of this first chapter, which 
will trace a history of therapeutic work through a series of key episodes from 
nineteenth century moral treatment to present day back-to-work welfare interventions.
4
   
 
The historical development of beliefs and practices surrounding the supposed 
therapeutic qualities of work has interest to the contemporary scholar for several 
reasons.  First, in an era of increasing ‗workfare‘ policies on both sides of the Atlantic, 
beliefs in the healthful properties of work have become a politically virulent (although 
comparatively under-theorised) concept in justifying the return of individuals on 
sickness-related benefits to the free labour market.  Second, whilst the notion has 
become commonplace that employment can restore mental health, specifically 
‗therapeutic‘ occupations for the mentally ill have fallen out of favour as relics of an 
older-fashioned and prejudiced era of mental health care (the stigmatised images of 
basket-weaving, and relatedly, ‗basket-cases‘ in occupational therapy will be 
considered later in the chapter).  Taking what might loosely be called a ‗history of 
ideas‘ approach (Lovejoy, 1936), the chapter thus explores how the historical 
development of therapeutic work can shed light on contemporary complexities in 
work-related mental health policy and, as such, how the history of therapeutic work 
reveals also a broader tension in our human relationship to work and occupation.
5
   
 
In what follows, rather than attempt a comprehensive account of the development of 
the mental health services with regard to work therapies, the chapter follows instead a 
set of discrete ‗moments‘ or ‗passing points‘ in which some key transitions or 
contestations arise, with particular focus on Britain and North America.  Throughout 
these episodes, several recurring contestations or tensions will be discussed: first, the 
tension between ‗ordinary‘ work and specifically therapeutic or sheltered work; 
second, the tension between work in an external reality and an introspective ‗work on 
                                                     
4 A version of this material has appeared as Laws, J. (2011) Crackpots and Basket-cases: A History of 
Therapeutic Work and Occupation.  History of the Human Sciences, 24, 65–81 and was presented at the 
Philosophy of Psychiatry Seminar, Lancaster University, January 2009.  The author would like to thank 
three anonymous reviewers and participants at the seminar series for helpful feedback on earlier drafts. 
5 The history of ideas approach to history-writing was proposed by Lovejoy in 1936 as a mode of 
investigating conceptual change through the lens of ideas themselves, or—as Lovejoy described them—
‗unit ideas‘ or ‗individual concepts‘ (Lovejoy, 1936).  Whilst the approach has been critiqued in recent 
years for lack of sensitivity to cultural context, when interpreted generously, it remains a useful source of 
encouragement for examining the ways in which specific beliefs and ideas (such as the idea that work is 
therapeutic) develop and recombine across different historical eras. 
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the self‘; finally, the questionable status that therapeutic employment has offered to 
psychiatric patients vis-à-vis wider society in terms of economics, policy and politics.  
As will be discussed in the final section, the enactment of such tensions is presented 
not as epochal moments but recurring struggles indicative of our human connectedness 
to work rather than solely the response to particular social and cultural forces.
6
   
 
Before embarking further on this journey, it is worthwhile finally addressing a 
particular peculiarity which arises in the existing literature on the history of the therapy 
of work (which is better conceived as a series of interesting but scattered references 
rather than a substantial sub-body).  For forty years since the publication of Madness 
and Civilisation (1967), references to work-based therapies in critical scholarship have 
rested almost exclusively on a Foucauldian account of institutionalised work as a form 
of disciplining unruly selves (what, in later writings, would become known as 
Foucault‘s ‗governmentality‘ thesis—see Bracken [1995] and Lilleleht [2002] for 
examples).  Whilst these insights undoubtedly hold value, it is my belief that such 
frameworks have subsumed other equally interesting points of critique in the history of 
therapeutic work.  Conversely, in those accounts of institutional work which have been 
written from the perspective of the developing occupational therapy professions (a rich 
and helpful body in general), Foucauldian accounts—and indeed most other critical 
approaches—have curiously been neglected, which again I believe is to the detriment 
of the subject.  (It is indicative, for example, that not one of the occupational therapy 
publications I cite in this chapter references Foucault in its bibliography.)  Whilst the 
contributions of both literatures are important, this chapter should in part be read as a 
gentle critique (or at least modification) of both perspectives.  For readers seeking 
further reading, Serrett (1985), Paterson (2002), Kielhofner (2004), Mocellin‘s two 
chapters (1995; 1996) and Hocking‘s trio (2008a; 2008b; 2008c) all provide helpful 
and philosophically informed starting points. 
 
                                                     
6 It is helpful also to mention here briefly the kinds of work that do not appear in this discussion because it 
is through these that I carve a space specifically for a conception of therapeutic work.  To take some 
examples of such omissions: work as it appeared in the workhouses or as was undertaken by pauper 
patients in nineteenth century asylums to ‗pay for their keep‘ (for in such presentations, work was 
conceived with no therapeutic understanding); or, in more recent years, the occupational health and 
industrial psychology movements in which the health of the general worker has come under focus (for 
again, in such instances, interest is motivated primarily by public health concerns or out of interest for 
economic performance rather than therapeutics proper).  Roughly then, therapeutic work might be seen as 
i. work set aside for people with mental health or other health difficulties and ii. navigated by some form 
of therapeutic principle; although as will be revealed, the formats of these criteria have changed 
significantly with context. 
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A History of Therapeutic Work 
 
York, England, 1813 
 
Whilst records as early as the third century have evidenced supervised occupations 
such as basket- and mat-weaving being offered to pauper lunatics in the monasteries 
(Applebaum, 1992), the most conventional starting point for a history of therapeutic 
work (and the target of Foucault‘s critique also) is the eighteenth century reforms of 
the asylum system that became known as ‗moral treatment‘ (Foucault, 1967; Doerner, 
1981; Scull, 1981).  In short, moral treatment (or moral therapy, as it was later termed) 
marked the shift from an earlier era of simply incarcerating lunatics to a systematic 
attempt at providing psychosocial treatment for people with mental health problems.  
The format, developed in several independent communities across Europe at the time, 
provided small family-run retreats in pleasant, pastoral surroundings for people in 
mental distress to take time to recover their rational faculties.  Participation in work 
activities formed a central part of the therapeutic regime and, in comparison to the 
older administrative hospitals in which inmates passed the majority of hours chained 
and in solitude, patients were instead set to work on the gardens, stables and 
workshops that surrounded the asylum.  Notionally, the location for this first passing 
point is 1813, England, upon publication of the first manuscript dedicated solely to the 
methods and philosophies of William Tuke‘s pioneering moral therapy retreat near 
York, in which regular employment was proclaimed the ‗most efficacious‘ intervention 
in inducing recovery (Tuke, 1813, p. 156).
7
 
 
The role of work in moral therapy was tightly bound with the philosophy on which the 
retreats were founded.  Famously, Foucault‘s objection to moral treatment (which 
would become known as the ‗governmentality‘ thesis) was that the apparently 
philanthropic rejection of physical restraint in favour of psychological interventions 
simply replaced the disciplining of bodies with the disciplining of minds; however, for 
Tuke and associates there was nothing clandestine about this.  Moral therapy rested on 
a mixed philosophical heritage of Enlightenment faith in reason, burgeoning capitalist 
                                                     
7 On the Continent, an earlier text is Pinel‘s (1801) Tr it  m  i o-philosophiqu  sur l  li n tion m nt l  
(translated into English by D. D. Davis as A Treatise on Insanity in 1806) in which proposals for the 
French traitement moral are outlined.  Commentaries differ on the extent to which Tuke was influenced by 
the movement in France, but most consider the greatest divergence between the two models to be the role 
of the physician within moral treatment, with the French alienist models favouring greater medical input 
than the more pastorally orientated English retreats.  See Coldefy and Curtis (2010) for further analysis. 
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rational self-interest and (at the York Retreat) the Quaker ethics of prudence and self-
control.  At the core of such philosophy, Tuke and others argued that the madman was 
not radically different from the rest of humanity (as earlier classical perspectives had 
suggested), but rather that through engaging with the patient as a rational being and 
encouraging him to behave the same way, madness could be cured.  The cultivation of 
self-discipline was thus the modus operandi within the Retreat and asylum texts made 
it explicit that patients were to be released from their restraints only on the 
understanding that they then agreed to control themselves (Tuke, 1813, p. 160).   
Work—that traditionally most disciplined of activities—was thus the perfect 
companion to such therapy and ‗employment in various occupations was expected as a 
way for the patient to maintain control over his or her disorder‘ (Bing, 1981, p. 31, my 
emphasis). 
 
What can be said about the meaning of work in the age of moral treatment?  First, 
moral therapy was not a work cure in the sense that therapeutic work was somehow 
held separate to other aspects of life in the asylum.  Rather, life in the Retreat thrived 
on a holistic organisation of time which took as its guiding principle the daily balance 
of work, rest and worship.  The exquisite physical surroundings (farms and gardens) of 
the asylum that formed the landscape of recovery were also bound closely to this 
work—as Philo writes, grounds ‗were not only about providing attractive surroundings 
for the lunatic to contemplate [....] but about securing a spacious and fertile situation in 
which the mad person could be actively involved as part of his or her therapy‘ (2004, p. 
592).  Whilst such therapeutic justifications had first been the reason for purchasing the 
asylum‘s extensive grounds, conversely, simply by virtue of the scale of the task, in 
time, farm work and garden work undertaken by patients also became essential to the 
asylum‘s upkeep.   
 
Second, conceptions of work in moral therapy did not draw a harsh distinction between 
the therapeutic work of patients and the (paid-for) work of staff.  Patients and staff 
worked alongside one another in the farm and kitchens and (whilst such position is 
somewhat hard to conceive given the barrage of medical and criminal record checks 
that face individuals with psychiatric histories seeking sensitive employment today) 
recovered patients were not only permitted to stay on as employees in the retreats, but 
were actively selected for such positions due to their perceived sensibilities in dealing 
with newer admissions (Gerard, 1997).  Leading from this, the emergence of such ‗care 
26  ‗Working Through‘: An Inquiry into Work and Madness  
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
work‘ in the asylums—conjoined with other developments such as the introduction of 
petting animals in the farmyard to ‗awaken the benevolent feelings‘ (Tuke, 1813, p. 
96)—marked the emergence of a new kind of ethical or affective relationship between 
worker and work (such affect would have differed greatly from both the meaner 
employment of the workhouses, but also the patient-to-patient relations of the 
administrative hospitals in which more acquiescent patients would be tasked to deliver 
beatings to their more vulnerable peers [Foucault, 1967]).  Alongside the increasing 
morality of attitudes toward ‗madmen‘, in moral therapy, work was also entering a new 
moral space.   
 
Whilst Foucault‘s reading of moral therapy may indeed have become somewhat over-
dominant in contemporary histories of psychiatry, the issue of ‗governmentality‘ or the 
relation of moral treatment to the burgeoning capitalist state remains an interesting one.  
For Foucault and many other sceptics, moral therapy was very much an instrument of 
both state and the bourgeoisie—a mechanism through which to ‗remodel the lunatic 
into something approximating the bourgeois ideal of the rational individual‘ (Scull, 
1981, p. 111).  However, more properly, moral therapy held an ambivalent relationship 
with the accelerating forces of industrialism and the market place.  Whilst moral 
treatment unarguably instilled in the patient the values of self-interest and self-
discipline essential for capitalist industrialism, for the moral therapists, mental illness 
was also considered an environmental disease exacerbated by smoky chimneys and 
overcrowded factory work (Philo, 2004).  The proponents of moral treatment were no 
strangers to the mass resistance to industrialism that had swept the country in the first 
quarter of the century (indeed Tuke‘s Description of the Retreat was published just one 
year after the ferocious clash between Luddites and the British Army at York).  
Similarly, the broader ethic of work apparent in the retreats owed little to the 
developing consciousness of the capitalists:  
 
It is not enough to have the insane playing the part of busy automatons.  There must be 
an active, and, if possible, willing participation on the part of the labourer, and such 
portion of interest, amusement, and mental exertion associated with the labour, that 
neither lassitude nor fatigue may follow.  (William Browne, Montrose Asylum, 
Dundee, 1837, p. 33)  
 
As discussed at length by others, by the mid-nineteenth century, under the combined 
strains of overcrowding and corruption, as industrialisation proceeded moral treatment 
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gave way once more to a primarily ‗warehousing‘ model of incarcerating lunatics.  
Work did not disappear at this time, with hospital farms and laundries ‗employing‘ 
large numbers of inmates (although few such positions were paid).  However, interest 
in the therapeutic value of such employment was minimal, and justifications instead 
rested on more simple economic and managerial goals.  Remembering a fact-finding 
mission to these large-scale state institutions in 1882, the reformer of the American 
psychiatric system, Adolf Meyer, writes:   
 
The committee had visited European institutions and had been especially impressed by 
the use of occupation as a substitute for restraint.  But they had a fear that the presence 
of private patients would interfere with the introduction of occupation […] This 
represents the attitude of many hospital men of the time.  Industrial shops and work in 
the laundry and kitchen and on the wards were very largely planned to relieve the 
employees.  A new step was to arise from a freer conception of work… (Meyer, 1922, 
p. 2) 
 
For Meyer, commitment to such a ‗freer‘ conception of work, and its therapeutic 
possibility for the mentally distressed, became a cornerstone of psychiatric reform.  
Meyer‘s ‗next step‘ (as histories of psychiatry will typically recount) was the birth of a 
distinctive set of practices that became known eventually as occupational therapy (OT).  
The birth of this new profession is the subject of the next section. 
 
Massachusetts, USA, 1904 
 
Notionally, the location for this passing point is 1904, Marblehead, Massachusetts, 
whereupon the physician Herbert Hall founded a sanatorium called Handicrafts Shops 
in collaboration with craftswoman Jessie Luther.  However, professional organisation 
of OT did not begin until the mass return of shell-shocked soldiers at the end of the 
First World War, and the term ‗occupational therapy‘ was not coined until 1914 by 
architect George Barton at a professional meeting in New York.  The movement 
arrived in Britain a decade later, when Scottish-born Margaret Fulton became Britain‘s 
first qualified OT at the Aberdeen Royal Asylum (Paterson, 2002; Reed, 2005).   
 
Like moral treatment, occupational therapy held a tense relationship with broader 
social trends in work and employment.  Early pioneers were influenced heavily by the 
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progressivist Arts and Crafts movement in Europe and similarly lamented the shift 
from farm to factory work and from traditional craftsmanship to mass production; 
trends which had only accelerated from the days of Tuke at the York Retreat.  In 
America, neurasthenia—a nervous exhaustion caused by overwork and over-
civilisation—was the malaise of the era and many of occupational therapy‘s first 
patients were neurasthenics (Gijswijt-Hofstra and Porter, 2001; Lears, 2009).  
However, the nascent occupational therapy also developed as a motion against the 
increasingly fashionable mode of treatment for mental illness in which invalids 
(usually female) were confined to total bed-rest and not even permitted the ‗work‘ of 
sitting up.  Unlike proponents of this ‗rest cure‘ (Weir-Mitchell, 1884), Hall and 
colleagues insisted it was poor working practices rather than work itself that were the 
cause of nervous illness and that conversely the sense of mastery gained through 
appropriate work was essential for recovery.  Through a return to traditional crafts such 
as basket-weaving and pottery making, the early occupational therapists thus sought to 
rescue a restorative work ethic from both the degrading practices of factory work and 
from the quiet despotism of bed-rest and, in doing so, rescue the soul of the patient:  
 
It is evident that hand-weavers cannot expect to compete with power looms.  Yet with 
the care and skill available in a hand weaving shop it is possible with special oversight 
of the workers to turn out products which the power looms could never accomplish and 
which are eagerly sought because of their charm and interest.  There under the 
influence of quiet work, [the patient] will forget and leave behind her symptoms by the 
acquirement of courage and self control. [...] Such briefly is the idea of the work cure 
(Hall and Buck, 1915, pp. xxiii–xxiv).  
 
Whilst work was more extensively theorised in occupational therapy than in the earlier 
moral treatment, the single greatest significance of OT for a concept of therapeutic 
work is perhaps harder to judge.  Whilst moral treatment (which many have considered 
a ‗pre-paradigm‘ for the professionalised OT) had focused largely on the powers of 
work to restore reason in the patient, occupational therapy expressed a growing belief 
in the therapeutic effects of quality workmanship in and of itself (Hocking, 2008a).  
Appreciation and mastery of a craft were central for the developing profession and, like 
the Hall-Luther collaboration at Marblehead, early practitioners included craftspeople, 
musicians and artisans as well as clinical attendants.  The recovery of the patient was 
considered to link closely with the therapist‘s reverence for his or her own work.  In 
such an atmosphere, teaching thus acquired an almost religious significance and 
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craftspeople stood on equal footing with clinical staff.  In time, instructors also 
included older patients who had become skilful in their occupation and thus, alongside 
handicrafts, teaching became another form of work considered suitable for the 
recovering nervous patient (Hall and Buck, 1915; Spackman, 1968). 
 
However, whilst the influence of the Arts and Crafts movement was important to the 
concept of work in the early OT years, perhaps more significant still was the 
emergence of a specifically therapeutic (systematised and strategic) understanding of 
work that arose from out of this discourse.  In moral therapy, the view of the healthy 
life had been a properly holistic position: grounds needed groundsmen and patients 
were in need of grounded activities; therapeutic elements of work were thus more or 
less seamless with the economic needs of the asylum.  Managers of the retreats 
considered work to be naturally beneficial and nothing particular had to be done to 
bring out its therapeutic qualities.  In OT, however (a result as we have seen of a 
growing resentment towards the ‗shoddy‘ workmanship of mass production), such faith 
in ‗naturally‘ occurring work became shaky.  As occupational therapy became more 
technical (demonstrated for example through the mushrooming volume of publications 
advising specific programmes or techniques for rehabilitation), an increasing schism 
developed between work in the ‗real‘ world of mills and factories and forms of 
occupation that could be used therapeutically.  As a profession, occupational therapists 
both gave birth to and became safe-guarders of such specifically therapeutic work.  Just 
as early psychiatrists had depended upon a notion of psychiatric ‗illness‘ to give 
authority to their developing practices, notions of a therapeutic occupation thus became 
a professional as well as philosophical investment: 
 
Occupational therapy provides a means of conserving and bringing into play whatever 
remains to the sick and injured of capacity for healthy functioning.  It is the role of the 
occupational therapist to see that the tedium and consequent depression occasioned by 
the enforced idleness of illness are relieved and that suffering is diminished.  (Kidner, 
1930, p. 40, memoirs of founding the National Society for the Promotion of 
Occupational Therapy in New York, 1917) 
 
The emergence of a systematic work therapy thus presented subtle but significant 
challenges to popular conceptions of work.  Like moral treatment, occupational therapy 
privileged the sense of usefulness and purpose in work, and paralleled popular beliefs 
from Tuke‘s age onward about the dangers of idleness and introspection: ‗We are too 
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apt as doctors to think, ―make him comfortable‖.  Make him as useful as possible is a 
better idea!‘ (Hall and Buck, 1915, p. 22).  However, whilst patients‘ products from the 
workshops were sold or put to use wherever possible, work was now undertaken 
primarily for therapeutic purposes.  Despite Hall‘s protestations that the curative 
workshops (as they were called) should never become ‗play shops‘, on closer 
inspection, it appeared that Hall and colleagues did advocate some forms of work that 
were devoid of external rewards: in a letter from Marblehead in 1918, for example, 
Hall advised an associate to instigate a three-step approach in occupational 
rehabilitation, of which only the final had ‗vocational‘ intent (cited in Spackman, 1968, 
p. 68).
8
  Indeed, in Hall‘s OT, even the pinnacle construct of craftsmanship was subtly 
displaced by therapy.  Marblehead correspondence reveals that by 1909, for example, 
Hall had discontinued teaching pottery at the sanatorium due to fears that it was too 
hard for patients to manage the frequent accidents with the pots (letter to Dr Frederick 
Shattuck, cited in Reed, 2005, p. 35).  (Ironically, this pottery work was later replaced 
with cement work using moulds: a less risky occupation, but one which also 
approximated more closely the ethic of mass production from which Hall and others 
had tried to get away).  Not only did such actions reduce the variety of work at 
Marblehead, to the extent that craftsmanship might be thought of as living in 
relationship with one‘s materials (an idea to which we shall return in chapter three), the 
cessation of pot-making and other such interventions also disrupted patients‘ abilities 
to experience such ‗craftsman‘s‘ relationship fully (Sennett, 2008).  From the mid-
twentieth century onwards, the earlier colloquialism ‗crackpot‘ (literally, a cracked 
head) became associated with the imagined lack of dexterity of workers in 
occupational therapy as a sign of poor craftsmanship and faulty merchandise.
9
  
However, ironically, it was through denying patients the experience of cracked pots (a 
natural wastage in the firing process) that the dubious craftsmanship of these 
therapeutic activities truly became visible. 
 
                                                     
8 To quote in full: ‗First, the bedside occupations such as weaving, wood-working, etc.  The effect of these 
is purely medical and not commercial.  The next step is the curative workshop where the patient has the 
opportunity to use tools in the machine shop.  This stage is intended to restore the functions of nerves and 
muscles.  The stage is not intended to be vocational, the aim being still medical‘.  The final stage advised 
by Hall involves work placement and training, in which ‗the man is placed in a trade or profession‘ (cited 
in Spackman, 1968, pp. 68–69). 
9 The Oxford English Dictionary is equivocal about this link, but numerous oral histories of ex-patients 
and staff documented on the internet recall such vocabularies from the 1930s onwards.  See 
http://www.upstatenyafricanheritage.com/margaretcunningham.html (accessed 10 July 2010) for an 
example. 
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The position of therapeutic work was thus a fragile and contested one in the 
profession‘s first decades and it is important to note that at no point was OT the only 
conception of work therapy available.  Both the sheltered dimensions of work and its 
soft protectionism separated OT from other competing notions of ‗work cure‘ in early 
twentieth century America.  The prominent medical reformer Richard Cabot, for 
example, despaired of the ‗quiet‘ occupations that were prescribed in OT and wrote 
instead of nervous invalids and moral miscreants requiring risk (‗violence‘ even) in 
work, insisting that it was the softening of labour that had occurred with the advent of 
mass production methods that was the cause of apathy and distress (Cabot, 1909).  
Elsewhere Cabot (who was an associate and friend of Hall) spoke highly of OT and in 
some commentaries is still associated with the profession for his contributions to 
conceptualising the link between work, character and recovery.  However, it is 
probably not surprising that it is his contributions to social work and not occupational 
therapy for which Cabot is ultimately remembered.   
 
Post-war England & America, 1945– 
 
To jump through history again, no narrative of therapeutic work would be complete 
without pause to mention the 1939–1945 war.  In the asylums, the effects of the war 
were comparatively unsurprising: traditional therapeutic craft-activities became 
restricted due to shortages of staff and materials and many curative workshops became 
reconfigured so as to allow psychiatric patients to undertake practical jobs for the war 
effort (MacDonald, 1957).  Beneath the most explicit horrors of the war, Britain and 
America also came together during the war years in a rare and unifying public notion 
of therapeutic work.  An oft-cited episode in many ‗people‘s histories‘ of the war 
describes the various enthusiastic contributions made by communities to the war effort 
(common examples include the collecting of iron railings to be recycled for 
ammunition, or in America, establishing knitting circles to knit socks and blankets for 
troops).  Often, remarks were added to such stories to the effect that in ‗actual fact‘ 
such practices were allowed to continue almost entirely for purposes of morale (or 
propaganda), since by the heyday of the war effort, the Allies had more socks and 
scrap metal than any force could know what to do with (MacDonald, 1988; Farr, 
2010).   
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However, the true focus of this third section is less the war itself but the immediate 
years following.  Compared with the brief opening for truly productive and important 
work for psychiatric patients in the war effort, after the war the demand for marginal 
workers such as psychiatric patients diminished (a classic reserve labour army 
argument) and therapeutic work retreated into itself once more  (Riddell et al., 2002).  
Yet in the surviving space of therapeutics, the encroachment of two major influences—
biomedical reductionism and Freudian psychotherapy—brought significant revisions to 
the earlier romantic notion of occupational therapy.  In this passing point, the 
intellectual encounter between these two, competing paradigms and preceding 
conceptions of therapeutic work are examined in the context of the post-war milieu.  
Primary resources are taken from both sides of the Atlantic. 
 
To tackle developments in the clinical sciences first, in the 1940s and 1950s a new 
‗paradigm‘ of biomedical reductionism had spread throughout medicine and into 
associated disciplines.  In essence, such developments concerned the dual drives to 
measure and categorise impairment as discrete malfunctions of specific body and 
nervous systems.  Despite its previous environmental inclinations, post-war OT 
responded sympathetically to this revamped reductionism and occupational 
rehabilitation took a decisively mechanistic and bio-medical direction (Kielhofner, 
2004).
10
   
 
The focus on the primarily embodied (biologic) character of work in the ‗new‘ 
occupational therapy was not in itself an innovation.  Hall and Buck‘s 1915 
manuscript, tellingly entitled The Work of Our Hands, discusses at length the physical, 
tactile, bodily therapeutics of manual work.  Traditional occupations were not just 
handicrafts but were congratulated for implicating the whole body: Hall‘s favoured 
occupation at Marblehead, for example, was the ‗old fashioned hand-loom‘ for its 
provision of ‗general exercise in strong and effective motion of arms and legs‘ (Hall, 
1910, p. 13).  Such concern with the physicalities of work was influenced heavily by 
the emerging discipline of energetics in the physical sciences.  Nature was posited as 
an active and unstable force and the human body an object of such dynamism also.  
Work, the deliberate expenditure of worldly energy, was thus an ongoing biologic 
process:  
                                                     
10 A biomechanical orientation in OT had to a lesser extent been advanced in response to the physically 
injured servicemen of the First World War.  However, a strong case remains for suggesting that the extent 
and reductionism of the paradigm was specific to the period after World War II. 
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Literally, the human body is burning up all the time—burning up and being rebuilt.  It 
cannot stop.  The only possible preservation of our healthy activities against such a 
self-corrosive process as goes on to produce ulcers in the stomach is in setting one‘s 
energies—those restless, ceaseless energies—to work instead of allowing them to be 
turned in upon oneself.  (Cabot, 1909, p. 24) 
 
Such philosophy grounded the biologic (organic) aspects of bodily activity to the 
semantics of human occupation.  It bound science with philosophy and craftsmen with 
their clinical counterparts in the early occupational therapy collaborations.  It also 
ensured that therapeutic work was outward facing; neither the self-corrosive energies 
of ulceration nor the purposeless tasks of ‗work-for-work‘s-sake‘ could constitute the 
proper kind of ‗energy transforming‘ that Cabot and other physicians at the birth of OT 
considered proper work.   
 
In the later reductionist biologism of the post-war period, however, the ‗binding‘ 
function of keeping work with world became inverted.  Again, the biomechanical 
processes of the body were placed centrally to a therapy of work, yet whereas in the 
old biologism, the body needed to work, in the new, it needed working upon.  The 
therapeutic purpose of work became the restoration of physical function: OT busied 
itself with making mobility aids for injured body parts and therapeutic ‗work‘ (such 
that it still existed) became mere exercises to improve physical and mental stamina.  It 
is significant that at this time, the term ‗activity therapist‘ became used in conjunction 
with the more traditional ‗occupational therapist‘.  Practitioners wrote of bizarre 
experiences:  
 
Some occupational therapists of today are tending to utilise the bicycle saw as a means 
of mechanical exercise, the patient merely bicycling not sawing.  In order to get the 
specific motion necessary, the patient may be found moving a sand block back and 
forth on a workbench.  There is no sandpaper on the block and there is no project to 
sand. (Spackman, 1968, p. 71) 
 
Elsewhere, a poignant image given the once beautiful craftsmanship of the Marblehead 
weaving industry, patients were recorded working at empty spinning wheels unstrung 
for weaving (Kielhofner, 2004).  According to Kielhofner (p. 54), such activities had 
become ‗disembodied‘, yet in fact, the body and its movements were the only 
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remaining connection to work.  More precisely, such activities had been ‗de-
worlded‘—their meaning confined to the body and any greater productivity in the 
‗real‘ world forsaken.  
 
If empty spinning wheels and the move towards a biomechanical occupational therapy 
posed serious challenges to the limits of ‗real‘ work, the rise of psychoanalysis did so 
even more.  In the beginning of the twentieth century, occupational therapy (especially 
in the States) had been the humane alternative to invasive physical restraints and 
aggressive use of psychotropic drugs.  By the 1940s and 1950s, however, this had 
become psychodynamic therapy.  
 
Early occupational therapy had had an ambivalent relationship with psychoanalysis.  
Freud was interested in the relations between work and mental health and many early 
practitioners of OT had shown interest in his ideas; however, the ‗fanciful‘ ideologies 
of psychoanalytic interpretation sat uncomfortably with the pragmatism of 
occupational therapy and, as I shall discuss in greater detail in chapter two, despite 
Freud‘s interest in ‗real world‘ work and employment, ultimately the true work of 
psychoanalysis was the psychological endeavour of self-analysis (Davidson, 1980).   
 
The rising dominance of psychotherapy in mental health service provision in the late 
1940s and 1950s thus put strains on traditional, romantic beliefs in the importance of 
craftsmanship and ‗doingness‘ for the fulfilment of human potential.  However, a 
therapeutic emphasis on the arts and crafts did not disappear entirely at this point.  
Instead, such activities assumed a role in diagnostics.  From the psychodynamic 
perspective, ‗work blocks‘ and dysfunctional behaviours became interpreted as signs of 
unconscious conflicts and blocked psychosexual needs that prevented maturation of the 
ego (Weil, 1959).  Creative activities such as painting and work with clay were seen to 
reveal the patient‘s hidden desires and provide a means of working through 
unconscious problems.  It was at this stage that a prototype art therapy began being 
practised in hospital wards and occupational therapy studios.  Whereas the aesthetic 
and ethical impetus for the early OT had been the careful workmanship of the Arts and 
Crafts movement, the inspiration for art therapy was post-war expressionism in its 
emphasis on emotional immediacy and subjective experience over objectivity and 
concrete reality (Wood, 1997).  In terms of workmanship, diligence and mastery were 
replaced by speed and expression—and indeed patients who appeared overly 
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concerned with the ‗conscious and deliberate composition‘ of their work were liable to 
be seen as resisting the unconscious drives of more ‗primitive‘ forms of creativity 
(Maclagan, 1997, p. 135).  
 
The ascendance of psychodynamic therapy and the birth of art therapy thus affected 
several ‗inward turns‘ on therapeutic occupations.  Work became a form of self-
exploration (introspection) rather a construction of the self in an outside reality.  
Furthermore, work in the therapeutic setting ceased to be an educative activity to bring 
the moral invalid into more wholesome and adult roles (whatever the perils of such 
model); rather, arts, crafts and other forms of purposeful activities became a regressive 
therapy to guide the patient through unresolved psycho-developmental conflicts.  In its 
efforts to reveal the unconscious self, art therapy exemplified many aspects of the 
‗confessional‘ that Foucault had distrusted in his later work.  Yet the aesthetics and 
ethics of expressionism took the self-disciplined activities which had traditionally been 
considered ‗work‘ and transformed them into infantile play: 
 
Occupational therapy can offer opportunities for the expression and satisfaction of 
unconscious oral and anal needs in an actual or symbolic way through activities which 
involve sucking, drinking, eating, chewing  and those which use excretory substitutes 
such as smearing or building with clay, paints, or soil. (Fidler, 1958, cited in 
Kielhofner, 2004, p. 49) 
 
Work had substituted a public meaning of work for a private one.  The contrast to the 
heydays of moral therapy, where the work of patients was vital for the asylum‘s 
economic viability was complete.  Finally, work shifted from the bodily realm to the 
psychic one.  Spackman‘s sterile spinning wheels above had worked the muscles and 
organs of the body, yet any remaining trace of ‗work‘ in smearing, sucking and 
chewing worked purely on the mind.  
 
In the perversities of art therapy and mechanised OT alike, through turning inward, 
occupational activities had lost authenticity as crafts.  Yet it is also important to note 
that in the broader socioeconomic conditions of the 1940s and 1950s, crafts themselves 
had also lost authenticity as sustainable ways to make a living.  As handicrafts in the 
outside world became relegated to hobbies and pastimes, for the first time in the 
history of therapeutic work, the allocation of craft activities to psychiatric patients 
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became synonymous with limitation and despair.  Basket-weaving—traditionally a 
respected skill—became the stigmatised pursuit of asylum inmates.  The derogatory 
term ‗basket-case‘, used originally in the First World War to describe quadruple 
amputees who were carried home on ‗basket‘ stretchers, found a new target amidst the 
basket-weavers of OT—in time coming to signify ‗hopeless cases‘ and ‗crazies‘ more 
generally (Center for Research in Social Policy, Worklife and Basketry, 2010).  Again, 
as with the hapless images of crackpots in the potteries, the imagery of therapeutic 
work that had been introduced by Tuke to free the madman became simply one more 
method for constraining him.  
 
Bristol, England & Maryland, USA, 1963–1979 
 
In this last section, the era of rehabilitation and ‗back-to-work training‘ (what we are 
tempted to think of now as the inevitable attitude towards work in mental health 
services) will be introduced in the form of two fiercely competing ideologies: 
‗industrial therapy‘ as a merger of industrial and therapeutic discourses on work, and 
work as it appeared in the radical and experimental therapeutic communities of 1960s 
‗anti‘-psychiatry.  The location is 1968: the heyday of radical anti-psychiatry and the 
patient-led movement; yet also (and equally controversially in its manner), the election 
of the first industrial manager as part of a hospital therapeutic team.   
 
In the former and most prevalent model, work in the industrial therapy units (ITUs) 
took the shape of formal employment contracts in purpose-built factories, most of 
which were administered by the hospitals.  The units were located within, or just off, 
hospital grounds and patients were given day-release privileges to attend from the 
wards.  Contracts (usually simple assembly tasks) were commissioned by external 
organisations and patients were paid a small ‗therapeutic wage‘ in return for their 
labour.  The ITUs prided themselves on their ability to compete commercially and 
many became successful private enterprises: at the Industrial Therapy Organisation in 
Bristol, for example, patients manufactured ballpoint pens, boxes and dismantled 
telephones and worked 8.15am–5.15pm five days a week with an hour‘s lunch break 
for a packed lunch provided by the hospital (Early, 1963, p. 282).  In time, 
government-administered sheltered workshops, which had been instigated by the 
Ministry of Labour in the late 1940s to ‗recondition‘ disabled service men after the 
Second World War, also started to receive psychiatric patients—although in some 
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instances, concerns from people working in and managing such institutions were raised 
about the potentially negative influence of the mentally ill upon other groups of 
disabled workers (Freudenberg, 1964, cited in Long, 2011).   
 
Industrial therapy was the brainchild of first-wave deinstitutionalisation through and 
through.  As a direct rejection of basket-weaving ideologies, the purpose was strictly 
rehabilitative and work placements were envisaged only as a stepping stone to the 
greater goal of employment in free market conditions.  A central objective of the ITUs 
was to make sheltered work as ‗lifelike‘ as possible and the rhythms and 
responsibilities of the workshops thus emulated the ordinary working week wherever 
practicable.  Spaces of work were similarly modelled on the factory floor rather than 
the occupational therapy suite (which, as Long, 2011, points out, was also more cost 
efficient): as John Denham, consultant psychiatrist at Long Grove Hospital in Epsom is 
recorded saying in 1963, ‗just a bare room with a minimum of furniture is required.  
The more factory-like the surroundings, the higher the patient‘s output‘ (cited in Long, 
2011).  Unlike earlier forms of OT in which patients‘ produce had been sold, industrial 
therapy was concerned with the quantity as well as the quality of the end output, and 
those who could not work with sufficient efficiency were returned to the wards (Jones, 
1972).  A stark comparison to the early craftsman-clinician collaborations of the turn-
of-the-century sanatoriums, psychiatrists in industrial therapy formed partnerships not 
with artisans but businessmen.  Remembering the appointment in 1968 of the first 
‗industrial manager‘ at the Birmingham ITU, Imlah (the medical director at the time) 
reflects:  
 
Right from the outset Mr. Williams ignored the fact that his workers had psychiatric 
problems.  He treated them exactly as he would a normal workforce.  [...] One of the 
main lessons we were learning was that psychiatric patients did not differ in their 
motivations, incentives and responses from non-psychiatric populations.  (Imlah, 2003, 
p. 19) 
 
The post-war optimism of industrial therapy appeared infectious and the model spread 
quickly throughout Europe and North America, yet it also raised questions about where 
the therapy of the ITU was imagined to take place.  Earlier romantic beliefs about the 
therapeutic value of engaging in work itself had given way to a primarily economic 
paradigm in which the work itself mattered minimally (the term ‗compensated work‘, 
which was often used alongside industrial therapy, is telltale here).  Nevertheless, for 
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those who worked in the hospital industries, wages held therapeutic properties beyond 
spending power alone.  Pay was an extrinsic motivator and encouraged patients to take 
steps towards seeking competitive employment; however, in the culture of the units, 
money was also seen as a symbol of progress and payday offered patients the 
opportunity to have the experience of accomplishment.
11
  Through the quasi-therapy of 
‗therapeutic earnings‘, classic intrinsic/extrinsic divisions in understanding motivations 
for working were thus at least partially destabilised.   
 
If industrial therapy reflected the intensifying concerns with economics and 
performance after the war, the 1960s generated another, very different notion of work 
in the emergence of therapeutic communities, or ‗milieu therapies‘ as they were also 
known.  The communes were experimental combinations of ‗anti‘-psychiatry, group 
psychotherapy and leftwing political theory.  In comparison to industrial therapy, 
rather than training the patient through work to prepare for work, the communities 
(which were most often converted wards of the de-institutionalising asylums) provided 
a psychological safe-space in which the patient could embark on the difficult 
psychological work of growing-up and moving beyond the classic (immature) role of 
the psychiatric inmate.  
 
In the communities, there was no great theorisation of work where work is understood 
only to be the shipment of patients for a few hours to an offsite workshop.  Rather, the 
whole experience on the ward was a ‗working-towards‘ recovery, in a similar sense to 
how therapy was understood not as a once-weekly private affair but a round-the-clock 
process unfolding between all community members.  A hard-line philosophy of patient 
self-governance lay at the core of the therapeutic method and from cleaning bathrooms 
to planning entertainments patients were responsible for the day-to-day tasks of 
running the community.  The crucial subtext of work in the communities was that 
patients were capable of negotiating complex social tasks but had for too long been 
encouraged into passive and stunted social roles by the apparatus of conventional 
                                                     
11 As an example of the complexities of the relationship between pay, therapy and recovery, see an extract 
from one of my interviewees, Tom, in recollecting life at a hospital factory in Newcastle: ‗What would 
happen is we would get a phone call, we would get contract work from firms.  And we would get six packs 
of boxes and we would have to staple them together and put the stuff what they had made in the boxes.  
And then, they would open them again and check them, and then put them in other boxes.  And that was 
the day.  It was a bit boring but it was good getting paid.  Well that‘s how you knew you were getting 
better because you did your job, and if you didn‘t get wrong for it then you‘d get paid a bit more money 
you see so you‘d think ―I‘m getting better‖.  A bit more money and one or two less [Tom motions putting 
pills in his mouth].  That‘s how you knew you were getting better, you see.  The only thing I regretted is 
getting paid a pittance for it—we were only allowed to earn five pounds a week!‘ (Tom, interview 
extract). 
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psychiatry.  In correction, if patients failed to order vegetables or arrange a 
thanksgiving dinner, the task would not be done by anyone else either.  (In fact, an 
interesting counter-narrative here suggests that the reason these strategies worked to 
the extent that they did was that during the war years, staff shortages in the health 
professions meant that often the ‗lunatics‘ really had taken over the asylums, thus 
affording older patients the opportunity to develop the skills and experiences necessary 
for such responsibilities.)  In the psychiatrist Jan Foudraine‘s autobiography of life at 
the Chestnut Lodge Community, Maryland, a month-long struggle to get the 
community to take responsibility for itself is described (including the deteriorating 
cleanliness of the ward and consequent interrogation by the Environmental Standards 
Department) alongside the psychological struggles each community member must first 
work through before accepting responsibility for making the ward inhabitable again 
(Foudraine, 1974).  
 
It is interesting to reflect on the meaning of work in the communities.  The 
communities understood themselves as a form of education (Foudraine relabelled his a 
‗school for living‘) and spoke little of work directly, yet it was through the complex 
work of ‗doing community‘ that learning was imagined to take place.  Patients were 
expected to act as co-therapists for one another and an essential work of community 
was to challenge individuals who were in infringement of community rules.  The 
effects were often explosive and ended occasionally with violence—indeed, whilst the 
therapeutic communities were in many ways the antithesis of the straight-talking ‗work 
cure‘ prescribed by Cabot above, milieu therapy was arguably the only intervention 
which approached Cabot‘s insistence upon the therapeutic necessity of danger and risk 
in work.  Novelist Joanna Greenberg‘s fictionalised account of her life as a patient at 
Chestnut Lodge (five years before the arrival of Foudraine) captures well the frequent 
impossibility of this work.  In one description of the aftermath of a particularly virulent 
argument: 
 
Dust motes blown and floating all the patients were, but even so there were some 
things that could not be done.  Deborah knew very well that she could never ask Miss 
Coral why she had thrown the bed or how it was that Mrs. Forbes‘ arm had been 
intruded upon by that bed.  Lee Miller had cursed Deborah for the burnings which had 
resulted in the whole ward‘s restriction, but she had never asked why they had been 
done.  Miss Coral could never be confronted with throwing the bed, and her friends, 
such as they could be, would henceforth delicately expunge the name of Mrs. Forbes 
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from their conversation in the presence of the one who had caused her to be hurt.  
(Greenberg, 1964, p. 184) 
 
The idea of work mobilised in the communities was thus highly unconventional.  
However, whatever reactions their proponents provoked, at the least, in being 
permitted to face consequences of their actions, patients were unwrapped from the 
therapeutic cotton wool that had fettered work in both moral and occupational therapy.  
Unlike in the ITUs where an unwilling or unmotivated worker would simply be 
returned to the wards, in the communities no level of tiredness or distress would excuse 
the patient from the burden of his duty.  Similarly, in comparison to the fussing 
removal of ‗risky‘ activities such as pottery firing in turn-of-the-century OT, no kindly 
governor remained to protect patients from the possibilities of frustration.  Yet, as the 
reader has no doubt considered already, the authenticity of work in communities was 
always at best contestable.  In industrial therapy, work on the assembly line was under-
challenging and paid little more than ‗pocket money‘ (indeed, many of these wages 
would eventually be spent in the hospital tuck-shop).  But it was not unlike what other 
(sane) low-skilled workers were doing in the competitive labour market outside the 
asylum and, in that sense, the ITUs constituted a serious attempt at engaging patients in 
conventional adult roles.  Conversely, regardless of progressivist ideology, the 
therapeutic communities were built as playgrounds and classrooms for psychological 
healing.  Despite the successes of Foudraine‘s adventures, the potential for staff 
intervention remained quietly omnipresent as an artefact of the institutional existence 
of the community itself.  As for the ‗real‘ world (for fear of diluting the therapeutic 
experience), patients in the communities were not even allowed outside. 
 
Towards the Mainstream: The Recent History of Therapeutic Work 
 
In 1970, founder of the Medical and Health Research Association of New York, 
Bertram Black, wrote of the future of industrial therapy, ‗the best that can be said at 
this juncture is that industrial therapy for the mentally ill is here to stay […] it will 
become more central to treatment programmes for the mentally ill and will be more 
clearly recognised for its role in the tertiary prevention of mental illness and the 
stabilisation of recovery states of patients in the community‘ (1970, p. 176).  Today, it 
is difficult to see how such comments could be less accurate: whilst a growing culture 
of ‗workfare‘ has indeed accelerated the return of patients and ex-patients to previous 
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or new employment, industrial therapy (at least in its original form) did not survive the 
welfare restructuring of the 1980s, and many have suggested that therapeutic work now 
is only a matter for historical analysis (Taylor, 2002).  In this last section then, I shall 
embark on a speedy history of work therapies from Thatcherism and Reaganism until 
the present day before concluding with some thoughts about the nature of work as a 
therapeutic agent and its relation to recovery.   
 
To an extent, what happened to (the institutions of) therapeutic work in the 
Thatcher/Reagan years is part of a broader story of welfare reform about which much 
has already been written (Peck, 2001; Painter, 2002; Philo et al., 2005; Bambra, 2011).  
On both sides of the Atlantic, social policy saw a sea change in emphasis from 
providing sheltered and transitional work-placements for disabled workers to ensuring 
opportunities for people with disabilities in competitive mainstream employment.  
Ideas about the acceptability and desirability of long-term absence from the open 
labour market also changed, and coupled with transformations to procurement policies 
within the public sector which had effectively subsidised many of the ITUs, many 
sheltered workshops and hospital-based work therapies were terminated (Hyde, 1998).  
Ironically, New Labour (elected in the UK in 1997) made its mark from the 
Conservatives by continuing what they had begun—introducing a series of ‗New 
Deals‘ to get disabled people and other marginalised workers into employment and 
offering a range of modified recommendations to the medical professions about the 
dangers of ‗signing off‘ people from the workplace for extended periods of time.  In 
place of workshop provision, the gold-standard for vocational rehabilitation became 
one of several new models of ‗supported employment‘ in which individuals with 
mental health difficulties were assisted with the help of a named support worker or ‗job 
coach‘ to find and retain employment in competitive work settings (Hyde et al., 1999; 
Joyce et al., 2010).
12
   
 
Such events however say little about the recent history of therapeutic work (for such 
interventions are at their base social security reforms and belong more to a history of 
                                                     
12 At the time of writing, the most favoured of these programmes is the Individual Placement and Support 
(IPS) model (more recently known also as ‗evidence based supported employment‘), which was a design 
principle for New Labour‘s flagship ‗Pathways to Work‘ back-to-work programme.  The characteristics of 
IPS include early placement of service-users into paid positions in mainstream employment; prioritisation 
of competitive employment; rapid job search; integration of vocational services with mental health care; 
responsiveness to user preferences regarding employment type (compared with the more limited choices in 
the traditional workshops); and time-unlimited support from a job-coach or support worker (Bond et al., 
1997; Crowther and Marshall, 2001; Fox, 2007). 
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(un)employment policy than a history of therapeutic practice).  It is important to note 
that the traditional providers of therapeutic work—as well as the participants who 
embarked in it—did not disappear suddenly on election of the Conservatives or of New 
Labour or upon the launch of any of the aforementioned initiatives. 
 
To deal first with occupational therapy, after the reductionist turn of the 1950s and 
1960s (a period later conceived as a crisis point in the profession‘s history), OT entered 
a lengthy period of self-examination and self-redefinition—the results of which saw a 
refocus on the value of occupation in its fullest sense.  Whilst diminishing populations 
of psychiatric in-patients eroded some of the more traditional outlets for hospital-based 
therapies, continued deinstitutionalisation simultaneously produced new markets for 
practice.  Kielhofner (2004, p. 171) shows a 1978 photograph of a therapist supervising 
psychiatric patients on their first excursion on a shopping centre escalator as they 
prepare for life in a community setting (a reminder that for many long-term patients, 
social and technological changes in the outside world far outstripped their pre-
institutional experience).  As care in the community entered its maturity this flow of 
new dischargees slowed; however further reductions in service provision (notably in 
buildings-based daycare) placed more emphasis than ever on individuals being able to 
care for themselves.  ‗Activities of daily living‘—that is, of personal care, house 
maintenance, grocery shopping and the rest—thus became the province of OT, 
alongside facilitating access to mainstream leisure, education and (on occasion) 
employment pursuits.  Work (by which is here meant paid employment) was part of 
this equation, but only part.  Whilst some practitioners moved to posts in integrated 
jobcentre/rehabilitative projects, elsewhere occupational therapists expressed greater 
concern about this incorporation into the back-to-work agenda.
13
  However, it is 
unclear the extent to which this ambivalence stemmed only from the profession‘s 
defiantly broad view of occupation or from growing concerns about the 
unrehabilitatable nature of many clients in open employment conditions, especially in 
times of high unemployment.  In a revealing chapter written in 1996 for the earlier 
second edition of Creek‘s Occupational Therapy and Mental Health, for example:  
 
In the current economic climate, what is the role of the occupational therapist in work 
rehabilitation?  Assessment and preparation for work are key functions of occupational 
                                                     
13 For example, Nelson (1997, p. 21): ‗We need to resist the temptation to redefine ourselves with every 
new trend in health care.  We are not rehabilitation professionals or job counsellors—we are occupational 
therapists whose mission is much more basic and enduring than even the rehabilitation movement!‘ 
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therapy, including paid and unpaid work.  On the other hand, recognition that clients 
may require preparation for unemployment has to be accepted as a reality.  (Hume and 
Joice, 1997, p. 354)  
 
In contrast to this reticence, ‗buildings-based services‘ (including day programmes, 
drop-ins and traditional spaces of sheltered employment) have generally engaged more 
actively with the back-to-work/ community rehabilitation agenda (not least because, in 
the instance of statutory funded organisations, such cooperation has been a condition of 
funding).
14
  Whilst it is essential to stress the survival of some traditional sheltered 
workshops (such as the place I have called Walter House in my own research), many 
traditional sheltered employment schemes have been reframed as social enterprises or 
else have been replaced altogether by training and education services with dedicated 
back-to-work directives (Philo et al., 2005; Schneider, 2005).  Day services (including 
the ones which were the settings for my empirical research) have also adopted a more 
assertively rehabilitative role—primarily through efforts to support clients in activities 
beyond the mental health community, but also through generating new spaces of 
activity within conventional day services themselves.  In this sense, the recent history 
of diversional activities such as arts and crafts is interesting: to draw again from my 
own research, whilst a flagship development of the work programme at the Plumtree 
Project had been discarding the recreational crafts and jigsaw puzzles which had at one 
time constituted the limits of therapeutic activity, at Walter House (which had always 
been the more traditional of the day services), movement towards an activity-focused 
day programme including scheduled times for crafts, gardening and cookery was in 
itself a progressive move against the more prevailing culture of sitting, smoking and 
watching television.   
 
With these comments in consideration, to what extent does a genuine appreciation of 
the therapeutic qualities of work have relevance to current discussions and practices of 
back-to-work rehabilitation?  An initial response to this question is to state that 
rehabilitation (to paid employment or otherwise) has always been a goal of work 
                                                     
14 ‗Buildings-based‘ day services (as opposed either to groups meeting in mainstream community spaces 
such as libraries or colleges or outreach projects premised around one-to-one visits to clients in their 
private homes or workplaces) have been the target of widespread criticism and reform throughout the 
Labour government for their role in creating and maintaining (spatial) segregation between service-users 
and the wider community, even after deinstitutionalisation.  Key reports (notably the Department of 
Health‘s 2006 From Segregation to Inclusion: Commissioning Guidance on Day Services for People with 
Mental Health Problems) list vocation-based services and commitment to supporting clients to access 
mainstream leisure and social spaces among central criteria for continued financial support. 
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therapies (where we are drawing a distinction between ‗therapy‘ as engaged with 
addressing underlying disorder and ‗rehabilitation‘ as simply retraining and reinserting 
the patient into society).  In contemporary vocational rehabilitation, a neat example is 
the ongoing interest in skills acquisition, whereby through engaging in rehabilitative 
activities participants are understood to develop skills which not only help prepare the 
patient for life-after-illness (e.g., through improving their ‗employability‘) but to 
develop specific cognitive-affective capacities such as concentration, memory and 
emotional regulation which can then be turned inwards to treat, address, and mitigate 
against the (perceived) initial mental disorder itself (e.g., Roberts, 2002).  In the lived 
lives of people in distress, it should also be stressed that back-to-work itself can be 
experienced therapeutically (an idea that shall be returned to in greater detail later in 
the thesis).  Again, this is nothing new: in what might be considered a very early 
articulation of the social model of disability, Faulkes (1927) states that whilst curative 
workshops might not always be able to cure disease, they should strive to cure 
disablement. 
 
However, more importantly, an increasing momentum in policy and practice has 
emphasised the natural benefits of engaging in paid employment (for everyone, and 
not just the mentally ill).  Social inclusion and independence from benefits are 
presented as unequivocal social goods with important consequences for both societal 
and individual health.  In the vocabularies of supported employment, a closely linked 
idea is that of the ‗natural support‘—i.e., the co-worker or supervisor who provides 
informal encouragement in the workplace regardless of a client‘s mental health status 
(Nisbet and Hagner, 1988; Tauber et al., 2000).  This ‗neo-naturalism‘, as we might 
call it, has echoes of the earlier belief in the therapeutics of work observed in moral 
treatment and occupational therapy—yet, whereas in these earlier formats such 
principles were ordered by the natural world itself, here the more obvious logic is that 
of the market and the labour contract as organising principles for society.
15
   
 
Within this neo-naturalism, perhaps the most significant trend in the recent history of 
therapeutic work is thus a grander coming together or blurring of boundaries between 
the traditional realms of therapeutics and employment policy—evidenced not only by 
                                                     
15 Of course such a position is but the underbelly of workfare itself as an ideology that goes beyond the 
belief that one should work for one‘s benefits alone, but which places equal faith in work as ‗the best 
mechanism for delivering social goods to deprived groups in society‘ (Painter, 2002, p. 158).  For more 
critical commentaries see, for instance, Essen (2011), Jamieson (2011), and Slater (2011). 
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the blurring of boundaries between so-called ‗clinical‘ populations and the rest of 
society, but between the spaces of therapy and work rehabilitation, between mental 
health recovery and public health promotion, and between the health of the individual 
and the health of society (or, perhaps more accurately, the economy)—in illustration of 
the latter, for example, in the Department for Work and Pensions‘ Raising Expectations 
Report: ‗That is the point of welfare reform: transforming lives and healing the scars 
on our communities left by previous recessions [...] for too many of those claiming 
incapacity benefits still do not engage in back-to-work activity.  This is bad for them 
and bad for the country‘ (DWP, 2008, p. 79).   
 
Notions of therapy thus both decline and are reborn in welfare-to-work.  As seen in this 
last section, set-aside work activities are less likely today to be prescribed or even 
condoned for exclusively therapeutic intent for mental health patients, yet the idea that 
work is therapeutic nevertheless retains currency in the mainstream spaces of work and 
workfare.  Regarding the therapy of work then, whilst in some respects and according 
to some analyses it is difficult to describe therapeutic work in terms other than a 
requiem, in other ways, naturalised approaches to the therapeutic qualities of 
mainstream paid employment—in requiring no therapeutic mediator of a professional 
or practitioner—are closest of all to the proclamation of work as ‗nature‘s physician‘ 
made by Galen nearly two thousand years ago.      
 
Conclusion: The History and Future of Therapeutic Work  
 
In this chapter, a range of forms of therapeutic work and range of therapeutic 
mechanisms of work have been introduced and explored.  From asylum farms and 
hospital factories to contemporary placements in mainstream employment settings, 
these have differed in their geographies, their understandings of the causes and 
treatments of mental distress and also in the underlying attitudes they reveal about the 
human value of occupation. 
 
The purpose of the chapter has not been to promote the therapeutic value of work 
uncritically.  As demonstrated in the passing points above, it is far from the case that 
work therapies have always defended the logic of capitalist employment, with concerns 
about the qualities of work in broader society forming the backbone of many of the 
practices we have examined.  To show interest in modes of thinking about work 
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therapies thus by no means accepts any a priori benefit of work, to health or anything 
else (and with work-related-stress and related mental health issues consistently among 
the leading causes of employee absences in developed economies, this rider is of 
significant relevance).  However, it is the case that for certain viewpoints—‗anti-work‘ 
or ‗refusal of work‘ perspectives, for example—the very values of working hard and 
keeping busy that underwrite each of the work therapies I have discussed will remain 
points of contention and divergence, and such points should be held in mind when 
reflecting upon this chapter and moving forward to the next.  It has also not been the 
purpose of this chapter to accept uncritically the authority of therapy or its associated 
institutions.  Whilst stereotypes of basket-weaving are without doubt simplifications of 
the true richness and variety of therapeutic work throughout history, to ignore the very 
real stagnating and stigmatising effects that institutionalised work has at times had for 
its workers would be similarly naive—and it is worth mentioning here that a series of 
more critical voices towards therapy and its associated institutions will appear later in 
the thesis.  
 
Romanticism has been a recurring theme throughout this chapter and in reflecting on 
the more recent history of the therapy of work, it is important not to replicate such 
romanticism in our own discussions.  The ‗demise‘ of therapeutic work (if we must see 
it this way) is not reducible to narratives of government spending cuts reducing the 
quality or quantity of service-provision alone (in the way that welfare reform might 
popularly be perceived), but rather a reflection also of changing attitudes towards 
individuals who live with mental health difficulties and response to what such people 
themselves say they want from healthcare and rehabilitation (which according to the 
greater body of evidence, for the majority of individuals, includes inclusion in 
integrated employment settings).
16
  To the extent that therapeutic occupations of the 
past were in part solutions to the iatrogenic and systemic crises of long-term 
incarceration, it should also be remembered that following major deinstitutionalisation 
some forms of therapeutic occupation (e.g., the ward-based activities to stave off 
boredom) are no longer required.   
 
                                                     
16 The most frequently cited figure is that ninety per cent of current service-users want paid employment: 
see, for example, Grove (1999), Bacon and Grove (2010) or the National Mental Health Development Unit 
(2010)—although Essen‘s (2011) paper should not be ignored for its more critical appraisal of this 
evidence. 
  ~ Chapter 1 Crackpots and Basket-Cases ~ 47 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
What then, finally, can be said about the nature of therapeutic work from studying its 
historic development?  As I hinted at in the introduction, it is an easy temptation for 
histories of work-based therapies (particularly those which chronicle the development 
of the rehabilitative professions) to tend towards ‗directionalist‘ accounts of the 
changing beliefs about therapeutic work.  Certainly, in some respects, such 
perspectives are helpful: as supported by the research in this thesis, for example, in the 
period of history addressed in this chapter, practitioners of work-based therapies have 
experienced greater professionalisation and organisation.  Relatedly, as other research 
has argued, work-based therapies have steadily attracted more systematic and 
‗evidence based‘ theorisations for their conceptual foundation (Mocellin, 1996; Blair 
and Hume, 2002).  However, the greater purpose of this chapter instead has been to 
show that beyond such linear trajectories, complex ribbons of continuity and repetition 
can be observed in the challenges faced by the therapeutic professions.  Such repetition 
appears not in the specific kinds of work that have variously been considered 
therapeutic (which, as seen, have been highly contingent on wider socioeconomic 
factors), but rather through the recurring tensions or frictions that have surrounded 
their application.  In each of the episodes presented here, conceptions of therapeutic 
work have been faced with a host of recurrent tensions: between economically viable 
employment and specifically ‗therapeutic‘ occupations; between the competing 
requirements of protectionism and reality; between works undertaken by the mass 
public and the golden work of a pre-industrial age.  Not only in striking images of 
empty spinning wheels but from Tuke‘s ‗mild management‘ onwards, therapeutic work 
has bounced between notions of ‗working on the self‘ and ‗working with one‘s hands‘ 
(the therapeutic processes of introspection and exteriorisation, respectively).  Finally, 
in the myriad manifestations of a therapeutic work ethic, even the mechanisms of 
therapy have been disputed: does the patient get better through doing work or through 
the rewards of work (whether esteem or financial compensation); or as Foucault and 
Scull and other commentators have argued, is work not the mechanism of therapy, but 
rather the therapeutic goal (i.e., through rendering souls fit for the labour market)?  As 
suggested in the introduction, a key point of this argument has been that such tensions 
emerge not as epochal moments to be conquered by the latest therapeutic fashion but as 
recurring impasses which must be encountered and worked through again each time.   
 
Demonstrating the multiple modes and mechanisms of therapeutic work has been an 
important means of introducing more broadly the richness and complexity of the 
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relation between work and therapy—as well as demonstrating through argument and 
example the richness that accompanies a broad and non-essentialist understanding of 
work.  In the next chapter, this theme will be developed in an exploration not of work 
as a form of therapy, but therapy as a form of work—alongside all kinds of other 
hidden work-forms associated with being a patient and getting better.   
 
 
   49 
 
Chapter Two 
 
Imaginary Planes  
Recovery and the Work of Madness  
 
 
 
A minor incident is taking place at the Plumtree Centre: a courier has just arrived at 
main reception and is looking for someone to sign for a parcel.  Seeing me—
apparently not a user of the service—he catches my eye and asks, ‘do you work here?   
Around me, boxes are being packed by the assembly team, laundry folded in the 
maintenance unit.  Vera, one of the Centre s longest attending members, is rounding 
up people for the lottery syndicate.  Dawn, who has been working upstairs on a 
computer-based cognitive therapy programme, has come downstairs and is looking for 
someone to talk to.  In the corner, Trish, a paid support worker, and Toni, a student 
social worker on placement at the Centre, oversee the activity and idly discuss their 
plans for the evening.  Sam, a younger member who lives in an imaginary world in 
which she is a pilot in a secret air force, talks about her latest military campaign and 
the recent successes of her career.  ‘I think we all do , I say... 
 
The last chapter came to a close with the rise of an all-important discourse which 
would have profound effects on the ways in which work and mental health were 
conceived: a narrative of ‗back to work‘ in which the only work of real importance 
came to be seen as that of paid labour in competitive employment conditions.  Rather 
than in this chapter following such discourse into the mainstream workplace (a subject 
upon which much has already been written—for some evocative examples, see Kirsh, 
2000; Marwaha and Johnson, 2005; Alverson et al., 2006), instead I want to turn 
attention to a different series of work-forms and workspaces that are often overlooked 
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by ‗back to work‘: the various work-forms and pseudo-work-forms that emerge 
through being ill and getting better from illness; the ‗work‘ of engaging with mental 
health services and of being a patient; and the kinds of imaginary or delusional 
presentations of work that emerge in the lifeworlds of people living with psychotic 
disorders.
17
  
 
The first purpose of the chapter is to demonstrate that, contrary to the assumptions that 
may be drawn from back-to-work as a discourse, being ‗off sick‘ does not necessarily 
mean being ‗off work‘ and that even the lives of the longest-term service-users (some 
of whom have never engaged in the competitive labour market) can be full of activity, 
effort and burden.  The second purpose of the chapter is to bring under scrutiny the 
internal coherence of the construct of work itself—an exercise which is conducted both 
to unsettle traditional back-to-work narratives, but also to provide a baseline 
demonstration of the varied and non-essentialist understandings of work as I use the 
term in the remainder of this thesis.  Through exploring a series of examples drawn 
from the narratives of contemporary mental health service-users, the chapter explores 
how even in the apparently workless spaces of mental ill health, work remains a 
pertinent navigational construct through which service-users order and experience their 
lives.  Given the now well-established trend in critical scholarship of pushing out the 
conceptual boundaries of work to include various unpaid or socially contentious 
activities outside of formal employment (Oakley, 1974; McDowell and Massey, 1984; 
Glucksmann, 1995; Taylor, 2004; Pettinger et al., 2006; Weitzer, 2007), the chapter 
asks how the service-user activities and vocations described here relate to conventional 
work, and whether these too might also comprise suitable candidates for inclusion in 
the category.   
 
Examining the intersect between service-user work and what I shall refer to from now 
on simply as the ‗conceptualising work debate‘ supplies an interesting focal point for 
this second chapter for several reasons.  As has been argued by others, the work and 
activity of people with mental health problems have long been ignored or pathologised, 
or else reduced unthinkingly to the stereotypes of basket-weaving as described in 
chapter one (Foucault, 1967; Porter, 1987; Boyle and Harris, 2009).  Where the activity 
of mental health service-users does appear in the public eye, this is too often for 
                                                     
17 A version of this chapter is scheduled to appear in Sociological Review (Laws, J. Forthcoming. 
‗Recovery Work‘ and ‗Magic‘ among Long-Term Mental Health Service-Users) and has been presented to 
the Work, Employment & Society Conference 2010, Brighton, September 2010. 
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random acts of violence rather than for the many positive contributions of mad people 
to society (Harper, 2005).  Yet, more often, service-users are portrayed simply as 
passive and idle recipients of what other people do to them.  Exploring mad work and 
its similarities to more conventional forms of employment thus provides an example of 
an interesting and atypical point at which the constructs of work and madness meet.  
Moreover, as I will argue in greater depth shortly, describing mad work and adding it 
to mainstream discussions about the concept of work is also an ethical endeavour, 
joining others already working to challenge ignorance about mad work and mad 
workers (van Dongen, 2002; Grove et al., 2005; Parr, 2008).  
 
However, as a second justification, attending to how service-users and the institutions 
of psychiatry position particular aspects of illness and recovery into vocabularies of 
work also provides a means of demonstrating the power and breadth of work as an 
organising principle in social life—even in places which seem, as suggested above, far 
from the traditional workplace.  With this in mind, two complementary analytic 
strategies are adopted with regard to the empirical material presented in the chapter.  In 
the first, which is primarily a mode of description, various forms of mad activity are 
described and comparisons made with instances of paid employment in late capitalism 
(and it is important here to work at the level of the particular since a non-essentialist 
reading of work will always demand that evidence arises from the local and 
contextual).  It should be noted that this strategy does not necessarily seek to redefine 
these peripheral service-user activities within a greater category of work (as if making 
some ontological discovery); rather, the task is simply to disrupt the extent to which 
‗mad‘ and service-user forms of work are irresolvably different to more conventional 
occupations.  In the second strategy, attention is paid more specifically to the rhetorics 
of work and the ways in which the linguistic choices of social actors position particular 
activities and identities within or outside of work-related discourse.  Drawing on the 
work of authors such as Jenness (1990) and Cockburn (2011) who have used similar 
strategies to examine other marginal work activities such as prostitution and street 
newspaper vending, such an approach places particular attention on the emic properties 
of participants‘ narratives.  Alongside these emic and descriptive approaches, 
throughout the chapter new vocabularies of work are sought to re-describe the 
boundary between mad and sane forms of occupation.  In the first of my three case 
studies, the anthropological term ‗magic‘ is introduced to encapsulate what is 
simultaneously fantastical yet productive about certain appearances of work in 
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delusions.  Later in the chapter, hybrid terms such as ‗service-user professionalism‘ 
and ‗service-user production‘ extend this vocabulary to denote how an understanding 
of ‗mad‘ work must also encompass and exemplify more conventional notions of work 
and career.   
 
In the remainder of this chapter, the structure will be thus:  first, drawing on material 
from my primary research, three divergent and challenging forms of service-user work 
that emerged in the lives of my participants will be discussed: the magical work that 
appears in delusions and obsessions; the recovery work involved in being a service-
user; and the collective and semi-public forms of service-user enterprise that unfold in 
the contexts of niche barter economies in mental health facilities and the emerging 
field of service-user led healthcare delivery.  As with the ‗passing points‘ described in 
the first chapter, such groupings are partial and creative and do not seek to provide a 
comprehensive account but rather an examination of the breadth and complexity of the 
work of madness and getting better.  Finally, a careful analysis is undertaken of the 
qualities of these work-like pursuits and their relation to an ever-widening construct of 
what it means to be working.  Conclusions point to the ethics of recognising psychic 
and invisible forms of work, as well as to the conceptual difficulties in dissociating so-
called ‗mad‘ forms of work from other, supposedly saner occupations.   
 
The Appearance of Work in Mental Health Narratives  
 
Magical Work  
 
I am a pilot, I am going to join the Forces, I am a pilot, I am a pilot, yes!  A war, it is a 
secret, a secret test pilot.  You won‘t see the engine because I am travelling too fast.  
(Sam, participant in the sheltered work project) 
 
A first and most vivid manifestation of the kinds of mad work that I want to discuss in 
this chapter is the appearance of unusual and imaginary work experiences in the 
alternative worlds of psychosis and obsession.  Whilst psychotics (i.e., those who are 
deemed to have lost touch with reality) are generally considered the hardest to help in 
conventional occupational therapy programmes, conversely, the so-called clinical 
presentations of psychosis—the manifest content of delusional beliefs and 
obsessions—are often about work.  According to epidemiological research, amongst 
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the commonest themes in delusions are ‗being on a mission‘, ‗following a calling‘, 
‗having especial abilities‘, ‗accomplishing extraordinary achievements‘, and ‗being a 
self-made man‘ (Leff et al., 1976; Junginger et al., 1992; Kim et al., 2001; Bentall, 
2003)—themes which, whilst rarely labelled explicitly as work-related in the clinical 
literature, can nevertheless be encapsulated by their shared centeredness on work. 
 
Some of the participants involved in my research have believed themselves to have 
some unusual work to do.  To take some examples: Sam, a participant at the Plumtree 
Project on ‗day release‘ from a local in-patient hospital, is flying a secret new fighter-
jet in the Royal Air Force.  Her duty is to protect the nation.  The mission is 
undercover, but we in the workshop are allowed to hear about it.  In my first encounter 
with Sam at the day programme, she bursts into an in-progress focus group on mental 
health and employment with participants whom the staff had selected for me to speak 
with.  ‗I have a very important job‘, she says and pulls up a chair before proceeding to 
tell us about it.
18
  Martin, a successful and well-liked businessman, must hunt for nylon 
shirts.  Following a period of acute illness when he became worried he might be 
supernatural, wearing the manmade fibres now assures him he is a ‗real‘ human and 
the shirts form an essential part of his daily attire.  Given their increasing scarcity, the 
hunt for new shirts takes him on a national tour of charity shops and has also led to the 
start-up of an internet-based retro fashions outlet which he manages in his spare time.  
The work is enjoyable but not without its anxieties, both because of the time it costs 
him from his business, and the fear that the supply might run dry.  Vera, one of 
Plumtree‘s most loyal members, resists any active part in the ‗therapeutic activities‘ 
programme, except to organise the lottery syndicate.  The day is punctuated by her 
shuffles around the tables, asking ‗Got your 50p?‘ long after all likely participants have 
contributed or bowed out (and sometimes when there is no lottery draw to enter).  
People rarely attempt to dissuade Vera or disturb her in her work: to ask Vera for an 
interview, or to invite her for lunch or to play bingo, results in only an angry shaking of 
the tin—‗I got to do the syndicate, ain‘t I?‘.  David, a man re-entering employment 
after several months of hospitalisation, must ‗check‘ (lightly tap with his knuckles) the 
walls of his surroundings at frequencies instructed by internal voices.  The work has 
sinister responsibilities: completing the rituals prevents ‗bad‘ things from happening 
(the apocalypse included); as an apparent residue from his previous job at the bus 
                                                     
18 The process of arranging this focus group, beyond the ‗data‘ extracted from it, offered a telling insight 
into the understandings staff held about work, and about which service-users staff considered able to work, 
and to talk sensibly about their work.  It is interesting that the staff had not selected any of the participants 
who appear in this section of the chapter to take part in the discussion. 
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depot, David tells me that the routine checks are also essential for the punctual 
operation of the public transport system.   
 
As has been noted by others (Parr, 1999; van Dongen, 2002; van Dongen, 2004), in 
academic psychiatry and clinical case notes, the manifest contents of delusions and 
delusional work often appear ‗deadened‘: discarded entirely as scraps of 
symptomology or else salvaged for case histories or psychoanalysis (in van Dongen‘s 
research [2002], the patient she calls Rosemary sets out her room on the ward as an 
office and types her magical stories on a typewriter as if to reconcile this difference 
between the vivacity of mad worlds and the formal world of recordkeeping).  Yet, in 
the lived spaces of mental health care, delusional work refuses to remain in an 
underworld of the unconscious and prevails instead alongside more apparently real 
forms of occupation—bursting into conversations as Sam does to my research group 
and inscribing itself upon the bodies and minds of those who perform its duties.
19
   
 
For the purposes of this chapter, how should we interpret these delusional forms of 
work?  According to classic psychoanalytic understandings of delusions, the fantastical 
forms of work in psychosis and phantasy are little more than childlike rejections of an 
adult work ethic: regressions to an earlier and more preferable state of infancy in which 
the developing self experiences an ‗omnipotence‘ of thought in which wishes are 
automatically gratified—as they almost are for the newborn (Weil, 1959).  The florid 
contents of delusions, with their frequent renditions of heroism and triumph, are thus 
but elaborate ego defences to protect the psychotic individual from the more 
painstaking work of the ‗real‘ workaday world.  (And such views were certainly 
expedient in maintaining the mid-twentieth century image of the psychiatric patient as 
indolent and petulant: in the article cited above, for example, Weil compares the 
                                                     
19 It is also the case that these delusional work forms take place in multiple temporal and spatial registers.  
The spatiality of Sam‘s delusions—at least from an outsider‘s perspective—was limited strictly to the 
internal space of the imagination; indeed one of the impossibilities of Sam‘s delusions was that they defied 
the spatial and temporal truth-telling practices of narrative.  On addressing Sam, for example, who has 
been sitting in the same room as me all morning, a typical response might be, ‗been out flying all day, just 
got back, busy day‘ whereupon no effort is made to account for the absence of spatial and temporal 
opportunity for Sam to have undertaken the mission she has just described.  By contrast however, for 
Clive, another participant at Plumtree who worked in the kitchen team and who underwent a brief period 
of considering himself to be a master-chef as well as the catering manager of the Project, delusions took 
place (that is, occurred in and about the kitchen and involved the preparation of real food and giving 
genuine orders to co-workers at the Project who, in this particular delusion, acquired the roles of sous-
chefs and kitchen assistants).  Resnik (2001) talks about the possible psychoanalytic interpretations of 
delusional experiences as located (either or both) in intra-body space and inter-body space, only the latter 
of which involves mobility or ‗acting out‘ of the delusion.  We might also add to this discussion the 
implication for praxis of such spatial variances in the experience and enactment of delusional work. 
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‗work-blocked‘ psychiatric patient to the weaning baby, reluctant to undertake adult 
work due to its likeness with the first work experienced by the maturing ego—the 
additional and unwelcome effort of chewing solid food rather than suckling from the 
breast.) 
 
However, more contemporary evidence from cognitive neuroscience and social 
epidemiology gives reason to be cautious of such hurried dismissals of the work of 
delusions and obsessions.  First, an increasing body of psychopathological research 
suggests that, clinically speaking, delusional beliefs and sensory hallucinations share 
far more in common with ordinary cognitive processes than formerly imagined 
(Roberts, 1991; Freeman and Garety, 2004; Bell et al., 2006).  Drawing on data which 
examines the cognitive and emotional differences between psychotic and non-
psychotic belief systems, such studies suggest that the basis of delusional thinking may 
be less a psycho-emotional withdrawal from reality, and more a faulty attempt at 
engaging with reality.  In a second band of research, cross-cultural and historical 
studies suggest that the type of work prevalent in psychosis is shaped by the kind of 
occupation respected by society at that time—an unexpected finding if we believe that 
the mad are in some profound way out of touch with work.  In Burnham‘s historical 
analysis of case records in a mental hospital in Tasmania (1830–1940), for example, 
patients built railroads and farmed potatoes in their delusions—forms of labour much-
needed in the industrialising colony (Burnham, 1980).  In another study, Kim et al. 
(2001) demonstrate how the presentation of schizophrenia in contemporary Taipei, 
Seoul and Shanghai varies with broader cultural anxieties surrounding capital and 
livelihood.  In Shanghai, delusions on the themes of business were most frequently 
associated with grandiose beliefs such as being a millionaire—apparently consistent 
with a broader Chinese obsession with money in the recently opened market.  In 
Taiwan and South Korea, however, delusions about being robbed, cheated or swindled 
in business were more common, reflecting national anxieties about the instability of 
free capitalism among the Asian Tigers.  In my own research, the stories of Sam and 
the others support this thesis.  In a society where the armed forces are celebrated as 
heroes amidst unseen enemies and where the fighter pilot is the archetypal hero of all 
(a legacy from the Second World War), the work of an imaginary fighter pilot has a 
good level of cultural legibility.  Likewise, in an economic environment in which 
errors and inefficiencies can indeed have ‗apocalyptic‘ effects for businesses and their 
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employees, David‘s anxieties about performance and punctuality also resonate with 
wider socioeconomic concerns.
20
   
 
Beyond occupational ‗choice‘ (that is, the types of work that appear in delusions), the 
strategic play of work as an organising discourse in the delusions of the individuals I 
mention here similarly works with rather than against dominant work ethics.  Sam‘s 
entree to the focus group, ‗I have a very important job‘ makes in no uncertain terms a 
claim to occupational status—moreover, it is interesting that the rest of us accept her 
apologies for being late and shuffle round our chairs to make space for her on account 
of the extraordinary assignments she proceeds to recount.
21
  For David, ‗I m just doing 
my job‘ and ‗I m just doing what I m told‘ instead provides a means of demonstrating 
to others his awareness of the strangeness of his tapping routines whilst simultaneously 
not desisting with them—a condition of separateness-from-the-task that is an almost 
inevitable structural element of working for someone else.  For Vera, the strategic use 
of work is more subversive.  Participating in the work-ordered-day programme is a 
condition of attendance at Plumtree, and Vera is expected to demonstrate some kind of 
activity for which she is responsible.  The quasi-imaginary (or delusional extension of) 
organising the syndicate thus simultaneously says, ‗I am a needed and valued member 
of this community‘ and, ‗I am unavailable for any other work you have in mind for me 
because I am already busy‘.  Indeed, two of the commonest reasons for Vera, who 
rarely holds extended dialogue with others, to instigate conversation about the lottery is 
i. to remind staff that this is her job and that it is not to be allocated to anybody else, 
and ii. to protest that she cannot possibly undertake other duties at the Centre because 
she is already fully occupied (I am reminded here of a colleague at my own institution 
who confesses to ‗snaffling‘ particular administrative roles before others can volunteer 
in order to avoid being given more arduous tasks later).   
 
                                                     
20 Indeed, David‘s example takes us to the possibility of occupational legibility also, since for several 
decades bus driving has been highlighted by labour organisations as among the most stressful of 
occupations; partially—as David‘s delusions seem to articulate—due to the toxic combination of high 
demands and low control in the work environment (Tse et al., 2006). 
21 Sam‘s strategic use of work can be hurtful on occasion.  Sometimes she will assume the role of 
supervisor and will walk around the work units throwing out comments like, ‗you‘re not very good at that, 
are you?‘ to other members who are getting on with their work, or she will pull the plug on a computer 
where someone is practising his or her typing skills, saying, ‗you‘re too fucking slow!‘  On a pleasant 
summer day when I am walking with Kerry, another participant who is considering returning to University 
after a several year illness break, Sam comes and tells us that universities are stupid and that she already 
has a degree and that it was easy and boring which is why she found something more important to do with 
her time, and (for good measure) that my companion and I are both stupid and boring too.  It is testimony 
to the power of work as a discourse as well as her expertise in applying it that it was not only the other 
participant who was upset after this outburst. 
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Following the work of the anthropologist van Dongen (and, before her, Lévi-Strauss), 
an interesting way to think of such psychical vocations is as a kind of ‗magical‘ work: 
a work which is formally imaginary and yet in which, through the mimetic 
rearrangement of cultural symbols and myths, new ideas and identities are conjured 
into being (Lévi-Strauss, 1963; van Dongen, 2002; van Dongen, 2003).  In contrast to 
other terms such as ‗imaginary work‘ or ‗delusional work‘, magic captures the creative 
duplicity of the work of psychosis: a complex interaction between, on the one hand, 
work as it appears in the narrative of the delusion (the fighter pilot, the inventor, etc.) 
and, on the other, the cultural work of narrative production itself.  Through becoming a 
fighter pilot or living out the tapping rituals that will save the world, individuals 
working with the magical powers of psychosis thus find ways of speaking back to 
hegemony: either (as Sam does) to wrench open a discursive space in which she can 
enter cultural practices from which she is more ordinarily excluded, or (as can be seen 
better with Vera and David) to provide magical ways of escaping important discourses 
about, for example, the importance of work or the power of psychiatry.  For the chronic 
patients described in van Dongen‘s research, magical stories were most often a means 
of counteracting the similarly magical rituals of therapy and psychiatric medicine 
around which many of their lives in the hospital revolved.  Yet in the more 
community-based environment of Plumtree, another prevalent discourse to which 
delusions spoke might also be seen to be that of back-to-work itself: variously (to 
extrapolate imaginatively from the stories I have here described)—‗I am already 
working‘; ‗my work is important‘; ‗my mad work demonstrates that work is also 
relevant to me‘; ‗I am too special for regular occupations‘.  
 
Magical work is not always successful work and Sam and the others do not always 
reap the rewards for their psychic endeavours in the imaginary realm (a point which 
van Dongen makes in her own ethnography).  Yet, as van Dongen puts it:  
 
[Mad] people fight against ambiguity and disappointment of the promises of cultural 
myths and values, knowing that their fight is in vain.  They are unique individuals who 
live in their own created world, but they are united by their capacity to ‗use‘ cultural 
repertoires and models.  They are helped by the ambiguity of these repertoires and 
models, just like we are.  The creativity here is not meant as the power to ‗invent‘ 
something new, but as the vitality to re-invent and reconfigure elements of existing 
cultural models and myths.  It becomes possible to be Christ and Hitler 
simultaneously, or Eve and Abraham‘s son.  This need not be understood, as many 
58  ‗Working Through‘: An Inquiry into Work and Madness  
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
studies of life stories suggest, as a search for identity.  Instead these instances tell 
about the world of culture.  They are also part of a search for a place within a culture 
where ‗the rhetoric of suffering‘ has little meaning (and is described as ‗a complaint‘, 
‗word salad‘, ‗disorderly discourse‘ and the like).  They comprise and attempt to 
regain a place in the social order.  They are forms of magic to control what lies beyond 
control, to understand what is beyond understanding. (van Dongen, 2002, pp. 8–9) 
 
For van Dongen and myself, ‗magic‘ thus offers some possibility of gaining purchase 
upon the work that appears in delusions, by showing what is creative and productive in 
psychosis, as well as is what is incalcitrant and perverse.  Magic transforms people 
from ‗patients‘ into ‗pilots‘ and provides the means for even the most occupationally 
deprived to find (the apparition of) job satisfaction and social status that individuals in 
quality paid employment might take for granted.  Through stressing a surplus rather 
than absence of meaning in the work of psychotic people (the cultural legibility thesis), 
‗magic‘ articulates how the traditionally private qualities of madness extend into public 
realms also.  It also shows how mad work exercises power over an ordinary workaday 
world yet, unlike some more conventional forms of paid employment, simultaneously 
resists being reduced to its laws and regulations.   
 
As shown by its strategic appearance in delusions, magical work, like other forms of 
work, has the power to manipulate events and the feelings and actions of others.  
Whilst staff and other members at Plumtree might try to dissuade psychotic individuals 
from living out their mad vocations, at the level of linguistic practice magical work 
exists alongside the more mundane activities of packing and cooking.  However, 
despite the ways in which imaginary planes and saviours of the world exist in ordinary 
as well as imaginary spheres, simultaneously, individuals such as Sam and David 
always appear strange and awkward in their work.  Some prosaic manners of 
responding to the problems caused by living with magic will be addressed in the final 
chapter.  
 
Recovery Work  
 
I was just trying to put myself back together, really.  That‘s what my energies were 
going into.  And what was happening here [in the therapeutic activities programme] 
was helping that, but getting better was a work and an end in itself. (Kev, participant at 
Walter House)    
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If work reveals itself in madness, the combined effort of living with and recovering 
from mental distress can bring its own work also.  Therapy has long been understood 
(by its practitioners and its clients) as a kind of psychic recovery work (Riesman, 1950; 
Kanzer and Blum, 1967; Bartlett, 1973).  For Freud, the process of ‗working through‘ 
(or, the therapeutic process of repetition) was a central mechanism through which 
psychotherapy sought to replace maladaptive unconscious drives with conscious 
understanding (Freud, 1914).  According to the theory, clients‘ difficulties had to be 
faced in a number of different contexts both with and without the therapist‘s support 
before change could be said to be authentic.  In ‗working through‘, a double work 
emerged: patients both worked through the repetitions (up to a point at which learning 
was complete), yet they also worked through the repetitions: i.e., the repetitions and 
their constant reinterpretation were acts of work themselves.  Placing the therapeutic 
relationship within a material and social context of work—time-keeping, note-taking, 
the exchange of fees, etc.—was thus an important means of setting the tone for the 
psychic work ahead; the later psychoanalytic term ‗working alliance‘ to describe the 
conscious and unconscious co-operation between therapist and client captures this well 
(Jacobs, 2004).   
 
In more action-oriented therapies such as cognitive behavioural therapy (the current 
‗gold standard‘ in the treatment of depression), recovery is also described as an act of 
work.  Indeed, the extensive use of individual homework tasks such as mindfulness 
training or ‗thought logging‘ (a widely-used technique of recording and cataloguing 
moments of maladaptive thinking) is considered by many to be the driving mechanism 
of CBT as a therapeutic intervention (Addis and Jacobson, 2000).
22
  As with analytic, 
and also the humanist traditions, such working formulas both describe the therapeutic 
process as understood by its founders and practitioners, but also the means through 
which therapy is understood to work.  Geary (2002, p. 20), for example, writes that in 
comparison to the passive solution of taking medication, therapy is active, and that the 
                                                     
22 Rather than existing as standalone units of work, such therapeutic tasks also interact with the delusional 
forms of work described above.  David, for example, describes how the magical work of preventing the 
apocalypse is interrupted by the therapeutic commitment of chronicling his compulsions in one of the 
above mentioned ‗thought diaries‘.  In his words: ‗Well, it takes a lot out of your day, like.  You do your 
thing [i.e., act out your compulsion], so I check the walls and everything.  And then I have to go and write 
it down in this diary what the [occupational therapist] has given me to record that I‘ve had an episode 
[laughter].  By the time I‘ve done that and written it all down; and you have to put what you thought, what 
you did, and my writing‘s not that good anyway—well, after that, sometimes it‘s time to do another check! 
[More laughter]‘. 
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‘experience of actively engaging in something‘ is significantly more efficacious than 
medication, which risks reinforcing dependence and a feeling of being a victim. 
 
However, it would be a mistake to suggest that these types of work taking place within 
the spaces of formal therapy are the only work undertaken in recovery.  As Kev 
describes above, ‗getting your head round things‘ is a significant form of work in itself, 
whether it is done in the therapy room or elsewhere; and whilst such work might not 
generate effects which are visible to the outside world, it nonetheless has the capacity 
to be time-consuming and challenging.  In addition to this ‗thinking work‘ of getting 
better, Gwyneth—another participant in my research to whom we will return in chapter 
four—explains how, in the depths of a depression, ordinary activities also acquire 
especial properties: moving a pile of books can take days, getting dressed can take 
hours and turning on a light switch can feel like a metaphysical struggle against gods.
23
  
A language of work demonstrates what has become so difficult about these tasks 
(compare also Tom‘s statements about being in the company of others in his first 
weeks at Plumtree: ‗sometimes it‘s hard work just being here‘).  Yet the use of such 
vocabulary also seeks to disrupt traditional understandings between work and leisure 
and work and rest.  In another ‗hard work‘ quotation in which Shirley is discussing the 
difficulties of enjoying relaxation activities during the worst of her depression:   
 
It was hard work having the TV on or having a visitor.  I would get Trevor [husband] 
to tell callers, ‗she‘s sleeping‘, because I would find it too tiring to have a 
conversation.  [...] They [self-help books] tell you to do something relaxing you enjoy 
but that‘s the problem—you don‘t want to do anything, you don‘t enjoy anything.  You 
just want your head under the pillow.  (Shirley, housewife)  
 
Finally, as others have argued, becoming ill and negotiating a new status of 
‗psychiatric patient‘ also generates all kinds of additional cultural ‗face-work‘ and 
‗identity work‘ in adjusting to a new social self (Goffman, 1961; Aneshensel, 1999).  
Goffman‘s ‗moral career‘ of the mental patient primarily used the notion of career to 
describe the predictability of the social stages through which a psychiatric patient 
                                                     
23 Gwyneth describes more instances like this in her autobiographical self-help book, Sunbathing in the 
Rain.  In the book, Gwyneth describes getting better in terms of the work of a detective: ‗Every serious 
episode of depression is a murder mystery.  Your old self is gone and in its place is a ghost that is unable 
to feel any pleasure in food, conversation or in any of your usual forms of entertainment.  You become a 
body bag.  Your job is to find out which part of you has died and why it had to be killed (Lewis, 2002, p. 
xiii). 
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passed in the course of his or her illness (a thesis from which Goffman drew heavily on 
earlier criminology studies of the ‗professional thief‘, etc.).  Yet, as more recent users 
of the concept have shown, such careers also have much in common with more 
ordinary careers in the paid workplace, necessitating similar points of planning and 
decision making as well as frequent psychological and cultural upheavals (Karp, 1996; 
Aneshensel, 1999).   
 
If the above examples all describe predominantly intra-psychic labours, becoming a 
psychiatric patient and engaging with mental health services bring with them more 
down-to-earth forms of work too.  Using Star and Strauss‘s concept of ‗background 
work‘ (a type of invisible work in which the workers themselves appear visible, yet the 
work they perform goes unnoticed), Unruh and Pratt (2008) provide a revealing 
account of the multiple forms of behind-the-scenes work undertaken by patients in an 
outpatient cancer unit, such as travelling between care sites, finding information, 
managing medication side-effects and communicating with professionals.  In the in-
between workplaces of my own research, similar activities took place—and, as the 
narratives of several of my participants revealed, for users in non-traditional day 
services such as Plumtree, such work (especially with regard to finding the right kind 
of support or therapy) had often been particularly problematic, with numerous false 
starts or unsatisfactory experiences in statutory services or rehabilitative options 
elsewhere.  It is important to recognise also the cumulative effect of such service-user 
forms of work, since in the work-based programmes at Plumtree or at the sheltered 
workshop such background activities of being a patient/ client/ service-user had to be 
completed before and around the ‗real‘ (ordinary) work of gardening, catering and 
packing.   
 
Again, an interesting route through which to analyse the work of being a service-user is 
to focus on the languages which mental health day services and back-to-work services 
use.  Just as psychotherapy adopts an explicitly work-related vocabulary to describe its 
processes, in the daycentres, service-users sign care contracts, attend case conferences 
and annual reviews and, for older members approaching transfer to specialist geriatric 
facilities, often speak of ‗retiring‘ (from what, if their activities at the day services were 
not in some compelling sense work?).  Indeed, the generic shift in service provision 
from the term ‗patient‘ to ‗service-user‘ or ‗client‘ is redolent of this heavily work-
infused discourse.  A recurring theme in this work-driven vocabulary is the reference to 
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users managing themselves.  Discourses of patient self-management are undoubtedly 
modish in current UK health policy (see, for example, the publicly funded ‗Condition 
Management Programmes‘ for patients with long-term health complaints), but it is 
notable that, again, service-users also speak explicitly and extensively of the 
managerial duties undertaken as a result of living with mental distress.  This is 
encapsulated most clearly in an interview extract with Martin, the businessman who we 
met in the previous section:  
 
Martin: I can sometimes actually feel the electrodes of my mind fizzing away, and 
that‘s when I might decide to pop an extra haloperidol [anti-psychotic drug] or just 
chill out for a bit or go for a walk, but generally just lying down horizontal is the best 
way—so it‘s really about managing it.   
Myself:  Hmm.  I‘ve noticed you‘ve said that word ‗managing‘ several times today? 
Martin: Yes I have said it several times because I manage the illness in the same way 
that I manage other things like I manage staff and manage finance and manage cash-
flow or whatever it might be.  It‘s just another aspect of my life that I need to take 
control of, because when you do lose control, that‘s when you end up in hospital.   
 
In the instance of patient self-management, the material vocabularies of recovery are 
similarly work-related: one participant, under the advice of his occupational therapist, 
used a ‗Blackberry‘ (smart-phone and digital organiser) to coordinate his busy 
schedule of medical appointments, medications and rehabilitation activities, whilst at 
the training and enterprise centre a six-week course in ‗self-care and healthy living‘ 
gained accreditation with a local further education college during the period of my 
research.  In the training centre, another important nexus of recovery work was found 
in the computer room.  On the computers, users worked through CBT software 
packages, researched their psychiatric conditions or accessed peer-support on the 
internet, or else updated computerised forms of the thought-logging technique 
described above using purpose-made interactive spreadsheets.  Again, this ‗mad‘ work 
(i.e., work produced as a result of being mad) interconnects frequently with everyday 
work and concerns about employability, with more than one service-user commenting 
that the computer skills gained from learning to use the thought-logging software had 
been more useful than the more formal IT training provided by an external ‗skills for 
work‘ tutor.   
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As a final comment on recovery work, it should be noted that the examples offered in 
this subsection stop strictly at the descriptive level.  Just as conventional paid work can 
in different contexts be both psychologically rewarding and psychologically damaging, 
to observe that self-care and recovery is work-like provides little clue to its human 
consequences (and it is noted, following Foucault, that we might think of this project 
of putting-oneself-together and keeping-oneself-together in other terms also: as an art 
of living (te hnē tou biou) or an ethic of care toward the soul [Foucault, 1988]).  For 
Freud (a romantic in this respect), the kind of work imagined in ‗working through‘ was 
itself a therapeutic work: not the drudgery or danger of the factory, but a noble and 
uncomplaining lifework (Kirschner, 1996).  Such similarly romantic notions of self-
work as therapeutic-work were noted by some of my participants too.  In an example 
which is reminiscent of the nature therapy in the previous chapter, for Ryan, an ex-
soldier recovering from post-traumatic stress disorder and alcoholism, the work of 
digging out thorny bushes and replacing them with softer flowering plants seemed an 
appropriate metaphor for the mental cultivation that had been taking place in his head.  
For Pete, another recovering alcoholic, accepting this romantic-moralistic authority of 
work (i.e., that there was work to do) was an important part of his emotional and moral 
recovery.  Indeed, for Pete, who was a construction worker by trade and who described 
himself elsewhere as a ‗grafter‘, the very idea of recovery as a form of work offered 
comfort.  In talking about his maintenance of a counselling relationship and 
commitment to an alcoholics‘ support group, for example: ‗once I worked out what I 
had to do, I had to grit my teeth and stick with it.  And that‘s something I know how to 
do‘.  (We shall come back to Pete in chapter six, where I take up again the concept of 
magic as an analytical tool in recovery narratives.)
24
   
 
Yet such affirmative accounts of the work-like qualities of recovery are not the only 
experience available.  It is worth comparing Martin‘s comments above on self-
management to Karen‘s experience of dealing with the obsessive thoughts that disturb 
her in her work at the dental practice: 
 
Just think how much other people must be able to do!  I have all these little people in 
my head and they are all wanting different things, telling me things.  It takes me half 
my time to manage these, sort out who wants what of my attention… it is exhausting.  
                                                     
24 Again, this example provides an illustration of the versatility of the work metaphor: compare the 
intellectual and managerial skills described by Martin (a manager in real life) to the grafting and teeth-
gritting of Pete. 
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And that‘s before I see to the patients.  Other people must have so much time on their 
hands without having this to deal with, I can‘t imagine how much easier their jobs 
would be.  (Karen, dental nurse) 
 
Unlike Martin, for whom thinking of his self-care activities as management provided a 
greater sense of control over his unusual mental experiences, for Karen, management 
was thus perceived simply as an extra workload—and an unfair and unwelcome one 
also.  Just as the status of paid work differed between these two respondents in ‗real‘ 
life (with Martin a business owner and Karen a comparatively low-paid employee), 
intra-psychic work thus also differed in the ways that it tessellated with their broader 
experience of illness and recovery.
25
   
 
As a last problematic to interpreting the significance of work as an organising concept 
in recovery, it should be noted also that there is a politics to self-work and self-
management.  Just as it is in the real workplace, a fine line exists between the 
experience of self-management described by Martin and the less desirable micro-
management of workers described by many critical scholars as endemic to a neoliberal 
governmentality.  Furthermore, for the critical scholar, a recursive interaction must be 
addressed between the redemptive experiences of self-work as narrated by Pete and 
Ryan, and the framing elsewhere of such redemptive practices as technologies of the 
self done by the subject unto the subject on behalf of the various institutions of the 
state and psy professions (I refer particularly to the ideas of Foucault and Nikolas Rose 
in this regard).  For Rose, acceptance of the need to work on the self is one of the 
primary moral codifications of the psychotherapeutic state.  The idea of recursion 
between these accounts is significant since, as Rose puts it, such technologies act not 
as confrontational encounters between the state and the individual, but as ‗relays, 
bringing the varied ambitions of political, scientific, philanthropic and professional 
authorities into alignment with the ideals and aspirations of individuals, with the selves 
each of us want to be‘ (Rose, 1989, p. 217). 
                                                     
25 It is possible to see a gendered dimension in Martin and Karen‘s differing orientations also.  In a more 
upbeat discussion about her coping strategies, Karen on another day explains: ‗no-one‘s ever taught me 
how to deal with the little people.  I don‘t know, maybe I should be able to shut them up or something.  
But if you listen to them they feel like crying little children—really very anxious and worried—so if you 
sort of, mentally like, pick them up and you give them a little cuddle and you tell them, ―look, really, it‘s 
going to be okay, it‘s okay…‖‘, where the traditionally masculine (and work-ordered) concept of 
management is replaced by something more maternal and tactile, imbued with the qualities of 
responsiveness and listening.  Having made such comments, however, it is important to acknowledge that 
good management will also be permeated with qualities such as responsiveness and listening, and so again 
the issue to which we return is the vision of work or management that is imagined. 
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Recognising what is work-like about being a mental health service-user is thus an 
effective response to the assertion that the ‗mad‘ are ‗not working‘.  However, 
extending this re-description to account for the value of such ‗work‘ is more limited in 
application: just as other forms of work are varied and contested, the slipperiness of the 
concept in the outside world becomes reproduced in the intra-psychic spaces of 
madness also.   
 
Mad Markets and Service-user Production  
 
As a final (and briefer) discussion, a third presentation of work which is important to 
highlight is that of service-user markets, or to put it differently, the potential for mad 
work to transcend the level of the individual and form economies of trade and service-
provision within the niche subcultures of psychiatric survivorship.  In contrast to the 
above examples, in this instance it is less the functions of work (selling, providing, 
delivering) that are divorced from supposedly saner forms of work, than the self-
sufficiency of ‗mad‘ markets within the mental health community that is worthy of 
note.   
 
A first, provocative example of this is a consideration of the various ‗black‘ or 
underground economies present to varying extents at each of the day projects I 
visited—engaged in by a minority, but known about by most.  In these semi-
institutionalised spaces, exaggerated by the limited freedoms of some participants to 
access their own money or leave the grounds unattended, complex networks of trade 
were described by participants for the introduction and circulation of specifically mad 
commodities within the daycentres (and then frequently back into hospital wards).  
Such commodities, often condemned by conventional psychiatry but an essential part 
of day-to-day life for some service-users, included laxatives and weight-loss drugs for 
anorexics and bulimics and razor blades for self-harmers, as well as benzodiazepine 
sedatives (a frequent ‗drug of choice‘ for psychiatric patients following dependencies 
developed during prescribed use on the wards), and could be exchanged as part of a 
barter economy for favours or other goods, or on occasion sold for cash.
26
  Beyond 
                                                     
26 Like other research on ‗black‘ markets and illegal activities (e.g., Adler, 2004; Wiles et al., 2006), in 
terms of research methods, many references to the practices I describe here were made in informal rather 
than formal research settings (ethnography rather than recorded interview), were reported in the third 
person, as hearsay or gossip, or in the past (confessional) tense (‗something I used to do was...‘).  
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simple trading, descriptions by those taking part revealed such exchange circuits to 
have complex rules of governance: ‗benzos‘ could be traded with other patients for 
other pills (‗pill swapping‘) without evoking especial (expressed) ethical concerns; 
exchanging sedatives for cash by contrast, or with a trading partner who was not 
perceived to be acquiring or selling the medications for their personal usage, was more 
likely to be equated with other forms of illicit drug dealing and was appraised 
negatively.  Laxative trade was described only in the context of a specialist eating 
disorder unit where two of my participants had been treated, where the practice was 
described by both women as common.  In such trade networks, at different times 
various patients would come into possession of laxative drugs (which, beyond the 
hospital are readily available without prescription), which they then might choose to 
‗share‘ with other patients.  Such sharing differed qualitatively from the sharing of 
other personal goods such as make-up however, in that it was i. not restricted to 
immediate friendship circles, and ii. formed an unspoken but mutually understood 
contract of reciprocity, which separated it from other practices of gift-giving.  
Potentials in the service-user communities for the sourcing of more idiosyncratic needs 
also existed: patients at the Walter House often discussed ‗Betty‘, an obsessive 
collector of hats and postcards, who spent most of her time in high security care.  
Whilst Betty‘s family had long given up on her insatiable need for new objects, a ready 
crew of ex-ward mates appeared endlessly able to deliver the goods at visiting time in 
return for cigarettes (and, of course, the cost of the item repaid): as above, a work-
based vocabulary prevailed; ‗I‘m on a job for Betty‘ was common shorthand for such 
excursions.  In the provision and exchange of either hats or drugs/razors, functions (for 
suppliers) seemed to incorporate both elements of (material) profiteering and altruistic 
‗helping out a friend‘, and the search for esteem within an insider-community.   
 
Perhaps what is most striking about these local mad markets for a social study of work 
is the simultaneous senses of exoticism and mundanity they evoke.  On the one hand, 
                                                                                                                                             
Exceptions to this were recorded interviews with Emily and Bella who discussed at length practices at the 
Eating Disorders Unit, and Tom, a participant at Plumtree who for several months stopped attending the 
project because of practices in the Centre of selling drugs, contraband cigarettes and video games—
activities which he saw as ‗bringing the centre down‘ and ‗bringing bullies to the centre‘ (Tom also stated 
that he wasn‘t aware of the same kinds of problem since the current manager had arrived).  Perhaps it is 
for these methodological reasons that not many other accounts in the scholarly literature reference the 
trade practices I describe here (although see Fox et al., 2005), although frequent references to them can be 
found on the internet and in the media—often in the context of badly run psychiatric wards or the dangers 
to physical health of pill swapping and sedative misuse (see for example, The Observer [2 February 2003] 
or the discussion thread on the ‗gone too soon‘ message forum: 
http://www.gonetoosoon.org/community/area/thread_clozapine_clozaril/, last accessed 10 December 
2011). 
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hidden economies of ‗mad‘ goods and their somewhat contentious statuses seem most 
comfortable amidst a study of non-capitalist, ritual spheres of exchange whereupon 
items of symbolic value are frequently traded in separate social systems to everyday 
commodities (and to the extent that markets for postcards and razors and other such 
items co-exist alongside the ‗ordinary‘ money market with only restricted interaction 
between the two, this assertion can be upheld).
27
  However, in providing elegant 
solutions to supply and demand for specialist goods in difficult circumstances, the 
presence of exchange systems for prohibited commodities also seems a ‗natural‘ and 
predicable effect of the invisible hand of the market akin to other specialised markets, 
and is a powerful means of reconnecting semi-closed spaces of psychiatric 
communities to wider logics of the market.   
 
If bringing to the foreground these underground enterprises further pathologises 
service-user work, a less contentious case (and one to which we will return in chapter 
four of this thesis) is the increasing market-based outsourcing and delegation of 
support and rehabilitation work from state-led mental health and social services to third 
sector service-user organisations, through which patient networks begin to behave not 
only as channels of peer support, but as professional bodies able to receive care loads 
from public sector contracts (Chinman et al., 2006; Boyle and Harris, 2009; Munn-
Giddings et al., 2009).  Heralded by policymakers as a significant lever in the future of 
public services reform (and a career option for an increasing number of service-users 
also, as I shall discuss later), such ‗partnerships‘ between conventional state-funded 
care providers and patient networks mobilise not only the political potential of service-
user communities but also their expertise and efficiency at undertaking challenging 
projects.  Speaking to a service-user coordinator of such projects, for example, I was 
told how the network had been approached by statutory services to facilitate a self-help 
group for people with personality disorders (conventionally considered among the 
hardest to engage) due to the network‘s strong record for work with ‗difficult‘ clients.  
Such spaces of ‗service-user production‘, as they have become known, open the way 
                                                     
27 The most common example in this regard is the multi-centric economy of the Tiv of West Africa in 
which three exchange domains were seen to exist in parallel: trade networks for the exchange of 
subsistence goods such as yams, pigs and grains; economies of prestige goods such as cloth and gold rods; 
and the exchange system for marriageable women (Bohannan and Bohannan, 1968; Sillitoe, 2006).  
Exchanges were permitted within domains but inter-realm trade (‗conversion‘) was socially unacceptable.  
The stories of social climbers and rogues who attempted to traverse realms, e.g., by amassing subsistence 
goods to exchange for social status, can to an extent be likened to individuals described by my participants 
above who broke trade rules—for example, by making an (unjust) profit on tablet exchange or selling to 
people who were considered to be a risk to themselves (another prohibition)—thus not only exposing their 
own morals to be suspect, but bringing into view the fragile space of ethics in which all exchange takes 
place. 
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for not only new forms of ‗expert patients‘ but also new forms of service-user 
professionalism and, with them, new spaces of patient work.  Unlike the forms of 
magical and self-work described in earlier sections of the chapter, these public forms of 
service-user contribution demonstrate the ability of service-user work to successfully 
transcend the intra-psychic realm in ways which are socially and economically 
beneficial.  Moreover, such forms of work challenge stereotypical ideas about the 
disorganised, incapable and irresponsible nature of mental health communities and 
speak back to the growing attitude among policy-makers, introduced briefly towards 
the end of the last chapter, that ‗buildings-based‘ mental health services where mental 
health service-users spend much of their time together, are breeding grounds for habits 
and attitudes which further distance service-users from the competitive labour market.  
 
Finally, placed in this last empirical section somewhat clumsily, having described 
forms of goods and service-provision that are directly connected with the experience of 
illness and recovery, it is also important to note that individuals who appear in formal 
statistics as being off work on health grounds often assume significant responsibilities 
for more ordinary forms of unpaid and unrecognised work within the private sphere 
also (both through choice and otherwise).  Such responsibilities differ qualitatively 
from the other forms of work discussed here, but are mentionable not only because 
they provide yet another account of how the lives of service-users can be busy and 
productive outside of participation in the paid labour market, but because they also 
demonstrate how individuals fulfil multiple social roles of which being a patient is only 
one.  To take some examples which demonstrate how such care-work and domestic 
work intercepts illness and paid work experience: Christine is a mother of two, who 
worked as a librarian until the birth of her first child.  When her second child started 
nursery, she transiently restarted this career but, after only a few weeks, found herself 
unable to continue due to the interference of her obsessive compulsive disorder with 
entrusting the children to daycare (who within a few months had tested nearly all of the 
facilities in the area since, at each one, Christine had found a ‗terrible safety hazard‘ 
that necessitated their urgent relocation).  In consultation with her husband, Christine 
decided to leave the position and apply instead for an illness-related out-of-work 
benefit and stay at home with the children.  Whilst formally a full-time ‗mentally ill 
person‘, Christine thus simultaneously occupies the ordinary (or ordinarily ambiguous) 
role of full-time mother and caretaker, which many women voluntarily choose.  In a 
somewhat different example, Sue resigned from her work at the bank on health 
  ~ Chapter 2 Imaginary Planes ~ 69 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
grounds after a damaging set of experiences with depression, an ex-husband who 
stalked her at her workplace, and an employer who was unsympathetic to either of the 
above.  However, on spending time at home, she soon found herself looking after on a 
daily basis (and only partially willingly) not only her son‘s young children but a 
neighbour‘s child also.  Unlike Christine, Sue did not find this work conducive to her 
recovery and with three young children to look after, her depression worsened further.  
Jake, to whose story we will return in chapter five, both receives carers‘ allowance for 
looking after his father and is cared for by his father who is in receipt of the same 
benefit for looking after Jake: as I will discuss in chapter five, this mutually caring 
relationship has economic ramifications since without it Jake‘s father would need 
regular visits from a health worker to assist with his breathing apparatus, and Jake 
himself would likely have more frequent hospital admissions and mental health crises 
without a family member close by to offer support and encouragement.   
 
Whilst arguments about the legitimacy of these activities as forms of work are well 
rehearsed (Oakley, 1974; McDowell, 1989), for people who undertake such duties after 
exiting the waged labour market on mental health grounds, gaining recognition for this 
work can be even more difficult than for other home-keepers and unpaid carers.  Both 
at the level of national data collection and the perceptions of family and friends, receipt 
of incapacity benefit may obscure other forms of socially valuable production in which 
an individual might be engaged; with regard to care work, this may be doubly the case 
given the predominant and sticky notion of mental health service-users solely as 
recipients of care rather than care-providers themselves.  It is noted that, as in Sue‘s 
instance, care work is not always freely chosen, and that just as paid employment can 
contribute to mental distress and suffering, unpaid work in the home can do the same 
(and in ways which interact with, and form layers upon, existing work of illness and 
recovery).  Attending to ‗ordinary‘ forms of unpaid domestic and care work also 
demonstrates how stigma around mental illness extends beyond the formal workplace 
into other arenas of social production.  Sue, for example, described with some distress 
an occasion where the battery of her mobile phone had run out whilst taking the 
children to the park at the same time as the mother of her son‘s child popped by 
unexpectedly to collect the kids.  Instead of waiting until their agreed pick-up time, the 
mother had started frantically telephoning family and friends, expressing concerns that 
Sue was un-contactable and that she may have ‗done something stupid‘ to herself or 
the children.   
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Categorising Service-User Work  
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to demonstrate the multiple presentations of work 
in the lives of people living with and recovering from mental distress.  Empirically, 
three different kinds of ‗mad‘ or service-user work have been examined and the 
argument made that these exist both as hidden planes, occurring beneath the perception 
of more economically driven studies of madness and work, and as activities which—
like Sam‘s interjection to the focus group or Martin‘s fashion business—interrupt and 
intervene in ordinary, everyday life.   
 
At the beginning of the chapter, two different analytic strategies were identified which 
have been used by others to take seriously non-traditional or non-paid work activities 
such as the ones I have here described.  In the first (a project I linked primarily to 
second wave feminism), an onto-political classificatory debate was identified which 
sought to ‗open up‘ the category of work beyond paid employment to include marginal 
or non-economic activities which also have work-like credentials.  In the second, focus 
shifted from classificatory concerns to the rhetorics of work and the contexts in which 
work is employed by social actors to defend and justify particular forms of activity (a 
comment primarily about the power and centrality of work as a navigational construct 
in society).  Whilst the chapter has sympathised with these approaches and provided 
empirical examples which speak to these debates, it is also noted that each gets into 
difficulties when dealing with work in a strictly non-essentialist manner, as the chapter 
has also attempted to do.
28
  In response, throughout the chapter I have sought to alter 
the frames of these debates: not to ask ‗is this work?‘ (or exclaim, ‗this is work!‘) but 
instead ask what are the similarities and differences between these forms of mad 
activity and activities such as paid employment which are unproblematically 
considered by society to be work?; second, rather than commence an examination of 
how actors legitimise their actions through recourse to work vocabulary (a 
unidirectional hypothesis) I have sought to demonstrate the multiple contexts and 
motivations in which work is evoked in rhetorical struggle.  
 
                                                     
28 In the former strategy, in order to make the decree that activity X counts as work, some more-or-less 
rigidly delineated definition of the concept must first be accepted; in the second line of analysis, in placing 
work in the context of a rhetorical struggle for legitimacy, something vital—essential even—about work 
which gives it this rhetorical significance is accepted without critical discussion of the counter-
possibilities. 
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As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, problematising and re-problematising 
the conceptual boundaries of work has been a classic line of critique in the sociology of 
work and beyond, most often in the form of opening up the category to non-traditional 
kinds of worker previously excluded from its reaches.  Prominent examples include 
feminist treatments of homemaking and caring (Oakley, 1974; McDowell and Massey, 
1984; Pratt and Hanson, 1993); examinations of marginal economic activities such as 
prostitution or street newspaper vending (Weitzer, 2007; Cockburn, 2011); research 
into unpaid work in the voluntary sector (Taylor, 2004); and, further afield, 
anthropological studies of non-capitalist societies, exploring the work-like qualities of 
subsistence modes of production (e.g. Kaplan, 2000).  Joining such literatures, a host 
of additional contributions have emerged on cultural ‗work‘, consumption ‗work‘ and 
other activities traditionally considered beyond the boundaries of the construct.  An 
overarching strength of such literatures is their collective power to reveal how 
traditional notions of work ‗marginalise and devalue‘ the work of atypical workers 
(Taylor, 2004, p. 30).  Yet, as noted by Watson (2009), such radical extensions of the 
concept also risk destabilising the word to the point it loses utility, or breeding a ‗me 
too‘ tendency in scholarship in which ever more examples of human task performance 
are put up for consideration in the category.   
 
With the above comments in mind, how best should we interpret the ‗mad‘ forms of 
work described in this chapter, which simultaneously seem so workful and workless?  
If an essential criterion of work is to bind the individual to a material reality—and this 
was indeed at least partially Freud‘s therapeutic conception of work—then on first 
glance the magical work of delusions and obsessions (the first of my three categories) 
cannot be real: David‘s ‗checks‘ in the hospital will ensure the timely arrival of buses 
no more than Sam‘s aeroplanes will ‗really‘ protect the nation.29  However, whilst this 
might appear a convincing argument, a precursory survey of the contemporary job 
market demonstrates that, conversely, much conventional paid work also fails to match 
this reality criterion.  The rise of the information and service sectors—those which are 
often definable by their very retreat from material production (particularly of the kind 
                                                     
29 There is a tension regarding the reality criterion in early psychoanalytic thought in that Freud attempts 
to hold both the ‗ordinary professional work available to everyone‘ (Freud, 1929 p. 23), which he 
illustrates with the manual labour of gardening, and the mental labours of the artist and intellectual as the 
most fitting occupations for mental health.  Whilst Freud writes more extensively on art than manual 
labour, on balance it is nonetheless pursuits with more committed materialisms that Freud prefers, for fear 
that intellectual work may encourage the patient to turn his back further on reality and enter a psychotic 
existence (Freud, 1929 pp. 18–19).  In later psychoanalytic accounts, this complexity has generally been 
lost: Weil, for example, simply describes work as activities ‗involved in changing something in the outside 
world in a useful, purposeful way‘ (1959, p. 41). 
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that was offered in the workshop or factory)—has led some to class the increasing 
immateriality of labour as a key harbinger of ‗economic postmodernisation‘ (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000, p. 280).  Nor does the quality of fantasy which characterises much 
delusional work necessarily set mad work apart from sane.  Whilst classic critiques of 
capitalism have long stressed the mythical elements of business and the market (e.g. 
Arnold, 1937), striking contemporary examples such as the ‗virtual sweatshops‘ of 
computer gamers in the developing world who are hired to complete the easy levels of 
online games on behalf of money-rich, time-poor westerners highlight the extent to 
which capitalist waged labour can also operate on a primarily fantastical level (The 
Observer, 13 March 2005).  The concept of ‗magic‘, introduced to explain the mad 
work of psychoses, has similar utility in describing the ritual modes of visioning and 
ordering the world that are common to late global capital.  Like the work of the 
service-users in my study, such sorcery does not always have happy consequences: the 
financial models of the bankers in the lead up to the 2008 financial crisis, which failed 
so dramatically to relate to the ‗real world‘, capture a vivid moment at which this 
magical ordering fails.   
 
As a further objection, whilst it is tempting to assume that delusional work (i.e., the 
work of psychotic patients) is inevitably intra-psychic and otherworldly, from the more 
grounded examples of my ethnography it can be demonstrated that, like non-mad 
work, mad work demonstrates a host of relations with the outside world.  Whilst Sam‘s 
aeroplanes do not exist in any real-world sense, by contrast, although Martin‘s beliefs 
about the powers of nylon might make little sense to us, materially (no pun intended), 
the shirts are undoubtedly real.  Indeed, for Martin, the crucial factor of the shirts is the 
assurance they provide of a tangible, man-made reality.  The online fashion store 
demonstrates a high level of activity, ingenuity and skill, as well as generating 
economic profit.  Furthermore, whilst the obsession with nylon and the pilgrimages to 
Newcastle‘s charity shops might be considered a private work and a private madness, 
an actor network theory perspective, for example, might see instead the interface of the 
internet business as laced with transactions between a private and public sphere, 
conjoining psychic, virtual and material economies for Martin and his customers.  In 
many ways, then, it can be demonstrated that the magical work that appears in 
delusions appears on a continuum with other forms of paid employment.
30
   
                                                     
30 As a continuation to note 19 (p. 54) in which the different spatial and temporal registers of delusional 
work were considered, it is interesting to note that higher levels of overlap between magical/delusional 
work and the ‗real‘, non-psychotic world do not necessarily lead to a greater realness of such work‘s 
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To turn to the second of my ethnographic examples, the ‗self-work‘ of being a service-
user presents a different set of challenges to the murky task of defining work.  In a now 
famous analysis of the subject, Catherine Hakim draws on a long heritage of work 
theorists to arrive at what she calls the ‗substitution rule‘ or ‗third-person criterion‘ to 
distinguish between activities which constitute work and those which do not.  
According to the rule, an activity is deemed to be work only if it could be undertaken 
by a substitute (i.e., someone other than the one benefiting from the activity) without 
the task losing its value; conversely, if an activity would lose value or fail to ‗make 
sense‘ if a substitute took over, then in Hakim‘s framework, this is not work (Hakim, 
1996).  The utility of such a framework appears in the consideration of household 
activities (the focus of Hakim‘s research), where activities such as playing with one‘s 
children (which are presumed to have intrinsic value to the doer) are differentiated 
from other tasks such as routine cleaning which could be performed by an external 
party with no detriment to the work or its outcome.  
 
Following this line of thought, a ‗working on the self‘ seems highly problematic to 
notions of ‗real‘ work as defined by Hakim.  In the kinds of work that service-users do 
to and for themselves, not only do the kinds of task described (regulating one‘s 
emotions, modifying one‘s thoughts) have an intimacy that makes them intuitively 
inalienable from the self, since worker and object of the work are one and the same, the 
premise of ‗third person substitution‘ appears practically as well as philosophically 
impossible.  Yet, in the instance of mental health service-users, this can be 
problematised again.  Given that, ordinarily speaking, a professional therapist is 
considered to be doing legitimate work, how are we to distinguish work on someone 
else‘s self as necessarily different from work on one‘s own self?  Remote technologies 
                                                                                                                                             
effects.  Whilst similarities can be drawn between the spatial engagement of Clive‘s activities in the 
kitchen and Martin‘s work delusions (i.e., in contrast to the amaterial and aspatial character of Sam‘s 
delusions), these similarities did not extend to the ‗success‘ of the two men‘s work in the wider non-
delusional world.  Whilst, as described above, Martin‘s online business was commercially successful and 
efficiently operated, few of Clive‘s own culinary inventions made it to the table and many of the 
accomplishments for which he demanded recognition were in fact uncomplicated duties such as vegetable 
peeling or dishwashing, which had been done under the direction of the actual catering manager.  This 
observation is interesting because, in terms of the standard mode of categorising delusions as per the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, out of Martin, Clive and Sam, only Martin‘s 
delusions about the necessity of nylon can fully be identified as ‗bizarre‘ (i.e., clearly implausible within 
standard metaphysical reference points) since although Sam and Clive were clearly mistaken about their 
occupational talents, both fighter pilots and master chefs are real occupations in which a person could—in 
theory—be engaged.  In other words, the spatial engagement of delusional work in everyday materialities, 
its value as an ‗authentic‘ or profitable employment, and the ‗severity‘ or ‗bizarreness‘ of a delusion as 
judged in a clinical context have no necessary relation to one another.  A more substantial critique of 
hierarchical levels of truth or delusion will be developed in chapter six. 
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such as the CBT computer programmes described above further break down this 
distinction since, whereas in traditional face-to-face psychotherapy it might be argued 
that the client is receiving a service (in the same way that she might receive a massage 
or pedicure), in this instance, whilst the work may be managed by the computer 
programmers and therapists producing such software, the in-the-moment labour of 
therapy seems undertaken by the patient solely.  Similarly, if the original feminist 
premise is valid that informal care-work (e.g. in the home) is equal in value to paid 
employment in the care sector, then why should the particular forms of self-care that a 
person with mental health difficulties might do to or for herself be excluded a priori 
because the carer and recipient of the care are one and the same?  As an unusual 
example to illustrate this latter point, one of my interviewees reported an occasion 
where, during a ‗manic‘ phase, she saw advertised a free ‗training and treats‘ day for 
carers of the long-term mentally ill.  The woman applied, listing in detail the myriad 
tasks she did for herself to manage her mental health difficulties.  The curiosity of the 
application went undetected and the woman was offered a place, but on disclosing her 
particulars to other participants on the course she was asked to withdraw, since the 
(literal) self-centredness of her work had offended other presumably more legitimate 
carers.   
 
In an age where the boundary between personal development and formal work has 
become very blurred, the philosophical concept of psychological self-work becomes 
even more relevant.  In a conventional framework, a client in counselling or group 
therapy would not be considered to be working—yet, an equivalent individual taking 
part in a highly similar form of self-reflection and psychosocial learning, as part of (for 
example) personal or professional development within the workplace or a Kaizen 
continuous-improvement ring, would likely consider such activities to be part of their 
working day.  Whilst a convincing counter-argument might be that, in this example, 
the person in group therapy is developing herself for own benefit whilst the employee 
is developing herself for the benefit of her employer, two points cast doubt on this 
position.  First, if personal development in the workplace is only for the profit of the 
employer, then to what purpose is it often advertised in recruitment materials as an 
employee benefit (the covering letter for my recent teaching qualification describes the 
certification as a ‗valuable portable asset‘!)?  Second, whilst people enter therapy for 
many different reasons, it is also acknowledged that on multiple levels therapy does 
seek to return to people to their regular occupations: famously, Freud said that the key 
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aims of psychoanalysis were to enable the patient to love and to work—a statement 
which he later went on to define as heterosexual, monogamous love and paid 
employment (Smelser and Erikson, 1980).  More contemporarily, a rollout of policies 
such as the Increasing Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) programme explicitly 
seeks through the powers of cognitive behavioural therapy to reduce unemployment 
figures in Britain.  In this sense, following the logic of Glucksmann and others, in 
repairing and replenishing capitalism‘s labour supply, therapy (like Kaizen, mentoring 
or PPD) is also a form of self-development that simultaneously supports economic 
ends.
31
 
  
Finally, the work underpinning mad markets and service-user production seems most 
of all the three narratives of work I have discussed here to be ‗proper‘ work, 
conventionally described.  Such work acts upon a real world, addresses clearly 
articulated needs or gaps in the market, and shares many of its constituent activities 
with more conventional forms of work.  Yet, even where individuals are legally and 
competitively employed for their services (for example, the service-user professionals I 
introduced towards the end of this section), in the day-to-day linguistic structures of 
inclusion and exclusion, employees still report struggle in receiving recognition for 
their work.  Benji, the service-user coordinator in the above section, for example, tells 
me, ‗still my family say to me, ―when are you going to get a proper job?‖  I don‘t think 
they see me as gainfully employed‘.  As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 
four, this classificatory ambivalence towards self-labelled service-user occupations 
stands in contrast with the work experiences of individuals who as a result of their 
mental health experiences retrain as mainstream mental health or social care 
professionals—who, whilst often experiencing prejudice from non-mad colleagues as a 
result of their personal experiences—at the least are spared the experiences of 
exclusion or non-recognition that Benji and others in non-traditional employment 
forms experience.   It is my argument that this persistent under-recognition of ‗mad‘ 
work is not only a case of a generic undervaluing of unpaid or non-traditional forms 
work in contemporary society (Glucksmann, 1995; Levitas, 2005), but also evidence of 
a more profound difficulty in aligning the apparent unpredictability and intimacy of 
madness with the efficiency and manageability of the productive capitalist workforce. 
 
                                                     
31 A more cynical rendition of this story is the classic ‗anti-psychiatry‘ claim that psychiatry and 
psychotherapy act as agents of the state to fashion souls fit for capitalist labour; yet it is not necessary to 
subscribe to such views to follow this argument. 
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Conclusion: Navigating Work Narratives 
 
In this chapter, I hope to have offered a number of intersecting contributions to an 
understanding of work and madness.  First, in providing a thick description of the ways 
in which work appears (consciously and unconsciously) in the narratives of out-of-
work mental health service-users, the chapter shows how even in the traditionally 
workless spaces of psychiatric day services, work remains a relevant and important 
construct through which service-users understand and navigate their lives.   
 
Second (and relatedly), the chapter shows how in a culture of ‗back-to-work‘ for 
welfare recipients, the construct of work becomes a strategic device through which 
service-users legitimise a series of economic and non-economic activities traditionally 
outside the work remit: whilst Sam‘s expressions of her pilot career might best be seen 
as a longing for work, conversely, in the second and third of my three work narratives, 
service-users speak of work assertively: in classifying the activities of recovery and co-
support as work, they say ‗my activities are important and effortful social 
contributions‘.   
 
Finally, a focus on mad work finds ways of exploring why policies to get mental health 
service-users off benefits and back into paid employment often don t work as 
anticipated by planners and practitioners (and evidence suggests that this is the case—
at the point of finalising this manuscript, government projections for the latest back-to-
work scheme for incapacity benefit recipients have again been downscaled [National 
Audit Office, 2012]).  Drawing attention to what is ‗genuinely hard‘ about being ill 
frames the negative effects of living with a long-term illness in ways that are respectful 
rather than patronising towards mental health service-users.  Yet more centrally to this 
argument is the observation that recovery takes time and energy.  In the previous 
chapter I noted that in welfare-to-work, returning to paid employment was positioned 
as a moral imperative which had therapeutic benefits not only for the individual but for 
the wider community as well (p. 45).  Yet contemporary policy puts emphasis on the 
responsibilities of patients also, positioning the maintenance of one‘s health as an 
equal moral absolute for the ethical citizen (Evans, 2007).  Considering the time 
commitments and energy investments of getting better thus demonstrates how, in the 
context of mental health recoveries, demands both to work on oneself and to get back 
to work may be difficult to satisfy simultaneously.  This is not necessarily an argument 
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against early returns to work and it is recalled from the last chapter that returning to 
work may in itself constitute part of the working-on-the-self that is involved in getting 
better.  What this argument does suggest, however, is that for back-to-work projects to 
work on any convincing scale, greater support for those who are working the ‗double 
shift‘ of paid work and recovery work are likely to be very important.32 
  
There are reasons to be cautious about promoting the various forms of service-user 
activity described here as work.  Simplistic tales about mad people being better 
workers than others need to be avoided, as do crude etiological accounts which posit 
mental illnesses as straightforward outcomes of a pathologically over-active capitalist 
work ethic.  Moreover, as many participants in my ethnography would be keen to 
stress, this chapter strictly does not uphold the suggestions that mad work, if it is work 
at all, is an appropriate or fulfilling alternative to quality paid employment: again, as I 
have suggested already in this thesis, many long-term out-of-work service-users are 
highly motivated to join the labour market and despair of the multiple barriers they 
face in getting there (Grove et al., 2005).  Yet, perhaps most significantly, the danger 
of demonstrating what is work-like within madness is that it reproduces the idea that 
only that which can be shown to be work has value.  Watson has warned of current 
directions within the sociology of work that have ‗imperialistic ambitions‘ in speaking 
to ever more areas of human activity (Watson, 2009, p. 870).  In the intimate spaces of 
the psyche described here, perhaps such imperialism is most objectionable: certainly, 
to the extent that capitalism is critiqued as an unbridled force of governance over the 
human soul, the creativity and recalcitrance of ‗madness‘ (at least on a cultural level) 
offers one of few remaining safe-havens from a relentless capitalist work ethic.   
 
However, notwithstanding the above reservations, there is nevertheless an ‗ethics of 
description‘ at play in bringing into focus the tremendous work of madness and 
recovery.  In an age where (like it or not) work is posited as a moral duty, an 
acknowledgement of mad work offers a more respectful position towards mental health 
service-users and draws attention to the busyness and competence of even the most 
                                                     
32 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide an extended discussion of possible courses of action 
here, but suggestions from participants in this study include flexible working arrangements, ‗reasonable 
adjustments‘ to the workplace, graded returns to work after mental health crises, and understanding and 
support from employers, e.g., around ‗time out‘ to attend to medical appointments.   Grove and Membrey 
(2005) describe the case of a woman who negotiates with the chair of governors to be permitted to step out 
of school council meetings when necessary to reason with the voices in her head—an adjustment that thus 
allows her to continue to hold a position on the council—and this is also very much the kind of support I 
have in mind. 
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‗workless‘ members of the mental health community.  Yet such (re)-descriptions must 
be always ironic (as is much of ‗madness‘ itself), in that they stress what is workful 
about work and yet simultaneously concede that work itself is a fractured term that 
doesn t work as an organisational device for categorising action.   
 
In future chapters, ideas emerging in this chapter will be developed in several ways.  
First, the project of assertive description, as I have phrased it here, will be extended 
throughout the thesis as a means of documenting unusual experiences of recovery and 
work which are not always represented in more traditional accounts of the working 
lives of mental health service-users.  Concepts of service-user agency and the 
productive potential of mad experience also appear again in the thesis and, in chapter 
four, a fuller and more philosophically developed discussion of the service-user 
professionals I introduced briefly in the third section of this chapter will be provided.  
Beyond these, it is hoped that in conjunction with the previous chapter, the chapter 
provides a baseline demonstration of the plurality and richness of work as it appears in 
the narratives of people living with mental health difficulties; of the multiple identities 
that being a service-user or living with mental distress can generate; and the 
multiplicity of interpolations between these two constructs.   
 
For now, however, I will leave this chapter simply with the idea of the burden and 
busyness and duty of being a service-user, especially in a context of back-to-work.  
The complex relationships between work and mental health are important 
contemporary research topics in the social and clinical sciences with direct impacts on 
policy and practice.  A greater attention to ironic forms of mad work might contribute 
to understandings of why conventional back-to-work policies often don‘t work and, 
conversely, help ring-fence safe space for people like Sam and Vera, whose recalcitrant 
work in the alternative worlds of psychosis prevents their engagement in a more 
ordinary workaday world.  
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Chapter Three 
 
An Ethics of Relation 
On Alienation and Liking One’s Work 
 
 
  
All men should desire to live most happily, and should know that they cannot so live in 
any other way than by cultivating the soul, and yet leave the soul uncultivated.  
(Apuleius, cited in Foucault, 1988, p. 45) 
 
If I stayed late in the library to finish stuff off, the other people on my course would 
say, ‗you‘re naughty, you are—you‘re always working‘, and if I turned up late in the 
morning, they‘d tut-tut about that, too.  It‘s like they thought everyone had to work the 
same nine to five even if that‘s not what suited them.  [...]  I think they blamed me in 
part for my depression because they thought if she just got on with her work in the 
right way she wouldn‘t be under so much pressure all the time.  (Ginny, occupational 
therapy student) 
 
 
Having explored in the first two chapters numerous means of conceptualising the 
relations between work and therapy and work and madness, it is time now to begin 
expounding more explicitly a theory of relation, and what a focus on relationality in a 
critical study of work might entail.  As the first of two chapters taking relationality as 
their focus, ostensibly, the subject of this chapter is the imagined relationship between 
a worker and his or her work—the subject, of course, of the classic accounts of 
alienation, which probably remain the most comprehensive account of the connection 
between paid work and mental ill health in capitalist modernity—but also, as I go on to 
80  ‗Working Through‘: An Inquiry into Work and Madness  
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
demonstrate later, many more contemporary approaches too (in the next chapter, 
attention will turn to the relation between one‘s self and one‘s madness and the ways in 
which that relation can be conducted in the workplace).  Whilst the chapter takes 
seriously the notion that in conditions of late capitalism, the relation between work and 
worker faces particular challenges (see Josephson and Josephson, 1962; Braverman, 
1974; Sennett, 1998; Crawford, 2009, for a review), a purpose of the argument is also 
to think critically through the underlying ideas such hypotheses harbour about the kind 
of relation one should have with one‘s work.33   
 
In what follows, the chapter consists of three stages.  In the first section, I introduce 
some classic approaches to work and workmanship (to include romanticism, Marxism 
and industrial psychology) with a view to demonstrating not only the historical interest 
in work-worker relations across a range of scholarly traditions but also the normative 
ethics around which many of these positions can be seen to be based.  In the second, I 
make a series of comments to draw out the implications of these classic notions of 
relationality for understanding human flourishing at work, particularly in the case of 
mental ill-health.  In the final section, returning once more to my empirical material, I 
offer some lived examples from participants in my own research both to illustrate but 
also destabilise the ways in which the relation between work and worker and the 
significance of that relation have traditionally been conceived.  The central purpose of 
the chapter is to demonstrate how the relationship between work and worker has 
become trapped between two powerful discourses of nature and ethics which together 
act to delimit the relations that are deemed appropriate for humans to hold with their 
work.  With particular reference to those such as Ginny (above) who suffer from the 
constraints of appropriate relations, conventionally perceived, in conclusion the chapter 
attempts to reclaim the ethical nature of humankind‘s connection to work without the 
normative and even moralistic connotations that talk of ethics can bring. 
  
                                                     
33 A version of this chapter is scheduled to appear as Laws, J. (in press) ‗Madness, Alienation and 
Enjoying One‘s Work‘. In: Sahu, P. and Cuzzocrea, V. (eds) Valuing Work: Challenges and 
Opportunities. Oxford: Interdisciplinary Press, and appears in abridged form in the e-book The Value of 
Work: Updates on Old Issues (ID Press, eds. Laws and Cuzzocrea, 2011). 
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The Theory of Work: A Relational Tradition 
 
Whilst not always described as such, a history of the theory of work has long been a 
relational tradition.
34
  Although it is probably the case that theories of work have 
always included some notion of relationality (that is, an attention to the relation 
between worker and his or her work), perhaps the most iconic birth of a history of 
relation is the Protestant reformation.  Prior to the Reformation, philosophies of 
work—where they had existed—focused mainly on the issue of what kind of work was 
preferable for whatever given aim (health, happiness, godliness, etc.).  Famously, 
Aristotle denounced manual work in favour of the political and contemplative life of 
the philosopher.  Likewise, in medieval monasticism, notions of ideal work constituted 
the life of prayer and contemplation, with trade and commerce considered dangerously 
immoral.  At the heart of the Reformation, Luther swept away such notions of ‗higher‘ 
and ‗lower‘ callings and said no longer was it holy to depend on the spiritual life of the 
Church for one‘s work.  Instead, the best way for the Protestant to serve God was by 
doing most perfectly the work of his or her trade or occupation.  Humble labour and 
toil were Godly characteristics and were thus applicable to everyone and all kinds of 
work equally—providing their relation to the work was in good Christian faith.  Such 
shift to focusing on the relation between worker and work constituted the birth of the 
modern work ethic since whilst only a monastic elite could have practiced holy work in 
the pre-Luther understanding of what it meant to be holy, in the new theology, anyone 
could strive to relate to their work in a Godly fashion.
35
  
 
Far from the ascetics, the ideas of the romantics—both in early examples such as 
Rousseau through to the later nineteenth century Arts and Crafts movement—were also 
deeply connected with relations.  Whilst the Arts and Crafts movement offered strong 
commentaries on the importance of ‗good‘ kinds of work from a systemic point of 
view (as I have already discussed in chapter one with regard to the movement‘s 
denunciation of mass production and revival of craftsmanship), it also placed a degree 
                                                     
34 Whilst there are links to be made between the two arguments, the context in which I am discussing 
relation here should be separated from the context in which it is used in ‗systems‘ approaches such as the 
adoption of complexity theory in the social sciences (Byrne, 1998; Curtis and Riva, 2010).  In the latter, 
relation/relationality more expressly refers to the interaction or correlation between different elements in a 
system, rather than (as I use the term), the connection or bond.  As further reading, Harrison (2007) 
provides a review and critique of the ongoing interest in relation in geography more broadly, to which the 
second half of this chapter might loosely be considered to speak. 
35 See Tilgher (1977), Applebaum (1992, chapter fourteen) and of course Weber‘s The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905) for a more comprehensive overview of the ways in which conceptions 
of work changed during the Protestant Revolution. 
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of personal responsibility on the worker for relating to his work in good spirit: as 
William Morris put it, ‗the pleasure which ought to go with the making of every piece 
of handicraft has for its basis the keen interest which every healthy man takes in 
healthy life‘ (Morris 1883, p. 174).  Indeed, the tragedy of industrial society was that it 
‗forced‘ workers ‗to lead unhappy lives or allowed them to live unhappily‘ (ibid., my 
emphasis).  ‗Good work‘ was thus a matter both of external conditions and mental 
attitudes (although Morris was also in this sense an educationist and as such considered 
there to be a recursive relation between society and attitudinal dispositions).  In 
addition to romanticism‘s interest in the affective connection of worker to work, many 
romantic texts, especially in the Arts and Crafts movement, invited a third partner into 
the work-worker dyad.  This partner was nature (or the environment): in his oft-cited 
account of ‗an afternoon walk in the suburbs of one of our large manufacturing towns‘, 
for example, Ruskin complained that the industrial workman was deprived of the 
possibility to create anything beautiful, since working with a beautiful mind was a 
product of working in a beautiful environment (1859, p. 137).  Unlike other critiques of 
factory work which focused on the injustice of the ownership of production in the 
developing capitalism, for the romantics, the disruption of nature and the ‗natural‘ 
bond between worker and work was the greatest injury of industrialism.  
 
However, analysis of the connection between worker and work was without doubt 
most extensively and elaborately developed in the writings of Karl Marx.  For Marx, 
the sacred connection between man and work constituted one‘s gattungswesen 
(‗species-life‘ or ‗species-essence‘—i.e., that which distinguished man from animals).  
Rejecting the nostalgia of Rousseau and many other Enlightenment thinkers for some 
original state of nature in which humans were at one with the world, Marx saw the 
natural world as inherently alien and awkward to man.  Work—i.e., acting productively 
and creatively upon the world—was thus a central mode by which man could transcend 
this original alienation from nature and make himself ‗at home‘ in the world, socially, 
politically and materially (Sayers, 2005).  For Marx, the necessity for gattungswesen to 
be a working essence was thus self-evident (a reason, perhaps, why in all of Marx‘s 
writings there fails to be any extended delineation of his understanding of the term): so 
long as we understand humankind as a social being (that is, a species aware of its 
existence and membership to a community of humans), then if man creates his world 
through his work, by implication he also creates his social world and thus himself 
through his work as well.  Accordingly, work must necessarily occupy a position of 
  ~ Chapter 3 An ethics of relation ~ 83 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
absolute primacy for the existence of man as a social species, since work is not just a 
means for the species to survive, but a precondition for species life.   
 
Whilst there is comparatively little written in the secondary literature about Marx‘s 
views on work compared to his political and economic writings, it is probably no 
exaggeration to argue that the importance of the relation between work and human 
nature was the single most important aspect of Marxist philosophy.
36
  When Marx 
wrote ‗workingmen of all countries, unite!‘ (Marx and Engels, 1883), this was because 
he considered man‘s identity as a worker to be the foremost character of his 
humanness.  And whilst it is certainly true that Marx was moved by the cruelty and 
suffering he observed in the factories burgeoning around him, his rousing descriptions 
of the workingman‘s plight (‗the worker, who for twelve hours weaves, spins, drills, 
turns, builds, shovels, breaks stones, carries loads, etc.—does he consider this twelve 
hours‘ weaving, spinning, drilling, turning, building, shovelling, stone-breaking as a 
manifestation of his life, as life?‘) only gain their true Marxian significance when it is 
remembered that, for Marx, such industrialism not only placed the individual worker in 
miserable conditions for the larger portion of his day, but also robbed him of that 
which was most precious to his essence—his capacity for free, self-defining work 
(Marx, 1849, p. 23).   
 
For the purposes of this discussion, what is interesting and significant about Marx as a 
thinker is that it was not the qualities of work itself (weaving, spinning, shovelling, 
etc.) that interested him, nor the qualities of human essence that drove his theory.  
Instead, it was the relation between both of these fields—between gattungswesen and 
life-activity—that fascinated Marx.  In Capital, this is made most explicit in the 
famous bee analogy.  To synthesise the argument (which appears in alternative forms 
in his earlier writings also), it would be easy to imagine that through their superior use 
of technology, humans were separable from the rest of the animal kingdom by their 
ability to produce (indeed, here lies the origins of earlier conceptualisations of man as 
homo faber—a term which in Capital [p. 309] Marx attributes to Benjamin Franklin).  
Following the work of Hegel, Marx argued however that this was a mistake (or at best, 
a simplification)—after all, according to that famous quotation, ‗a spider conducts 
                                                     
36 For some readers, this remark will appear most applicable to the Early Marx, where Marx‘s humanist 
persuasions were strongest (see especially Althusser, 1953).  The extracts in the following paragraph from 
Capital however demonstrate the extension of (at least some of) these relational ideas into Marx‘s later 
writings. 
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operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect 
in the construction of her cells‘ (1906, p. 174).  Instead, it was the relation between 
work and worker that distinguished man from ‗mere animals‘.  Humans and animals 
both have the capacity to act as producers.  However, since animals produce only 
according to instinct or immediate need, animals have no ability to relate to their work 
as separate from themselves—as Marx put it, ‗the animal [...] does not distinguish itself 
from its life-activity.  It is its life activity‘ (1844, p. 68).  By comparison, humans—
who can and do choose to produce independently of immediate necessity—have the 
entwined abilities both to think upon their work as an activity separate from them, and 
to make decisions about how it should be carried out (or, at least, how they would like 
it to be carried out if given sufficient choice).  In this way, as Marx explained, ‗what 
distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is [...] that the architect raises his 
structure in imagination before he erects it in reality‘ (1906, p. 174).   
 
Despite the differences between the two traditions concerning the hospitability of the 
natural world, Marxism and romanticism thus converged in their absolute faith in the 
natural and vital link between work and worker.  In both traditions, the relationship 
between work and worker surpassed merely a glorious justification of work, but 
regarded work as the ‗vital impulse that unites matter and intelligence as the essence of 
man‘ (Applebaum, 1992, p. 475).  Alienation, a topic to which I shall return more 
extensively in the second half of this chapter, thus constituted the ‗separation of things 
that naturally belong together‘ (Mejos, 2007, p. 79).  Accordingly, the industrial 
worker‘s life was not only an unhappy one, but an unnatural one also.   
 
Whilst Marxism and romanticism are only two of many possible traditions that might 
have been introduced here, it is fair to say that relationality (a focus on the relation 
between work and worker) permeates other less critical literatures also.  Whilst 
contemporary industrial psychology and management studies have little in common 
with nineteenth century romanticism and socialism, here too a surprising focus on the 
vital relationship between worker and work can be found.  From the foundational ideas 
of Maslow emerges a core belief that the healthy, ‗self-actualised‘ worker will 
‗naturally‘ engage actively, mindfully and joyously with work; furthermore that the 
healthiest worker will experience ongoing ‗growth motivation‘ (i.e., will strive for new 
challenges and experiences) in his occupation (Maslow, 1954).  Moreover—as I will 
discuss in more detail later—disturbances to the imagined connection between worker 
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and work constitute the backbone of many work-based illnesses: in the literature, 
workaholism is described as a ‗disease of over-commitment‘, and at the opposite end 
of the spectrum, depression and burnout as ‗detached concern‘ and ‗distant attitude‘ 
towards one‘s work, often caused by perceived over-use or injury (metaphors of a 
snapped ligament are here suitable).
37
  Likewise, whilst again it is not within the 
reaches of this chapter to review such literatures, in recently fashionable philosophical-
evolutionary-clinical perspectives such as Tallis‘ The Hand, a focus on doing, acting—
and by implication—working are seen as psycho-biogenetically crucial aspects of 
emerging human subjectivity, thus uniting the possibility of first-person being with the 
experience of person-activity relation (Tallis, 2003; see also Csikszentmihalyi, 1973; 
Kane, 1996).   
 
Developing Connections 
 
So far, there is nothing especially radical about what has been presented above—
certainly, Marx, Ruskin, Luther and the rest are unsurprising entries for a history of the 
theory of work.  However, it might be helpful at this point to consider exactly what is 
at stake in thinking about the inherent relationality implicit in the structures of these 
ideas, and how we might separate this from other kinds of theoretical concerns (for the 
point must be made again, whilst it is very much the argument of this chapter to 
suggest that connectedness and relation run through the diverse intellectual traditions 
reviewed here, rarely would any of these bodies be described explicitly as a theory of 
relation in the first instance).  Briefly, perhaps four major significances of focusing on 
relation can be seen (I name these wholism; an interest in ‗howness‘; a relational 
relation; and an ethical orientation towards connection): 
 
(a)  Wholism 
 
In short, this concerns the focal point of investigations into the connection between 
work and humankind.  As stated above, whilst some implicit notion of relationality has 
always tied together the loose ends of philosophy required for explaining the 
apparently ‗vital‘ character that work has for man, it is a step further still to shift this 
                                                     
37 Verbatim extracts taken (in order) from Cherniss, cited in Iacovides et al. (2003, p. 211); Karger, (1981, 
p. 271); and Schaufeli et al. (2008, p. 173). 
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idea of relation to the centre of conceptual focus.  If imagined visually, many theories 
of work, conventionally conceived, appear thus: 
 
 
 
with the components ‗human‘ and ‗work‘ accentuated (emboldened) and the essential 
connectedness (the dotted line between the two) there-present, logically necessary for 
the progression of the argument, but left implicit and overshadowed by the more 
prominent passages of the argument.  A relational perspective concerns thus a shift in 
focus rather than substance; a squint of the mind‘s eye to bring relation to the forefront: 
 
 
 
Despite the subtlety, there are some serious implications of this manoeuvre, especially 
in a context of mental (ill) health.  First, to acknowledge the importance of connection 
within theories of work is to say that good work is not (just) about the characteristics, 
skills or mental health of particular workers, either individually or collectively as a 
workforce.  Given numerous encroaching trends towards individualism in the mental 
health at work literature, this is significant since highly individualised approaches tend 
to obscure wider organisational, cultural and economic reasons for worker ill health or 
unhappiness (Friedman‘s infamous ‗Type A/ Type B‘ personality traits as a predictor 
of workplace stress are a good example [Friedman and Rosenman, 1974]).  Similarly, 
focusing on relatedness disqualifies the alternative hypothesis that good or healthy or 
therapeutic work is (just) a property of the work itself, as if any one particular form of 
work—gardening or handicrafts, for example—could be identified as equally good for 
everyone (a lingering concern about those therapeutic ideals of work introduced earlier 
in the thesis).  As seen above, the Arts and Crafts movement and Marxism risk being 
read in this light; although, as I shall go on to demonstrate later, this fails to highlight 
their full potential. 
 
Partially, the effect of this ‗squint‘ is a trend towards methodological wholism: the sum 
of the qualities of worker and work are greater together than the sum of both expressed 
separately.  But the effect created is also one of process or dynamism—that the 
presumed collisions and linkages between human and work (which are, of course, in 
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the main imagined) are not just empty finger-spaces between workers and work but are 
themselves filled with characterful presence.   
 
(b) An interest in ‘howness   
 
It‘s not what you do; it‘s the way that you do it.  Again, the subject of this second 
element of relationality concerns shifting attention from the isolated qualities of worker 
and workmanship to the qualities of the working relationship itself.  This notion of 
‗howness‘ covers both structural elements (the terms of one‘s working conditions and 
the qualities of freedom in work) but also dimensions which might vaguely be 
expressed as ‗in the heart‘ of the worker too—what I shall talk about later as matters of 
ethical orientations.  From this latter perspective, from the broad literature on work 
(including that which I have reviewed already in this thesis) a selection of recurring 
imperatives can be identified for how the ‗good‘ worker must relate to his work, most 
of which fall under the general heading of character or virtue ethics.  To provide a 
synthesis:  
 
 You must cultivate in your work a sense of greater purpose beyond personal 
financial gain—be this serving God (cp. Luther), seeking excellence in your 
craftsmanship (cp. Ruskin), or actualising your gattungswesen (cp. Marx). 
 You must seek joy in your work.  As seen above, this was central to the Arts and 
Crafts movement, but see also contemporary organisational psychology and 
management models (a favourite example is the fishmongers of Pike Street Fish-
market, Seattle, who have acquired world fame in their attempt to enjoy their rather 
smelly work.  The fishmongers sing songs, juggle the fish and engage shoppers 
and tourists at the market in participatory fish-throwing fun—and have more 
recently become motivational gurus and consultants on issues of joy at work.)
38
  
 Similarly, you must seek a future in your work.  Marx‘s future was class 
emancipation.  For others, this is the personal ambition of career progression.  Carl 
Rogers (1980), the founder of the humanistic counselling movement, for example, 
describes humans as seedlings, ‗naturally‘ seeking growth and development 
(Rogers called this the ‗human actualising tendency‘).  Failure to exhibit such 
tendencies in the workplace or elsewhere was seen by Rogers as evidence of 
                                                     
38 See the management text, Fish!  A Remarkable Way to Boost Morale and Improve Results (Lundin et 
al., 2001), for an example of these fishmongers‘ motivational merchandise. 
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pathology (and the organic image of seeds and its role in according particular 
character traits such as ambitiousness a seemingly natural status resonates well 
with my earlier comments on vitalism).   
 You must be responsive to your work.  This is a point that will be developed later.  
Tomatoes on the vine cannot be rushed (the first of several points that concern time 
in this chapter); craftwork must respect the qualities of the material as well as of 
the tool.  In work which works upon people (the service industries and helping 
professions, for example), the personhood of the worked-upon as well as the 
worker must be allowed to shape the relationship. 
 
It is fair to say that Marx did not cultivate a virtue approach in his writings on work to 
the extent that had appeared in the romantic or theological traditions.  To a great 
extent, Marx overlooked the individual subjective experience of the worker entirely 
and thus such psychologistic perspectives had little place in Marxist thought—indeed, 
the great paradox of alienation was that the content and committed employee under 
conditions of capitalism would be as alienated as the unhappiest worker, since on a 
structural level both experienced the same abstraction of their labour into the hands of 
their employer.  For some commentators (Mészáros is an example), this observation 
was what was most novel about Marx: that alienation and its eventual transcendence 
(i.e., communist revolution) was an ontological assertion rather than an ethical ought.  
However, it also seems fair to argue that Marx did not avoid this character tradition 
entirely, either: whilst the growing class consciousness that Marx saw as a condition 
for revolution may well have been a matter of ontics over ethics, and whilst the 
relational character virtues I have described above (commitment, mastery, joy, etc.) 
had little place in Marx‘s diagnostics of alienation, a strong relational ethics was 
nonetheless present and is no harder to find than in the Manifesto itself.  In 
‗workingmen of all countries, unite!‘, we see Marx‘s answer to how one should relate 
to one‘s work was this: politically. 
 
(c) A Relational Relationship 
 
Perhaps this is the least instinctive implication of taking seriously the relationality of 
work, and is thus worth examining in slightly more depth.  Put succinctly, observing 
relationality concerns the realisation that people have a relationship with as well as a 
relationship to their work—i.e., that work relates to the worker as well as the worker to 
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the work.  (Perhaps this might also be encapsulated in the semantic difference between 
‗relationship‘ and ‗connection‘, where the former signifies a more sentient and 
reciprocal engagement—although I have not gone as far as to make such differentiation 
in my own writing).  I have called this a relational relationship, not because the term 
adds anything new (what other kind of relation could there be?) but to remind the 
reader (and writer!) of this two-way relation; that is, to pre-empt and guard against the 
anthropocentric metaphysics that will otherwise draw us back into a means of 
conceptualising the link between work and worker that is exclusively human-driven.  
 
Perhaps the most ready illustration of this relational relation can be observed in the 
Judeo-Christian conception of ‗vocation‘ or ‗calling‘ (beruf) as a Godly-guided choice 
of occupation for the individual to best fulfil his purpose in life, which again we might 
trace to the Protestant Revolution and to Luther and Calvin.  In the imagined biblical 
past, men and women had been conscribed to God‘s works by means of direct 
recruitment such as Yahweh‘s dramatic appearance to Moses during the revelation at 
Mount Sinai.  By the age of Luther and Calvin however, God‘s method of calling men 
had turned instead to the more mysterious means of divine providence.  Characteristic 
of a thoroughly rationalistic religion, the Protestant tradition attempted to overcome 
such abandonment by advocating a systematic examination of one‘s aptitudes and 
talents (and the perceived virtues of the trades) as a means to discern one‘s vocation—
Rousseau‘s concerns for a suitable trade for the imaginary Emile are an entertaining 
example: 
   
Emile shall learn a trade.  ‗An honest trade, at least‘ you say.  What do you mean by 
honest?  Is not every useful trade honest?  I would not make him an embroiderer, a 
gilder, a polisher of him, like Locke‘s young gentleman.  Neither would I make him a 
musician, an actor, or an author.  With the exception of these and others like them, let 
him choose his own trade, I do not mean to interfere with his choice.  I would rather 
have him a shoemaker than a poet, I would rather he paved streets than painted flowers 
on china [...] I was wrong.  It is not enough to choose an honest trade, but let us 
remember there can be no honesty without usefulness.  (Rousseau, 1762, p. 172) 
 
Yet (as is the point of the passage in Emile), true calling came from work itself—from 
the land or tools or sentiments of some or other profession.  Whatever Rousseau‘s 
hopes for Emile, ultimately these were futile: ‗the world is full of [workers] who have 
no native gift for their calling, into which they were driven in early childhood, either 
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through the conventional ideas of other people, or because those about them were 
deceived by an appearance of zeal‘ ... ‗this spirit [of work] shall guide our choice of 
trade for Emile, or rather, not our choice but his; for the maxims he has imbibed make 
him despise... vain labours‘ (p. 172).  Signs of calling thus lined the world, guiding the 
receptive worker into action.  In Luther‘s vivid imagery from Psalms, ‗the pious farmer 
sees this verse written on his wagon and plough, a cobbler sees it on his leather and 
awl, a labourer sees it on wood and iron: Happy shalt thou be, and it shall be well with 
thee‘, such calling provided gladness and purpose in work (cited in Applebaum, 1992, 
p. 323).  As Carlyle writes, ignoring such audible cries of work—or being unable to 
answer (as in the instance of underemployment, which is the subject of his concern in 
this extract)—was tantamount to madness: 
 
In the Union Workhouse [...] they sat there, nearby one another; but in a kind of torpor, 
especially in a silence, which was very striking.  In silence: for, alas, what word was to 
be said?  An Earth all lying round, crying, ‗Come and till me, come and reap me‘;—
yet we here sit enchanted! [...] The Sun shines and the Earth calls; and, by the 
governing Powers and Impotences of this England, we are forbidden to obey.  There 
was something that reminded me of Dante‘s Hell in the look of all this, and I rode 
swiftly away.  (Carlyle, 1843, p. 237) 
   
A significance of this ‗relational relationship‘ for human flourishing is that there is a 
certain ‗there-ness‘ or ‗otherness‘ in work; that work acts upon us as we act upon it, 
nurturing particular forms of connection between the mind and reality.  Smith 
discusses this in relation to craft work: 
 
In doing work that demands craft skills we cannot wholly impose ourselves on the 
world of things, yet as we master the work, the gulf between us and things, so often 
cause of baffled alienation, diminishes to the point where we can, as we say, ‗put 
something of ourselves‘ into what we do.  Thus we learn a proper relationship to the 
world, one in which we are neither so distanced from it that, like animals, we can only 
submit to its contingencies and obey its iron law, nor so at one with it that, like gods, 
we can make the world respond to our will as readily as our daydreams do.  (Smith, 
1987, pp. 197–201)   
 
Sennett develops this point helpfully to distinguish between ‗found‘ and ‗made‘ 
resistances and their relation to character virtues such as patience: ‗just as a carpenter 
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discovers unexpected knots in a piece of wood, a builder will find unforeseen mud 
beneath a housing site.  These found resistances contrast to what a painter does who 
scrapes off a perfectly serviceable portrait, deciding to start over again; here the artist 
has put an obstacle in his or her own path‘ (Sennett, 2008, p. 215).  Such resistances—
the refusal of wood or paint to surrender its own properties to the fancy of the 
craftsman—is the prerequisite for work, since without such opposition, action becomes 
like a free-wheeling bicycle with no bite on reality.  Of course, talking in such a way 
about work breeds its own kind of romanticism and I shall return critically to this 
notion of a ‗proper relationship‘ later in the chapter.  In terms of mental health, 
however, a relational relationship with work nonetheless provides some small 
safeguards for sanity.  Work allows for a relationship with the world in which the 
fragile self can be seen to achieve something in its material environment (which is 
important, as Gwyneth—the poet and author we met in the previous chapter—says, it 
is easy to feel powerless in the face of objects when one is depressed, since even the 
inanimate world can appear to have more strength than you [Lewis, 2002]).  Yet being 
forced to face the resistance of work also protects the soul from an unregulated 
megalomanic flooding onto the world—as Smith suggests above, the stuff of 
daydreams—or worse, psychosis, since the psychotic condition is one in which human 
consciousness has become detached from the constraints of a physical reality.
39
   
 
Observing a relational relation (the focus of this subsection) develops the first, wholist 
claim (above) into an examination of the dynamic interplay of the connection between 
man and work.  In diagrammatic form again,  
 
 
 
becomes, 
  
 
Yet, if taken seriously, such thesis also stands as a caveat to the character ethics that 
underwrote much of the second claim (the issue of ‗howness‘), since in a relational 
relationship, connection or attachment are not properties of the individual worker but 
                                                     
39 This position of course draws much from Heidegger, for whom the individual is always ‗thrown‘ into 
the there-ness of existence and for whom authentic existence depends upon finding one‘s unique place in 
the world (Heidegger, 1927). 
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comprise the interactions of both parties (work and worker) as they act upon the 
other.
40
  This notion of relational ethics will be developed in the next point. 
 
(d) A Doctrine of the Mean 
 
Having established that there are relational relations between worker and work, the 
final character of relational theories that I wish to draw out is their implicit 
commitment to an Aristotelian golden mean of relationality—i.e., that it is possible 
both to be too connected and not connected enough to one‘s work—and (following the 
Aristotelian tradition) that transgressions from such norms are contraventions of both 
nature and ethics.
41
  To return briefly to Marxist theory, it is straightforward to say that 
the separation of worker and work that Marx envisaged taking place in capitalism was 
both dangerous and undesirable.  However, as demonstrated in the bee analogy, it is 
equally important to stress that for Marx, some degree of separation between worker 
and work was also not only desirable but requisite for engaging in work at all (put 
more formally, objectification and externalisation are conditions of acting upon the 
world; for Marx, this exterior was of course nature itself).  Ditto, as evidenced in the 
opening line of the quotation from Smith above, in the establishment of an appropriate 
relation of craftsworkers to crafts materials (not too connected, and connected enough).  
Indeed, in this example of craftwork we might remember the patients at the 
Marblehead sanatorium (chapter one, p. 30), who were unable to ever finish the pots 
they were making due to their fears that the wares might break in the firing process, 
and suppose that they had somehow stepped outside this ‗safe‘ range of relatedness.   
 
It is in this construction of a golden mean of relatedness, brought about by the coming 
together of morality and healthiness (nature), that the significance of relationality for a 
study of mental health emerges.  As described above, relating to one‘s work in the right 
way is depicted as an ethical ought but also (as per the tenets of vitalism) one dictated 
                                                     
40 Although this is not to suggest like-for-like reciprocity—for just as Heidegger draws a distinction 
between the way in which the lizard touches the stone and the stone touches the lizard, we realise that the 
metaphorical way in which work touches the human and the human handles his work are not the same but 
have their own particular qualities (Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, in Ingold, 
2010). 
41 Aristotle suggested that all examples of the virtues were caught between the extremes of corresponding 
excess and deficiency, ‗in which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, whilst the intermediate is 
praised and is a form of success; and being praised and being successful are both characteristic of virtue.  
Therefore virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we have seen, it aims at what is intermediate‘ (Nicomachean 
Ethics, Book II, Chapter 6, §24–28).  To Aristotle, the notion of such mean tied together ethical health, 
mental health and physical health and his illustrations are taken from examples as diverse as portion size 
for food, courage and temperance, which consciously traverse all three areas. 
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by the natural laws of human existence.  As such, a series of mini theses can be 
imagined: i. That transgressions from the golden mean constitute pathology, as a sign 
of poor embodied and ethical health; ii. That the limits of healthy relations are defined 
both by nature and by ethical standards; iii. That there is a component of responsibility 
in work-related health—that is, that remaining within the bounds of good relation is the 
personal duty of the individual as well as an effect of broader social structures of work.   
 
In both the clinical context and the construction of everyday pathology, work-based 
illnesses and poor mental habits refer back to these (imaginary, implicit) golden 
relations.  We have already mentioned workaholism and burnout as diseases of 
connection (we shall consider some empirical illustrations shortly).  Perfectionism and 
its antonym, carelessness, are other neat examples—indeed, in the literature, both of 
these deviations from more healthy relations to quality and performance are linked to a 
common psychological flaw: low self-esteem.
42
  The old Freudian concepts, to be 
anally retentive or anally expulsive, also warn of the dangers of transgressing the 
golden mean of appropriate relatedness (leading to fastidious and cautious, or creative 
yet haphazard behaviours respectively)—and whilst such concepts are usually 
dismissed in contemporary psychoanalysis, it is nevertheless striking to note their 
ongoing presence in the conversational diagnosis of common workplace maladies 
(‗he‘s anal‘, etc.). 
 
There is also an ethics of time and space which come to bear on this ‗mental hygiene‘ 
of good worker-work relations (the term mental hygiene, invented in the mid-
nineteenth century to describe a range of personal practices for the maintenance of 
mental and moral wellbeing, is apt here with its connotations of orderliness and 
cleanliness, and is popular in workplace psychology in this context).
43
  As such, the 
hours and days of the week that can be worked, the places in which work can take 
                                                     
42 Particularly in the context of school children.  In the instance of perfectionism, the child is perceived to 
lack the self-esteem and confidence to tolerate mistakes; in carelessness, she does not see herself as 
worthy enough to strive for perfection, or indeed any kind of quality at all.  See Cigman (2009) for a 
discussion. 
43 See, for example, the chapter entitled, ‗Mental hygiene: Working on yourself‘, in Morris and Laufer‘s 
Dysfunctional Workplaces: From Chaos to Collaboration—A Guide to Keeping Sane on the Job (2008).  
The chapter begins, ‗this is the most important chapter in the book, because it‘s about the most significant 
working relationship in your life: your relationship with yourself.  This relationship, your inner life, not 
only shapes how you feel moment by moment, it also determines [...] how well you function at work, and 
how your presence in the workplace impacts everyone else there‘ (p. 169).  Among the many practices 
which are cited in the book as examples of good mental hygiene are management of perfectionism, dealing 
with worry, and behaving in ways to ensure one ‗gets noticed‘ at work without obsessing over whether one 
is ‗getting noticed‘ or not. 
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place, and the micro-organisation of workspace become conscripted into particular 
ethical/health-related significances.  Notwithstanding the drive towards presenteeism 
and the long-hours culture in many workplaces, simultaneously, ‗taking work home‘, 
staying late in the office or failing to maintain a particular work/life balance constitute 
infidelity to one‘s own occupational self-care regimes.  (Later, I introduce Maurice, an 
artist and glassworker who in the height of a manic-creative rush, breaks such norms 
by choosing to work for several days without sleep until a task is done—to the intense 
disapproval of his psychiatrist.  In a rather more sombre story, Ginny—the 
occupational therapy student at the start of this chapter (p. 79, opening quotation)—
talks despondently about how her co-workers chastise her when she stays late in the 
library to catch up on work, which she finds takes her longer than her peers due to the 
sedating side-effects of her anti-psychotic medication.  ‗You‘re naughty—you‘re 
always working‘, they tell her—and eventually she starts smuggling her work home in 
secret or leaving the campus at the same time as them just to turn back when they are 
out of sight).  Management of the volume of papers in one‘s inbox, regulation of one‘s 
desk-tidying practices, resisting (or not) the temptation to open work emails at home 
and ensuring a healthy expulsion of work-related materials from the bedroom 
(common advice for promoting good quality sleep) thus all contribute to the myriad 
ways through which the care of the self must be enacted through the maintenance of 
particular worker-work relations.   
 
(e) A Relationship in Crisis 
 
Finally, in what is less a comment on relationality itself, but more a reflection on 
theories of relation, is a fifth point concerning an ongoing narrative of crisis in which 
worker-work relations are often presented: that is, as dominant modes of production in 
society move ever further from more primitive forms of engaging with work, our 
natural human relationship with work becomes increasingly under threat.  
 
Perhaps the most touching testimony to the centrality of work in Western society is the 
oft-seen temptation to anthropomorphise work and the relations we have with it.  In 
clinical psychology, the loss of work is considered a bereavement in which the person 
who has lost her work must grieve as for the loss of a human relation (Vickers, 2009).  
Such grief and mourning is observed at a cultural level too.  In the wake of the first 
industrial revolution, Marx grieves for earlier modes of artisanship in which ‗the 
  ~ Chapter 3 An ethics of relation ~ 95 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
labourer and his means of production remained closely united, like the snail with its 
shell‘ (Marx, 1906, p. 480)—a vision of wrenching apart which Marx saw as indicative 
of capitalism.  In the second and third revolutions (to automation and then 
deindustrialisation), similar wrenches are documented.  For an evocative and oft-cited 
extract from Braverman: 
 
Thus, after a million years of labour, during which humans created not only a complex 
social culture but in a very real sense created themselves as well, the very cultural-
biological trait upon which this entire evolution is founded has been brought, within 
the last two hundred years, to a crisis, a crisis which Marcuse aptly calls the threat of a 
‗catastrophe of the human essence‘.  The unity of thought and action, conception and 
execution, hand and mind which capitalism threatened from its beginnings, is now 
attacked by a systematic dissolution employing all the resources of science and the 
various engineering disciplines based upon it.  The subjective factor of the labour 
process is removed to a place among its inanimate objective factors.  To the materials 
and instruments of production are added a ‗labour force‘, another ‗factor of 
production‘, and the process is henceforth carried on by management as the sole 
subjective element. (1974, pp. 170–171) 
 
Amidst such narratives of crisis, it is indicative that the essential relation between 
human and work becomes central not just to one‘s working life but to life as a whole.  
Likewise, throughout such narratives, the once structurally defined phenomenon of 
alienation becomes widened to a broader state of cultural malaise and unhappiness 
attributed not only to work-worker relations but to the total system of work and 
consumerism as it unfolds in late capitalism—in the United States, the publication of 
Josephson and Josephson‘s Man Alone: Alienation in Modern Society (1962) catches 
the moment well. 
 
The elements of relationality I have discussed above—wholism, vitalism and an ethics 
of the golden mean—thus come together in the nostalgia of crisis discourse, creating a 
compelling framework for healthy relations to work yet simultaneously always already 
mourning the inevitability of its encroaching end.  
 
Lastly, it is noteworthy that in certain accounts, alienation has also taken a political 
turn to the right in the context of crisis discourse (this is an alienation which owes 
more to Durkheim than Marx, given its focus on social order).  Marx‘s alienation—as 
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we have now established fully—was a structural concern; the severance under the 
conditions of capital between worker and his rightful work or gattungswesen.  The 
new, right-wing alienation instead observes a cultural and psychological alienation of 
specific subgroups of society from the labour market.  Young people, single mothers 
and people on long-term sickness benefits (including the mentally ill) have lost the 
natural narrative pull towards paid employment—an alienation which such subgroups 
self-perpetuate through under-investment in their working lives.  Policy interventions 
to get people back to work (especially in the UK and US) have increasingly followed 
such discourse: the depressed are envisioned to have ‗lost touch‘ with the labour 
market, becoming ‗trapped‘ in a culture of benefit dependency (note the difference 
here to Carlyle‘s enchanted unemployed workers in the Workhouse above, wherein 
again an experience of entrapment is described but in which instance appears to the 
horror and angst of the workers who are unable to respond to the World‘s calls).  
According to such models, ongoing cycles of despair are thus created: depression leads 
to worklessness which leads to alienation which leads to more depression.  Notions of 
in-work alienation of the kind Marx discussed—if mentioned at all—become 
overridden by talks of financial incentives such as ‗minimum wage‘ or ‗working tax 
credits‘ as if these counteract the need for a more vital human fulfilment in work.  Such 
ideas are not developed further in this chapter but are worth holding in attention due to 
their clear impact on mental health policies.  
 
Relationality, Work and Mental Ill Health  
 
Having established more explicitly some features of a relational focus to work and its 
relevance to mental ill health, in the remainder of this chapter I turn to some empirical 
case studies to explore how relationality might inform an analysis of the narratives of 
people with mental health problems, but also to provide some way of critiquing the 
implicit assumptions of appropriate relationality that classic theories of relations have 
harboured.  The reasons for introducing so-called ‗clinical‘ populations (i.e., people 
with diagnoses of mental illness) to the discussion are multifold.  First, if we think we 
have established grounds for a ‗right‘ or ‗healthy‘ relation to work and workmanship, 
then considering the narratives of people with unusual work relations provides one way 
of exploring what becomes of those who transgress such borders—that is to say, those 
who appear too connected or not connected enough to their work.  (To add some 
indicative questions: Is, as some of the classic perspectives suggest, madness or mental 
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ill health an inevitable result of poor worker-work relations?  And conversely, are such 
‗alternative‘ relations between work and worker in and of themselves sufficient 
evidence to identify pathology?)  Second, a focus on ‗mad‘ relations addresses a 
current lacuna in the literature: in psychiatric literature as it is with theories of work, 
notions of relationality are ever-present, often even casting the moulds of psychiatric 
diagnoses themselves (‗attachment disorders‘ as the most obvious of examples)—
however, as it is with work theories, rarely are psychiatric accounts of ill health 
explicitly discussed in vocabularies of relation as I have framed them here.   
 
However, it is not my purpose to spend the remainder of this chapter arguing that 
relationality should instead become the new centre point of research into work and 
mental health (for to do so would of course itself give way to a new form of 
reductionism).  Rather, what I hope to do next is, using the narratives of individuals 
living with mental health difficulties, to explore how our assumptions of relationality 
(and particularly of the ‗right‘ relation) often falter in the empirical context.  In what 
might be read as a series of disruptions to the ethico-medical basis of the golden mean 
of relation, the four major points with which I take issue here concern i. the privileging 
of particular types of work for healthy relationality; ii. the romanticisation of the 
worker-work relation, illustrated by the compacting of alienation into a disease of 
under-connection only; iii. the primacy of the task in work-worker vitalism (another 
form of romanticism about work); lastly, iv. the notion that work-worker relations 
which transgress the implicit mean of good relation are necessarily damaging. 
 
Suitable Work 
 
We shall begin with some very simple points: in the first instance, to speak to the 
virtue ethics I discussed in (b) above.  We should cultivate in ourselves, we are told, 
connections to our work which contain joy, ambition, purity, attunedness, etc.—and 
that such good relations will then go on to nurture our wellbeing further.  Yet, do the 
appropriateness and opportunity for such orientations not depend themselves on the 
type and quality of the work we are undertaking?  It is worth expanding these questions 
in light of the discussion of craftsmanship above, to focus on a particular material—
glass, the production of which has been associated with the North East Coast since the 
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early eighteenth century.
44
  Maurice and Simon, both of whom are glassworkers, each 
in different ways describe their relation to this material and to their work.  Maurice is 
an artist and glassblower who rents workshop space and a retail unit in a visitor craft 
attraction.  He is one of the individuals in this research project who treasures his 
madness for the creativity it bestows upon him—and yet whilst he sees value in his 
madness for assisting him in his work, he also sees the value of his material 
connectedness to his work in keeping him in grounded contact with the material world: 
 
When I get some shop time [i.e., rented time in the workshop], the glass is just right 
[...]  I stop noticing the heat or thinking about the people watching me.  Hot glass looks 
like cold glass—that is what they teach you at art school, so you learn to be careful 
because you are talking three thousand degrees.  But it means you have to use your 
instinct, you have to feel it [...] Your whole body gets in line with the glass, I feel very 
in touch with the glass. 
 
(We will come back to Maurice in the next chapter.)  Simon‘s experience of glasswork 
however comes in the form of factory work in a plant making industrial-grade glazing 
panels further down the coast.  The job, from which he resigned eight years ago, was a 
major tipping point in his nervous breakdown—and a particular incident to which he 
returns was his involvement in a serious industrial accident in which a colleague lost a 
limb after one of the panels fractured when he lifted it.  As Simon describes it, the 
accident had been ‗waiting to happen‘ not only because of managerial corner-cutting 
with regard to health and safety and the quality of raw materials (triggered in part by 
the economic difficulties of sustaining a manufacturing industry in the UK in the face 
of international competition), but also because the automation of the glass making 
process stopped employees having a good practical knowledge of the glass.  It is worth 
quoting a section of the conversation at length:  
 
Myself:  Would you describe it as a skilled job? 
Simon:  Yes.  Well, no. Semi-skilled.  It‘s more about nerve than skill.  It was a bit of a 
dangerous game really and there was no health and safety or anything like that.  As my 
confidence got worse, I was never really one for missing work but it got to any excuse 
not to show up on a morning.  I just didn‘t have the nerve to pick up the sheets of glass 
                                                     
44 Elliott makes this point more polemically in his critique of the contemporary tendency to treat work-
dissatisfaction and alienation as if it were a clinical disorder: ‗What could a psychiatrist say to the happy 
slave?  What could he say to an alienated Sisyphus as he pushes the boulder up the mountain?  That he 
would push the boulder more enthusiastically, more creatively, more insightfully, if he were on Prozac?‘ 
(Elliott, 2000, p. 11) 
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anymore.  That‘s also how you cut yourself, not just if you‘re too cocky but if you‘re 
frightened of it, if you‘re too wary of it. 
Myself:   So you have to have just the right amount of confidence then?  Not too much, 
not too little? 
Simon:  Yes, the people who are too confident are the ones that tend to get hurt.  It‘s a 
dangerous game.  That was what happened to Wilf.  It was the management‘s fault, we 
never had gloves nor hats nor anything like that that we were supposed to in the 
factory, but Wilf had got too cocky with the glass.  When you pick up a structure 
you‘re meant to check it for runs or anything and he didn‘t.  He just picked it up and 
that was it.  
 
(In the aftermath of this incident, Simon explains how, after the injured worker had 
been taken in the ambulance, Simon had been refused permission to leave the floor to 
get changed, even though he was covered in blood and was very shaken).  In these two 
stories, then, Simon and Maurice both see their relatedness to the ‗there-ness‘ of the 
glass as tightly bound with their mental health (or lack of it): in Maurice‘s case, a 
healthful relation which supports his wellbeing, and in Simon‘s case, the breakdown of 
a relation which in the end makes him incapable of work in the glass industry at all 
(‘I m not trained for anything else but I m scared of the glass now ).  More than just 
illustrations of good and bad relationships however, these stories demonstrate how the 
ethical properties of glass are inscribed differently in different contexts of work and 
how the structures and qualities of employment make appropriate different kinds of 
relatedness with one‘s work (would we not worry about an employee who was entirely 
blasé about the accident at the factory or for whom such an experience did not alter at 
all their relation with the material?).  The entry on glassblowing in Diderot‘s 
Encyclopédie of the arts and crafts (1751–1772) is interesting to historicise this point.  
The anonymous author (possibly Voltaire, according to some sources) describes how 
the natural bubbles and irregularities of handmade glass are virtues, both giving the 
glass a distinctiveness or ‗character‘ that makes it unique, but also developing in the 
craftsman a more patient understanding of his own limitations as a worker.  The 
introduction of the rolling machine—the first technology to make window panes a 
workable possibility—is described both with an Enlightenment enthusiasm for 
progress but also with an already-present concern for the loss of these ethical 
boundaries that hand-blown glass had naturally provided (Diderot and d‘Alembert, 
Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire Raisonné des Sciences, des Arts et des Métiers, 
discussed in Sennett, 2008, pp. 88–104).  Yet rather than see Maurice and Simon as 
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reflective of an undifferentiated narrative of crisis in worker-work relations, we might 
add more nuanced details too.  Maurice‘s work is not straightforwardly a traditional 
form of craftsmanship but itself is a reaction against the staidness of much commercial 
art (and more broadly, as we shall discuss in the next chapter, Maurice‘s decision to 
work full-time as an artist reflects his desire for a celebratory lifestyle of creativity that 
suits the manic aspects of his personality).  Just as the arts centre in which his 
workshop is based celebrates the regeneration of an industrial landscape into one for 
leisure and economic re-growth, Maurice uses reclaimed industrial glass found along 
the North East beaches to re-inscribe meaning to decorative glasswork.  Likewise, the 
factory in which Simon (and his father, and his father‘s father too) had spent all their 
working lives—at the point of Simon‘s breakdown and the industrial accident—was 
not the home of the experimental rolling machine of its day, but a struggling business 
in an industry in decline in a local region which no longer expected itself to have 
international prestige for the goods it manufactured.  It is all of these factors that must 
be taken into account together, beyond the virtue ethics espoused by the ‗joy at work‘ 
scholars and the Pike Street Fishermen, to understand the possibilities and nuances of 
work-worker relations.    
 
Illustrating the impact of the structural, technological and cultural environment on our 
relatedness to work is thus useful in understanding the plurality of work-worker 
relations, and the examples of Maurice and Simon are indicative of arguments about 
the largely negative human consequences of moving away from more traditional work 
forms (the narrative of crisis, discussed above).  However, if this takes us to the idea 
that different kinds of work have different levels of quality (a central idea in the 
narratives of crisis/degradation of work arguments above), to turn this on its head, we 
might simultaneously state that ideas about the kinds of work in which we are 
presumed to find quality are themselves governed by romantic ideals.  As seen in 
chapter one, particular forms of work have long been considered (in a relatively 
untested way) to have especial healthful or therapeutic qualities: craftwork, traditional 
manufacturing occupations, gardening and other nature work, (sometimes) the helping 
professions and other romantic occupations too; whilst simultaneously other types of 
work—the call centre, the fast-food restaurant—gain for themselves a bad name.  As 
shown in chapter one, this has long been a concern of the therapeutic traditions, but in 
the contemporary scholarly literature on work, a resurgence in such neo-romanticism 
has again been seen, with particular emphasis on the value of embodied, ‗handy‘, 
‗thingy‘ work-forms—Crawford‘s somewhat unsubtly titled, The Case for Working 
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With Your Hands, or Why Office Work is Bad for You and Why Fixing Things Feels 
Good captures the mood (for further examples, see Tallis, 2003; O. James, 2007; Warr, 
2007; Sennett, 2008).   
 
Without wishing to reject all value in these ideas (and I recall individuals such as Ryan 
and Kev from the previous chapter for whom exactly these kinds of work—the gentle 
activities of gardening and craft—have exactly the therapeutic properties described), 
Sennett‘s utter dismissal—ridicule almost—of the apparently abstract work of the 
Computer Aided Design technicians he describes in The Craftsman, for example, poses 
serious difficulties for understanding Amy, another participant in my project, for whom 
computer-based design work is an activity (and a career) which has a total therapeutic 
absorbedness in very concrete ways.  Similarly, whilst working as a dental nurse might 
seem highly suitable for Karen, who has a germ phobia and hates to see her hands 
looking dirty, the ‗getting oily‘ that Crawford recommends in mechanical work is 
unlikely to work out for her so well.  Whilst these points might seem as simple as the 
observations of the studio/factory above, again in reading the literature on ‗good‘ work, 
on craftsmanship, on the merits of working with our bodies and our hands and being 
(literally) in touch with the world, it really can become difficult to remember that for 
others, more abstract work, disembodied work, office work (repetitive work, even) can 
be experienced as equally acceptable and sometimes more preferable to more 
traditionally therapeutic occupations.  We shall continue these discussions with some 
further empirical examples below. 
 
Alienation/Desiring Connection  
 
If theories of relation to work are susceptible to the romanticisation of particular 
(hands-on, crafty) occupations, then what of alienation?  Alienation, as I have argued 
above, is presented to us as the archetypal disease of relation and also the archetypal 
disease of capitalist modernity—as Baudrillard has it, a total alienation constituting not 
only the pains of the workplace but the ‗very structure of market society‘ (1986, p. 
190).  Yet how do we visualise alienation?  What kind of cameo or case study can best 
represent the alienated worker?  The first answer, typically, has been ‗no-one‘.  This is 
the great Marxist crisis of empirics—since the alienated worker is obscured from 
recognising his or her own alienation (i.e., the condition of false consciousness) there 
is no one figurehead to say ‗I am alienated‘.  A second answer invokes a witness: with 
102  ‗Working Through‘: An Inquiry into Work and Madness  
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
no agent to say ‗I am-‘ the witness testifies to the state of alienation as they experience 
it in others.  Guest quotes from an interview with an assembly worker‘s wife at the 
height of 1970s automation:   
 
He comes home at night, plops down in a chair, and just sits for about fifteen minutes.  
I don‘t know much about what he does in the plant, but it does something to him.  
(Cited in Meakin, 1976, p. 11, emphasis added)  
 
A third answer invokes everyday low-level under-fulfilment, as Sayers describes, ‗a 
general sense of meaninglessness, malaise or discontentment‘ (Sayers, 2005, p. 609)—
neither mad nor dangerous, just empty and pervasive.  Variously then, alienation 
appears in the background rather than foreground, as chronic rather than acute, as 
neurotic not psychotic, and as normal and normalised rather than disturbing and 
extraordinary.  In the point I wish to develop here, alienation also appears 
predominantly as an under- rather than over- connection between worker and work.  
Yet historically, we know this is not inevitable: referring briefly to my earlier points on 
the Aristotelian mean of ‗good‘ relations, alienation in a technical sense refers merely 
to the transgression of relationships from this healthy ideal: literally, a making alien or 
making strange of connection).  What then of the over-connected alienated?  I shall 
turn to some examples. 
 
Sally is a cashier in a supermarket.  She works long and late hours.  She has become 
increasingly convinced that her body is part of the till: that her hands transferring 
money from customer to cash-drawer are just part of the machinery, and her bright 
persona (‗Do you want any help with your packing?‘) pre-programmed.  Appropriately 
for a machine, she has actually lost feeling in both arms: indeed it was this symptom 
rather than feelings of mental ill-health that encouraged her to consult her doctor.  
 
Barbara is a solicitor, the first of her family to complete higher education and join a 
‗profession‘.  The only female employee in her firm, she feels progressively under 
siege at her workplace; increasingly suspecting her male counterparts of ‗stealing‘ her 
work and systematically confiscating from her the prestigious contracts she has won (a 
claim that is eventually upheld in an employment tribunal).  Describing her success as 
the ‗only thing that had ever made [her] parents happy‘, Barbara refuses to take time 
off work due to fear of falling behind.  Frequently spending all night at the office, 
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Barbara gradually loses the ability to leave her desk or belongings unattended, and 
eventually invests in a laptop and portable workstation which she carries everywhere—
including on trips to the bathroom—to prevent other potential attacks on her 
workmanship.  She has also begun recording on a Dictaphone the day-to-day activities 
of the office so that it might be used in evidence if necessary.  Alarmed by such 
behaviours, Barbara‘s supervisors recommend again that she goes home, but Barbara 
says she feels happier remaining in the office.  Days later she is arrested and 
‗sectioned‘ under the mental health act after refusing to leave the office block foyer, 
where she had been found asleep, laptop and portable workstation in hand, in the 
middle of the day.   
 
Michael owned a motorcycle repair business that he had built up whilst working at the 
local coal mine as a youngster.  When the mine closed, Michael survived by turning to 
the bikes full-time and for nearly a decade the business flourished.  However, when a 
change in EU legislation flooded the UK with ‗parallel imports‘ of new motorcycles 
the market for second-hand parts collapsed and the business failed.  Michael too 
collapsed.  No other work—separate from the bikes and business he loved so much—
seemed palatable.  After several failed attempts at finding similar employment 
opportunities, he cleared the premises, gave away his dog and drove to a motorway 
service station to kill himself.  (As it happened, he survived.)  
 
What can be said about these case studies?  In accordance with the overarching 
argument of this chapter, understanding the relationship that each of these individuals 
have with their work seems essential to understanding their emotional experiences (and 
in a way that appears much richer than simply citing a psychiatric diagnosis).  Yet such 
individuals are not ‗alienated‘ in the simplest sense of severed connections; rather, it is 
that worker and work are too entwined—i.e., it is the character and quality of the 
working relation itself that has become alien.  These narratives are not without their 
politics: in each, broader conditions of capitalism may speculatively be said to have 
‗done something‘ to the person—the physical merging of self and work reported by 
Sally reminiscent of the Chaplin sketch where Chaplin, playing an assembly line 
worker, becomes wrenched into the movements and mechanisms of the machinery 
(Modern Times, 1934).  Yet the quiet portrait of alienation (exhaustion) in Glass‘s 
assembly workers neglects this second, over-connected distortion between worker and 
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work.  To quote from a different witness, the sister of one the workers portrayed in 
Kaiser‘s expressionist play, Gas: 
 
I speak of my brother!  I did not know that I had a brother.  A man went out of the 
house in the morning and came back in the evening—and slept.  Or he went in the 
evening and was back in the morning—and slept.  One hand was large, the other small.  
The large hand never slept.  It moved constantly to and fro—day and night.  It fed on 
him and grew out of his whole strength.  This hand was the man!  Where was my 
brother then?  Who played by my side and build sandcastles with his two hands?  He 
rushed to work.  Work needed only one hand from him—that pressed and raised the 
lever.  (Soliloquy of a gas worker‘s sister, Kaiser, 1973, p. 179) 
  
Are Sally‘s or Barbara‘s or Michael‘s connections with work vital?  Certainly, as for 
Kaiser‘s gas worker above, they are corporeal, reshaping the body and delineating 
sleep and movement and—in the case of Michael‘s suicide attempt—nearly life itself.  
Vitality as a life-force connecting work and worker can thus be destructive as well as 
wonderful.  The alienation of under-connection is important to the study of (non) 
flourishing work.  But a full theory of relation must account for overly vital, overly 
connected relations to work as well. 
 
Questioning Vitalism 
 
The next disruption again concerns vitality, this time with regard to the ‗essence‘ of 
work to which humans are presumed to be connected.  Described above, Marx‘s 
alienation comprised not one but four dislocations: i. between worker and the product 
of his work; ii. between workers and their working conditions; iii. between worker and 
his fellow workmates; and iv. the connection between humankind and his destiny 
(gattungswesen).  In each, we can see how a subtly different meaning of the word 
‗work‘ is advanced, and thus a different connection supposed:  
 
i.   worker---work / task of work (verb, ‘I am working‘)  
ii.  worker---work / product of activity (noun, ‗a sample of my work‘) 
iii. worker---work / socio-temporal-spatial conditions of work (work as a workplace, ‗I 
am at work‘) 
iv. worker---work / the community of workers (‗I am in work ) 
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Yet how is this pluralism treated in accounts which try to develop relational ideas 
empirically?  Whilst slightly dated, a useful and oft-cited paper in terms of the empirics 
of (Marxist) alienation is Braybrooke‘s classic; see particularly the following extract:  
 
It may be asserted that there are three conditions under any one of which, according to 
Marx, a worker, N, is alienated from his work, X: first, if he does not have an intrinsic 
purpose in doing X, whether this is because he does not know what the Y is that doing 
X can be expected to lead to, or because he has only an extrinsic purpose in doing X; 
second, if he does not have a sense of purpose in doing X or third, if the Y in question 
is produced for exchange without prior arrangement between N and the buyer, and 
there was no opportunity, in the course of developing a common plan in which he and 
all other productive member of society had a voice, to consider whether there were no 
socially more useful alternatives to N‘s doing X.  (Braybrooke, 1988, p. 71) 
 
After positing these claims, Braybrooke fleshes out numerous empirical synopses that 
problematise such statements.  First, there is the person following the instructions of a 
trusted leader who feels great purpose in her work yet knows little about the overall 
strategy or goal of the project.  Then, there is the person who believes in and finds 
purpose in her work but is not currently able to sense its purpose (for example, because 
it is too tiring both to do the work and at the same time maintain a subjective 
awareness of its purpose) yet who nevertheless continues doing it until the point she 
can say, ‗it is done!‘  (Undertaking a lengthy piece of research, such as a doctoral 
thesis, might be a good example here.)  
 
There is much in Braybrooke‘s analysis which appears helpful here.  However, taking 
Braybrooke as an example of a genre of relational thinking, the critique of classic 
accounts of alienation I wish to develop here is that in his focus on purpose, i.e., the 
task of the work (sense i. above), Braybrooke neglects the other semantic possibilities 
of the essence of work.  
 
To turn once more to my case studies: Ian (who has lived with bipolar depression for a 
number of decades) owns and manages a railway station.  He is passionate about trains 
and is one of few remaining independent stationmasters in the UK.  During crises in 
his mental health, Ian has arranged to be admitted not to his nearest hospital (a 
purpose-built unit on the outskirts of town) but the older inner-city psychiatric hospital 
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which is in sight and sound of the rail tracks—a source of great comfort to him during 
his distress since he can watch the trains go by.  Yet despite this clear connection to his 
work, the day-to-day tasks of managing the station (organising staff, consulting with 
train companies, meeting and greeting passengers) constitute only part of Ian‘s 
connection to work.  In a deliberate pun, Ian says besides the work-itself, work is also a 
‗platform‘, linking him to a range of wider social benefits ranging from status and 
friendship among colleagues to opportunities for civic engagement in business clubs 
and local associations and an outlet for his Christian calling—through the station, 
numerous charity and missionary events have been promoted.  Whilst work is a task 
(managing the station), it is also a time and place and set of social conventions; and it 
is these together which hold importance for Ian.  
 
June, however, a long-term sufferer of anxiety, works in an office which deals with 
customer accounts.  On asking her to narrate the story of her recovery, work features 
prominently.  Yet the work itself (data processing, basically) appears little in what she 
says.  Indeed, when she is asked what she actually does, answers instead tend to be on 
the lines of ‗I work under such-and-such supervisor‘, or ‗we process stuff that comes 
from the applications department‘.  On pressing harder, it appears quite difficult for 
June to describe for what the records she is entering will be used or how her treatment 
of the figures will be helpful to the organisation at large.  Certainly the matter has little 
personal consequence for her (‗well I just keep the records up-to-date, really‘... ‗I don‘t 
really think about what I‘m doing, I just zone out‘).  In many ways, June‘s apparent 
lack of connection to the work—her inability to articulate it, even—appear classic 
signs of alienated, abstract labour, yet it is far from true to suggest June does not like 
her work; indeed, when the prospect of a transfer to another department arose on the 
grounds of her mental health difficulties, she resisted this strongly: ‗It‘s a good unit I 
work in, I like the people, I have lunch breaks with a friend, people here will make me 
a cup of tea if I‘m feeling low‘.45  Instead, meaning for June is derived from the 
rhythms of lunch-breaks and tea-breaks and the day-to-day generic activities of being-
in-an-office.  On the second time we meet, the department has a new procurement 
system for ordering office supplies which is confusing and stressful; on our fourth 
interview (in the run up to Christmas), there are parties to be planned and someone has 
hung baubles on the yucca plant.  Such events are unexceptional but meaningful 
milestones in June‘s recovery.  The purchasing system is more complex than its 
                                                     
45 These comments might be seen as good illustrations of the ‗natural supports‘ present in paid 
employment that I discussed in chapter one, p. 44. 
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predecessor; this gives June an anxious few days as she feels unconfident in learning 
new skills but she is delighted to find she has coped.  Christmas is a milestone—last 
year she would not have felt able to attend the office party, but this year she‘s made it. 
   
What is interesting about these details is their simultaneous workfulness yet 
worklessless.  Parties, stationery orders, maintenance of the office pot-plant are 
undoubtedly part of ‗going to work‘ yet have little to do with work (verb) itself, just as 
Ian‘s civic and Christian engagements are made possible by his paid work but have 
little or nothing to do with train stations.  Referring back to the Braybrooke quotation 
at the beginning of this sub-section, Ian‘s connections to work traverse the conditions 
i–iv: he enjoys the work; he owns the product of his work; he gains much from the 
socio-spatial-temporalities of working (as he says, work is a platform).  For June 
however, work-itself features little in her recovery story: to re-quote Braybrooke, her 
motivation is not in ‗doing X‘ but in being at the place where X happens.  Yet it is 
evident that in different ways, both benefit significantly from their employment in 
terms of their mental health recovery. 
 
As a final example, Phil worked as a PE teacher in a secondary school—a job he 
professed to like and which he was good at and in which he frequently engaged in 
additional voluntary tasks above and beyond the duties expected of him by his 
colleagues or managers.  When Phil became ill with depression and insomnia however, 
he found he no longer wanted a job that enthused him or that stretched him to his full 
potential and, in returning to work after a period off sick, chose employment as a driver 
for a delivery firm—a post he says suits him much better as he can ‗switch off‘, feel 
okay about not always working his hardest, and can avoid sleepless nights thinking 
about the next day—something that had proved a real problem during his teaching 
career.  Whilst this example is by no means extraordinary it is useful here for two 
reasons: first, it introduces the idea of voluntary career downgrading (a comparatively 
common decision made by workers in the context of improving ‗work/life balance‘ or 
the ‗slow living movement‘) without the inherent romanticisation of particular forms of 
work that often accompanies such moves.  Unlike the individuals who sacrifice high-
power, high-paid jobs for lower-paying alternatives that in other ways fulfil them (and 
there were these individuals in my research), Phil moves in the opposite direction: 
from a job he enjoys and which many would see as fulfilling to a faceless role in a 
large corporation.  Phil thus disrupts the idea that there are particular forms of work 
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that are always and necessarily ‗good quality‘ for everyone (and the presence of some 
teachers later in this thesis who find their work extremely important to their mental 
health helps to make this point more vivid).  Yet Phil‘s story also disrupts, somewhat 
disconcertingly, the idea that liking the activity of one‘s employment is always 
desirable—again, in contrast to the oft-heard stories of stressed out teachers inundated 
with marking and bureaucracy—Phil‘s restlessness at night was not always due to 
worry or frustration about the school day ahead but excitement, anticipation and 
mental rehearsal of tomorrow‘s events.46  
 
Despite the humanist appeal of vitalism, a vital connection between oneself and one‘s 
activity may not then be the only or indeed the most important way in which work can 
be therapeutic.  To pander to idealism, we might say that it is preferable for workers to 
be placed in work which fulfils them both through task and environment.  Yet in terms 
of a mature theory of relations, before disregarding the possibility of any therapeutic 
work which doesn‘t focus solely on the doingness of work, attention to ‗platforms‘ and 
Marx‘s work-forms ii–iv must also be considered. 
 
The Right Relation 
 
Finally, what can be made of the claims above that there is a right way to relate to 
one‘s work, or a healthy way?  If appropriate relationality exists as an Aristotelian 
mean between on the one hand workaholism and the other disengaged alienation, are 
such extremes then clinical or ethical dilemmas?  If evidence of ‗dangerous‘ 
relationality can be found—the stories of Barbara or Michael, for example—does this 
therefore provide a positive basis for delineating particular ways in which an individual 
ought to relate to his or her work? 
 
June has already taken us part of the way through this argument.  Despite her formal 
alienation from the ‗doingness‘ of her work, June likes her job and finds it helpful to 
her mental health.  Her relationship to the tasks of the work is scarcely ‗vital‘—it 
matters little to June what data she is processing; indeed, frequently she doesn‘t know.  
                                                     
46 The growing interest in ‗slow living‘ and associated ideas of downgrading, downshifting and voluntary 
demotion (see also slow food, slow travel, slow schools) describes itself as a ‗growing cultural shift 
towards slowing down‘ and addressing the time paucity of late capitalist life.   
See http://slowmovement.com/ and www.slowplanet.com for some community resources, or Merrifield‘s 
The Wisdom of Donkeys (2009) or Parkins and Craig‘s (2009) Slow Living for academic, autobiographical 
accounts. 
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However, her articulate explanations of what she does like about her job (the socio-
spatial-temporalities of employment) convince us that her relation to work is at the 
least doing her no harm.  Similarly, Ian, the stationmaster, occupies a space outside of 
‗ordinary‘ working relations—frequently working through the night or through 
weekends, investing most of his personal savings into his business, and as mentioned 
above, even arranging his medical care so that he can be close to the railway he loves.  
Yet vociferously Ian rejects the notion that his constant long working hours and 
eccentric business ideas are ‗just‘ an element of his manic condition.  Rather, he says 
simply that he likes his work, that he is good at it, and that there is a lot of work to be 
done. 
 
However, I do not wish to cite June and Ian as anomalies in an otherwise sound 
framework; rather, the argument I am presenting is that there are serious problems in 
imagining these narrow bands of ‗appropriate‘ relationality as healthy or desirable.  
Bob works in a cake factory: much of his job consists of scraping out cake tins before 
they go into an industrial dishwasher.  He is an intelligent man with a daughter about to 
start university, but the idea that he might seek ‗career progression‘ seems to baffle 
him.  ‗It‘s warm, the pay‘s okay, they don‘t mind if you eat the leftovers.  Why would I 
want to change to something else?‘  Yet when he is diagnosed with depression his lack 
of ambition is taken as one more symptom of his illness; furthermore, when he enters 
counselling to explore the causes of his depression, working in a job which is ‗below 
his ability‘ is automatically seen by the counsellor as a problematic area in his life.  
 
Michael—the motorbike mechanic from above—started his mental health ‗career‘ at 
the point of his suicide attempt with a diagnosis of clinical (reactive) depression at the 
collapse of his business: an unsurprising diagnosis, given the facts.  A couple of years 
later, still out of work and having turned down several offers of rehabilitative work 
placements in jobs that were of no interest to him, when Michael explained to his 
psychiatrist how happy his motorcycle business had made him, the diagnosis got 
‗upgraded‘ to manic (bipolar) depression: ‗no one should be that happy in their work, I 
was told—you were either imagining it or you were high!‘.  
 
Hattie‘s career to-date has consisted of numerous phases: after abandoning a place 
reading theology at Oxford, Hattie became a pastry chef, and after that, a columnist for 
a London magazine.  However, failing to build a consistent theme for the column, 
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Hattie was not offered a permanent position and resorted to freelance journalism 
instead—writing on a range of topics from spirituality to culinary fashion.  Hattie is 
diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD), a condition of ‗emotional 
instability‘ relatively common among young female graduates.  BPD is characterised 
by frequent changes of mood and identity—including (according to the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Illness) frequent changes to job and career choice: Like 
Bob and Michael, Hattie‘s relation to work is seen both as a clinical symptom of her 
‗illness‘, a personal behavioural deficiency exacerbating her condition, and evidence of 
her pathology.   
 
On balance, it seems unlikely that Michael‘s love for the motorbike business is ‗truly‘ 
evidence of a clinical pathology.  If Michael‘s passion had instead been selling 
insurance or toilet brushes we might still forge ahead with this argument as a purely 
analytic strategy; however, a boyhood love of motorbikes turning into a decade-long 
business success story would for many bikers be a ‗dream job‘.  Indeed, even in the 
academic literature on work, motorbike repair is accorded a particular romance 
(Persig‘s 1974 novel, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance is the classic 
example; thirty years later, Crawford‘s above mentioned monograph also takes 
motorcycle repair as the archetypal ‗good‘ occupation).  Michael‘s ‗obsession‘ (if we 
must think of it in this way) taps into a cultural narrative about masculinity and 
motorbikes; it is not an individual madness.  
 
Similarly, could Hattie‘s ‗borderline‘ personality not indeed be a more general 
manifestation of late capitalist culture?  Of portfolio career-making?  Of a (very 
understandable) rejection of the corporate fast-track schemes which have become a 
cliché for graduate job-hunters or of the career-building pressures which appear to have 
driven Barbara and many others to literal insanity?  Indeed, in this latter sense, might 
Hattie‘s relationship to her career development be less evidence of madness or frivolity 
and more a sign of caring for or safeguarding her health, especially if she is aware that 
she is particularly susceptible to emotional stress (which she is).  
 
Focusing on relations can thus obscure subtle distinctions about what is ‗natural‘ and 
what is simply expected; and between what might be considered unusual and the point 
at which such unusualness becomes pathological.  Similarly, any attempt to discern 
‗appropriate‘ relations must be particularly sensitive to the distinction between what is 
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undesirable on an absolute ethical level and what simply fails to fit with current modes 
of ideal citizenship.  Sceptical and ‗anti-psychiatric‘ critiques of psychiatric diagnosis 
have long established a historic link between the categorisations of certain populations 
as ‗pathological‘ and the needs of a capitalist workforce: Hattie must learn to commit 
to a career path and Michael must sacrifice his motorbikes for a more profitable type of 
employment if the logic of capitalism is to go unchallenged.  Emotionally and 
existentially, it may or not be the case that Hattie, Michael and Bob would become 
happier if they changed the relations they had with their work (or the relations that 
work had with them); however, this is sharply different from identifying pathology on 
the basis of their non-compliance.  
 
Conclusion: Returning to Ethics 
 
Shifting the conceptual focus from work or worker to the relations between the two is a 
subtly radical manoeuvre.  If we are prepared to believe that it is the character of 
relationship that is at stake, then the locus of the problem is not the individual and 
neither is it the work, but rather the interaction between them.  Again, this goes further 
than to say that the individual relates to her work ‗wrongly‘ but rather stresses a two-
way relationality between worker and work that surpasses the characteristics of either 
alone.  From the perspectives of a social model of mental distress, such moves are 
welcome because not only do they allow for a pluralist vision of what kinds of work 
may be satisfying for individuals, they also move beyond a culture of blaming the 
individual for what are considered to be his or her own problems in living.  However, 
given the infancy of such study (or rather, the infancy of such study in any explicit 
form), there are numerous places where further consideration is needed to expose the 
relation of relation to mental health.  The purpose of this chapter, as I have conceived 
it, has been just to raise a few of these issues.  
 
As I have phrased it here, the initial issue I have raised with theories of work relation 
concerns primarily the romanticisation of the relationship between worker and work, as 
evident in much of the classic work literature.  In the first ‗difficulty‘ I discussed, the 
(unguarded) desirability of connection is called into question, with destructive and 
damaging examples of over-connectedness to one‘s work introduced as counter-
illustrations to more common visions of (disconnected) alienation.  Next the 
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romanticism of ‗doingness‘—the vitality thesis of activity-as-humanity—is re-
examined in terms of its primary position in therapeutic discourses surrounding work.   
 
Finally, the chapter expresses concern with the normative governance of relationality 
in the context of psychiatric sub-populations, which as I have shown in my empirical 
examples, has possibilities for harm.  The idea that one ought to be connected to one‘s 
work in any particular way is of course an ethical one (as the word ‗ought‘ implies).  
However, such statements are articulated only rarely in an explicit language of ethics.  
Certainly this is the case in Marx, for example, where the ‗impotent ‗ought‘‘ of human 
nature is presented as the natural laws of ‗species life‘ (Mészáros, 1979, p. 72).  
Instead, in romanticising and reifying the connection between work and worker, the 
ethics of work fail to recognise themselves as these—value statements bound by tastes 
and cultures.  Instead of emphasising the importance of relationality (a helpful move in 
my opinion), such views also presume what such ‗healthy‘ relations might be like, as if 
based on innocent facts about what a healthy human being is like and needs.  In such 
views, deviations from prescribed relations—workaholism, burnout, lack of career 
progression, etc.—appear as unhealthy pathologies as readily as they do moral 
failings.  It is not the ethics of relation themselves that are problematic but rather their 
easy and unreflective naturalisation that here causes concern.   
 
Of course, there are good reasons for thinking that certain kinds of relation to work are 
more healthful than others.  The literal translation of the Japanese karoshi, to ‗work to 
death‘, captures the natural parameters or embodied experience of a particular kind of 
hyper-attachment to work, in this instance driven by particular economic and 
employment conditions.  Likewise, certain strategies such as ‗competitive waking‘ (a 
term coined by The New Yorker to connote employees who compete for the earliest 
start time) presumably give way eventually to the natural demands of sleep or 
exhaustion.  Ian the Stationmaster—whilst insistent that his passion for work was not 
reducible to his mental illness—nonetheless conceded that opening a second station 
had been the key trigger to his most recent breakdown.  Interestingly—as seen with 
Martin in chapter two—Ian‘s management techniques for his enthusiasm towards work 
included selective use of prescription medicine (anti-psychotic sedatives and sleeping 
tablets) to help him ‗ration‘ his energies—implying that there were some (health-
related, corporeal, ‗natural‘) boundaries at work in his relations.  
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Similarly there are counter-arguments to the claim that what we desire and hope for in 
work are matters of personal free choice.  Marx‘s response to Bob and June would 
surely be that of false consciousness (bad faith, to put this into an existential 
vocabulary): in order to sustain capitalism, capital must systematically suppress the 
ambitions and desires of the greater portion of its population.  To reuse the ideas of J.S. 
Mill, one might argue that (in the case of Bob) enjoying the warmth of a factory and 
eating cake crumbs are not the ‗highest‘ of pleasures—had Bob been offered more 
opportunities in life, indeed, had he not been depressed—perhaps he might have found 
something better still.
47
  Many of the people whose narratives I have told in this thesis 
came from cultures of almost unimaginably dampened expectations, written and 
rewritten by further demarcations of mental illness and stigma.  (My most poignant 
illustration of this came not from my own research but from one of my undergraduate 
medical students, whose community health project—a compulsory part of 
contemporary undergraduate medical education—I was supervising.  The student, who 
was from an affluent family in the south of the country, had been helping at an after-
school project for children from a deprived area of the North East.  Despite seeing 
much evidence of material hardship on her placement, what really shocked her was 
that when on asking a young girl what she wanted to be when she grew up, the child 
shrugged and said she didn‘t really want to be anything.  As the student wrote in her 
dissertation, her own siblings and the children from her neighbourhood whom she 
babysat always had a hundred answers to this question, even if they were only the 
fantasy statements ‗I‘m going to be a butterfly‘ or a ‗fairy‘ or a ‗superhero‘, rather than 
a sustainable career choice.  Meeting children with no imaginative ambition seemed to 
her the biggest—and most troublesome—marker of class and deprivation.)   
 
However, notwithstanding these comments and despite the inability of classic models 
of wellbeing to account for the apparent contentment of the Bob in the cake factory, it 
still seems highly problematic to suggest that there is nothing necessarily ‗wrong‘ with 
either Bob or his work.  Similarly, whilst June‘s lack of connection to data processing 
seems a prime example of alienation in the classic way in which Marx saw workers as 
separated from their life activity, it is less clear that such severance hurts her in any 
way.  Whilst it might be tempting to apply all kinds of theory to Bob and June—
that their lack of ambition or lack of interest is one more symptom of their depression, 
                                                     
47 John Stuart Mill developed Bentham‘s utilitarianism by distinguishing between higher and lower 
pleasures.  Famously, he argued ‗it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to 
be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied‘ (1863, p. 10). 
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for example, or that their apparently modest aspirations are based on a ‗false 
consciousness‘ or ‗bad faith‘—it is perhaps our insistence (obsession, even) that there 
is something pathological going on that is more in need of examination.   
 
The connections one has with one‘s work thus pose interpretive problems in the 
landscape of psychiatric survivorship.  For some, ‗going mad‘ seems a story of how 
their relation with work has broken down.  Yet at other times, unusual connections 
with work appear to be labelled as ill or even insane simply due to this—their 
difference.  In certain respects, such relations are thus better understood as matters of 
ethics (values and human significances) than matters of health or wellness where such 
conceptions are rooted in wholly natural or even medical discourses.  Yet to insist that 
relations to work are irreducibly ethical and thus in no way ‗natural‘ does not entail 
taking a view on how people ought to relate to their work or what a ‗good‘ work ethic 
might look like.  
 
Maintaining health (mental and physical), as Metzl and Kirkland (2010) argue, has 
become the ‗new morality‘ in a wide range of arenas.  As the contributors to their 
edited collection argue, it is important to note that this morality is not separate from the 
conditions that produced it: the motivation of the psy industries and the pharmaceutical 
industries, the beauty and the dietary business also.  The moral code that advocates 
particular healthy relations to work also functions to get people (back) to work.  
(Berlant [2010, p. 28] illustrates her argument here with reference to the Sudafed 
advertising campaign, which famously markets its products not for the physical and 
emotional comfort they bring, but for their ability to get the consumer into the 
workplace even on days when they are sick.)  I do not believe this is the whole story, 
but it is part of it.  The kinds of ethical governance presented by romanticism and neo-
romantic ideas about work have a different heritage—one that, in part, seeks to protect 
the individual from being consumed by the capitalist work machine in the way that 
Berlant and others describe.  Yet the normalising effect of these ethics still produces a 
demand for a particular kind of relation to work which, whist suited and helpful to 
some, also risks excluding and pathologising others.  
 
The conclusion is not to abandon ethics.  Rather, the challenge is to return work 
(explicitly, courageously) to the realm of ethics; to re-establish that the kind of relation 
one has with one‘s work is a matter of choice and personal autonomy in the rich sense 
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that ethics traditionally implies.  An example that gives me great hope is that of the 
recent history of attitudes concerning gender and sexual practice in which matters such 
as homosexuality or unmarried motherhood have gradually shifted (or more accurately, 
are shifting) in the public mind‘s eye from categories of unnaturalness and mental 
disorder to matters of choice and personal lifestyle.  Of course, this does not mean that 
issues of sexuality, gender or relationship status exist somehow outside of ethics (for 
what area of human life could or would want to exist as such?) but rather that the kind 
of ethics that are gradually replacing the more restrictive codes of the past are ones 
which attend more thoroughly to the ethical complexity of the good life and its 
contingent and relative nature.
48
  My suggestion in this chapter is that the work ethic 
has some catching up to do with the sex ethic.  To do this, what is ethical (i.e., 
concerned with values) must first be recognised in the relations we hope to have with 
our work.   
 
It has been my contention throughout this chapter that so-called ‗mad‘ people have too 
long suffered from narrow conceptions of ethical conduct.  Systems that prevent or 
pervert flourishing connectedness to work are ethical concerns and Marx and the 
romantics present a crucial point in encouraging us to think carefully about what kinds 
of relationship with work our current systems of production permit.  Yet the 
extrapolation of the more normative undertones of romanticism (that this is the ‗right‘ 
relation to work) to all work-forms and all workers may be less helpful in 
understanding the rich variety of relations between work, worker and human 
flourishing that can be observed, especially among survivors of mental distress.   
 
In the next chapter both the notions of relation and ethics are carried forward to 
consider, this time, the relation between oneself and one‘s madness, with particular 
focus on a diverse groups of individuals who in different ways make a livelihood from 
their experiences of distress or madness.  Just as this chapter has attempted to tell a 
different kind of story about the work-worker relation and especially about the vision 
of alienation, in what follows next, a different series of narratives are sought—
especially for individuals living with mental distress—about that ‗most important of 
relations‘ between one and oneself. 
                                                     
48 Michael Warner‘s (2000) The Trouble with Normal provides some of the theoretical underpinnings to 
this argument. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Putting Madness to Work  
Mad Artists and Insider Industry 
 
 
  
Use, n. ...The act of putting something to work, or employing or applying a thing, for 
any (esp. a beneficial or productive) purpose; the fact, state, or condition of being put 
to work, employed, or applied in this way; utilisation or appropriation, esp. in order to 
achieve an end or pursue one‘s purpose.  (Oxford English Dictionary) 
 
I wanted a career path where I could use this experience and make good of some of the 
negative things I‘d been through.... (Helen, counsellor and ex-psychiatric patient) 
 
 
What do we do with our madness at work?  Can madness be useful for anything?  
What abilities or skills might living with or surviving an experience of mental distress 
cultivate in a person?  The purpose of this chapter is to examine the experiences of 
individuals who, in various ways, have ‗put their madness to use‘ in their working 
lives.  Rather than address the putative correlation between mental illness and ability 
per se (although see Jamison, 1993; Kaufman, 2001; Beresford, 2003; Woodward and 
Joseph, 2003), the chapter focuses instead on how productive aspects of madness 
tessellate in the lives of such service-user workers with broader discourses of work and 
career.
49
 
                                                     
49 Methodologically, as indicated in the introduction, the empirical material in this chapter differs from 
previous chapters in that certain participants (Gwyneth, James, Marie, Meghan, Nick and Steph) were 
purposively recruited for this discussion and, in comparison with the ‗extremely open-ended‘ interviewing 
method adopted elsewhere, conversations in such interviews were steered more specifically to the relation 
between work and madness.  I am indebted to the participants of the one-day seminar, ‗Unsettling 
  ~ Chapter 4 Putting Madness to Work ~ 117 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
To an extent, the theme of this chapter continues the exercise in assertive description 
that has been commenced in earlier parts of this thesis.  Amidst the sheer quantity of 
attention given to issues of unemployment and perceived unemployability among 
mental health service-users, there is something potentially radical about adding to the 
research archives records of those who not only work whilst living with a mental 
health condition but who attribute their success at work to the nature of that experience 
itself.  However, beyond such a function, the chapter also seeks to disrupt or challenge 
the romanticism that talk of the ‗talented mad‘ can inspire.  Gwyneth, a poet and self-
help author, talks about a fellow author and depressive who died of an (accidental) 
overdose whilst writing his memoirs, to which people responded, ‗it‘s what he would 
have wanted‘.  Such romanticised attitudes to madness and the creative spirit—as 
Gwyneth points out and as I shall repeat later in the discussion—are a simplistic and 
often inaccurate way of discussing ‗mad ability‘ which obscures diversity and occludes 
the real-world hardship and limitation that mental distress can cause.   
 
The second theme of the chapter returns to the issues of relationality and to the ethics 
of relating that were at the heart of chapter three.  How ought one to relate to one‘s 
madness?  If madness can be put to work usefully does this therefore provide the mad 
person with an obligation to work madly?  As I shall argue, as it is for relations 
between work and worker, the relation between one‘s self and one‘s madness is 
governed by an often cautious ethics—the pleasant romanticism of the talented artist 
countered by an equal distaste towards applications of madness that appear too showy 
or self-serving (later in the chapter we shall consider ‗misery writers‘ and ‗service-user 
celebrities‘ who seek fame and fortune from their mental health experiences as 
examples of individuals who appear to ‗break‘ such rules—although, again, it is my 
intention to question these ethics more rigorously and with less normative 
connotations).   
 
The main body of this chapter is arranged around three interrelated clusters of mad 
workers who in various ways make a living from their madness and experience of 
mental ill health: the traditional creative or innovative professions with which mad 
people have been historically associated; the service-user professionals and insider 
                                                                                                                                             
Relations: Mad Activism and Academia‘, at the University of Central Lancashire (12 April 2011) for their 
assistance in recruitment and in helping me to work through some of the issues raised in this discussion. 
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experts who I introduced briefly in my discussion of service-user production towards 
the end of chapter two; and individuals who, as a result of their mental health 
experiences, have retrained to join the helping or empathic professions in order to help 
others in distress.  The signature of the chapter is that of the example—that is, through 
careful examination of the narratives of different mad workers to demonstrate the 
intrigue, complexity and diversity of putting madness to use.  Two further tropes which 
appear later in the discussion include speaking of participants as ‗survivors‘ and as 
‗narrators‘—to engage with the indebtedness to some of the narratives here with 
recovery/survivorship models of mental distress in the first instance (Jacobson and 
Greenley, 2001; Grove et al., 2005); and in the second, to retain emphasis on the 
individual‘s self-framing of the lived relationships between work and mental health 
experiences. 
 
A Borrowed Muse: Madness and the Creative Professions 
 
He who, having no touch of the Muses‘ madness in his soul, comes to the door and 
thinks that he will get into the temple by the help of art—he, I say, and his poetry are 
not admitted; the sane man disappears and is nowhere when he enters into rivalry with 
the madman... (Plato, Phaedrus, 245a) 
 
It is worth beginning briefly with the most familiar (perhaps the only familiar) means 
through which madness bring gifts—that is, of course, in the context of the creative, 
artistic and innovative professions.  Van Gogh, Plath, Shelley, Woolf, Hemingway, 
Gauguin, Pollock, Nietzsche, Nash (almost forgotten until the release of A Beautiful 
Mind in 2001)—schizophrenics or manic depressives the lot of them apparently.  The 
list goes on.
50
 
 
Historically, the equation of madness with creative genius is traceable to antiquity, 
with Plato‘s famous account of poetic inspiration as ‗divine insanity‘ (Plato, Ion, 553e) 
or Aristotle‘s claim, reformulated by Seneca four hundred years later, that ‗no great 
                                                     
50 An interesting but discrete link between creativity and mental health with which I have not engaged 
explicitly is the ‗arts for mental health‘ agenda, which in the last decade has spawned numerous 
community arts-based projects across the country for a range of marginalised groups, including mental 
health service-users.  Unlike the ‗mad creators‘ in this discussion, such projects place less priority either 
on artistic excellence or on making a livelihood from one‘s occupation—but rather see in creative 
practices (especially participatory ones) opportunities for cultural inclusion, promotion of wellbeing, and 
social connectedness (Anglia Ruskin University and University of Central Lancashire, 2005; Macnaughton 
et al., 2005; Sharp et al., 2005; Parr, 2006). 
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genius is without a touch of madness‘ (cited in Heehs, 1997, p. 46).  Towards the end 
of the eighteenth century, romanticism relit this interest, with madness depicted as an 
exalted state in which access to higher truths could be gained.  Interest in mad ability 
continued into the twentieth century with the fashion for art brut (or ‗outsider art‘) in 
which the artwork of asylum inmates became prized as examples of so-called ‗pure‘ 
creativity unfettered by the pressures of civilised society (Beveridge, 2001).  In the last 
thirty years, establishing an empirical basis for the link between mental illness and 
ability has become the concern of academic research also.  Notwithstanding the 
difficulty in ascertaining causality in correlation studies, to date, recurrent findings 
based on epidemiological studies and historical surveys include higher rates of mental 
illness in the creative industries than in other professions (Jamison, 1989; Post, 1994); 
higher rates of mental illness at the top end of the creative professions (world masters, 
geniuses, prize winners, etc.) than across such professions as a whole (Ludwig, 1995; 
Kaufman, 2001); and higher proportions of creative workers among the mentally ill 
than in the general population (Rothenberg, 1990; Heehs, 1997). 
 
It is of course beyond the scope of this chapter to contribute to this debate at an 
epidemiological level; rather, the aim is to take the discussion into the subtly different 
topic of work—by which I here mean employment, livelihood and the career 
trajectories of mental health service-users pursuing creative occupations.  First, and in 
a question which is almost entirely absent from the existing research literature 
(although see Jamison, 1993; Parr, 2006), if madness can be advantageous in certain 
forms of creative work, how does mad ability fit into the career and employment 
strategies of creative workers living with mental health conditions?  Second, with 
regard to the broader theme in this chapter, what can be said about madness in the 
creative professions with regard to a ‗philosophy of use‘: that is, in the context of the 
creative professions, how is madness used or made useful?  In what way does it differ 
from saying ‗I am mad and I do X‘, to say ‗I use my madness for the purposes of X‘?  
(Recalling the teleological school from Aristotle onwards in which it is stated that to 
fully understand a thing, one must see and understand it in use, it is hoped that this 
analysis will not only open discussion on the nature of being mad at work, but also on 
the qualities and characteristics of madness itself.)   
 
To address some of these questions I introduce five individuals who in different ways 
speak to this issue: Maurice, the glassworker from the previous chapter; Brett, a 
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(former) professional violinist; Lucy, a participant at the Plumtree project who has 
recently received an enterprise grant to establish herself as a professional writer; and 
then Charles and Martin, a self-declared ‗mad scientist‘ and the entrepreneur whose 
shirt-selling business was considered in chapter two, for their contributions to the 
‗innovative‘ side of this discussion.  (It is recognised that these most different 
manifestations of creative work have many internal differentiations; for the purposes of 
this discussion we shall keep them together simply because this has been the strategy 
in the classic treatments of the subject.)  Whilst this must necessarily be a condensed 
discussion, it is hoped that at least the combined impressions of multiplicity and 
possibility within these cases can be conveyed. 
  
For convenience, I shall start by summarising the diverse career trajectories of these 
individuals:  
 
Maurice (mid forties):  Has ‗always‘ wanted to be an artist; has enjoyed 
painting since a child.  Explicitly links his creativity to his periods of mania, 
during which he will stay up all night producing artworks (or occasionally 
destroying those which are not to his satisfaction).  Maurice turned to a 
fulltime artistic career after the closure of the shipyards where he had 
previously been employed.  Since graduating in 2001 with a Bachelors‘ degree 
in Glass and Ceramics from Sunderland University, he has been self-
employed, renting a workshop and gallery at a crafts visitor centre, which he 
runs with the support of the Enterprise Project.   
 
Brett (late thirties): Trained as a professional violinist in his hometown in 
Germany, before being invited to the UK after several years touring with a 
Rhineland Philharmonic Orchestra, where he was spotted by a prominent 
British ensemble.  In the ‗early days‘, Brett found his unusual mental health 
experiences ‗congruent‘ with his musical lifestyle and considered his mood 
and music to depend on the other.  More recently, however, Brett reports 
himself to have ‗burned out‘ and has not worked in any musical capacity for 
five years besides occasional after-school tuition.  
 
Lucy (late twenties): Worked as an audio-typist between intermittent bouts of 
depression before entering a lengthier period of unemployment and ill health in 
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the early 2000s.  Began developing her interest in creative writing whilst 
participating in a writing class at the Plumtree project (which she now leads), 
and then later, through a regular poetry slot in a service-user magazine.  Has 
now had several short stories published, a play performed at the Edinburgh 
Fringe festival and has received an ‗in principle‘ statement of interest from a 
mainstream publisher for a full-length novel (genre: ‗humorous romance‘).  
Lucy cites as one influence in following this career path Susanna Kaysen‘s 
semi-autobiographical novel Girl, Interrupted, in which the protagonist 
embarks on a new career as a writer after a spell in a psychiatric hospital.  
 
Charles (late fifties): After gaining a doctorate in particle physics in the 1970s, 
Charles worked in universities and research institutes in the UK and abroad, 
developing an international reputation for his work and receiving several 
awards—a success he attributes largely to his ‗ability to see the world 
differently‘.  However, as the negative effects of schizophrenia worsened, the 
interpersonal aspects of working in a university became more challenging.  
Charles took medical retirement from his chair at a Northern University in 
2008 although he still partakes in certain honorary academic roles.  
 
Martin (early fifties): Owner and manager of several successful businesses 
specialising in publicity and online trading (not to mention the retro fashion 
store).  Has worked for over three decades through oscillating periods of mania 
and depression, including distance-managing the enterprises from a psychiatric 
ward.  Finds his ‗wacky‘ hypo-manic tendencies an advantage in the 
workplace—although he emphasises that his business knack supersedes that of 
mad inspiration alone. 
 
To comment first on the issue of career trajectories, from these brief synopses, it is 
possible to draw out several emergent themes.  First is a clear sense of diversity in 
career pathway, material circumstances, type of work and illness narrative across these 
different stories.  Whilst not an analytic point as such, in what has become a running 
theme throughout this thesis, such diversity provides a stern warning against 
homogenising tales of mad talent or inspiration.  Second, notwithstanding this 
diversity, is the spontaneous and explicit linkage made by each of the narrators 
between their creative careers and experiences of madness (a comment which is 
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significant with regard to the correlation/causality problem highlighted above: whilst, 
as is the case for large-scale correlation studies, individual narrations cannot 
conclusively verify a causal relation between madness and ability, exploring how 
individuals themselves understand and narrate this link is another way of approaching 
the problem).  The third point to be noted for the purposes of this chapter is the 
embeddedness of mad inspiration and mad career planning within the ordinary 
structures of employment and unemployment (to include market trends, employment 
policy, organisational culture, support for disabled workers, etc.).  Despite the 
observable success (historic or ongoing) of each of the narrators, some level of 
occupational disadvantage also persists as a theme in all five accounts: mental illness 
has caused significant periods out of work for each of the participants; two of the 
narrators effectively ended their careers as a result of illness and two more depend on a 
third-party mental health organisation to keep their businesses alive.
51
  Beyond these 
comments, and ultimately more relevantly for this chapter, however, in the narratives 
of Maurice, Brett, Lucy, Martin and Charles accounts of living with madness can also 
be found which begin to move beyond the pre-modern, mystical view of madness 
described above (inspiration lent by gods and muses) and instead into something which 
might be considered a more mature philosophy of use (I shall explain this comment 
shortly).  
 
It will be helpful to begin by recapping these earlier visions of productive madness.  In 
the classical model, whilst creative madness was accorded status, mad individuals 
themselves were seen not as owners of the insight to which they were privy, but as 
‗vessels of superior knowledge‘ from whom others could divine truth (Heehs, 1997, p. 
45, original emphasis).  Such narratives interlinked closely with mysticism and 
mythology, with muses (as goddesses of poetry and literature) often equated with 
madness.  In the Romantic revival and forward into the European fascination with art 
brut, a similar ‗vessel‘ analogy was seen, this time placing the troubled depths of the 
human as the source of mad creativity (from the turn of the twentieth century on, this 
source became rephrased in Freudian vocabularies of the ‗unconscious‘ although most 
of the collectors of art brut claimed to be anti-Freudian).  A key term here was surplus, 
with notions of unconscious neurotic or psychotic energy overflowing into artistic 
                                                     
51 Lucy receives business mentoring from Plumtree, as well as benefiting from flexible social security 
payments negotiated by the Centre, to reflect the fluctuating amount she earns from her writing.  The 
financial side of Maurice‘s business is managed almost entirely by the Training and Enterprise project, 
which also offers him access to a labour bank who open the shop for him if he is unwell.  Both Lucy and 
Maurice suggest there have been times their enterprises would have failed had it not been for this support. 
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works of great merit.  Such spillages had cathartic as well as artistic potential, but—
like the Ancient version before them—lacked sense of deliberate or controllable ‗use‘ 
of madness in any great sense.  
 
The first thing to note is the persisting relevance of these classical and romantic extra-
conscious ideas (what I shall hereon refer to simply as ‗vessel‘ accounts) in the 
narratives of the contemporary workers above.  For Maurice, who speaks extensively 
and gladly on the topic, madness is: ‗an energy‘; ‗a muse‘; ‗the source of artistic 
guidance‘; ‗the thing that drives me to perfection‘.  As Maurice describes, ‗I don‘t 
think I could keep this up [i.e., producing commercial art] without these visitations‘.  
When swells of madness arrive, Maurice describes his creative wits sharpening and he 
enters both a highly productive state and a highly critical one also.   
 
A similar narrative can be found in Brett, although with less happy outcome:  
 
These melancholies would set in and I would retreat into myself.  When they arrived, I 
would be in turmoil, quite wretched, but these states made me play [the violin] very 
well indeed.  I was a very passionate, emotional player ... which is crucial when you 
are performing in symphony.    
 
As Brett goes onto explain, however, unlike Maurice, over time, these creative 
depressions (what he distinguished as ‗melancholies‘) diminished and were replaced 
instead by a more pervasive numbness that made all but the most perfunctory 
performance impossible.  To date, Brett still plays the violin, but only in the context of 
after-school tuition (a ‗lesser‘ artistic endeavour)—and his primary source of income 
remains out-of-work benefits.  
 
Whilst such narratives support fairly faithful renditions of classical ‗vessel‘ hypotheses 
in many ways (particularly in terms of the location of madness outside of conscious 
control), from the point of view of work, it is evident that both men also developed 
particular strategies for harbouring this force as and when it arrived (an indication of 
agency not present in classic vessel accounts).  Two particularly clear examples of this 
concern decisions surrounding medication use and the spatiotemporal organisation of 
workload.  Regarding medication choices: 
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Maurice:  
I have given the matter much thought and I don‘t think medication is for me—it 
dampens down my artistic temperament [...] I feel cloudy and fuggy and no 
inspiration. 
 
Brett:  
I was given Clomipramine [tricyclic antidepressant] but I didn‘t take it for very long 
because it interfered with my work.  I had recently started taking an SSRI when I had 
my final breakdown and I have wondered whether that is what caused it [i.e., the onset 
of the numbness].   
 
In terms of the second, both men reported particular manipulations of work time and 
space to suit or accommodate mad inspiration.  At the craft centre, Maurice negotiated 
permission to work late into the evening on projects when struck by inspiration, as well 
as securing with the enterprise centre support from the labour bank to cover his shifts 
in the gallery when madness made him nocturnal (one condition of rental at the visitor 
centre was that units were opened during core hours).  At his parents‘ home in 
Germany, Brett adapted a basement into a soundproofed studio to allow for long 
periods of practice during his melancholias.  Since Brett felt solitude was a necessary 
element of his melancholic periods, during these years he devised with his parents a 
particular code of practice concerning disruptions, whereupon his mother would satisfy 
herself daily that he was alive and had eaten, but where beyond that, the family would 
consent to not entering the studio.  Whilst neither Brett nor Maurice suggested any 
control over their ‗visitations‘ of madness, such strategies were thus important means 
of maximising creative inspiration as and when it came.   
 
Whilst Maurice and Brett thus partly challenge the notion of the madman as only a 
conduit for un- or extra-conscious expression, in the next examples I shall demonstrate 
a much greater rupture from the vessel hypothesis.   
 
To begin with some quotations (my emphasis added):  
 
Martin:  
I have some tremendous ideas for publicity when I‘m high, it is quite a resource [M 
tells some of the stories reported in chapter two].  Some of them are a bit, shall we say, 
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wacky and they don‘t go anywhere.  But some of them are very valuable, it is a very 
valuable business resource to get the upper hand, to get customer‘s attention, to be 
memorable.   
 
Charles:  
As a schizophrenic, I am good at seeing patterns and connections.  I tend to see 
connections others may have missed. [...] It is an advantage to be very interested in 
following rules but also to think very differently in this profession.  I have learnt to 
value this aspect of my character.  
 
Lucy: 
I have reached the high notes and the low notes of the emotional scale.  I‘ve been 
through some very dark days and I‘ve learnt [to be] very sensitive towards joy also.  I 
draw on that experience in developing characters‘ psychologies or in painting a 
particular picture of events and situations even though mental illness has never been a 
topic I‘ve addressed in my writing.  My own life is a whole library of inspiration.52  
 
As I have highlighted in the underlined passages above, in these extracts numerous 
ruptures can be seen which separate such accounts from vessel narratives.  First, in 
originating not from an external force (as if possessed...) or from an unruly 
unconscious, mad inspiration appears as a semi-stable, semi-reliable aspect of the self, 
or—as Martin puts it—a ‗resource‘ from which the self can draw.  (We might make 
something of the difference here between ‗resource‘ and ‗source‘, which was one of 
Maurice‘s descriptors above, where the former indicates a much higher level of 
domestication.)  Second and relatedly, in these extracts a level of ownership of 
madness can be demonstrated whereby narrators both accept responsibility for mad 
thoughts and experiences but also express ability to draw on them where relevant and 
appropriate (a sense that was more or less entirely absent from the vessel accounts, 
whereupon madness was simply awaited).  Third and finally, a level of distance or 
compartmentalisation is identified in each of these accounts between mad and sane 
experience, and between mad parts of the self and agentic (working) aspects.  (To the 
extent that in the previous chapter I suggested that a level of separation was one 
minimal ground upon which proper relation can be defined, this is significant.)  Lucy‘s 
                                                     
52 It is interesting that Lucy‘s assertions about the links between emotionality, character-formation and 
storytelling have not received particular attention in the academic literature, although a small body of 
literature (e.g., Stirman and Pennebaker, 2001; Thomas and Duke, 2007) demonstrates the converse effect 
of how the emotional pathologies of depressed writers ‗seep through‘ into their work, leaving a series of 
characteristic cognitive flaws and muddles in depressed people‘s writing. 
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imagery of a library is indicative here as a bounded store of affective memories which 
can be alternately visited or locked away, as is Martin‘s comment below (a neat 
comparison to the spatiotemporal strategies of Maurice, who we remember sought to 
be as close and as immediate to his mania as possible):  
 
I try to put some time between having an idea [i.e., a manic idea] and carrying it out.  I 
sleep on it and in the cold light of day I think is this really a good idea?  Is it sensible?  
Will it make money?  Will it get me sectioned?  What will it do to my friends and 
family?  (Martin) 
 
With regard to a philosophy of use, these three elements (resource, ownership, and 
compartmentalisation) are thus significant.  To draw an analogy temporarily with the 
use of physical resources, as Tallis (2004) points out, a mature and uniquely human 
expression of usage involves not only the selective employment of objects to enhance 
the existing capacities of the self (a feature present elsewhere in the animal world—to 
reach with a stick rather than just a limb, for example, or to smash with a rock rather 
than a hand) but a productive engagement with objects in ways which add new 
dimensions to capacity or selfhood.  In the selectivity and separation manifest in these 
later narratives of Lucy and the others it is thus this mature usage I suggest here 
becomes visible. 
 
Attending to individuals‘ own framings of the links between creativity and madness 
provides a different kind of insight to the causality debate provoked by the classic 
correlation studies of ability and mental distress.  Of course, that Lucy understands her 
madness as a library or Maurice his as an extra-psychic muse does not in itself offer 
‗proof‘ about how mental illness connects to creative ability (and we observe that these 
narratives are themselves creative expressions which produces additional layers of 
complexity).  However, as I suggest here, observing articulations of ownership and 
strategic resource management gives insight into the possibility of using madness or, 
put differently, of putting madness to work.  Such examples also add to existing 
appreciations of creative experiences as ‗pre-dominantly calm interior spaces that 
service-users can access as part of a strategy for recovery‘ (Parr, 2008, p. 119), 
demonstrating how highly creative mad experiences might also be rich reserves of 
energy and inspiration that creative workers can access strategically for career and 
artistic progression, as well as for making a living.   
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What I hope to have demonstrated in this section, at its simplest, is that even within the 
highly stereotyped and niche arena of mad creativity, a multitude of relations between 
madness and creative output are identifiable.  Simultaneously, numerous propositions 
can be rejected about mad creativity.  First, is the notion of genius which has a 
tendency to muddle discussions on this topic (it is noted that none of the creative 
workers in this discussion are geniuses, rather, what is interesting about them is the 
way in which they enfold mad experience into more-or-less conventional 
understandings of livelihood).  Second is any lingering notion of romanticism: it is 
clear—not just from the narratives of Brett or Charles who had to give up work 
because of their mental health difficulties—that choosing to embrace mad creativity at 
work has psychic costs.  Decisions such as medication-use were made carefully and 
often reluctantly.  Maurice, for example, describes it as ‗very disappointing‘ that 
medication didn‘t suit his artistic temperament and also made clear that in principle he 
would gladly sacrifice his glassblowing in return for remittance from the 
uncomfortable highs and unbearable lows of un-medicated bipolar disorder—except 
that when he was not doing his artwork he felt just as bad anyway.   
 
Finally, these accounts reject universalising narratives of mad creativity.  It is obvious 
that enhanced creative sensibilities are not reported by everybody diagnosed with a 
mental health complaint.  Yet conversely, for mad creators, mad inspiration constitutes 
just one of many aspects of career and livelihood narratives.  Martin‘s distancing 
strategies, Lucy‘s editing tasks and Maurice‘s engagement with the visitor centre and 
the labour bank are all evidence of a beyond-mad creative career which interacts with 
the ordinary structures of the working world.  Perhaps, to some extent, it is the very 
presence of these strategies—of the purposeful translation of ‗pure‘ mad experience 
into commodifiable produce—that helps to define what Lucy, Martin and the others do 
as ‗work‘ at all.  In the next section, this final idea of distance will be built upon to 
consider the alternative context of health services development and mental health 
campaigning as an outlet for mad experience. 
 
Insider Industry: The Service-User Professionals 
 
The second kind of utilisation of madness that shall be discussed here breaks quite 
abruptly from these creative pursuits to a different form of work: a category of 
activities that one advocate describes as a ‗growing industry of service-user 
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professionals‘: service-user consultants, campaigners, researchers, representatives and 
advisors who in various ways use their experiences of mental distress and status as 
mental health service-users to represent the service-user community, to develop mental 
health services and to provide public information and advice about issues relating to 
mental illness.  
 
Benji, who we met briefly in chapter two, is the co-ordinator of a regional user and 
carer network for service-user-led self-help, health promotion, and research groups.  
Margaret is employed as a manager in a leading mental health charity, as is Nick for a 
user-led involvement project.  Felicity works as a freelance service-user consultant for 
the NHS, providing a user voice on service developments and facilitating ongoing user 
evaluations.  James is a service-user lecturer delivering sessions to medical and social 
work students at several North East Universities.  Meghan and Steph are employed by 
a different university as service-user researchers.  This list of public and third sector 
workers is supplemented by a small but growing private sector of mad consultancy 
businesses which I shall discuss later in the chapter, as well as a host of unpaid 
positions within the insider industry.   
 
In contrast to my first example, what draws these professions together in terms of a 
usage of madness is not a creative genius or mad inspiration but rather the privileged 
status of being a service-user and the associated ‗insider insight‘ that this status brings.  
As I shall discuss later, such positions from the point of recruitment onward distinguish 
themselves as user-privileged or user-exclusive (that is, people without experience of 
mental ill health will be unable or will find it hard to apply); furthermore, in these 
positions, openness about being a service-user and being able to refer to that 
experience forms a crucial part of one‘s working day.  Whilst it is certainly a niche job 
market it is notable that relatively significant numbers of people are occupied in such 
positions.  In the course of 2010, thirty-three service-user posts (including paid, 
unpaid, ad hoc and permanent positions) were advertised across the North East 
region‘s two major service-user mailing networks.53  Similarly, although the author is 
unaware of any other literature bringing these occupations together explicitly under a 
banner of work or professionalism, a growing body of academic research from both 
empirical and conceptual persuasions is emerging which takes seriously the 
                                                     
53 Figure based on archives for the service-user mailing lists Launchpad and the North East Service User 
and Carer Network, January–December 2010. 
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contributions of individuals employed in these fields (Reed and Reynolds, 1996; 
Church, 2001; Beresford, 2002; Boyle and Harris, 2009; Munn-Giddings et al., 2009; 
Lewis, 2010; Moran et al., 2012).   
 
After a brief discussion of the evolution of these mad professions, the strategy in this 
section is to consider first the articulation of insiderness within the service-user 
professions before developing the conversation above about using madness and 
transforming raw experience into a useable commodity.   
 
Whilst the modern political context for employing service-users in service planning, 
provision and policy (an agenda known today simply as ‗involvement‘) is largely 
traceable to a series of Department of Health initiatives in the early 1990s (DoH, 1990; 
DoH,1991), the history of patients becoming involved with the running and 
development of mental health services is almost as old as the history of the asylum 
itself (Barnes and Bowl, 2001; Crossley, 2006).  Since the seventeenth century, records 
exist of asylum protests and inmate revolts as patient-driven cries for involvement (the 
1620 dispute at Bethlem in which inmates petitioned the House of Lords about asylum 
conditions is an oft-cited example).  Simultaneously, a heritage of clinician-led 
involvement can also be demonstrated: in chapter one, I described how at various 
points in history psychiatrists have encouraged patients to take on responsibilities on 
the wards on therapeutic grounds.  A similar history can be found of utilitarian 
justifications for involvement also: Walk (1961) describes how in the establishment of 
Bicêtre, Pinel‘s chief nursing assistant Pussin (an ex-patient himself) made a habit of 
recruiting staff from the convalescing patient population in the belief that because of 
their experiences, they would be all the more competent.  Driven by the increasing 
market logic of public services towards the end of the twentieth century, service-user 
involvement in its contemporary form appears as a coming together of each of these 
influences, framed both around the neoliberal discourse of ‗partnership‘ between users 
and providers of public services but also renewed criticality among user populations, 
especially concerning public sector cuts and the instigation of new mental health 
legislation concerning compulsory treatment (Boyle and Harris, 2009).   
 
It is within this landscape that service-user professionalism as a specific type of 
involvement activity exists, marked most clearly by a formalisation of user 
involvement, a shift towards competitively paid positions for individuals representing 
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the service-user community and a ‗white-collarisation‘ of service-user campaigning 
from asylum revolts and radical action to largely office-based work within the 
mainstream structures of service delivery and development (Chinman et al., 2006; 
Munn-Giddings et al., 2009; Moran, et al., 2012).  Within this professionalisation, 
significant diversification in the opportunities available to service-user professionals 
has arisen with posts today available in policy and planning contexts, public health and 
education, and the production of social research within the academy and beyond (this is 
not to say that equality has been achieved between service-users and professionals in 
these fields but rather to demonstrate the range of potentials).  In the last decade 
particularly, this diversification has been accompanied by an increasing sophistication 
in the organisational structures of service-user professionalism—often at a national or 
regional scale.  In 2007, the European Commission announced funding for the 
innovative ‗Ex-In‘ (i.e., ‗expert insiders‘) project to instigate the formation of an 
internationally recognised ‗Experts By Experience‘ qualification as well as to promote 
user involvement more broadly (A. James, 2007).  At a similar time, many service-user 
organisations and mental health charities also added training in the skills of 
consultation, advocacy and research to their own core activities.  A more recent 
development still has seen the emergence of several regional and national level 
involvement hubs and employment agencies to match user-representatives to 
organisations in need of them, to provide larger scale coordination of local-level 
involvement activities, and (increasingly) to provide standardised data collection and 
independent monitoring of involvement activities.
54
  What brings all of these 
developments together is the increasing taken-for-grantedness of the multiple assets of 
insider experts.  Quoting Phil Hope MP, the then Minister of State for Care Services, 
March 2009: ‗[Service-user involvement] makes the system more efficient, more 
effective and more responsive.  More importantly, it makes social care altogether more 
humane, more trustworthy, more valued—and altogether more transforming for those 
who use it‘ (cited in Boyle and Harris, 2009, p. 1). 
 
As with my discussion of the creative professions in the first case study of this chapter, 
the effect I hope to achieve in this section is to demonstrate the heterogeneity and 
inherent complexity within what, from the outside, might appear an otherwise 
homogenous and uncomplicated arena of service-user work.  As an initial example, a 
                                                     
54 For a successful Northern example, see SERV-USER (Support, Education, Resources and Vision 
Uniting Service-users and Carers for Effective Results); aspects of the Mental Health Research Network 
(North East Hub) undertake similar functions. 
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first obvious instance of complexity concerns positionality—that is, the various ways in 
which insider status is framed and articulated in service-user-only posts.  Given that 
insider exclusivity is employer driven (i.e., built in to the recruitment process itself), a 
useful illustration constitutes the various formal job descriptions, job advertisements 
and other recruitment materials used to advertise such positions.  In figure 4.1, a 
selection of four positions taken from the thirty-three vacancies advertised in 2010 are 
summarised: an unpaid research position within a mental health consultation exercise 
(position A); a project manager vacancy for a service-user involvement group (position 
B); a hospital-based position promoting awareness of the spiritual needs of psychiatric 
in-patients (position C); and a consultancy position within the Royal College of 
Psychiatry‘s National Audit of Schizophrenia (position D).   
 
 
 
Figur  4.1 ‘S rvi  -us r only  positions: four s rvi  -user vacancies* 
Position Job Description Person Specification  Remuneration 
(A)Project Volunteer 
 
Service-user ‘have 
your say  project 
within national 
service-user 
involvement charity  
Volunteers required to help 
with the construction of a user-
led report as part of an NHS 
consultation exercise.  
Volunteers will take part as 
respondents in the research 
and will be later involved as 
data collectors themselves. 
Person-centred: 
 
‘People with mental distress  
to include ‘service-users and 
people who do not currently 
use services . 
Unpaid position. 
 
Volunteers are ‘free 
to choose how much 
or how little they are 
involved in the 
pro  ss.  
(B)Service-user 
Development 
Worker  
 
National Mental 
Health Charity, 
Sunderland 
 
Project manager sought to 
develop and facilitate an inner-
city service-user group to 
promote user involvement in 
the running, planning and 
delivery of mental health 
services. 
Provider-centred: 
‘You will have knowledge of 
mental health services from a 
user perspective. Applications 
from people who currently 
use or have used mental 
health services are 
welcomed . 
30 hours per week, 
including flexible 
working where 
possible. 
 
£22,221 pro 
rata/£17,777 per 
annum 
(C)Patient 
Involvement Worker  
 
Specialist 
Psychiatric Hospital,  
Rehabilitation and 
Recovery Division, 
Northumberland, 
Tyne and Wear NHS 
 
Hospital-based position 
working one-to-one with 
patients and staff to promote 
awareness of the spiritual 
aspects of mental health 
recovery and to develop 
spiritual services in the 
hospital. 
Recovery discourse: 
Essential criteria include 
‘personal lived experience of 
recovery from mental health 
problems  [...] ‘A key feature 
of the post will be the 
person s unique lived 
experience of recovery and 
how the wisdom that comes 
with this can support others 
on their personal journey.  
Full time position,  
 
NHS Grade 3  
£15,000–£18,800 
(D)Service-user 
Advisor 
 
National Audit of 
Schizophrenia 
(NAS),  
 Royal College of 
Psychiatrists 
Vacancy to join project team 
for the National Audit of 
Schizophrenia.  The successful 
applicant will take part in all 
aspects of the audit including 
managing the service-user/ 
carer module. 
Medical discourse: 
 
‘Recent or current experience 
of mental health services; 
including experience of 
taking antipsychotic 
medication  
Consultancy fee £200 
per day, plus 
expenses 
 
75 days July 2010–
December 2012. 
* All quotations are from recruitment materials.  Posts have been anonymised where details would compromise the anonymity of 
specific research participants. 
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Whilst on first glance such roles appear highly similar in their insider-only status, from 
examining even a small selection of vacancies such as these, it becomes clear that the 
underlying understandings of ‗insiderness‘ within the positions are not only diverse but 
also contradictory.  In the first three positions (roles A–C) insiderness is defined in 
broadly social rather than medical terms; in D, by contrast medical terminology is 
retained.  Position B (the project manager) and post D (the consultancy post) specify 
particular services or treatments the successful candidate must have experienced; in A 
and C, such service-oriented requirements are substituted for a more person-centred 
approach instead.  In each position, a different temporality of insiderness can also be 
demonstrated: in post A, it is specified that the candidate should have current or recent 
experience of mental distress, although the post-holder may or may not currently use 
services; in post C (the hospital position) an individual is sought who has at one time 
experienced distress, but who can demonstrate that they have now recovered.   
 
A similar diversity can be demonstrated in the table in terms of attitudes to work and to 
the project of repositioning the mental health patient as an active and competent 
worker (again, a diversity with significance since a primary refrain within the 
involvement agenda has been to challenge stereotypes of the psychiatric patient as a 
passive and incapable recipient of care).  Positions A and D (the two research posts) 
demonstrate this variance well.  In the voluntary position (see also figure 4.2), the role 
of the traditional patient representative is most closely resembled.  Volunteers ‗help‘ to 
run focus groups (but don‘t organise or facilitate them); they ‗use‘ questionnaires, but 
with less of an active role in research design.  Significantly, whilst sporting some of the 
accoutrements of a regular employment vacancy (e.g., the presence of a formal role 
description and certain person specification), the role involves no employment/ 
volunteering contract, no set hours, and allows the individual participant to select the 
activities she does or doesn‘t want to do.  Whilst admirably inclusive in its design, the 
imagined applicant—if we are allowed to speculate—is notably impaired by their 
mental health difficulty, lacks confidence and experience, and is poorly skilled/ 
educated.  In the associated leaflet for initiation training for new volunteers (figure 4.3) 
this effect is intensified, with jolly layout, casual typeface, clipart illustrations and 
reference to ‗having fun‘ and ‗meeting people‘ suggestive more of a social club or 
therapy group than a site of serious service-user work.   
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Figure 4.3  Position A, advertisement for service-user training (anonymised) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2  Position A, job description (anonymised) 
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In contrast to position A, the Royal College of Psychiatry vacancy, D (figure 4.4) 
offers significant and striking revisionings of the traditional (incapable, muddled, 
poorly educated) service-user—an effect that is even more dramatic given the role‘s 
focus on schizophrenia which, as others have discussed, is generally considered the 
most stigmatised diagnosis in employment contexts (Stuart, 2006).  The person 
specification, which includes amongst other criteria ‗skills in quantitative data 
analysis‘ and ‗experience in training delivery‘, seeks only the most educated and 
experienced of candidates.  Indeed, in the opening sentence alone (‗we are currently in 
the process of putting together a project team [...] and seek a dynamic, motivated 
individual‘) several of the most pernicious stereotypes about the ‗traditional‘ 
schizophrenic are succinctly disturbed.  Amongst other progressive elements, the post 
is competitive (in contrast to position A where work was found for all applications), 
well paid and—at least on paper—promising a high level of equity with medical 
professionals.  Such exercises in ‗compare and contrast‘ are intended less to identify 
good or bad practice (which in itself suggests some external set of universal ethics) and 
more to demonstrate how service-user positions in the involvement agenda engage 
with varying constructions of the psychiatric patient.  It is a self-evident critique that 
whilst the consultancy post disrupts in positive and progressive ways the traditional 
notion of the poorly skilled and unconfident patient representative, by nature of its own 
Figure 4.4 Position D, job description and person specification 
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exclusivity, the position simultaneously excludes the many mental health service-users 
who have indeed been occupationally and educationally disadvantaged by their mental 
health condition (although simultaneously offering a rare opportunity for highly skilled 
individuals with mental health conditions to engage in an involvement role which is 
suited to their level of experience—a group who may feel particularly excluded from 
the more typical unskilled work of the ‗ex-basket-weaving‘ communities).  By 
contrast, whilst position A offers individuals with minimal employment or social 
experience chance for engagement in meaningful project work, traditional passive 
patient roles are replaced with only slightly more active ones—indeed, to quote Nick, 
who was involved in project A‘s recruitment campaign: ‗anyone can volunteer even if 
[...] they are still quite poorly—they can come and just do what they can or even just sit 
and watch [my emphasis]—and some people do‘. 
 
More centrally to this chapter, beyond constructions of service-user status, the four 
posts introduced in the discussion above also demonstrate a variety of positions 
regarding a philosophy of use (that is to say, the way in which workers and employers 
understand insiderness as being useful or advantageous in a work-related context).  To 
quote again from the recruitment materials, in position A, the added value of insider 
status is presented primarily as insider viewpoint (‗sharing thoughts, views, ideas and 
concerns‘); in position C, by contrast, usage appears more active and with greater 
emphasis on the affective and emotional qualities of being an insider (‗lending his or 
her unique insight into mental illness‘ and ‗using his or her experience of distress to 
support staff‘).  In position D (‗to act as a contact for service-user organisations‘), in 
addition to the above usages, insider status is framed as a means of making connections 
with other service-users—a conceptualisation of insider advantage which speaks less to 
the personal abilities a service-user may have, and more to expectations of how an 
insider in comparison to an outsider will be received by the mental health community.  
(A parallel is the distinction between the ex-criminal who is employed by the police 
because he has the criminal knowhow about plots and scams, and the ex-criminal who 
is employed because his status as such is considered one means of appearing relevant 
to the targets of police outreach programmes.)  It is also worth highlighting that—
despite the highly positive attitude towards insiderness across the vacancies—not all 
service-user-only positions articulate a philosophy of use in any explicit sense at all.  In 
position B, for example (which might be considered to be the post with the least 
developed concept of usage), encouraging applications from individuals with firsthand 
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experience of distress is articulated not in utilitarian terms, but rather as a means of 
actively addressing the organisation‘s avidly pro-inclusion agenda. 
 
For the purposes of this chapter, I want to extend this exploration of a philosophy of 
use to demonstrate how, in the service-user professions, madness or mad experience is 
made useful and useable.  In the section above, several use-strategies have already 
been identified in the creative workers who use their madness at work—techniques for 
storing raw madness and making the most of a creative high when madness arrives, or 
for putting distance between mad inspiration and its application in the workplace (as in 
the case of Martin or Lucy).  In the examples of the service-user professionals I 
describe in this section, use-strategies refer more specifically to the ‗making palatable‘ 
of mad experience and a channelling of service-user voices into a collective project of 
representation.  These ‗conversions‘, as I call them, signify a break from the mere 
resource management of the creative workers above to the second-order processing 
and packaging of madness and mad insight.  Such conversions also capture the essence 
of service-user professionalism as distinct from other forms of user activism, in 
denouncing ‗raw‘ madness in involvement activities and advocating instead the 
importance for service-user communities to engage with mainstream agencies in 
rational and deceptively sane ways.
55
  
 
There are numerous conversions involved in processing madness in the service-user 
professional context and it is worth considering a few of these in detail.  The following 
extracts are taken both from the recruitment materials of the vacancies above and from 
individuals involved in the appointment of these or similar posts (Nick works for 
charity A and was involved in recruiting for the advertised position; Benji, in his work 
with the Service-User Network, assisted in the design of job B.  Steph, Meghan and 
Felicity are current service-user professionals and are talking about what makes a good 
involvement worker).  In particular, the two conversions I hope to bring out are i. the 
translation of personal experience into a voice capable of representing a wider service-
user community (what I refer to as collectivisation), and ii. the processing of particular 
manifestations of mad subjectivity (high emotionality, unusual presentation of self or 
ideas, etc.) into modes of acting that are consistent with the language games and 
behavioural codes of mainstream professionals (what I call domestication).  
                                                     
55 Further discussion of this exclusion or marginalisation of the irrational and emotional aspects of living 
with a mental health disorder from user involvement exercises can be found in Barnes (2002), Carr (2007) 
and Peck et al. (2002). 
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 Person specification, post C: ‗Ability to share personal stories of recovery in a 
professional manner‘ ... ‗ability to communicate insights from personal experience 
effectively in a multi-professional team‘. (Domestication)  
 Job description, post B: ‗You will work with a range of service-user and professional 
groups to facilitate communication between service-users and service providers in a 
professional environment‘. (Domestication) 
 Job description, post D: ‗To provide a service-user perspective [based on] personal 
knowledge and excellent relations with existing user organisations‘. (Collectivisation) 
 Nick, discussing the design of the service-user leadership scheme: ‗What we are 
looking to do is [...] train and support people to begin to speaking up for themselves to 
improve their own lives and the things that matter to them and also to contribute to 
improving the whole mental health system as a whole‘.  (Collectivisation) 
 Benji: ‗You have to be professional.  There are other people that have been through the 
same experiences as yourself but who have got different views.  You can‘t shout your 
individual views ahead of other people‘s on the grounds that you think you‘re more a 
service-user than someone else‘. (Domestication and collectivisation) 
 Steph, talking about service-user generated research, research ‗impact‘, and the 
problems of being ‗drowned out‘ by traditional academic research: ‗We need [...] to 
deliver [service-user generated research] that gets across the message and is true to 
what our members think and feel in the way they want to say it, presented in a style so 
policy-makers won‘t just discard it as some sub-standard mad haverings‘. 
(Domestication and collectivisation) 
  
Whilst conversions of mad experience such as collectivisation and domestication were 
presented as prerequisites for the success of service-user projects, simultaneously these 
were areas of difficulty and discomfort for individuals working in the field (especially 
for those with duties for overseeing other service-user workers).  In order to ‗use‘ mad 
experience effectively, service-user professionals had to balance between inclusion and 
representation as a pure agenda (in which all mad workers are equally encouraged in 
involvement activities) and a more tactical positioning of mad stories to maximise 
chances of developing productive relations with partner agencies.  Complications and 
setbacks demonstrated the need, as Benji puts it below, for ‗channelling‘ mad energy, 
yet also revealed the frictions between ‗pure‘ madness and the demands and 
expectations of the professional workplace: 
 
There is somebody in [the Network] who‘s very zealous and her heart‘s in the right 
place but there was an infamous meeting September last year where she let rip into a 
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poor regional commissioner and you know everyone else in the room was thinking 
‗ooh err, you‘re not getting this right—you campaign against the system not against an 
individual‘.  [The offending representative was removed and the meeting adjourned.]  I 
don‘t think she realised how she was coming across but the sad thing with that was that 
there had to be a lot of bridge building after that, whereas if she‘d played it cool, if 
she‘d just been a bit canny...  It‘s great you get people who are passionate but it‘s a 
case of trying to channel that energy in the right way.  I think that that‘s something that 
service-users as a constituency have to get smarter at—both thinking tactically and 
strategically.  (Benji, talking about a meeting in which a representative‘s outburst had 
led to the conclusion by some professional agencies that service-user groups should no 
longer be invited to high profile policy development events.) 
 
There is an ongoing issue concerning a lady who doesn‘t look after herself very well 
with personal hygiene and she is quite buxom and well her clothes—they don‘t really 
reflect that.  It‘s very sensitive and we try to say in very general terms things like, 
‗let‘s all of us try to look really smart and clean for the next meeting‘ to everyone, but 
it is very difficult to take her to one side and say ‗look, there is an odour and it‘s not 
very pleasant sitting near you and you‘re not really giving out the right impression 
about people with mental health problems‘ because perhaps what we are supposed to 
be about is acceptance but at the same time we want to be taken seriously.  (Steph, 
service-user researcher discussing the difficulty of ‗looking professional‘ to the 
organisation‘s partner university.)56 
 
In the training courses (Ex-In and the rest), teaching the skills of conversion 
(communication skills and basic self-care, assertiveness training and conflict 
resolution) were thus as important as higher level subject-specific training (although 
Steph pointed out that for the volunteers in the user-led research project, many of these 
supposedly ‗mad‘ faux pas were simply due to an unfamiliarity with the conventions of 
academia).  In some of the posts (particularly those advertised by mainstream rather 
than mad-only employers), structures were also built into the recruitment process so as 
to limit the kinds of madness that were permissible in the involvement context.  An 
interesting example is the NHS vacancy, in which skills such as the ‗need for frequent 
concentration‘, ‗the ability to adapt to receiving frequent interruptions‘ and ‗awareness 
of body language, tone of voice and facial expressions‘ refer implicitly to the potential 
difficulties that service-user candidates might experience—without referencing 
explicitly matters of medical or social impairment within the job description. 
                                                     
56 For more on the bodily odours of madness see Parr (2001). 
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However, if this talk of conversions gives the impression that the work of the service-
user professionals only concerns suppressing eccentricity or neutralising intense 
emotion, then this impression is wrong.  The final pair of use-strategies I want to bring 
out here constitutes dramatisation (‗camping up‘ the delivery of mad stories, as Benji 
puts it) and deployment (of particular staff or volunteers within a service-user network 
to particular causes): collectively, the conscious management and manipulation of 
service-user voice and service-user emotion in order to maximise effect for the 
particular audience and task in hand.  Concerning the first of these strategies, Meghan 
and Felicity—who both might be considered professional storytellers or testifiers—
discuss dramatisation and the act of managing performance:  
 
It was a bit daunting at first standing in front of people and sharing my experience [...] 
I‘ve got it to a tee now—I know where to pause and when to tell a joke and where to 
have dramatic effect—there is a bit of an on-stage and an off-stage me, and there are 
some things I won‘t share publicly. [...]  It changes too, if I‘m talking to a group of 
volunteers and I‘m telling them that the system is monumentally up shit creek and they 
can do something to fight it, or if I‘m talking to a room of psychiatrists. (Felicity) 
 
I share my experiences for particular effect in the hope that it will help others in the 
future.  You don‘t exactly want to elicit people‘s sympathy but you want to impress on 
them what you‘ve been through so you just ... tell it in a particular way. (Meghan) 
 
Regarding deployment, Benji evidences a similar management of emotion/disclosure at 
an organisational level—this time, as he puts it, in terms of being ‗savvy‘ about which 
volunteers to deploy to which project.  Whilst it would be tempting given the above 
discussion to imagine that such selection would prioritise only the most articulate and 
emotionally restrained volunteers, in fact, Benji‘s descriptions reveal a more nuanced 
picture of deployment in which different kinds of mad presence and different levels of 
(dis)ability can be ‗put to use‘ in different contexts.  As such, individuals who were in 
certain situations uncomfortably intrusive in other contexts proved great assets for 
rallying up support or attracting attention, whilst individuals who wished to share 
especially harrowing experiences or who were prone to particularly tearful or emotive 
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contributions could in the right context be deployed as ‗a sneaky secret arsenal‘ to raise 
awareness or heighten sensitivity to a particular concern.
57
 
 
Dramatisation and deployment as the context-specific performance of personal 
testimony and allocation of specific mad voices to specific campaigns thus reveal the 
strange duplicity of professionalism in the insider industry.  On the one hand, 
professionalism emerges in the narratives of service-user workers as a need for 
compliance with the ethics and codes of the white-collar workplace (especially 
regarding emotional governance and presentation of self)—a commitment which, in 
the context of insider industry, may primarily necessitate the suppression or 
minimisation of emotion and eccentricity.  On the other, as Felicity and Meghan detail, 
when one‘s job begins and ends with telling one‘s story and acting as a messenger for 
others in mental distress, professionalism (this time understood as a standard of skill 
commensurate with that of an expert) indicates the ability to execute and to deploy a 
range of affective performances—some of which may indeed challenge what is 
ordinarily sayable and doable in conventional professional spheres.  As I have 
attempted to show in these examples, the usage of mad experience and the ‗emotion 
work‘ of insider industry are thus always complex and contradictory.  At times, 
service-user professionalism constitutes the taming and converting of emotions and 
personal stories to fit into dominant organisational contexts.  Yet as the examples of 
dramatisation and deployment also demonstrate, at the same time, service-user 
professionalism constitutes the deliberate putting to work of particular emotional 
displays for particular gain (and we might note here particular overlaps with other 
forms of service work in the so-called ‗knowledge economy‘—this is Hardt and 
Negri‘s ‗affective labour‘ par excellence: a commodification of insider insight to serve 
not only personal needs, but the requirements of the service-user movement as a 
political constituency more broadly).
58
 
 
                                                     
57 If the practice of placing especially vulnerable individuals in novel situations with a view to shocking or 
provoking the audience appears implausibly exploitative it must be stressed that volunteers freely choose 
to take on a duty, that they are supported throughout by a more senior service-user representative, and that 
such encounters are not normally framed in such language of ‗vulnerability‘ within the service-user 
network, either by volunteers or co-ordinators. 
58 See Hardt and Negri (2004, p. 108).  An important and relevant resource here is Lewis‘s (2010) paper 
on service-user involvement which seeks expressly to explore the ‗emotion work‘ of user involvement in 
public services.  In contrast to the discussion here, amongst other issues the paper explores the private 
emotional experiences of users taking part in involvement activities and how these work through particular 
personal conundrums (e.g., the desire to help others or to vent anger and frustration). 
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To conclude this section then, service-user professionalism occupies an unusual 
occupational space in which conventional renditions of the passive service-user are 
challenged and where firsthand experience of distress is recoded as an important 
workplace asset.  Such space is also a fragile and contested one, however, and in order 
to survive, definitions of ‗insiderness‘, understandings of what insiderness offers and 
the relation of service-user professionals to the outside world must be continuously 
renegotiated.  Besides insider insight, insiderness (being mad or having been mad) also 
poses difficulties in the context of professionalism.  In comparison to the creative 
workers who, to a greater or lesser extent, benefit from the rawness of mad experience, 
in the professional working environment, the vividness of madness and expressiveness 
of strong emotion must be balanced carefully with competing demands for convention 
and rationality.  In the context of service-user professionalism, being a good ‗mad 
representative‘ does not always mean being as mad as you can.  Indeed, as some of the 
above examples have shown, for those who are really in the grips of madness (however 
this is understood), getting by in the service-user professions may be as hard as 
anywhere else.  
 
Insider Empathy and the Helping Professions  
 
The third and final utilisation of mad expertise I want to discuss shifts this time to 
interpersonal work and the empathic or helping professions.   
 
After recovering from his own mental health crisis, Jed sells his taxi firm to become a 
psychiatric support worker with social services.  Sheila takes a job at the Women‘s 
Centre as a trained listener and support group facilitator.  Helen leaves a career in 
human relations to retrain as a counsellor.  Tim, a history teacher at a secondary 
school, finds himself increasingly drawn towards special needs teaching and eventually 
moves to full-time work with children with behavioural problems.  After herself 
studying for a psychology degree whilst being treated for schizoaffective disorder, 
Marie takes a support role in a university student welfare centre, working particularly 
with students with mental health difficulties.  Unlike the public and political workspace 
of the service-user professionals above, what draws these professions together is the 
ability to comfort and counsel and show compassion in the face of suffering and 
vulnerability—a capacity which, without exception, the individuals introduced here 
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speak of in terms of motivation based on their own experiences and a guiding insider 
‗empathy‘ or ‗insight‘ which instructs them in their work. 
 
It is worth (in similar spirit to the above sections) exploring some of the multiple ways 
in which this insider empathy and commitment to care are understood by their agents, 
and what this can reveal about the apparent utility of insider experience.  Helen 
describes the process by which she decided to leave her career in human resources and 
begin a Master‘s degree in counselling, after counselling had helped her deal with her 
own experiences of depression and childhood abuse several years earlier (a process she 
frames expressly in the language of skills and career development):  
 
I wanted a new challenge but I didn‘t like the idea of going back to college with kids 
fresh out of high school.  I‘d often been told I‘m a good listener by the people about 
me—I think it comes from having been round the block a few times—and I thought 
counselling would be a career path where I could make something of this skill and 
make good of some of the negative things I‘d been through.  [...]  I felt my real 
strengths were my ability to empathise and my age.  And having had a mental health 
problem makes you very interested in psychology—your own and other people‘s.  So I 
was going for my strengths and my interests.  
 
In contrast to this career and skills-based narrative, Jed on the other hand describes a 
change (in lifestyle as well as job type) that more closely positions compassion as a 
matter of character or virtue.  During his taxi driving days in a rough part of town, 
preserving a hard man reputation had been an ordinary part of getting by (a lifestyle 
which he now attributes as the cause of his depressive crisis).  After his breakdown, 
which came on suddenly and which rendered him inexplicably unable to open the 
curtains or step outside, under the instruction of his daughter, he gradually began to 
awaken his softer side.  Years later, now employed as a qualified support worker, 
maintaining a more compassionate disposition and disciplining himself to remember 
his past experiences forms a central aspect of Jed‘s professional identity: 
 
I was in the staffroom [at the support agency] and there was some nurses laughing at 
this client ‗cos he was a bit affected like and he had been a bit pompous [Jed acts out 
the client‘s demeanour] and I was going to join in but then I thought ‗no, this isn‘t 
right!  You got to be respectful because this man, this is just his illness talking and he 
needs help.‘  And I know what that‘s like because I‘ve been there.  So if I‘m in a 
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position of power now I got to stand up for people, haven‘t I?  So I stood up and said, 
‗I don‘t think it‘s right what you‘re doing‘.  
 
For Tim, the teacher who transfers from mainstream to special education, empathy 
appeared instead as a mysterious ‗power‘ with which he had unexpectedly been 
endowed.  In his own words, after ‗breaking down and breaking through‘, this 
‗untapped potential‘ simply revealed itself to him (there are similarities to be drawn 
here with the divine inspiration of classical accounts of the creative genius, and with 
the irreducible experiences of ‗magic‘ I discuss in the final chapter).  Tim describes an 
incident in the special educational needs (SEN) unit with a child in distress:  
 
It was one day at work about a month after I‘d gone back to teaching.  A lad was 
kicking off in a corridor and a colleague—an experienced colleague—was trying to 
calm him down and get him to come with her somewhere.  [The child refuses and 
becomes more agitated].  He was rigid—I mean his whole body was [motions an 
arched position] with stress and rage and—I looked at him and thought, ‗I know, son, I 
know‘.  And I just said something like, ‗why don‘t you come with me, son?  We‘ll 
have a chat‘.  And he let me put my hand on his shoulder—just lightly like—and he 
came with me.  It was very moving really and I just felt it here [points to heart], I felt I 
knew how he was feeling and so I could get through to him.   
 
Such an incident was the first of several similar success stories and Tim quickly gained 
a reputation throughout the school as being particularly talented in the SEN context.  
Official transfer to the Unit came two years later when a promotion opportunity in his 
own department caused him and his seniors to formally re-evaluate the direction his 
career was taking. 
 
A slightly modified view of the role of insider experience is seen with Carly (readers 
may note particular crossovers between this narrative and the strategies of the service-
user professionals in the previous section with regard to Carly‘s performative 
disclosure of personal experience).  Carly qualified as a psychiatric social worker after 
experiencing a mental health crisis as a young adult and is currently employed by a 
third sector housing project supporting individuals leaving statutory in-patient 
facilities.  One of the many reasons for leaving the local authority where she started her 
career concerned the ways in which she was allowed to reveal aspects of her own self 
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to others.  She describes an incident in talking down a ‗jumper‘ from a bridge whilst 
employed by the local authority: 
  
I said to him, ‗you‘re not going to believe this but I have been there too!  I tried to 
jump off a bridge when I was twenty!  My parents had died, I had lost everything—I 
didn‘t think I could ever recover.  I was so angry when someone stopped their car and 
dragged me back but I did recover—you can get through this too!‘   
 
Whilst Carly felt strongly that this personal disclosure had been the ‗key‘ to her 
success, at the office, disclosing personal experiences to clients was considered ‗bad 
form‘ and even though numerous colleagues had also suffered losses and traumas that 
had led them into the mental health field, these were kept as ‗ghost selves‘, un-
discussed and forgotten.  Hearing about the incident from the police, Carly‘s 
supervisors had congratulated but also reprimanded her for her actions.  Now at the 
supported accommodation project, Carly describes how the more relaxed attitude to 
disclosure allows for better relations with her clients: 
 
I like to be cards on the table with our clients.  I say, ‗If I can do it, so can you‘.  I 
think it can be good for them to hear that because they need to know I‘m not coming 
from some position on high but at the same time some of them get this victim 
mentality something which says ‗oh, no one‘s ever had it as bad as me‘ and they think 
they can‘t do it. 
 
Like the creative workers and service-user professionals described already in this 
chapter, the experiences of Carly, Tim, Helen and Jed both support and disrupt 
common imaginations of madness and ability.  Despite the intuitive appeal of the value 
of insider empathy in the helping and caring professions, as I have discussed already, 
popular images of the mental health patient present something surprising (risky, even) 
in placing people with their own mental fragilities in emotionally demanding roles: as 
Sheila puts it, ‗if you‘ve got a bad leg you‘re not going to want to be a footballer or a 
window cleaner or something, so if you‘ve got problems with your mood and your 
feelings, some people think it‘s not a good idea that you‘ve got a job which is all about 
the touchy-feely stuff‘.  (This said, despite such hesitancy, it is noteworthy that, like 
the user involvement agenda in the previous section, employing survivors of mental 
distress in the caring and counselling professions has become an increasing focus of 
UK policy: see, for example, the strong statement of support from the Department of 
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Health in 2006: ‗NHS trusts, PCTs, local authorities and other public services provide 
a wide range of employment opportunities [...] Having used mental health services may 
be a positive advantage for prospective applicants through being able to utilise their 
experience of using mental health services.  This in turn can serve to improve the 
quality of mental healthcare by involving people with direct experience in the care of 
others‘ [Department of Health, 2006, p. 12].)  In the academic literature, insider 
empathy or insider insight again attracts controversy.  Whilst some research (e.g., 
Bateson‘s [1991] empathy-altruism hypothesis or Staub and Vollhardt‘s [2008] 
‗altruism born of suffering‘) reports solid empirical evidence of the link between 
experiential empathy and enhanced helping capacities, other studies stress more 
prominently the neurotic, alexithymic and egoistic effects of many mental illnesses, 
which therefore disable the individual from productive helping relationships (Batson et 
al., 1983; Northoff, 2007).
59
   
 
As with the previous sections, the array of experiences introduced here also 
demonstrates the multiple manifestations of insider advantage (phrased here as the 
vaguely overlapping phenomena of ‗empathy‘ or ‗knowing what it‘s like‘), with 
conceptualisations varying from a bounded set of capacities and skills (Helen) or an 
enhanced sense of doing what is right (Jed), to an affective force drawing an individual 
into a certain kind of empathic encounter (Tim).  As with the creative workers and 
service-user professionals, it is interesting to observe also how individuals in empathic 
careers reported differing relations with these insider insights.  For Helen—especially 
in the early days—the biggest challenge in pursuing a counselling career had been 
persuading friends and family that she was ‗safe‘ with her capacity to empathise (‗I 
don‘t want you getting too involved‘, her husband would say); even though Helen 
rejected the legitimacy of such warnings, encouraged perhaps by her professional 
training, empathy remained a double-edged resource which had to be trained and 
cultivated.
60
  For Jed, by contrast, finding a new empathic side to his personality (and 
                                                     
59 A counter-narrative is the possibility of an organic basis for the relation between empathy and distress 
in certain diagnoses, such as hyperactivity of the amygdalae, which has for several decades been a 
candidate for explaining the simultaneous enhanced lability and enhanced empathic astuteness of 
individuals with conditions such as borderline personality disorder (Krohn, 1974; Fertuck et al., 2009).  
An interesting aspect of this narrative is that, in such accounts, empathy is not considered a useful bi-
product of distress but rather part of the patient‘s social difficulties, e.g., allowing the sufferer to recognise 
in others shades of emotion that they themselves had not yet acknowledged, leading to an array of 
confusions between social partners (Flury et al., 2008). 
60 Writing from the perspective of professional counselling practice, Bondi and Fewell (2003) highlight 
the spatiality of these metaphorical boundary tactics in the therapeutic setting, drawing attention to the 
similarity between professional counselling training and the informal ‗conversions‘ and distance-making 
strategies of the service-user professionals in the above section. 
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moreover building a career on such empathy) was an entirely unexpected growth 
experience: ‗this doesn‘t mean I‘ve turned into a poofter, you know?‘, he says to me, 
anxiously—a concern which is revealing of the alienness of his new occupation in 
comparison to the Big Man days of his taxi-rank past.
61
   
 
Finally, the diversity of the narratives above also raises questions about the link 
between insider empathy and perceived proficiency in the helping professions (that is, 
if insider insight can be so many different things at different times, from what ground 
can we ascertain an automatic exclusive advantage to being an insider?).  Tim makes 
his first breakthrough with a hard-to-help child with the words ‗I know, son, I know‘; a 
knowledge which is later supplemented by the feeling of knowing also—‗I felt I knew 
how he was feeling and so I could get through to him‘.  (This latter knowing-feeling 
complex relates closely to the phenomenological expression of empathy as the 
experience of experiencing what the other experiences as the experience of 
experiencing something from the other‘s perspective [cp. Husserl, 1931].)  Yet this 
warrants careful consideration: of what is this knowledge imagined to be?  If mental 
distress brings different kinds of suffering to different people (hearing voices as 
different to depression which differs again from obsessive compulsive disorder or 
being an upset child in a special behaviours unit), then the extent to which experiential 
knowledge is genuinely transferable between experiencers seems dependent largely on 
the interpretation of the ‗it‘ in the statement ‗knowing what it‘s like‘—with anything 
but the loosest of readings bringing Tim‘s knowledge claims into doubt.  (The flipside 
of this argument is that if ‗knowing what it‘s like‘ is interpreted in a broader sense of 
simply knowledge of what it is to feel pain, then given most people have suffered pain 
at one time or another, the claims of insider exclusivity are instead rendered dubious.)  
Second, in order to make use of such knowledge, presumably some level of 
communicating this insight and converting it into appropriate action is of equal 
importance to possessing the knowledge—for Tim, the embodied and affective 
deftness with which he says ‗I know‘ as well as the locked-in knowledge or experience 
of knowing.  (This attention to practice is important because, as others have noted, 
                                                     
61 This is but one of several narratives in this thesis which speaks to a broader feminisation of the 
workplace and the challenges of this for traditional northern male identities—a telling example is Michael, 
the motorcycle mechanic and ex-miner from the previous chapter, who had been threatened with penalties 
to his out-of-work benefit after telling a female advisor that he ‗didn‘t really want to work around women‘.  
(‗I‘m not being funny like but they‘re all gossipy[...] being down the pits and then with the bikes, I‘ve 
never really been around that many women [...] they make me feel a bit weird, all that talking and chin-
wagging‘).  For general discussion and review, see McDowell (2003); Nayak (2003). 
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without it empathy risks becoming a somewhat un-political and uninvolved motivation 
[Svenaeus and Gunnarson, 2012].)
62
  
 
Problematisations can also be made of the kind of knowledge invoked in insider 
insight.  In a discussion about the use of patients‘ knowledge in biomedical research, 
Caron-Flinterman et al. (2005) differentiates between insights that are experiential, 
procedural, and propositional in character (an attempt primarily to move away from 
sloppy or universalising categorisations of ‗lay‘ or ‗non-expert‘ knowledge).  In the 
field of service-users and ex-service-users working in the helping professions, a similar 
array of knowledges can be seen.  Whilst Tim‘s experience of knowledge is primarily 
intuitive and affective (an illustration perhaps of the ‗touchy-feely‘ aspects of insider 
empathy to which Sheila refers), compare instead the knowledge that informs Marie in 
her career (emphasis underlined):  
 
I know that the mental health services are not perfect.  Don‘t expect a student to 
necessarily be receiving much support in terms of quantity or intensity of meetings 
from the community mental health teams.  I know that if someone is not engaging with 
psychiatric services that might be because the services weren‘t offering them anything 
useful and might have been because they were offering something damaging. [...] 
I know some supports that the University can put in place for a student with mental 
health difficulties and, anecdotally, what the advantages and disadvantages of these 
may be. [...] I know that jumping into exams might be the best thing for this student to 
do right now or it might be the worst option ever and we should be looking to get her a 
concession to sit them when she‘s stronger.  
 
As seen, the knowledge Marie lists here is propositional—to be able to list reasonable 
adjustments that an institution might make for a student or to identify a range of 
outcomes that might result from such accommodations (in Bloom‘s taxonomy, such 
abilities would fall toward the bottom of the learning hierarchy).  Furthermore, much 
of this knowledge is not in the strictest sense insider knowledge if insiderness is 
measured only as knowledge gained from one‘s personal experience.  During her years 
in and out of hospital, Marie became friendly with numerous patients, including 
several who were also students at the time of their illnesses and it is through these 
encounters that much of this knowing was garnered—as Marie puts it, an ‗anecdotal‘ 
                                                     
62 For a broader philosophical discussion of ‗insider epistemology‘ or experiential knowledge both within 
and beyond the psychiatric survivor context, see Harding (1993), Fay (1996), Caron-Flinterman et al. 
(2005) or Corbin Dwyer (2009). 
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knowledge, accumulated through years of this listening and collating stories from 
others with similar experiences to herself.  Whilst in Marie‘s instance, insider status 
appeared expedient in acquiring such insight, since talking and listening and 
establishing rapport are not qualities of insiders alone, we note that insiderness in this 
instance is not the only means through which such knowledge could have been 
accessed. 
 
Finally, there is a problem concerning the temporal aspect of insider insight.  Whilst ‗I 
know because I‘ve been there‘ suggests a value in experiential knowledge of suffering 
in and of itself (e.g., because of the ability it grants the individual in relating to such 
experiences in others), it is noteworthy that again, much insider value in the helping 
professions instead relies on the experience of having overcome this initial state of 
crisis or angst.  A recurring theme across several of the narratives recounted here is that 
of an intermediary reparative event in the lives of the narrator (e.g., counselling 
experience or mental health recovery) which was seen to transform raw, painful 
experience into a kind of wisdom that could be put to use effectively.  In such 
instances, insider insight worked not to acknowledge suffering (‗I know, son, I know‘) 
but, counter-intuitively, to stand in testimony to the fallibility of in-the-moment 
knowledge and experience—to borrow again from Carly‘s speech to the jumper on the 
bridge, ‗I didn t think I could ever recover ... but I did‘.  (An articulation of this 
twofold nature of insider knowledge which does not involve disclosure is seen in 
Helen‘s discussion of the role of hope in her counselling practice.  Whilst Helen 
maintains that it is her experiential knowledge of suffering that makes her a sensitive 
and empathic listener, as she goes on to say later, it is her experience not of suffering 
but of recovery that enables her to have faith in people‘s ability to get better—an 
intuition which is significant because she reports in her own life experiences of 
therapists and doctors who had ‗written her off‘ from a recovery trajectory because of 
the length and intensity of her problems.)   
 
In formal terms then, it is demonstrable that the link between insider experience and 
insider ability in the context of the helping professions is far from self-evident and in 
fact constitutes a multitude of engagements with a range of cognitive/affective and 
active/re-active intuitions (Fay makes the Spinozan distinction between the latter 
couplet in the context of insider epistemology, where active responses are those in 
which being an insider leads one to know, think or desire certain things whereas 
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reactive responses are those in which being an insider allows one to perceive 
accurately how others want one to react [Fay, 1996].)  Significantly, as was argued in 
the previous section also, whilst insider insight can be advantageous in the helping and 
empathic professions, insider status alone is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
competent conduct.  Despite the popular intuitiveness of insider insight, narrators 
themselves expressed awareness of this ‗myth‘ of insiderness.  For various reasons, 
professional empathy was often something that had to be cultivated consciously rather 
than an experience that sprang naturally from the wells of personal insight: Jed‘s effort 
to lead a professional life based around respect for his clients is in this regard 
indicative.  Similarly, pressure from colleagues to live up to popular ideas about insider 
insight was reported by some as a workplace aggravation.  Sheila talks about her 
frustrations with her co-workers at the women‘s project for taking for granted and 
mystifying her psychiatric in-knowledge: 
 
If there‘s something about mental health sometimes they‘ll lean across and say, ‗they 
[the woman] are talking about this consultant, do you know where he‘s based?‘ Or, err, 
‗body dysmorphia—do you know what that is?‘ Well, I know because I look it up on 
the internet.  Or because I go back and talk with the woman and say ‗I‘ve not come 
across that one before, can you tell me what that‘s about?‘  I‘ve not got some magic 
eye inside me.  
 
Finally, each of the narrators in this section also spoke of the difficulties of having too 
much insider knowledge and too much empathy.  Marie, the student support worker, 
describes a comprehensive arrangement with her colleagues by which she hands over  
cases which are too similar to her own (‗it‘s the religious ones that get to me‘, she says, 
as her own experience of psychotic breakdown involved a series of extreme and 
disturbing religious obsessions).  Helen describes a similar occasion, sitting in her 
supervisors‘ living room for a whole afternoon in tears, when a counselling client 
unexpectedly brought back painful memories of her own unhappy childhood.   
 
The conclusion to this section is that like the other occupational clusters examined in 
this chapter, empathic insider insight is complex and diverse—both evincing and 
disrupting popular notions of mad ability and insiderness insight.  Whilst it has not 
been a major theme of this discussion, it also offers some parallel reflections on the 
process of researcher positionality in studies involving psychiatric service-users: whilst 
being an insider might have particular benefits both in establishing helpful research 
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relationships and benefiting from an underlay of insider knowledge, this benefit is 
partial, tentative and perhaps cloudier in its significance than a very hurried 
interpretation of ‗mad affiliated‘ research might imply. 
 
Conclusion: Relating to Madness 
 
In summary, so far in this chapter various empirical examples have been introduced to 
demonstrate the nuances and complexities in what I have referred to as a ‗philosophy 
of use‘ among individuals making a livelihood from their mental health experiences.  
In doing so, numerous conceptualisations of a productive madness have been explored, 
from ‗insider insight‘ and ‗mad inspiration‘ to the political solidarity of sharing a 
mental health identity with another.  Numerous career trajectories have also been 
encountered, with individuals both moving into mad-enhanced careers electively and 
as a result of structural and health difficulties in previous employment sectors.  
Throughout the chapter, numerous potentials for using madness have also been 
explored, yet—as per the discussion of insider insight above—so too have the 
difficulties with imagining any necessary or sufficient linkage between madness and 
ability.   
 
So then, to return to the original issue, what of the relation between one‘s self and 
one‘s madness?  So far, a range of strategies of relation (ownership, 
compartmentalisation, deployment, dramatisation) have been presented and 
problematised, especially with regard to their workplace potentials.  Yet what of the 
old interest in an ethics of relation, a politics of relation; of the ‗impotent ought‘ of 
right relations that I introduced in the previous chapter?  How is one to relate to one‘s 
madness; to put it to work?  And what are we to make of these individuals whose work 
with their madness constitutes a core part of their occupation and livelihood? 
 
It seems that there are a range of critical possibilities to consider.  In the first we see, to 
borrow Parr‘s phrase, a ‗hopeful ontology‘ (Parr, 2008)—a series of creative 
possibilities for the self and for the service-user movement combined.  At the heart of 
this chapter I have attempted to disrupt assumptions that madness can be only a 
disadvantage in the workplace; moreover, to stretch understandings of mad ability 
beyond those of the solitary mad artist alone.  In the mad-enhanced work of the kind 
that has appeared in these case studies, hopeful potentials have been explored for 
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playing against popular notions of the working wounded, presenting instead people 
who have experienced mental health difficulties as important workplace assets with 
privileged and profitable access to insight and knowledge.  Playful subversions of 
traditional mad/non-mad power relations have been the result of many of these 
interactions: Maurice, the artist in the first section, ‗feels sorry‘ for people who don‘t 
have mad experiences like he does and reports incidents on his design course of 
‗stopping to help‘ his non-mad course-mates who were lacking such manic inspiration; 
in the offices of the user network—a space habited entirely by mad employees and 
volunteers—Benji says (in a conscious twist of ordinary workplace attitudes towards 
people with mental health difficulties), ‗it‘s not that we‘d never employ someone who 
wasn‘t a service-user [...] just they‘d have to really prove they were up for the job‘.   
 
Making use of one‘s madness in the public sphere of work has possibilities in the 
ethico-therapeutic spaces of personal narratives also.  Beresford (2003, p. 47) describes 
occupations which give voice to service-user experience as bringing individuals 
‗closer‘ to their own experiences (a process he sees as empowering, especially in a 
context where too often personal narratives are overwritten with professional 
understandings).  I prefer to this notion of proximity a concept of ‗regaining‘ or, as I 
suggested earlier in the chapter, ‗owning‘ experience (a distinction which moves away 
from impressions of mere closeness, towards a set of discrete adjustments in the 
relation between self and experience in which an agentic self capable of holding and 
defending its own experiences is the outcome).
63
  In either rendition, such assertive and 
productive coming-to-terms with one‘s madness has much in common with post-
traumatic growth and recovery models of mental distress in which ‗making sense‘ and 
‗making good‘ of one‘s experiences constitute an important retrieval of the self 
essential to psychiatric recovery (Woodward and Joseph, 2003; Fardella, 2008).  
 
In considering the relation between self and madness, however, whilst to an extent the 
narratives described in this chapter are triumphant stories of reclaiming and 
repositioning madness and mad experience, it is interesting that—as was the case for 
the worker-work relation in the previous chapter—a complex ‗ethics of relation‘ also 
can be seen to govern such applications.  In this chapter we have already touched upon 
some limits to putting madness to work acceptably: the service-user professionals 
                                                     
63 Or, as a back-reference to chapter two, a self capable of ‗managing‘ its madness (from Latin, manus, 
‗hand‘—to handle, esp. to control). 
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whose madness detracted from the broader aims of the mental health movement, or, in 
the helping professions, forms of relating to others through shared experience which 
put one‘s own recovery at risk (in the service-user vacancies in the second section of 
this chapter, this also appeared in some of the job descriptions: person specification 18 
of the hospital-based position, for example: ‗ability to maintain recovery whilst 
assisting others whose experiences may be similar to yours‘).  Yet in the working 
narratives of the individuals appearing in this chapter, more value-based judgements 
could also be seen to govern the bounds of ‗right relation‘ as understood by the 
narrators.  In what should be seen as a direct extension to the discussion of ‗right 
relations‘ in the previous chapter, we might summarise some examples (this time 
phrased as a series of prohibitions):  
 
 Usage of personal experience at work should not suppress or deny the 
inevitable differences between oneself or others (the concerns of Benji earlier 
in the chapter). 
 Usage should not leak one‘s own experience into the hearing of others‘ 
experience—in the therapeutic context, a concern approximated closely to 
Freud‘s concept of counter-transference.  
 Usage should not be brash with experiences of trauma or suffering, or be 
competitive with other survivors about the ‗severity‘ of despair or medical 
diagnosis (this was the kind of ‗career-building‘ of the competitive asylum 
inmate described by Goffman (1961) from which I tried to separate the mad 
workers in my own research in chapter two).  
 Usage should not be brash about economic gain from one‘s mad work, 
especially where charges of profiteering might be made.  (Narrators spoke of 
the difficulties of negotiating this sensibility when at the same time relying on 
an income from the career path they had chosen: Lucy recounts an occasion 
where, on speaking as an invited guest to the charity that had been involved in 
the service-user magazine where she had had her first publication, the charity 
had found it brazen that she had declined to waive her speakers‘ fees—‗but it‘s 
my livelihood , she explained).   
 
An important rhetorical device used by narrators to situate their experiences within this 
ethical territory was that of the non-present Other who transgressed or negated such 
rules.  Amongst the service-user professionals, a recurring figure in this self-distancing 
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strategy was that of the profit-making survivor/entrepreneur—mainly profit-making 
motivational coaches and ‗service-user fat-cats‘ (Felicity‘s coinage) who had turned to 
private consultancy.
64
  Among the creators and helping professionals, a similar ethical 
locating of one‘s relation to one‘s mad experiences could be seen.  Helen told the story 
of a fellow sufferer of depression on her counselling course who would jump into class 
discussions to make each slide on the PowerPoint presentation directly relevant to her 
own experience, and who would subsequently spend all coffee breaks spilling the 
wisdom of her own recovery onto her ever more wary friends; Gwyneth, who after 
producing a number of successful poetry collections turns her talents to an 
autobiographical self-help book on depression, instead positions her own project 
against ‗misery memoirs‘ (that undesirable genre of triumph-over-hardship 
autobiography with similarly burgeoning critical reception):  
 
There is misery in the book but I hope it‘s on the train on the way out. There was a 
very poignant moment where I told a friend, another writer, what I was doing and I 
said I wasn‘t doing it for myself and he said ‗that‘ll keep you safe then‘.  And by that I 
think he meant that if I had been self-serving in the book I would have probably been 
attacked by the critics—I think people can sniff out people who are trying to advance 
their career or using their writing as their own self-fulfilling therapy. [...] But there are 
authors who have written maybe sixteen or seventeen books about their wretchedness, 
and they seem to be unable or unwilling to move on.  That‘s misery memoirs to me. 
[...]  I hope my book is about transition.  
 
Evaluating the workplace reclamation of madness/mad experience with regard to 
critical theory, however, is harder still.  Domesticating madness and reclaiming 
recovery are of course the modern project par excellence: a fixing of the self and 
making the non-productive productive to which critical scholars have become 
accustomed to treating warily.
65
  Furthermore, the political ramifications of the kind of 
                                                     
64 See Felicity, talking about a somewhat infamous survivor-turned-motivational guru who was operating 
in the area: ‗It‘s a racket because you spend fifteen pounds on a ticket and then he says for £8.99 a month 
you can subscribe to his podcasts and then for another twenty you can buy a book or get a personal e-
coach or whatever.  I don‘t know about the ethics of that because you‘re playing on people‘s emotions‘.  
65 An intriguing illustration is Freud‘s description of sublimation (that is, the conversion of unconscious 
neurotic drives into socially useful products), which he insisted was the only instance of a ‗successful‘ 
defence mechanism.  In terms of Freud‘s wider writings, the example is curious since if sublimation was 
identified only upon positive valuation of social productivity, then a distinctly non-analytic (judgment-
based, contextual) element had to be admitted to the theory—something we note as uncharacteristic of 
Freud‘s greater project (Gemes, 2009).  For the purposes of this discussion, Freud‘s insistence that for a 
defence mechanism to be successful it had to have social value (which in the examples he provides 
equates closely to economic value also) is indicative of the broader modernist compulsion to make the 
irrational rational by returning it to the more familiar logic of means-end rationality and productivity.  
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moral rescuing of negative experience introduced in this chapter (if life gives you 
lemons...) should also be apparent as a potentially conservative and individualistic 
regime of ‗make do and mend‘ which obscures the ongoing inequalities of life.  (This 
claim can be extended to much of the recovery model in terms of narrowing 
interpretations of recovery from a social to a personal level: ‗Fine, if the story really is 
―I was having troubles, I went to the doctor, I was given a pill, now I‘m feeling better 
again‖—but if you are still living in a crummy boarding house and you are not being 
paid a living wage for your work, recovery is not complete‘ [Reville, 2011].)  Yet 
where narratives go beyond psychological recovery alone and move to the provocative 
arena of selling one‘s madness (as the voice of experience or the inspired artwork), we 
can extend these arguments further.  If, as according to critical theories of relation, 
waged labour involves not only a selling of one‘s time but aspects of one‘s own self 
(again, a symptom of late capitalist ‗knowledge economies‘), then in the 
commodification of madness and the selling of distressing experience, this is extended 
beyond the fast-food worker‘s ‗service with a smile‘ to the most private, painful and 
personal aspects of oneself.  To the extent that madness is already an expression of 
alienation, a double injury thus occurs in putting madness to work—not only an 
alienation of one‘s authentic species-being but, to layer alienation upon alienation, a 
severance of one‘s authentic alienation also.  (An interesting discussion could ensue 
over whether the placement of the larger proportion of the workers in this chapter in 
the public or charitable sectors is significant—that is, whether the experiential effect of 
‗doing some good‘ with one‘s work overrides the underlying structural alienation of 
paid labour, yet I shall persevere with this argument for now).  Taking this argument 
further into the realms of anti-capitalism and anti-psychiatry—for example, to those 
such as Deleuze and Guattari who celebrate in madness one remaining space outside of 
capitalist production and desire—such marketisation of madness constitutes not only a 
personal tragedy but a social and political one also.
66
   
 
                                                                                                                                             
Freud considered the ‗greater number of our cultural achievements‘ across the arts and sciences to be a 
result of sublimation (Freud, 1905, p. 43); his most famous example was that of Leonardo da Vinci, who, 
according to Freud‘s analysis, successfully diverted (sublimated) repressed homosexual desires into a 
powerful drive for artistic and scientific excellence (Freud, 1910). 
66 In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari paint the problem of capitalist desire as the self-repressing desire 
to work: echoing Wilhelm Reich, they ask, ‗How can people possibly reach the point of shouting: ―More 
taxes! Less bread!‖? .... Why do people still tolerate being humiliated and enslaved, to such a point, 
indeed, that they actually want humiliation and slavery not only for others but for themselves?‘ (1972, p. 
31).  Later, both capitalism and psychiatry (psychoanalysis) are charged with binding the energies of the 
pure ideal-type schizophrenic into a ‗world that always opposes the revolutionary potential of decoded 
flows with new interior limits‘ (p. 267).  In his practice at La Borde, Guattari had attempted to interrupt 
the collusion between psychiatry and self-repression, denouncing both patients and staff at the commune 
who were up before noon for work at nine as ‗alienated by capitalism‘ (Dosse, 2010, p. 176). 
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Finally, we might turn critical attention to notions of equity.  Using madness and mad 
experience (and formalising its employment) offers privileged spaces for mad-only 
work and has hopeful potentials for users/survivors working in other fields also.  Yet 
however ‗useful‘ madness might be, it is important not to obscure issues of ongoing 
pay and power disadvantages for individuals using their firsthand experiences 
explicitly in their work (James suggests that his sessional rate for lecturing on the 
medical degree is less than half that of similarly qualified co-workers; similarly, in the 
hospital-based position in the second subsection, we note the salary grading is 
significantly lower than non-service-user-only posts when considering like-for-like 
roles and responsibilities such as decision-making power and level of skilled work).  It 
is noteworthy thus that in recent years, somewhat of a backlash against certain service-
user employment forms has been seen from within the service-user movement—at an 
international seminar on mad activism and service-user led research (University of 
Central Lancashire, April 2011), guests from Canada spoke of a Toronto-based project, 
‗Keep Your Hands Off Our Stories‘ to tackle the concerning exploitation of service-
user workers and the appropriation of user-generated research into mainstream 
academic discourse.    
 
It was stated at the beginning of this chapter that, following the teleological school in 
which it is posited that to know a thing a knowledge of its uses must be acquired, in 
examining carefully the ways in which madness might be made useful at work, a 
deeper understanding of the qualities of madness or character of being mad could also 
be found.  In the field of putting madness to work, it is interesting to see how the two 
major elements of this chapter—usage and ethics—are thus intimately linked, since 
thinking about use leads us eventually (inevitably?) to questions of teleology.  If 
madness is a thing, separate from the rest of the self (as the empirical examples of 
distancing, ownership, compartmentalising here have suggested), does it therefore 
make sense to speak of madness as having a teleology also?  Aristotle‘s knife 
(Nicomachean Ethics, Books I and III) reveals its knifeness through exploration of 
what a knife as a knife is good at; just as we cannot understand properly the concept of 
a knife until we have seen it in action, perhaps it is also the case that we cannot 
understand madness until we have tested its useful possibilities as well as 
acknowledged its potential for harm.
67
  However, Aristotle also states that a good knife 
                                                     
67 ‗The subject of investigation is sometimes the  instruments, sometimes the use of them; and similarly in 
the other cases sometimes the means, sometimes the mode of using them or the means of bringing it 
about....‘ (Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, Chapter 3, §27–31).  Aristotle implicates the virtues of using 
156  ‗Working Through‘: An Inquiry into Work and Madness  
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
is one which is put to its use—which fulfils its utility and is not just kept in storage or 
display, and furthermore which is put to its use in a way which was consistent with the 
greater good (to cut only the right things, at the right times, for the right reasons).  By 
this logic, the potentials of madness thus demand to be fulfilled—no longer can the 
person in possession of madness exist ‗outside‘ of ethics but rather must be obliged to 
discover and then actualise the virtues (uses) of this madness as incorporated into his 
life (we see how the common assertion, ‗I just wanted to put it all behind me‘ bears 
little weight in this philosophy).  It is in this introduction of duty that we thus see the 
pulsating nature of putting madness to work—a possibility for freedom which 
constantly opens and collapses with its own double-sidedness.  Teleological reasoning 
of the kind sketched out here offers comfort and courage to individuals coming to 
terms with mental health diagnoses, especially where these are coupled with the lived 
experiences of insight or ability; we might see this as analogous to notions of ‗fate‘ in 
individuals‘ personal sense-making strategies for understanding breakdown (see Helen, 
for example: ‗I think I was meant to go through this because I have come out the other 
side as a stronger and better person‘).  However, in the same breath, since ethics of this 
teleological nature necessarily produce duty and obligation (to fulfil the teleological 
end of usage) then by such reasoning, the radical possibilities of productive madness 
for liberating the psychiatric patient also trap her simultaneously in the bounded codes 
of ethical conduct that the previous chapter has problematised already.   
 
In this and the previous chapter, the complex ethical relations between work and 
worker and worker and madness have been explored and expounded.  In each chapter, 
the idea of a conservative ethics of relation (that we should work in this way, at these 
times, and that we must hide/cure/confess our madness in these particular contexts and 
environments) has been problematised and a case made instead for a more diverse and 
creative understanding of those all-important relations between one‘s self and one‘s 
gattungswesen.  In both chapters, in providing examples which challenge or test the 
ways in which relation, work, usage and madness are ordinarily talked about, an 
investigation into ‗what it makes sense to say‘ about these seminal concepts is also set 
sail. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
something correctly in his definition of intrinsic goods—in Terence Irwin‘s succinct summary, ‗seeing is 
the good of the eye because the eye‘s function is to see, cutting is the good of a knife because the knife‘s 
function is to cut, and so on‘ (Book I, Chapter 6, §12, editor‘s notes). 
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It was noted at the start of the previous chapter that the history of the philosophy of 
work and madness was, at its heart, relational.  What I hope to have demonstrated in 
these past two chapters is that this goes beyond saying simply that everything is related 
to everything else (a cry for attention to context and complexity primarily) but to say 
that the way in which we conceive of such relations—both as philosophers or social 
scientists and in so called ‗lay‘ or lived capacities—itself shapes the kinds of working 
practices we endorse for human flourishing and our responses to people who variously 
fall outside, or fly in the face, of such engagements.  Marx‘s classic portrayal of the 
alienated worker captures something enduring and real that survives into the twenty-
first century world of work with easy applicability.  Yet thinking of June and Martin 
and Sally and Barbara and Maurice and Carly and all the other workers who have been 
introduced in the previous two chapters, it seems evident that a more plural and less 
normatively centred framework will be needed to account for the whole multiplicity of 
ways in which work-worker relations can go wrong or in which happiness can be 
found. 
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Chapter Five 
 
What Works? 
Plato’s Pharmacy and the ‘What Works’ 
Agenda 
 
 
  
Work (v.) 23.a. to act in the desired way, to do what is required; to be practicable or 
effectual, to succeed. 
 
 
 Bambra, C. (2002) What Typ s of ‘Welfare to Work  Work and for Whom? 
 Centre for Mental Health (2008) Doing What Works 
 Centre for Mental Health (2011) Commissioning What Works  
 College of Occupational Therapists (2010) Working for Wellness: What 
Works, When? 
 Institute for Employment Studies (2007) What Works at Work? 
 Schneider, J. (2005) Getting Back to Work: What Do We Know About What 
Works? 
 
~ Extracts from a ‘what works  bibliography 
 
 
The focus of these final two chapters is ‗what works‘: that is, the genre of evidence-
based research and evidence-based policy design that have become known collectively 
as the ‗what works‘ literature in mental health care and beyond.  It may be apparent 
that many of the arenas of social activity that have been touched upon in this thesis 
(therapy, rehabilitation, management, education) have become somewhat preoccupied 
in the last decade and a half with this kind of thinking about research.  It may also have 
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become apparent in the thesis so far that such kind of justification for doing research 
has not been the primary purpose of this project.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is less to bring news of what does or what doesn‘t work in 
terms of getting people with mental health problems back to work, or to demonstrate 
where this doctoral thesis sits amidst such evidence (although both issues are touched 
upon circuitously).  Rather, in what follows, the chapter seeks to take a step back from 
the empirical evidence (my own or other people‘s) in order to explore at a more 
discursive level what it makes sense to say when we declare that something ‗is 
working‘ in the context of mental (ill) health, and, in doing so, to explore a final 
dimension of work as we have followed it throughout the thesis.  In the course of the 
chapter, I will argue that to claim that something works (or to ask a question about the 
same) is a speech act: that is, a discursive intervention that both describes and brings 
into being particular modes of conceptualising and acting in the world, rather than 
merely an empty reflection on the world as it is. 
 
After offering a brief précis of the ‗what works‘ literature and some of the more 
pressing critiques that have been directed toward it, the approach of the chapter will be 
thus: first, having identified again the polysemous nature of work, a brief linguistic 
history of ‗what works‘ terminology will be provided to place ‗what works‘ in its 
wider semantic network; second, having located the popular origins of ‗what works‘ in 
the language of the clinic, the chapter revisits the evidence to demonstrate instead the 
numinous origins of the evidence agenda.  Finally, the chapter turns to three brief 
problematics of the speech act ‗it works!‘, which I have framed loosely around 
Hippocrates‘ dictum ‗first do no harm‘, Derrida‘s exposition of Plato‘s pharmakon, 
and the mechanical metaphor of clockwork.  In the meandering discussion throughout 
these fragments, the hope is to persuade the reader how, despite the initial 
transparency (simplicity) of the proclamation ‗this works!‘, the rhetoric of ‗what 
works‘ in fact obscures nuance and complexity in deciding what works and for whom.  
In the final chapter, a more magical alternative to the kind of world which is described 
by ‗what works‘ is explored.  Such alternative will be introduced in due course. 
 
It is easy when summarising large and loosely defined bodies of literature to make 
generalisations; where such summaries are developed into critique, dangers of a straw 
man fallacy also occur (Flyvbjerg, 2004).  It is not the purpose of this chapter to 
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renounce all value in ‗what works‘ perspectives, and throughout the chapter I cite 
numerous examples of helpful contributions from the ‗what works‘ genre.  The truer 
focus of critique remains—as above—the movement between the realities and fantasies 
of the evidence-base, and the moment of discursive translation between the research 
encounter of a particular study (that action X has effect Y for Z) and the broader and, 
as I see it, less trustworthy allure of what Smeyers and Depaepe refer to as the rhetoric 
of ‗work works‘ (Smeyers and Depaepe, 2006a). 
 
‘What Works’ and the Evidence Agenda 
 
To offer a rough and ready guide to the subject, ‗what works‘ and the ‗what works 
literature‘ connote a well-established and, in certain contexts, almost ubiquitous mode 
of conceptualising research which take as their primary philosophy the production of 
answers to questions of efficacy across a range of social or clinical interventions.  
Arising out of the discourses of ‗evidence-based practice‘ and ‗research-based 
evidence‘, ‗what works‘ publications are commissioned with planning or evaluation in 
mind, are modelled on experimental or quasi-experimental methodologies (the 
randomised control trial or case-control study), and are generally concerned with rigour 
and comprehensiveness over more exploratory textures of research (an observation 
which is significant since much of the argument in this thesis so far has been about 
finding the right language with which to discuss particular social and philosophical 
concerns).  In the UK, ‗what works‘ burst onto the political agenda in 1997 when New 
Labour won the general election with the slogan ‗what matters is what works‘—on the 
one hand signifying a conscious retreat from the ideology of older Labour parties, but 
also (from the perspective of the academy) signalling a new kind of political space for 
‗evidence‘ and the academic expert (Davies et al., 2009).  Today, with both an 
enlarged market for evidenced-based research and an increasing pressure within the 
academy to demonstrate the social impact of its scholarship, ‗what works‘ is promoted 
as the ‗gold standard‘ across many areas of social inquiry.  In medicine and healthcare, 
the showpiece of what works is the highly prestigious Cochrane Library (see also the 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence)—a format which has been 
replicated widely in other areas of social activity: in educational research, for example, 
as another arena in which ‗what works‘ has become very prevalent, see the ‗What 
Works Clearinghouse‘ or the ‗Doing What Works Centre‘. 
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To locate ‗what works‘ in an intellectual and ideological landscape, it is essential to 
reference at least three (interrelated) ‗logics‘ or influences.  First and most obviously is 
the centring of ‗what works‘ in the methods but also the authority of science.  
Rhetorically, much emphasis is placed upon the social sciences (as opposed to social 
studies or social research, or the Geisteswissenschaften as they are named elsewhere) 
with all the allusions to objectivity and transparency that talk of ‗science‘ evokes.  
Another prevalent rhetoric is that of clinical science—and particularly the Randomised 
Control Trial (RCT)—as the ‗gold standard‘ to which social research should aim 
(Wessely, 2002; Goldacre, 2011).  Of course, RCTs have not gone without their fair 
share of critique (some of which I shall consider shortly); however, the enigma of 
science in general, of clinical science in particular, and the RCT as a ‗gold standard‘ in 
evidence collection remains a significant influence in shaping what is considered to 
constitute robust and reliable social research.  Within a discourse of science, it is 
notable that realism also assumes a double rhetorical role (and we shall come back to 
the importance of realism in the final chapter): on the one hand, ‗what works‘ research 
boasts realist methodologies to emphasise that this is research which is outward facing 
and attentive to the social world as it is; on the other hand, policy makers gain status as 
‗realists‘ by seeking evidence-bases (rather than ideologies) on which to base 
decisions.   
 
Second, ‗what works‘ is endemically tied to a particular kind of means-end thinking 
which, in philosophical discourse, is often known as techne—a form of technical 
reasoning concerned with the management of need, the production of certain outputs 
and with prediction and control (Nussbaum, 1986; Smith, 2006a).  Regarding 
healthcare and other welfare structures, this can be seen in the pervasive language of 
interventionism whereby a wide range of programmes, practices and policies ranging 
from education and poverty alleviation to mental health sectioning or vocational 
rehabilitation are brought together under a broad umbrella of ‗doing something‘ to 
someone or group of someones.  (In the web pages of the current government, for 
example, interventions are used variously to describe the practices of restraining a 
child or psychiatric patient, instigating a national back-to-work programme, invading a 
country and prescribing antibiotics.)
68
  Of course techne, which conceptualises the 
                                                     
68 Examples are found easily across most Departmental and Ministry web pages, as well as the public-
facing www.direct.gov.uk interface.  On the Department for Education pages alone, for example, a search 
returns 538 results for ‗intervention‘ as used in this context (search conducted 17 October 2011, 
www.education.gov.uk). 
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world as a series of ‗procedures, manuals, algorithms and flow diagrams‘ (Smith, 
2006b, p. 161) links closely with the science and scientism discussed above—consider, 
for instance, examples as early as Bacon‘s Novum Organum (1620) which translates 
variously as ‗new handbook‘ or ‗new instrument‘ (of science); also with what for 
several decades now has been described as a culture of ‗expertism‘ in which 
increasingly we feel the need for expert opinion to offer ‗quick fix‘ solutions to 
problems of living (Rieff, 1968; Phillips, 1996; Furedi, 2004). 
 
Finally, ‗what works‘ research and evidence-based practice is located unequivocally in 
the logic of the market and acceptance of the involvement of market forces in public 
service provision.  In the first-wave ‗what works‘ publications in the late 1990s, such 
logic appeared most prevalently as a consumerist language of ‗giving the people what 
they wanted‘ (as opposed to what services could provide) with particular emphasis on 
the values of choice and competition in public services.  In more recent publications, 
especially those responding to the latest ‗crises‘ in public expenditure, emphasis has 
shifted more explicitly to a language of efficiency (getting the most for our money) and 
prioritisation (to fund only the most effective programmes).  As Gray and Mcdonald 
put it, these overarching and overlapping influences of the market, science and 
technicism can be read ‗congruently‘ in the light of neoliberal  ideologies (Gray and 
Mcdonald, 2006, p. 11).  Within this broad social diagnosis, however, it is important to 
identify more nuanced factors which also render legible this renascent demand for 
evidence.  Examples of some such factors as identified by Davies et al. (2009, p. 2) 
include: the growth of an increasingly well-educated and well-informed public (as well 
as an increasingly sceptical and distrusting one); the explosion in the collection and 
circulation of data of all kinds; an increasing emphasis on productivity and 
international competitiveness; and an increasing emphasis on scrutiny and ‗audit 
culture‘ in public as well as private services.   
 
Critical Reception 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, ‗what works‘ and the evidence agenda have generated a 
substantial volume of critical debate already.   
 
A sizeable proportion of this has been positive.  The self-proclaimed realism of ‗what 
works‘ and its commitment to ‗getting to the facts‘ can seem extremely attractive to 
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policy planners and end users alike.  In the first instance, in calling for and generating 
new bodies of evidence, ‗what works‘ and the evidence base have played significant 
roles in the development of progressive and positive policy developments.  In the UK, 
for example, the early years programme, Sure Start, is heralded as a flagship ‗mixed-
heritage‘ package drawn from various aspects of earlier schemes which had been 
proven to be efficacious (Solesbury, 2001).  Simultaneously and conversely, ‗what 
works‘ has had real-time effect in dismantling previously held but un-evidenced ideas.  
Wessely (2002), for example, cites the case of psychological debriefing, which in the 
late 1990s had been routinely offered to health and emergency workers in the wake of 
major incidents (multi-fatality road accidents, firearms incidents, etc.) as a preventative 
measure for post-traumatic stress. On collection of a systematic evidence base, 
however, figures demonstrated that indiscriminate psychological debriefing in fact 
increased the chances of subsequent psychopathology unless workers had already been 
demonstrating pathological symptoms at the time of the event.  Accumulation of 
evidence (which was used particularly to challenge policies in districts where 
engagement with such debriefings was mandatory for certain employees) thus allowed 
for a more complex way of thinking about trauma and the appropriateness of 
psychological expertise.  
 
At the political level, ‗what works‘ has also been welcomed for hailing a new era in 
service provision.  First, in embarking on an active search for what works best, ‗what 
works‘ marks a conscious movement away from a culture of pessimism in many 
institutions in which doing nothing had become the norm.  Such comments are highly 
relevant to psychiatry—remember, for example, the scene in chapter one following the 
collapse of the hospital industries, in which chronic patients were left in daycentres 
with little hope of meaningful occupation.  According to some commentators (see 
Cullen and Gendreau, 2001) such move was echoed by a complementary shift at the 
level of theory in which critical scholars began to move beyond the fatalistic critiques 
of the 1970s and 1980s that posited mental illness along with other phenomena such as 
long-term unemployment and recidivism as structural problems that could therefore 
only be addressed by the grand restructuring of society.  Whilst—as was seen in the 
previous chapter—professional and service-user models of constructing knowledge are 
often considered antagonistic to each other, it is indicative in this regard that ‗what 
works‘ is often welcomed as readily within service-user communities as it is by ‗top-
down‘ professionals and planners (Grove et al., 2005).  
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Given such research optimism, the popularity of ‗what works‘ is unsurprising and, as 
suggested above, likely only to increase during times of political austerity.  However, 
despite such support, numerous concerns have been raised about the epistemological 
and ontological bases of ‗what works‘ as well as the usefulness of its conclusions, and 
it is evident today that alongside the genre‘s prevalence, a strong and well-established 
resistance to ‗what works‘ can also be observed (for a selection of reviews, see Marks, 
2002; Gray and Mcdonald, 2006; Smeyers and Depaepe, 2006b; Smith, 2006b; 
Amann, 2010; Biesta, 2010; Smith, 2011). 
 
The first cluster of such critiques concerns specifically the epistemology and 
methodology of the scientific paradigm itself, its underlying positivistic-empirical 
commitment and its restrictive definitions of what classes as evidence.
69
  According to 
such critiques, the prevalent frameworks of ‗what works‘ are methodologically 
inadequate, outdated and overly restrictive for understanding complex social 
phenomena.  Whilst strong in identifying general quantitative relationships, they are 
weak at establishing either causal relations or the kind of deeper understandings 
associated with verstehen (Amann, 2010; Smith, 2011).  In their commitment to the 
large and the positivist they also reduce the range of phenomena that can be studied by 
social science; dealing well with that which is visible to the methods of large-scale data 
collection, but neglecting the unspoken, the implicit, the subjective and the 
unconscious (Wessely, 2002).  As examples of inductive research, all of the limitations 
of generalisability are also suffered—with few guarantees that what has been shown to 
work in the specific context of a particular study will ‗roll out‘ to work for a wider 
population (Fendler, 2006).  Being restricted to tightly defined research questions and 
the analysis of pre-specified outcomes and factors, ‗what works‘ methods are also poor 
at generating new or unexpected findings—and as such can be cited for eroding 
creativity and criticality in the social sciences (Smeyers and Depaepe, 2006a).  
 
The second kind of critique of ‗what works‘ that has received attention in the academic 
community concerns the politics of knowledge and the tendency of ‗what works‘ to 
dominate over other modes of acquiring and validating evidence.  Whilst such effect is 
                                                     
69 Among such critiques, reference is often also made to the genre‘s heavy reliance on quantitative data, 
but it is important to stress that from within evidence-based research itself, a conscious attempt to integrate 
more qualitative methodologies is often made: see for example, the recent activities of the qualitative 
research methods group of the aforementioned Cochrane Library (http://cqrmg.cochrane.org/, accessed 12 
March 2012). 
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to an extent a localised matter of research competition in the academic ecosystem (for 
example, preferential funding from research councils for ‗what works‘ research and the 
resulting threat to smaller, qualitative or philosophical inquiries) such domination is 
also a necessary and logical facet of the ‗what works‘ philosophy itself: in aiming to 
replicate only what is shown to have results—as Eisenhart puts it, ‗to promote the 
outcomes we want and eliminate the ones we do not want‘ (in Smeyers and Depaepe, 
2006b, p. 8)—‗what works‘ is necessarily a totalitarian philosophy; as Cullen and 
Gendreau describe it, one of five core principles of ‗what works‘ is to ‗―destroy‖ 
knowledge that is not evidence based‘ (2001, p. 331, my emphasis).   
 
Whilst there are many implications of this ‗politics of knowledge‘ that might be 
discussed here, one of particular interest to this chapter (and which will be developed 
further in chapter six) is the role of ‗what works‘ in the production of numerous 
interrelated hierarchies of the presumed status and quality of research or intervention.  
In the best known and most historic of these, the subject under evaluation is clinical 
evidence (see, for example, the Canadian Task Force on the Periodic Health 
Examination, 1979; or Sackett, 1986, for two of the earliest and most persistent in the 
literature); in nearly all, the randomised controlled trial (or systematic review of 
multiple RTCs) are listed as the gold standard, followed by matched studies and then 
cohort studies in order of preference.
70
   
 
Following the appearance of such hierarchies in the clinical context, equivalent 
stratifications have worked their way into qualitative social research and social 
interventions also.  In the case of qualitative research, predictably, this leads to what 
some have described as the ‗quantification of qualitative data‘—an upward pressure for 
researchers using qualitative data to emulate the RCT‘s focus on representativeness, 
generalisability and systematisation, for example, through comprehensive data coding 
and rigorous sampling—to the obvious detriment of more interpretive, 
phenomenological, ethnographic and textual methods.  In the instance of interventions 
by contrast, such hierarchies reflect the need to be seen to be evidence-based (a neat 
example is the rebranding of ‗Individual Placement and Support‘ as the gold standard 
                                                     
70 Again, it is noteworthy that qualitative research does appear in such hierarchies.  However, such 
methods are generally rated only on footing with ‗anecdotal evidence‘ or ‗personal communication‘: to 
quote from the selection process of one recent systematic review of back-to-work policies, for example, 
interpretive qualitative methods, ethnographies, action research and anything which ‗privileged subjective 
meaning‘ or which ‗did not address outcomes in terms of effectiveness, process or structure‘ were omitted 
from the search (Bambra, 2002, p. 22). 
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in rehabilitative practice for people with mental health problems as ‗Evidence Based 
Employment Support [Bond, 2004]).  At the top of such hierarchies are drug treatments 
which appear most readily amenable to investigation by double-blind RCT, followed 
next by non-medical but quantifiable clinical interventions such as cognitive 
behavioural therapy or mechanical physiotherapy.  Further down or away from this 
ideal are social interventions in which outcome or output is easily quantified, but in 
which control over the intervention or of confounding variables is significantly 
smaller—back-to-work schemes, which are inevitably inseparable from the 
particularities of local economies, are a good example.
71
  It is notable that where 
outcomes of an intervention are highly subjective or where delivery is hard to 
standardise—humanistic or psychodynamic talking therapies as key examples—
programmes are often omitted entirely from the ‗what works‘ agenda, opening the way 
for what Biesta describes as a ‗deeply problematic‘ scenario in which ‗professionals 
are only allowed to do those things for which there is positive research evidence 
available‘ (Biesta, 2010, p. 492).  
 
However, a third and final line of critique, and the one that I shall develop more fully 
throughout this chapter, concerns the teleological commitments of ‗what works‘—i.e., 
that however impressive our methods for testing the production of outcomes, ‗what 
works‘ depends always and foremost on our conception of what it means to be working 
and what we consider in the first instance to be desirable outcomes.  At a broad level, 
such teleological concerns link to wider anxieties about the desirability of efficacy 
(consider, for example, Marcuse‘s elocutions that ‗concentration camps, mass 
exterminations, world wars and atom bombs are no ―relapse into barbarism‖‘ but rather 
the ‗unrepressed implementation‘ of science and technology (in Smith, 2006b, p. 
162)—and of course we note that these technologies ‗work‘ with exceptional efficiency 
where a certain kind of goal is rendered desirable).  In the specifically psychiatric 
context, however, it is noteworthy that ‗desirable outcomes‘ are at the very heart of 
psychiatric contention: consider, for example, the concepts of ‗being a danger to 
oneself‘ or acting ‗against one‘s best interests‘ which form the basis for much 
contemporary mental health legislation.  To take some contentious examples, pro-
anorexic websites, which advise members on losing ever more weight, may well be full 
                                                     
71 These latter hierarchies refer in the main to state funding.  For charitable funding from private or third 
sector sources such as the controversial UK Lottery Fund, it is often reported that a contrasting ‗emotional 
hierarchy‘ can be seen whereby bids from smiley, pigtailed children and other heart-warming projects are 
often more successful than projects with less affective/aesthetic appeal such as support for the long-term 
unemployed or mentally ill—regardless of the evidence (BBC, 1999; London Evening Standards, 2007). 
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of strategies that work, where extreme weight loss is the only goal.  Similarly, Curtis et 
al. detail (among other things) safety features on modern psychiatric wards such as 
doorknobs and clothes hangers designed to prevent ligature—innovations which might 
be said to ‗work well‘ in suicide prevention but which are presumably most 
dysfunctional from the perspective of the patient looking for a place from which to 
hang themselves (Curtis et al., 2007).  (To add to this complexity, ironically, according 
to staff and patients making use of such innovations, such hangers and doorknobs do 
not work particularly well with regard to their primary purposes—i.e., hanging clothes 
and opening doors: the handles are too slippery and heavier items of clothes trigger the 
automatic release on the safety peg mechanisms.)  The assessment of modified hangers 
and door handles ‗as working‘ thus really comes down to for whom and to what end.   
 
In the back-to-work agenda, this teleological critique of ‗what works‘ is similarly 
relevant.  As I have tried to show throughout this thesis, ideas about getting people 
with mental health difficulties into paid employment are inevitably involved in a mesh 
of (philosophical) beliefs about the meanings of work (for a person/ the economy/ the 
moral ‗health‘ of society)—yet evaluations of back-to-work schemes which measure 
employment status only underplay such philosophical and value-based questions 
(Essen, 2011).  Whilst there is a strong case for saying that the loss of these 
philosophic perspectives is undesirable in and of itself, in such examples it can also be 
seen how a lack of engagement with broader questions of teleology also affects the 
validity with which ‗what works‘ evaluations measure the ‗success‘ of a programme.  
This point about the teleological commitments of ‗what works‘ and the validity of 
‗what works‘ as a measurement tool is worth pursuing and so for the purposes of 
illustration I offer three related but contrasting statements, each taken from pro-work 
mental health stakeholders to demonstrate this further: from the mental health charity, 
Rethink, the statement that competitive employment is a right for mental health 
service-users (Rethink, 2012); from the Centre for Mental Health report (2011) the 
statement that when dealing with mental health service-user populations, competitive 
employment is a marker for recovery, and, from the Social Exclusion Unit (2004), the 
assertion that competitive employment is an opportunity for social inclusion for the 
psychiatrically disabled.  In each of these reports, the need for a stronger evidence base 
for ‗what works‘ is advocated, citing back-to-work figures (i.e., employment status) 
data as the ideal measurement in assessing recovery. 
 
168  ‗Working Through‘: An Inquiry into Work and Madness  
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
What can be seen in these three ‗what works‘ proponents then, is depending on the 
context in which employment is embedded, paid work (and therefore what a what 
works study should be measuring) assumes different functions.  For Rethink, as a 
human right, employment appears as an end in itself (and therefore the correct measure 
for a sensitive evaluation); for the Centre for Mental Health, employment is a proxy for 
recovery—and as such, a valid measure only if enhanced wellbeing really does 
correlate with finding a job.  For the Social Exclusion Unit, perhaps most vaguely of 
all, employment is seen as an avenue to greater material, social and emotional 
wellbeing (the ‗true‘ desired outcome), which an employment-focused evaluation will 
measure only if the employment indeed leads to such benefits for the individual in 
question (in the formal language of logic models, paid work in this statement might be 
referred to as a ‗throughput‘ or ‗intermediate outcome‘ [Pawson and Tilley, 2007]).   
 
Further subtleties can be added too.  On closer inspection, it is access to work rather 
than actual employment provision which Rethink advocate as a ‗right‘ for people with 
mental health difficulties.  The Centre for Mental Health report adds a temporal 
dimension (employment is only a marker for health if the individual remains in a post 
for six months or more).  Finally, the Social Exclusion Unit makes the above claims 
specifically about ‗good quality‘ work—a hazy, and one fears, rather slender 
proportion of total job vacancies.  As such, whilst it seems tautologous to suggest that 
what works in a back-to-work intervention is that which gets individuals back to work, 
in practice such outcomes are rarely only the fulfilment of particular empirical ends, 
but instead are sited within wider ideologies which not only give meaning to defined 
outcomes but which also mediate their status.  Without a clear understanding of the 
true desired endpoints of ‗what works‘, ‗what works‘ studies—no matter how 
sophisticated the methodology—thus fall short of providing genuine new insight.  As 
shown in examples like these, teleological critiques of ‗what works‘ are thus fertile 
lines for exploring not only the efficiency of ‗what works‘ methodologies but also what 
it makes sense to say about work, as used in this context. 
 
What Works? 
 
Despite the primacy and prevalence of ‗what works‘ frameworks for research, 
powerful critiques of its methodologies, its resulting knowledge politics, and its 
teleological assumptions can thus be made.  In these last teleological critiques, what 
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can be seen is a breaking down or breaking up of the meaning of ‗what works‘ itself: 
what does it mean to suggest that something ‗works‘; what is its significance and how 
might we understand the existing primacy of what works in a language of evidence-
based inquiry? 
 
It is helpful to start by placing ‗what works‘ and its place in the semantic web into 
some kind of historical context.  Appearing first in Old English wyrcean in around 800 
(from Old Saxon workian and Old High German wurhcen, ‗to do or to act upon‘; also 
Old Norse, orka to manage, contrive), there are thirty-five entries for the contemporary 
‗work‘ (verb) in the full Oxford English Dictionary and thirty-three for ‗work‘ (noun), 
in addition to nine phrasal verbs (work in, work up, work out, etc.) and over one 
hundred and thirty compound nouns (workplace, worktop, workforce and the rest).  
Whilst early usage tended to refer in a general sense to action or performance (much 
like the modern ‗to do‘) with contemporary connotations of ‗effort‘ or ‗employment‘ 
appearing  in around 1100, the sense of the word as indicated in ‗what works‘ does not 
appear until the twenty-third OED entry (‘to perform a function, or produce an effect; 
to act, operate, take effect; esp. to act in the desired way, do what is required; to be 
practicable or effectual, to succeed ), with earliest instances recorded in the late-
1500s.
72
   
 
There are several critical points to be taken from this etymology.  First is the 
interconnectedness between work (sense 23, as I shall now refer to it) and the seedlings 
of the industrial and mechanical revolutions.  As other commentators have argued in 
different contexts, the concerns of sense 23, ‗to be practicable‘ or ‗to produce an effect‘ 
were characteristic of the kind of consciousness emerging at the very end of the Middle 
Ages (Mumford, 1967; Applebaum, 1992).  Social, technological and scientific 
developments throughout the sixteenth century demanded new ways of discussing 
work—and such requirements stretched beyond human labour alone to the growing 
sense of objects and machinery working or not working.  Whilst earlier generations had 
utilised systems and machines (a novel military tactic or manner of rotating the fields), 
sense 23 appeared to rise from the exclusively mechanical experience of something 
being broken (see c. 1610, for example: ‗Smale modles often fayle when they cume to 
                                                     
72 Thanks to John McKinnell for support with this paragraph. 
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worcke upon heavye weightes‘73, in Bond‘s Early History of Mining, cited in the 
Oxford English Dictionary)—a phenomenon which was surprisingly new (Applebaum, 
1992).  Two similarly-timed and related additions to the lexicon which strengthen this 
point were the modern day efficacy and its companion efficiency (1527 and 1593 
respectively), conveying similar cultural preoccupations.   
 
Second to be drawn from this etymology is, in the centuries following the term‘s first 
recorded usages, the rapid extension of sense 23 from solely concrete applications 
(working upon weightes as in the instance above) to abstract usage—that is the 
expression ‗it works‘ as a universal judgement of adequacy applicable equally to 
everything from machines or body parts to analytic arguments and later, even human 
relationships (I m sorry, you and me ain t working no more).  What emerged with this 
semantic expansion was thus a universal commensurability in which all manner of 
things could be understood in a comparable world of function/dysfunction.  In Mrs 
Clifford‘s Aunt Anne (1892), for example, when the narrator declares, ‗Walter had tried 
sending Florence and the children and going down every week himself but he found it 
didn‘t work‘ (p. 40), the reader understands that Walter‘s travel arrangements are 
equally defunct as a holey bucket or scratched gramophone record—in a similar way to 
how in skimming the titles of the latest evidenced-based journal today we might 
readily get the impression that a childcare programme or surgical procedure or 
environmental treaty might all be considered to work (or not work) in comparable and 
equivalent ways.    
 
To turn to the recent research and policy context (i.e., the evidence agenda outlined 
above), the etymological nascence of ‗what works‘ is more clearly rhetorical.  Whilst it 
is a matter of history that ‗what works‘ as a research agenda was a child of 1990s New 
Right politics (in the UK, New Labour), what is more striking for this purpose is that 
the emergence of ‗what works‘ as a research discourse was almost entirely created by 
such political priorities.  As a crude bibliometric proxy, figure 5.1 shows a general 
upswing in ‗what works‘ publications from the late 1980s onwards but booming at the 
time of the 1997 election (and indeed the majority of the early 1997–1998 publications 
are government sources relating to the election). 
                                                     
73 ‗Small models often fail when they come to work upon heavy weights‘, i.e., the difficulty in transferring 
findings from a small-scale mock-up to a full-scale working mine. 
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Figure 5.1  Instances of the term ‘what works  in the titles of entries in the Web of Knowledge database, 
1969–2010 (as the percentage of total new entries per year)74 
 
 
Figure 5.2  Instances of the term ‘evidence base  in publications titles in the Web of Knowledge database, 
1969–2010 (as the percentage of total new entries per year) 
 
 
 
The case for ‗evidence base‘ (figure 5.2) is stronger still: whilst the use of ‗evidence-
based  as an adjective rises steadily from the late 1980s with the terms ‗evidence based 
medicine‘ and ‗evidence based practice‘ appearing in 1992 and 1993 respectively, the 
                                                     
74 Graphs for illustrative purposes only.  Data generated by ISI Web of Knowledge citation report tool, 04 
October 2011.  Results limited to ‗what works‘ (fig. 5.1) and ‗evidence base‘ OR ‗evidence-base‘ + NOT 
‗evidence based‘ (fig. 5.2) in title field.  Results displayed as a percentage of new publications added to 
the database per year.  Some figures may include duplicates.  Figures also include a small number of 
publications critiquing ‗what works‘ methodologies as well as those engaging with it uncritically. 
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use of ‗evidence base‘ as a noun to describe a particular body of knowledge or 
literature is almost an exclusively post-1997 term (again, the 1996 publication in the 
figure above—a methodological piece on the virtues of systematic literature reviews—
is written with explicit reference to forthcoming political announcements concerning 
research). 
 
From the emergence of sense 23 in the sixteenth century from earlier senses of the verb 
to ‗what works‘ as a contemporary research and policy buzz-phrase, the history of 
‗what works‘ is thus inherently entangled in the growing primacy of mechanical, 
industrial and scientific viewpoints.  Yet the rhetoric of ‗what works‘ also casts its own 
voice upon the writing of such history, which as I shall go on to discuss in the 
following paragraphs, offers spaces for critique and correction.  To begin such 
deconstructive retelling, I shall start with the interrelated issues of the supreme 
modishness of ‗what works‘ in current discourse (both popular and academic); the 
(alleged) historical connection between ‗what works‘, clinical medicine and the RCT; 
and the relatedness of both of these issues to a sense that what ‗works‘ is somehow 
obvious or clear.   
 
It is useful to start with an illustration in the form of a recent Guardian article (14 May 
2011) from the psychiatrist-turned-science-writer, Ben Goldacre.  ‗How can you tell if 
a policy is working?‘ the article begins, ‗Run a trial!‘.  The piece, which is fairly 
typical of its kind, begins by setting out the randomised controlled trial as the ‗gold 
standard‘ in social research and through a series of energetic indictments (‗Do long 
prison sentences work?  Run a trial.  Different teaching approaches?  Run a trial.  Job-
seeking support?  Run a trial.  This isn‘t rocket science!‘) encourages the method‘s 
rollout to an ever greater number of social activities.  A repeated facet of the article is 
to dismiss judgement as a legitimate aspect of decision making; another to stress the 
simplicity (obviousness) of the RCT solution.  ‗Stop wittering...‘, writes Goldacre, 
‗...define your outcome, randomise [individuals] to different programmes, and you‘ll 
have the answer by the end of next parliament‘.  Finally, like many other popular 
histories of science, the article roots randomised trials and the ‗what works‘ paradigm 
in clinical medicine, as if, just as in the clinic where we can watch the patient get better 
(or otherwise), trials can offer the same clarity to more complex social scenarios.   
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In fact—both in terms of historical sequence and understandings of what clinical 
research is like—such a story is hugely condensed.  As others have noted, whilst 
clinical research had been using crude statistical analysis in experimentations since the 
early 1900s, the modern RCT with randomised participants and the presence of a 
comparable ‗control‘ group came from the unlikely arena of parapsychology and the 
scientific study of telepathy (Hacking, 1988).  In other words, the RCT came not from 
a profession such as medicine which was already ontologically secure in its ‗scientific‘ 
status, but from a marginalised area of inquiry where investigators had least confidence 
in their observations.  Given the tiny changes in perception that were to be detected in 
identifying telepathy (which, in the early 1930s was considered a potential explanation 
for the apparent ‗intuitiveness‘ of women in comparison to men), randomisation 
between an experimental condition and a control appeared a way of establishing that 
observations were not due to bias or chance—as well as establishing credibility in the 
scientific community.  Yet this first use of randomisation in scientific method also had 
much in common with earlier classical uses of randomisation: to let ‗fate‘ allocate 
decisions where human actors had little idea about the genuine best course of action.  
Whereas clinical trials prior to the RCT had thus largely been driven by intuition, it 
was parapsychology which introduced the large scale scientific trial as a means for 
truly unbiased knowledge.  (Indeed such relationship between RCTs and 
unknowingness continues to be observed in contemporary medical research, where 
‗clinical equipoise‘—i.e., genuine professional uncertainty about the most efficacious 
therapy—is considered a central ethical requisite before allocating patients to random 
treatment options [Freedman, 1987].)  From parapsychology, the RCT spread to more 
mainstream psychological interests and then to educational research before finally 
being applied to medical trials in 1948.  Whilst ‗randomised controlled trials‘ and 
‗randomised clinical trials‘ are thus used generally as synonyms today, it is a matter of 
interest that such historical linkage is imaginative only.   
 
To continue to disrupt this association between clinical science, ‗what works‘ and the 
clarity of findings, in mainstream medicine the first modern clinical RCT appeared in 
1948—yet it is noteworthy that still this fell short of the clarity imagined by Goldacre‘s 
magic solutions to research.  The study, published in the British Medical Journal, 
described a Medical Research Council investigation into the efficacy of the antibiotic 
streptomycin in the treatment of pulmonary tuberculosis.  The experiment marked a 
turning point not only for research methodologies but for the treatment of consumption 
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also (a disease which, once active, had generally killed over 50% of its victims prior to 
the antibiotic‘s introduction).  Results were impressive: of the patients offered 
streptomycin in the study, only 4 of 55 (7%) died compared to 27% in the control.  
Night-time temperatures dropped.  Improvement was also observed in the pulmonary 
tissues, with lung X-rays revealing improvements in 69% of the treated patients 
compared again to just 32% of the control.  In lay terms, it seems with every good 
reason to have claimed the drug ‗worked‘.  However, it is interesting that such clarity 
was not the experience of researchers involved in the trial.  As the report begins:  
 
The natural course of pulmonary tuberculosis is in fact so variable and unpredictable 
that in fact evidence of improvement or cure following the use of a new drug in a few 
cases cannot be accepted as proof of that drug. (Medical Research Council, 1948, p. 
769) 
 
The painstaking design of this first RCT then (which involved considerable political 
leverage as well as scientific innovation since prioritising research patients to treatment 
centres ahead of waiting lists was at that point an unfamiliar practice) was thus a direct 
result of the fact that (in the individual instance) it was difficult to tell whether a drug 
did or didn‘t work.  The introduction of streptomycin came after years of futile 
experiments with ‗gold therapy‘ in which gold salts were injected into the infected 
tissues, which had become the orthodox treatment for TB despite its toxicity.  The 
continuation with gold for so many years despite the total absence of clinical evidence 
to support its usage was taken by many as illustration of how, ‗in the face of dreadful 
clinical circumstances the interpretation of evidence can be swayed by hope‘ (Benedek, 
2004, p. 50).  The characteristics of the randomised control trial in the antibiotic 
research—randomised allocation to groups, double blind investigators, comparison 
with a suitable control group—were thus introduced as a way of mediating complexity 
and subjectivity in the face of lessons learnt from history.  
 
Despite such context, it is interesting however that the study did not imagine itself to 
have circumnavigated issues of ‗judgement‘ or provided a solution to its difficulties.  
Whilst certain clinical outcomes—death, as the most obvious example—were objective 
and likely to have a high level of inter-researcher reliability (i.e., the tendency for 
multiple researchers to arrive at the same conclusions), other more graduated measures 
lacked such clarity.  Below, figures 5.3 and 5.4 show radiology images from cases 
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ranked in the ‗considerable improvement‘ and ‗moderate improvement‘ outcome 
groups respectively, as published in the original paper.  Whilst the clinical changes in 
figure 5.3 are readily apparent to the untrained eye, the purpose of the inclusion in the 
publication of the second set of images in which the more modest treatment results 
were observed seems instead to demonstrate the subtly and subjectivity of clinical 
change; a further set of images were similarly demonstrative of the arbitrary 
classifications between ‗considerable‘ and ‗moderate‘ improvement, and ‗moderate‘ 
Figure 5.3 Example of a ‗considerably improved‘ TB case before and after streptomycin treatment  
(Medical Research Council, 1948, p. 772, reprinted with permission) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Example of a ‗moderately improved‘ TB case before and after streptomycin treatment 
(Medical Research Council, 1948, p. 772, reprinted with permission) 
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and ‗no‘ improvement.  Interpretation and judgement, rather than mere measurement or 
observation, were thus integral to the development of the RCT method.  Sensitive to 
the errors of the gold therapists, three independent radiologists were assigned the tasks 
of viewing and categorising each X-ray film (two of whom had no other connection to 
the study) and interpretations were discussed between each clinician in cases of 
disparity.   
 
It is also noteworthy that (at least in print) in the early RCTs did not use the term ‗what 
works‘—or indeed any other comparable act of final declaration.  Pulmonary 
tuberculosis—like many of the psychological conditions I shall consider shortly—had 
multiple independent clinical indicators, none of which directly correlated either with 
the patient‘s experience of illness or even his or her chances of survival.  According to 
the report, ‗assessment of condition at the end of the six-months period should be 
based on a judicious combination of changes in the radiological picture, changes in 
general condition, temperature, weight, sedimentation rate, and bacillary content of the 
sputum‘ (Medical Research Council, 1948, p. 771, my emphasis).  Functionality of the 
drug was measured only in these strictly empiricist-positivist terms of observation of 
the facts.  
 
Hippocrates’ Balance 
 
Despite the claims of ‗what works‘ to science and to the kind of epistemological 
commitments that are usually associated with high empiricism—and despite claims of 
Goldacre or others that the methods of randomised trials somehow transcend the need 
for judgement—unlike the logic of the early RCTS, it can be seen that ‗what works‘ is 
strictly a post-empiricist genre which, in claiming ‗this works!‘, owes as much to 
interpretation and judgement as simply reporting findings.  
 
In contemporary RCTs (still remaining strictly within the clinic for the moment) 
despite significant developments in both clinical measures and statistical analysis, as 
with the example above, elements of judgement can still not be eliminated.  Faced with 
data, however sophisticatedly garnered, evaluators must make numerous judgements in 
deciding what works: what proportion of the population receiving a drug or treatment 
must exhibit positive outcomes before the intervention can be said to work?  To what 
degree must a positive benefit be experienced (elimination of all symptoms, or relief 
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from just some)?  A useful illustration comes in the form of the various statistical tools 
and measures developed both by the pharmaceutical industry itself and those 
evaluating its products to assess the efficiency of a drug for any given population.  In 
comparison to the fantasy of ‗what works‘ (the promise of certainty described by 
Goldacre above [p. 172]), such tools reveal that at the very level of the language of 
clinical evaluation, ‗efficacy‘ contains within it the certainty that what works for some 
will not work for all.  
 
An example which is accessible enough for the non-statistician to work through is the 
‗number-needed-to-treat‘ score (NNT)—in short a measurement of the average number 
of individuals who will need to be treated by a particular intervention in order to 
produce one positive clinical outcome when compared with a control.  The example is 
useful because it is widely used in psychiatry, is useful in both curative and 
prophylactic contexts, and constitutes an instance where evidence-based medicine itself 
tries to separate itself from cruder models of ‗what works‘.  Quoting from Bandolier, 
the University of Oxford‘s monthly bulletin on evidence-based medicine, for example: 
‗too often the statistical problem being addressed is whether a treatment works, when 
the real question is different—how well does the treatment work?  Bandolier favours 
the number-needed-to-treat as a useful way of looking at results of reviews or trials 
because it more usefully expresses the therapeutic effort that is needed to get a 
therapeutic result‘ (Bandolier 2007).  The most striking point that NNT reveals then is 
that (as suggested above) what works for some is unlikely to work for all (which is 
fine, except that the allure of ‗what works‘ as Goldacre and others have presented it 
suggests something more universal than this).  In the NNT, scores greater than 1 
indicate that for at least one person in the sample, treatment had no positive impact.  
With some exceptions (antibiotics, for example, for which NNTs can be as low as 1.2) 
typical values are much higher: depending on the way in which outcomes are 
measured, NNTs for psychiatric medications are typically between 4 and 20.
75
  
Somewhat counter-intuitively, it is interesting that in the advent of pharmacogenetics 
in which drugs are ‗personalised‘ to the needs of specific genetic make-ups, 
                                                     
75 The antibiotic figure is taken from the Bandolier website.  For the psychiatric data, I have taken the 
lower figure of NNT=4 from an article in Psychology Today by a practising psychiatrist who offers the 
statistic anecdotally (Kramer, 2008).  The higher figure, NNT=21 came from a study of Selective 
Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) among children aged 13 (Tsapakis et al., 2008).  The same study 
gave a NNT of 10 for mixed-age users of SSRI antidepressants.  NNTs for new generation antipsychotics 
are generally within similar NNT ranges. Where NNT is used prophylactically, figures are likely to be 
much higher: using Kramer‘s estimations again, if 4 or 5 percent of untreated mentally ill patients 
eventually commit suicide, then for an intervention whose NNT is 5 (to block the underlying illness), the 
NNT to prevent suicide would be in the 110 range. 
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epidemiological measures such as the NNT in fact worsen, since their helpfulness to 
the general population decreases.   
 
To develop this point (or rather, this object of intrigue), alongside evaluation with 
NNT, corresponding figures are also calculated for number-needed-to-harm (NNH): in 
other words, the numbers of patients expected to take a drug before one case of 
unwanted effect would be statistically probable (in contrast to NNT, the higher the 
NNH value the better).  The first thing we might comment upon here is the way in 
which ‗what works‘ measures such as the NNH thus standardise and normalise 
iatrogenic harm.  The very existence of ‗what works‘ measures such as the NNH, as 
others have pointed out, problematises Hippocrates‘ dictum to ‗first do no harm‘ which 
medical students are taught on first arrival to medical school.  Whilst it is not the 
purpose of this chapter to vilify psychiatric medications, it is nonetheless interesting 
that according to the search engine Google‘s ‗search predictor‘ tool (a rough and ready 
indicator of the popularity of particular inquiries on the internet), the most frequent 
term entered alongside ‗NNH‘ is ‗antipsychotic medication‘.  Second is the 
observation that drugs have both an NNT and an NNH value; i.e., the two scales NNT 
and NNH operate independently from the other and, in the everyday language of 
pharmacometrics, benefit and harm can be co-existing statuses.  Conclusions are thus i. 
stochastic, i.e., there is an X chance that drug A will help but a Y chance that the same 
drug will cause harm, and ii. bidirectional: in comparison to the unidirectional claim 
‗this works!‘, NNT/NNH figures comment both upon the chances of help and upon the 
chances of harm.  Finally—and it is this point I shall develop further—imagining a 
hypothetical drug in which NNT and NNH values are extremely similar (and there are 
many such drugs: common preventative treatment with aspirin for myocardial 
infarctions among a healthy population, for example, has a similar NNT as its NNH 
risk of gastrointestinal haemorrhage), the one patient who receives benefit and the one 
patient who experiences harm may be one and the same.  (In this slightly exaggerated 
example, the patient is saved from heart attack, but dies nonetheless from an internal 
bleed).  At the level of the individual patient then as well as at population-level 
analysis, in contrast to the mere observation of particular empirical outcomes, what 
works is complex, often paradoxical and necessarily constructed by interpretation and 
judgement.  Moreover, the kind of efficiency evoked in ‗what works‘ is not the 
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mechanical efficiency of an engine (heating this water here will lead to motion there) 
but the cost-benefit efficiency of economics.
76
  
  
The ambiguity of this cost-benefit equation for individuals making decisions about 
interventions (social and medical) can be witnessed in patient narratives also, both 
consciously and unwittingly revealing the complexities of what it means to ‗work‘.  To 
take a couple of examples:  
 
Harry, once a bricklayer, discussing his experiences with anti-psychotic medications:  
 
Oh, they worked alright—I stopped hearing the voices and the doctors said I was 
getting better but the problem was the side effects—my legs got very stiff and I had the 
shakes [H holds out a hand to demonstrate the lasting effects of dyskinesia].  One day I 
fell off a ladder and I couldn‘t get up.  I didn‘t want the lads to know what was wrong 
with me, the boss said I wasn‘t fit to work like that.  So I had to stop my trade.  [At the 
point of the interview, Harry was continuing to take the medication but has been 
unsuccessful at finding non-manual employment.] 
 
Becky, discussing a return to work in the catering industry as advised by her 
occupational therapist: 
 
Yeah, it worked, I guess.  It takes my mind off things, gets me up in the morning.  The 
depression has definitely improved.  But the anxiety, no really the anxiety has got 
worse because there‘s more to get anxious about.  So the anxiety and the shakes and 
the headaches, they‘ve got worse.  On balance... [Becky leaves the sentence unfinished 
and another speaker takes over] 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising given the relevance of this Hippocrates‘ balance or cost-
benefit analysis to service-user narratives that ‗writing down the pros and the cons‘ (a 
balance sheet) was one of the central forms of recovery work defined in chapter two. 
 
 
 
                                                     
76 The words ‗first do no harm‘ are not taken verbatim from Hippocrates (who likely inspired but did not 
write the Corpus Hippocraticum) but this nevertheless remains a popular myth which is transmitted to 
medical students on entering the profession.  Figures from the aspirin study are from Berger et al. (2006). 
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Plato’s Pharmacy  
 
Derrida is also concerned with the problematics of the pharmacy—of ‗what works‘, if 
you will.  To recap the argument so far, pharmacometrics such as NNT and NNH leave 
us primarily with a ‗cost-benefit‘ style of analysis which destabilises the unity and 
universalism of ‗what works‘.  There has been a paradoxical ‗looping‘ effect in the 
argument: the overall purpose of this chapter is to consider ‗what works‘ in social 
rather than clinical settings (rehabilitative schemes, back-to-work schemes, educational 
programmes, etc.) yet discursively such studies lean on the authority of clinical 
research for legitimacy—a legitimacy found in part because clinical sciences appear to 
bring with them a therapeutic (and thus ‗natural‘) logic which is deemed more 
acceptable in matters of human health and wellbeing than economic logic alone (will it 
save money?). Yet on careful examination of practices in healthcare evaluation, 
therapeutic efficacy works as a therapeutic economy of desired outcomes and harmful 
effects (Hippocrates‘ balance, as it were).  A limitation of this line of argument is that 
the metaphor of balance still suggests a certain clarity of outcomes: certain effects are 
‗clearly‘ desirable whereas others—‗side effects‘—are transparently harmful.  With 
Derrida, I wish to disrupt this disruption further, to go deeper into the pharmacy, to go 
where outcomes are less knowable...  
 
A dreamer has a recurring dream.  She walks through a lavish department 
store and descends down a grand staircase into the basement.  There she finds 
an expansive pharmacy—a combination of modern-day drugstore and old-
fashioned alchemist with gleaming conicals filled with bejewelled elixirs.  The 
pharmacy is unattended; the pharmacist absent.  The counter is invitingly 
open.  Automatically—as if in a dream within the dream—she reaches out and 
takes a medicine, and turns to leave.  Yet before reaching the exit, her 
 ons iousn ss ‘ w k s .  Sh  is still unw t h  ; th  ph rm  ist still  bs nt, 
but she gently places the elixir on the floor.  And she flees. 
 
The dreamer tells this dream to a first therapist, of one of the analytic 
traditions.  The therapist likens it to a memory of the woman as a small girl, 
 r  ping into h r moth r s b  room to try on  ostum  j w ll ry (  pl y-
activity that had on one occasion been permitted).  Unbeknown, her mother is 
in the room, undressing.  The chil  s  s th  moth r s op n br  sts, nippl s lik  
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jewels.  The breasts and the jewellery box remind her of another childhood 
memory—a locked medicine cabinet in the bathroom.  All three have been 
op n   to h r in th  p st, un  r h r moth r s  los  sup rvision (memories of 
breastfeeding, memories of being nursed by her mother during a childhood 
illness, memories of the dressing-up session), but all three are now forbidden 
and can be accessed only by her mother and her father.  The memory stays 
with the dreamer as her mother was angry to have been disturbed and the girl 
was punished.   
 
The dreamer tells the story to a second therapist, this time of a more humanist 
bent.  The humanist says the basement represents her unconscious desires; the 
pharmacy a symbol for cure and treatment and recovery.  The dreamer is 
offered treatment in the dream.  The pharmacist even leaves the door open (cp. 
Matt 7-7 ‘kno k  n  th   oor will b  op n   to you ).  Yet, after some internal 
struggle, the dreamer refuses the treatment; she flees from the cure.  This 
therapist sees this as evidence that the woman is in fact frightened of getting 
better; that she is depressed because on some level she wants to be depressed. 
 
The dreamer has another interpretation; her own.  She has been depressed for 
a long time.  She has been addicted to many drugs (prescribed and otherwise).  
She has been numbed and treated and passed from pillar to post (the pillars 
that support that grand staircase into the pharmacy, perhaps).  She has relied 
for too long on institutions which make for her decisions and take away her 
sense of self.  The pharmacy is temptation; it is a spell; an anaesthetic.  She is 
not offered the medicine, she is stealing it—this is not her path to recovery.  
The psychiatric pharmacy is a dangerous place that threatens as well as 
encourages healing.  In the pharmacy dream, the dreamer lives out a fear not 
of recovery, but relapse; the dream is not of the longing for cure, but its 
problematisation... 
 
(An Experience of Dreaming and Therapy: A Client‘s Perspective)77 
 
                                                     
77 Personal communication.  Example used in a colleague‘s teaching on a psychotherapy MA at a Higher 
Education Institution.  Extract rephrased in my own words. 
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The key text here is Derrida‘s essay ‗Plato‘s Pharmacy‘, first published in English in 
Dissemination (1972), in which Derrida tackles Plato‘s dialogue The Phaedrus—a text 
in which potions and medicines (the pharmakon) are used as a metaphor for writing.  It 
is worth taking a detour with Derrida to Plato to explore more this problematic or 
undecidability of outcomes, before returning to our dreamer above. 
 
The Phaedrus follows a morning excursion with Socrates and the young Phaedrus 
along the banks of the river Ilissus to talk on matters of philosophy and rhetoric.  
Ostensibly, the text is concerned greatly with ‗what works‘: Socrates and Phaedrus 
evaluate a discourse written by a visiting speechwriter, Lysias, on the topic of ‗what 
works‘ in choosing a lover; later, various techniques in the art of rhetoric are evaluated, 
again on a ‗what works‘ basis.  Medicines, drugs, potions, spells, recipes—words 
which in the Greek are united by the singular word pharmakon (a fact which Derrida 
will make much of later)—are riddled throughout the text.  Socrates tells Phaedrus he 
has found a potion to coax the older man out of the city and down to the river (this 
potion is the allure of good argument).  Phaedrus looks for a ‗recipe‘ for the perfect 
speech form.  As they walk along the river bank, Phaedrus thinks he recognises the 
place in which, according to legend, Boreas (the North Wind) carried away the virgin 
Oreithyia to rape her in a cloud—but no, says Socrates, a better explanation is that the 
girl was playing with Pharmacia when she got lost (who Pharmacia might be, is left 
ambiguous in the text).  Substantially, in what is generally considered the mainstay of 
the text, the art of writing is compared with a medicine or drug that can be used for 
both good or harm: on the one hand writing helps knowledge and argument; on the 
other—since the thinker and the speaker are no longer one—writing is a danger which 
damages discourse.  The dialogue ends with a rendition of an Egyptian myth about the 
invention of letters.  Theuth, god of Thebes, invents writing and takes it to Thammas, 
the god king of all of Egypt so that it might be rolled out to the rest of the land.  The 
writing (medicine) is trialled but the king rejects it: it will cause forgetfulness and will 
not develop intelligence (NB, this ‗trial‘ is of the judicial kind rather than a randomised 
control).  In the dialogue, Socrates himself is equivocal about the benefit of writing but 
(according to Derrida) standard commentaries of the text generally take the King‘s 
dismissal of writing to be Plato‘s ‗final‘ meaning of The Phaedrus. 
 
In the first instance, the Platonic text itself speaks substantively on the problematic of 
intervention.  Socrates first defends his tendency to stay within the city walls declaring 
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that he can learn more from men than he can from the countryside, but equally seems 
to welcome Phaedrus‘s intervention to get him to come out.78  Writing—as a kind of 
intervention upon thought—is presented both as an untrustworthy power and as a 
solution to the untrustworthiness of human memory.  The (desirability of) medical 
expertise and the (undesirability of) madness—the first, which in ordinary 
circumstances is employed to cure the second—are also deeply doubted.  Towards the 
end of the dialogue, Socrates says, ‗suppose a person comes to your friend and says ―I 
know how to apply drugs which shall have either a heating or a cooling effect and I can 
give a vomit and also a purge, and knowing all this I claim to be a physician, what do 
you suppose they would say?‖‘  And Phaedrus and Socrates agree that unless this 
person also knew when and to whom to apply such treatments, then surely he would be 
a ‗madman‘.  Yet, to touch back on our discussions in chapter four, this exchange 
happens only after Socrates has venerated madness as the source of love and creativity.  
Both physicians and medicines and madness and folly thus ‗hang‘ in the dialogue: each 
used as a mode by which to justify but also with which to destabilise the other.
79
 
 
Yet Derrida‘s reading of Plato takes this analysis further.  To continue with madness as 
the example, in The Phaedrus, ‗curing‘ madness is problematic since madness can be 
both be muse and inspiration (in the sincere way of the lover), excessive appreciation 
(in the way that Socrates teases Phaedrus that he has enjoyed his rendition of Lysias‘s 
                                                     
78 Socrates: Yet you seem to have discovered a drug for getting me out ( ok is moi tēs  mēs   xo ou to 
ph rm kon hēurēk n i) (Phaedrus, 230d).  In the following line, Socrates defends his choice to stay 
within the city walls, explaining that his love is for learning and he can learn more from people than he 
can from the countryside, but earlier in the text he concedes that the advice given to Phaedrus by 
Acumenus to get out of the city is ‗right‘.  In the translator‘s notes to Dissemination, Johnson notes that 
Hackforth (in the Princeton University Press Collected Dialogues of Plato) translates pharmakon in this 
line as ‗recipe‘; Helmbold and Rabonowitz (in the 1956 Library of Liberal Arts Educational edition) 
translate ‗remedy‘.  In the 1953 Benjamin Jowett translation I have used in this thesis, the term ‗spell‘ is 
preferred.   
79 As part of Socrates‘ speech on madness: ‗There will be more reason in appealing to the ancient 
inventors of names, who would never have connected prophecy (mantike) which foretells the future and is 
the noblest of arts, with madness (manike), or called them both by the same name, if they had deemed 
madness to be a disgrace or dishonour; they must have thought that there was an inspired madness which 
was a noble thing; for the two words, mantike and manike, are really the same, and the letter t is only a 
modern and tasteless insertion‘ (Phaedrus, 244b).  The scepticism towards medical and pharmaceutical 
intervention demonstrated in this exchange is indicative of Platonic thought more broadly: in Protagoras 
(354a), Plato classes medicines among the class of things that can be both good (agatha) and painful 
(aniara).  With regard to our earlier interest in the Hippocratic tradition, this is significant—in Protagoras, 
Socrates attempts to dissuade a young friend (also by the name of Hippocrates) from employing the 
sophist Protagoras as a tutor.  The line above (agatha/aniara) is placed foolishly in the mouth of 
Protagoras (whose interventions themselves cannot be trusted) and it is instead for Socrates to make the 
point acceptably (‗take care, my friend, that the Sophist does not deceive us when he praises what he sells, 
like the dealers wholesale or retail who sell the food of the body; for they praise indiscriminately all their 
goods, without knowing what are really beneficial or hurtful‘ (Socrates, Protagoras).  It is no accident 
then that in challenging the young Hippocrates about his admiration for the sophist, Socrates compares 
Protagoras to Hippocrates‘ ‗namesake‘ (i.e., of Kos, the Hippocrates of the Oath) who—as history has 
made famous—was much wiser about the harmful as well therapeutic consequences of intervention). 
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speech, ‗the effect on me was ravishing and this I owe to you, Phaedrus, for I observed 
you while reading to be in an ecstasy [...] and I became inspired with a phrenzy‘ 
[130a]) and foolishness and folly (as in the example of the fraudulent doctor).  Yet for 
Plato, these characteristics form strands of madness—a static typology of madnesses in 
which some forms are more desirable than others, but in which the moral value of each 
could be ascertained by rational discussion.  (To be precise, according to Socrates‘ 
speech there are two kinds of madness: one divine and the other produced by human 
infirmity; of the former, four sub-groups can be defined).  Such argument is in more 
ways than one akin to the medicinal wares of the sophists above, or to the kind of 
understanding which emerges from NNT/NNH scores: that some things are good and 
some things are bad and that overall evaluation consists of measuring one against the 
other.  (To recapitulate, in the instance of NNT/NNH, I likened this to a ‗cost-benefit‘ 
analysis of outcomes, whereupon the declaration—‗it works!‘—constituted a condition 
where benefits exceed costs).  
 
Away from such typologies—which constitute one of the most famous parts of this text 
but which are arguably not the strongest philosophically—Derrida thus directs the 
reader to the syntactics of the pharmakon—this term (remedy/poison) which in its 
original language can be ‗simultaneously beneficent or maleficent‘ (1972, p. 70, my 
emphasis).  Unlike the cost-benefit equation in which strands can be separated, 
labelled, diagnosed, classified, the pharmakon is truly polysemous, irrevocably 
undecidable, always a case of both and neither:   
 
The pharmakon—this charm, this spellbinding virtue, this power of fascination would 
be a substance with all that that word can connote in terms of matter with occult 
virtues, cryptic depths refusing to submit their ambivalence to analysis, already paving 
the way for alchemy—if we didn‘t have eventually to come to recognise it as 
antisubstance itself: that which resists any philosopheme, indefinitely exceeding its 
bounds as non-identity, nonessence, nonsubstance; granting philosophy by that very 
fact the inexhaustible adversity of what funds it and the infinite absence of what 
founds it. (Derrida, 1972, p. 70) 
 
The subtitle of Derrida‘s essay is The Doctoring of Philosophy and this in part speaks 
to the work of translation (yet another intervention that Derrida discusses).  More 
successfully than in French, a ‗drug‘—the English word—is ambiguous in that it can 
be good or bad (the paradox of ‗recreational drugs‘ is indicative here) but unlike in 
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Greek, no word in English means simultaneously a remedy and a poison; a spell and a 
recipe, an elixir and a philtre: the natural polysemy of the pharmakon cannot ‗work‘ in 
another language.  (I use the term ‗natural‘ here to indicate the possibility of various 
synthetic neologisms and compounds—the ‗poison-cure‘, the ‗recipe-remedy‘, etc.—
which English speaking authors might use to indicate to their readers the problem: yet 
such plays with the text also draw attention to themselves; as Derrida points out, the 
pharmakon in its native language is never ‗leaking on all sides‘ (p. 13); in Greek, the 
reader can skim over pharmakon and assign to it one meaning or none at all, yet it is 
never a problem word which jolts the reader or stops her in her tracks).  Translators 
must then select, and with such selection, the polysemic breadth of the sign is 
inevitably crushed.  As Derrida has it, the term moves from a nonphilosopheme (a 
thing which carries no doctrine) to a philosopheme—which is now committed and 
directed.  Derrida‘s example is the myth of Theuth as it is told at the end of The 
Phaedrus: in translating (in Robin‘s edition) Theuth to be presenting writing as a 
remedy (instead of any other translation of the word), Theuth is shown as unwise and 
naive about his invention, a device which (in the translated version) then serves to give 
authority to the king‘s dismissal of writing on account of its dangers—as if this were 
therefore Plato‘s preference also.  In highlighting the simultaneous polysemy of the 
pharmakon, Derrida thus ‗rescues‘ Plato from the grasp of earlier commentators who 
fall into this trap of translation (from the start, the essay is a rescue-attempt—a remedy, 
if you will: ‗Only a blind or grossly insensitive reading could have spread the rumour 
that Plato was simply condemning the writer‘s activity [or that] that the Phaedrus is 
badly composed [...] the hypothesis of a rigorous, sure and subtle form is naturally 
more fertile‘ [pp. 66–67]).   
 
We are ready then (finally) to return to ‗what works‘ and to our dreamer in the 
pharmacy.  First, ‗what works‘: we see that unlike a cost-benefit analysis, the 
uncertainty of the pharmakon allows a permanent undecidability in the value and 
desirability of outcomes.  It would be helpful to refer to some empirical material again, 
remembering the quotations from Harry and Becky at the end of the last section also.  
 
Kerry, describing her experiences of sedation during a serious depressive episode 
following the death of her sister, which coincided with her preliminary architectural 
exams (from which eventually she withdraws):  
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It‘s not that they didn‘t work, they worked too well!  I took the tablets at bedtime to 
get me off to sleep and so I could get some rest.  They took away the bad thoughts but 
the problem was that they took away all thoughts whatsoever.  I left the course out of a 
mixture of grief and the medication, I think—they made me just too tired to think 
anything. 
 
James, on the results of drug treatment and psychotherapy: 
 
I am changed.  [Pause]  Is that a good thing?  I mean I am different.  More confident.  
A bit less caring.  Bit of a better father—a better person—perhaps because I‘m more 
out there for my son.  More cautious.  I cuddle my son less because I don‘t feel things 
so intensely.  I am supposed to say ‗I feel better‘, I think.   
 
Examples such as those of Kerry and James are helpful to illustrate the pharmakon.  
Yet, importantly, Derrida‘s pharmakon offers a more sensitive way of understanding 
‗outcomes‘; of resisting reduction to ‗it works!‘ (or doesn‘t); of being sensitive to the 
mixed experiences of those receiving what (in absence of a nonphilosopheme in 
English) we must therefore call ‗treatment‘.  More than a cost-benefit analysis, these 
instances are teleologically distressed; unsettling notions of what it means to recover 
and problematising the very desirability of such recovery (where recovery equals the 
cessation of thoughts or abolition of emotion).   
 
Yet second, there is the issue of temporality, revisited.  The pharmakon is atemporal or 
eternal in the sense that it is irrevocably revocable.  ‗What works‘, by contrast and to 
its discredit, is a stopping point—a signal in the world of research that we have 
finished contemplating this particular problem now and are ready to move to 
something new.  ‗What works‘—the studies listed at the start of this chapter, for 
example—forgets that those for whom the intervention should be working will go on 
working through this intervention long after the report has been written (when the view 
from hindsight has yet to have happened).  It also forgets how decisions concerning the 
upkeep of particular therapeutic regimes (taking these pills this morning) can ‗play on 
the mind‘ of individuals, long after the official proclamation ‗this works!‘ has been 
made in the trial or the consulting room.  It is telling, therefore that Derrida‘s essay is 
not about work, but play (the final section is titled ‗Play: From the Pharmakon to the 
Letter to the Supplement‘)—a term which for Derrida can be defined as having no 
stopping point since play which works towards some greater finishing point is no 
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longer properly playful.
80
  As in the quotations here, it is often necessary for patients to 
‗work through‘ their feelings towards interventions and being intervened upon, yet the 
finality of ‗this works!‘ can also be disrupted in patient narratives by play: ‗it works 
too well‘, ‗oh, it worked  [irony]—a work and a play which goes on long after the 
declaration of the RCT.   
 
Back to the dream then, in the basement of the pharmacy.  We have been discussing 
amongst other things in this chapter the notion of expertise and the power relations 
involved in making expert judgements such as ‗this works‘ or the kind of interpretation 
that is involved in dream analysis.  The bejewelled medicines in the pharmacy are 
evocative and ambivalent and, in their ambivalence seem to ‗speak back‘ to the 
dreamer and those who are attempting to analyse her dream.  Yet the story of the 
dreamer and her therapists as described here has been one of closing down 
interpretations, of the fixation of meaning; of the elimination of ambivalence (the 
pharmakon) as itself a legitimate reading.  Having read Derrida—hopefully having 
worked through to the end of this passage, also—it will now seem ‗clearer‘ (to borrow 
from the language of ‗what works‘) that such interpretations can be more fertile when 
left uncertain and hanging.  In a general sense this is characteristic of the broader shift 
from structuralism (in which dream analysis is generally located) to post-structuralism: 
as Johnson says in her introduction to Derrida, whilst it is easy to imagine that 
deconstruction is in some way tantamount to textual destruction which makes sense-
making impossible, de-construction in fact marks a careful undoing of the text which 
preserves and uncovers (p. ix).  Yet if we are determined to see obliteration in 
deconstruction, then this is assuredly the destruction of a concept—of a singular and 
primary interpretation which leaves room for no other.   
 
 
 
 
                                                     
80 The word ‗work‘ is used occasionally in the translated essay, but only some of these references translate 
back into the French.  Speaking about networks of meaning, for example, Johnson‘s translation reads: 
‗these links go on working of themselves‘ (p. 96); however, in the French ‗Et pourtant ces liaisons 
s opèr nt    ll s-mêmes‘ translates more literally as ‗these connections take place for themselves‘ without 
the full connotations that ‗work‘ has in English (1972 Édition du Seuil, p. 108, my emphasis).  Avoidance 
of the word ‗work‘ can also be seen, for example, in the playful uses of the word ‗play‘.  On p. 157 of the 
translated edition, for example, Derrida says ‗Plato thus plays at taking play seriously‘ (‗joue ainsi à 
pr n r  l  j u  u s ri ux , Édition du Seuil, p. 181)—a statement which in both languages would be 
written more naturally as to work at playing seriously: a technique by the author to draw the reader‘s 
attention simultaneously to the problems of work and the deliberateness of play.   
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Like Clockwork 
 
When the weather starts to get cold, they‘ll be back like clockwork.   
(Nigel, staff member, talking about the diminishing numbers of participants at Walter 
House during the summer months) 
 
So far we have been considering ‗what works‘ predominantly as a matter of ‗what 
achieves particular outcomes‘ (and how achieving particular outcomes may differ from 
the more universal declaration, ‗this works!‘).  To finish this chapter then, I will 
consider a different form of working: that which works because it keeps the system 
going; which works without a clear external goal; systems which work well at being 
broken; at the paradox of clockwork as both a symbol of the revolution in industry and 
efficiency—yet in and of itself something which merely repeats; which rotates; which 
passes movement from one adjacent component to the next but without cumulative 
progress; which works not to growth but to necessary entropy.  The revolving door 
syndrome (the notorious rotation of patients between hospitals and community care) is 
a case in point: on the first hand, an emblem of policy failure; yet on the other, a 
system that works particularly well (after all, a revolving door which works is 
presumably one which rotates: a broken or jammed door in this analogy would infer 
either a return to long-term incarceration or permanent un-relapsing recovery).  
Clockwork or gearwork then is the final metaphor with which I shall consider the 
problematic of ‗what works‘ (having already considered cost-benefit analyses and the 
pharmakon): an automated and repetitive mechanical action whereupon ‗outcome‘ 
refers both to an external end and the autotelic maintenance of motion.  We might 
imagine all types of fancy clockwork here—the elaborate contraptions pictured in 
Diderot‘s Encyclopédie for example.  Yet I wish instead to hold in mind a much 
simpler machine: the classroom ‗gearboard‘: that pedagogic device used in the 
technology workshop to teach the functions of gears and other machinery in which 
pupils must put together simple components so that on turning with a handle, part A 
will move B, which moves C, which moves D, which then—if the child has 
succeeded—will turn to move A.  Figure 5.5 shows a variation, ‗square gears‘, 
designed and sold as an adult‘s curio: the caption on the website below exclaims, 
‗these gears really work!‘  
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Fig 5.5 ‗Square gears‘.  Illustration based on a curio sold at Clayton-Boyer Clockmakers (http://lisaboyer.com).  
Used with permission. 
 
Three things might be said about the heritage of clockwork or gearwork which are 
interesting for this discussion.  First, in comparison to other ‗inventions‘ of modernity, 
the intrigue of clockwork was not its power but its comparative self-sustainability.  In a 
passage discussing the invention of the mainspring (a longer-lasting alternative to 
weighted clock mechanisms), Johann Cochläus (c. 1511) marvels at a ‗many-wheeled 
clock [...] fashioned out of small bits of iron, which runs and chimes the hours without 
weights for forty hours‘ (cited in Dohrn-van Rossum, 1997, p. 121, my emphasis)—a 
sharp contrast to other technologies of the early sixteenth century in which an ever-
present energy source was required.  Second is the observation that the metaphorical 
use of the term ‗clockwork‘ appeared very early on in clockwork‘s history, with 
figurative references to the regularity and predictability of clockwork appearing from 
the late 1500s onwards and with a level of frequency by the early Seventeenth Century.  
Further connotations of this figurative usage encompassed what in more formal terms 
could be described as materialism and philosophical mechanism—that is, that with 
only the right knowledge about the constituent parts, the system could be entirely 
knowable.  In the scientific revolution, such mechanical metaphors became central to 
understanding the natural world, with Newton‘s ‗clockwork universe‘ and Descartes‘ 
dualist proof as famous examples.  Third concerns the close association between the 
modern advancement of gearwork with toys and play (rather than industriousness or 
efficiency).
81
  It is often forgotten in industrial history that the revolutionary invention 
                                                     
81 The specification of modern history is important here since examples of highly complex gearwork can 
be found in antiquity, such as the Antikythera mechanism (c. 150 BC) which calculated astronomical 
positions.  However, such examples are rare and remained unchallenged in complexity until the early 
industrial revolution. 
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of the silk loom by Jacques de Vaucanson (1741) was triggered by Vaucanson‘s earlier 
career as a toy-maker.  The silk loom (which transformed the French textile industry) 
was commissioned when Louis XV saw Vaucanson‘s famous Flute Player (1738)—a 
life-size clockwork doll which played the flute via a complex system of bellows and 
levers which operated ‗breath‘ and moved the tongue (Sennett, 2008).  Whilst 
clockwork (both as an accurate time-telling device and as the workings of early 
industrial automata) is thus most readily remembered in the context of the developing 
industrial revolution, the mechanisms of clockwork also had roots in an additional, 
more playful heritage, with little concern for either output or efficiency. 
 
 So what can clockwork tell us about ‗what works‘ and the genre of research we are 
calling here the ‗what works‘ literature?  Put simply, what I hope to demonstrate in this 
section is how—like the gearboard above—some things that appear to have little effect 
in the ‗real‘ world can nonetheless be seen to be working (elegantly, efficiently), and 
how other things that can be said to work might instead be seen better as going round 
in circles.  I shall illustrate with some examples.  
 
My first example is the revolving door syndrome, which I have introduced already.  On 
first glance, it is ‗obvious‘ that the revolving door is evidence of something not 
working, yet if we take the metaphor of the revolving door more seriously, it works 
with almost the kind of clockwork regularity that can be seen in the child‘s gearboard 
or Newton‘s clockwork universe.  This is not just a flippant interrogation of a 
metaphor, either.  As a system (if we delete from our minds any goal of long-term 
recovery) the revolving door of mental health care is a well-equipped, well-oiled 
machine.  Contemporary psychiatric units are built not for long-term admissions but 
the short term revolving patient.  Inter-professional teams of mental health workers, 
social workers, supported housing officers and the rest not only respond to revolving 
patients but are designed with them in mind.  The benefits system (which must be 
informed of any change to a claimant‘s living arrangements) is also robust at coping 
with repeated hospital readmissions: in comparison to the complex and time-
consuming steps a claimant must make to disclose entrances into and out of the labour 
market, notifying the relevant agencies of temporary stays in hospital is a simple and 
well-administrated process.  Whilst from a therapeutic perspective admissions and 
discharges are frequently the most criticised aspects of the mental health apparatus (not 
least because of the revolving door syndrome), if we nonetheless equate one-to-one 
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face time with therapeutic intervention, the majority of patient-professional contact 
time is concentrated into periods of admission and discharge.  Crisis teams, assessment 
teams, rehabilitation teams and the rest find their niche in supporting patients on their 
way in or their way back out.  For those actually in hospital, comparatively little 
happens—the analogy would be an imaginary classroom in which the teacher only 
really attended to her children whilst they were arriving in the morning or packing up 
to go home.   
 
Clearly then, the ‗revolving door‘ works.  Medics, support workers, social workers, 
community nurses and the rest are employed and continue to be employed due to the 
high probability of future readmissions from their most loyal customers (as Adam 
Smith would have it, thus taking home salaries which ‗trickle‘ to other parts of the 
economy—like Newton and Descartes, Adam Smith also utilised a clockwork 
metaphor in conceptualising society).  Patients, on the whole, survive—neither killing 
themselves nor entering a more permanent state of ill health which would prevent 
future circuits.  Even performance indicators of this ‗system‘—generally figures for 
processing patients rather than establishing long-term benefit—work with rather than 
challenge its rotating character (see Leader, 2011b, for a discussion).  According to the 
demands of work (sense 23), the system might scarcely ‗do what is required‘ or be 
‗effectual‘ when held up against any greater vision of recovery, yet as a revolving door 
it is like clockwork in its regularity and reliability.  
 
It is helpful in this context to imagine this machinery from the position of the service-
user also.  In what has become somewhat of a contemporary classic in critical 
psychiatry, Lucy Johnstone‘s ‗story of a depressed housewife‘ (1989) gives the case 
study of ‗Elaine‘, a middle-classed, middle-aged mother of now grown-up children 
who suffers decades of chronic depression and repeat hospitalisations which are 
characteristic of the ‗revolving door‘.  When she is well, Elaine is an attentive 
homemaker who takes on enormous responsibilities for a large and demanding family, 
which consists not only of her adult sons who live at home but also a series of relatives 
who are in the habit of ‗just dropping by‘ and generally relying on her to organise 
family affairs (often without thanks).  In periods of ill health, these duties (which 
ordinarily she quite enjoys) become entirely too much for her and after some 
intermediary negotiations between herself and her husband, she is admitted to hospital 
to ‗give her a rest‘.  During these admissions, various drugs will be tried and in 
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occupational therapy, she is ‗retrained‘ in domestic pastimes such as sewing and 
cooking.  However, after discharge—perhaps triggered by the next domestic crisis or 
family event—Elaine‘s depression will worsen and the cycle repeats itself.  
 
Whilst everyone in the cameo claims the situation is not satisfactory, Johnstone instead 
demonstrates how this pattern is in fact in several ways functional.  In times of crisis, 
Elaine (who has in the past made several serious suicide attempts) is admitted to a 
place of safety and is offered a quick-fix solution in the form of rest and medication 
which averts more serious tragedy.  Likewise, in absorbing Elaine into the hospital 
system during times in which her symptoms are most challenging for her family to deal 
with, the system protects the household unit from stresses and strains which might 
otherwise lead to permanent relationship breakdown.  However, wider social systems 
are maintained also.  In sheltering Elaine and her family within a biomedical discourse, 
the psychiatric ‗quick-fix‘ of hospitalisation excuse both Elaine and the family unit 
from addressing more deep-seated causes for her distress (which in this instance 
Johnstone links closely to an unhappy childhood caring for her step-siblings and her 
husband‘s and children‘s propagation of this situation).  By taking Elaine away whilst 
she is upset, Elaine‘s husband is permitted to stay in the stereotypical masculine role of 
avoiding emotional difficulties, thus maintaining traditional gender roles.  Equally, 
through her husband taking time out from work to help with the household when 
Elaine is unwell (a change to routine), the role of Elaine as the ‗natural‘ and ‗rightful‘ 
caretaker is thus reinforced—allowing Elaine to feel needed, and providing her 
husband with someone who, for the most part, takes care of the house and looks after 
the kids.  
 
Johnstone‘s monograph offers an interesting examination of the ways in which patients 
and the psychiatric system ‗work together‘ to maintain the status quo (a state not unlike 
RD Laing‘s ‗collusion‘ or Goffman‘s ‗sick role‘).  Elaine goes round in circles, but it is 
important to distinguish these from spirals in which gradual deterioration (or recovery) 
can be seen.  It is true that the situation might not be ideal but it nonetheless includes 
elements which are preferable either to long-term hospital admission or an imagined 
but unknowable future without psychiatric interventions.  Indeed at the end of the case 
study where Johnstone chronicles what happens when an external party (a therapist) 
helps Elaine be more assertive with her demanding family, the family does break 
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down, unable to adapt to Elaine‘s more confident persona (and bereaved of a person to 
unquestioningly complete their household chores).   
 
Published in first edition in 1989, there are elements of Johnstone‘s analysis that 
appear somewhat dated to today‘s readers, and it should be noted also that numbers of 
hospital admissions of the kind described in Elaine‘s case study have been significantly 
reduced upon the instigation of ‗crisis teams‘ and other home-based crisis support 
systems (Burns, 2007).  Nevertheless, this kind of cyclical motion that works at not 
working can be seen in contemporary community contexts also.  
 
The final example in this section comes from my own fieldwork, and a participant 
Jake, who was one of the few people in the study who had never worked in any paid 
context yet who was actively participating in jobcentre schemes to help people like 
himself enter employment.  Jake was in his late twenties and had been diagnosed with 
schizophrenia when he was sixteen, shortly after his mother died.  He currently saw 
himself on a path of social and moral rehabilitation after some years of ‗knocking 
about with the neighbourhood bad lads‘ (and indeed framed taking part in this research 
project as part of his re-socialisation!).  Jake lived at home with his dad (who was 
himself disabled with obstructive respiratory disease): since the death of Jake‘s mother, 
he and his Dad had acted as carers for each other, and in recent years had become very 
close.  After a drink-driving offence in the ‗bad lad‘ days which had led to the 
confiscation of Jake‘s driving licence, Dad took on particular responsibilities for 
transporting Jake to a series of voluntary placements and to Walter House (where I first 
met him).  Such assistance was important not only for reasons of transportation, but in 
helping Jake to not fall once again into a lifestyle of daytime drinking and drug-taking 
which had on previous occasions had led to psychotic crises.  Jake and his Dad also did 
a lot of activities together just as a twosome: film watching, going to car boot sales, 
and looking forward to Friday night fish and chips.   
 
The narrative of Jake‘s life—particularly regarding his relationship with his father and 
his attempts to live productively—was full of ‗whenevers‘.  Often these were warm 
and affirmative statements: ‗whenever I do the computer course, I feel great‘; 
‗whenever I go to go to the social [i.e., social security], my dad will come with me‘.  
Yet a further set of whenevers depict a situation in which we might recognise elements 
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of Elaine‘s story above.  Where a ‗whenever‘ is represented by the arrow sequence, I 
give some examples:  
 
i.  Jake at home with Dad   J‘s mental health improves and so signs up for extra 
activities at the daycentre  Dad‘s asthma gets worse and so J quits in order to help 
him around the house  Jake at home with Dad. 
 
ii.  Jake at home with Dad  J starts feeling better and tells his Dad he is ready for 
some more independence  Dad stops driving him to daycentre  Jake drops out of 
‗healthy‘ social networks and hangs round with ‗local lads‘  J resumes drinking, 
cannabis smoking and stops taking his medication  J admitted to hospital/ arrested 
and released into father‘s care  Jake at home with Dad. 
 
iii. Jake at home with Dad  Dad‘s asthma improves  Dad starts going to the 
Bowling Club without J  J‘s symptoms get worse, resumes contact with the bad lads, 
etc.   Dad stops attending the Club  Jake at home with Dad.  
 
And I could go on.  Whilst both Jake and Dad on the face of it encourage one another 
to ‗get out‘ and ‗get on‘, in these and other stories, the end outcome of any 
improvement to either party‘s health or independence (regardless of the intermediary 
stages) was inevitably a return to Jake and Dad at home together.  Through analysing 
Jake‘s ‗whenevers‘, Jake‘s dependence on his father for his healthier lifestyle is 
powerfully revealed (an observation which should not be under-estimated in terms of 
‗what works‘ in getting people back on their feet—a topic to which I shall return in 
more depth later).  Yet it is also possible to see in these patterns ways in which Jake‘s 
relationship with his dad also maintains a state in which Jake does not succeed in 
entering more full time occupations outside the home. A curious analyst, for example, 
would undoubtedly find mileage in Jake‘s statement that ‗whenever‘ he tries to embark 
on a new project or voluntary placement, his dad‘s asthma gets worse (and that 
furthermore this necessitates Jake‘s return to the family home).  Similarly, when Jake 
tells his father he is ready for a bit more independence, practical support from his dad 
instantaneously diminishes.  Reminders to take his medication and encouragement to 
attend the support group are instantly withdrawn.  Lifts to the daycentre or to visit 
supportive friends all but cease (creating a strong geographical incentive for Jake‘s 
relapse, since public transport about the council estate in which he and his dad live are 
at best unreliable).  It is the ‗whenever‘ in Jake‘s relationship that is thus here curious: 
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given these failures occur time and again, it really does seem as if both Jake and his 
father‘s actions are driven by some unconscious ulterior anxiety—as Johnstone might 
see it—about a change to their exclusive relationship, or betrayal at being ‗jilted‘ by 
the other in attempting to increase their independence.   
 
In psychoanalysis and many derivatives such as object relations theory and 
transactional analysis, homeostatic systems such as the one between Jake and his 
father, or Elaine and the home/hospital circuit are ordinary and almost inevitable 
elements of most close relationships, which have the potential both to lead to mutual 
stagnation as well as mutual growth.  For Eric Berne, founder of the transactional 
analysis school of psychotherapy, such patterns were ‗games‘: ‗ongoing series of 
complementary ulterior transactions progressing to well-defined, predictable outcomes‘ 
and ‗recurring sets of transactions, often repetitious, superficially plausible‘ (Berne, 
1964, p. 44).  His most famous contribution, Games People Play, sought not only to 
assert the existence of such games but provide a ‗thesaurus‘ of various game patterns 
that were endemic in the 1960s California in which he was writing.  Characteristically, 
these were labelled in colloquial terms—‗yes, but...‘, ‗if it weren‘t for you‘—to 
characterise the core strategic moves of the players.  The clockwork descriptions of 
Berne‘s interactions (with their rather playfully heavy-handed determinism) sought to 
show the predictability of human relationships, but also how the complex and often 
unconscious psychological needs of individuals could be met and maintained by 
finding other players with complementary motives.  
 
Some things can be said about transactional analysis that are relevant here: first, games 
were played unconsciously and unspokenly and the contemporary (pejorative) 
connotation of ‗mind games‘ was not present.  Second, games were part of an ordinary 
system of social interactions and were not reserved for the pathological alone (as an 
example, in Berne‘s later writings on professional helping relationships, therapists and 
practitioners were as much involved with game-playing as their patients).  Third, 
games were played for psychological ‗payoffs‘—esteem, intimacy, forgiveness, etc.—
yet crucially to this discussion, these payoffs were not cumulative but rather, as Berne 
puts it, the ‗stabilising (homeostatic) functions‘ that game-playing fulfils (Berne, 1964, 
p. 44, my emphasis). 
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Within academic psychology and psychiatry, transactional analysis has fallen out of 
favour for various reasons—partly because mechanistic metaphors have generally been 
surpassed in the social sciences by more ecological analogies—but also due to 
criticism from families and carers who felt unduly ‗blamed‘ for their loved ones‘ 
distress in these kinds of family-orientated analyses (although in clinical practice, 
Games People Play remains on the core reading list for medical students and many 
core tenets of transactional analysis have fed into extremely fashionable interventions 
of today—cognitive behavioural therapy and dialectical behavioural therapy as 
particular examples).  Yet transactional analysis and game analysis—these relics from 
a clockwork universe—are helpful to our discussion of ‗what works‘, illustrating how 
the ‗workings‘ of systems can be understood as efficient and functional machines, even 
when at any broader teleological level the system ‗isn‘t working‘ at all.  
 
Analysis of Jake‘s ‗whenevers‘ above provides important information about ‗what 
works‘ for Jake, which in the right kind of context we might find useful to help Jake 
and his father and others like them to achieve particular goals.  Yet, in Jake‘s instance 
too we might also see how Jake‘s life with his dad also has functionality in its own 
right.  Jake is kept well and generally out of hospital.  Jake‘s father also has a carer for 
the times his own health impediments become serious (without Jake being available 
throughout the daytime to change oxygen cylinders and offer other forms of assistance, 
it is likely that his father would require relatively intensive support from home health-
workers during his own health crises).  Both have the satisfaction of caring for one 
another, as well as the pleasure they derive from the other‘s companionship.  In their 
current homeostasis, both also contribute to wider community projects: Jake volunteers 
for the conservation project at the daycentre; his dad also provides valuable back up for 
the project, generally transporting other vulnerable members and sometimes providing 
practical assistance too.  If the past is a reliable indicator, Jake‘s lifestyle with the 
support of his father is more socially desirable than his (drunken) lifestyle alone.  In 
some lights (especially within discourses which seek to engage the long-term out-of-
work in paid employment) the homeostatic mechanisms that keep Jake and Dad 
together are the work of attrition: wiling away Jake‘s opportunities for authentic social 
engagement, and wearing away his Dad‘s entitlement to an old age free from 
demanding care responsibilities.
82
  Yet a more sympathetic reading might also see 
                                                     
82 This work of attrition relates to yet another definition of the term ‗work‘ (OED, entry 8.c, ‗to wear a 
cavity, etc, by  ttrition ): a work which unlike clockwork has a cumulative output but in which what works 
and what is desirable are detached from one another.  In one interview, Bob (from chapter three) describes 
  ~ Chapter 5 What Works ~ 197 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
value in Jake and his father‘s system—a work of maintenance, of repair, of 
relationship—and, as I have tried to frame it here, a work which has potentially broader 
economic and social benefits also.   
 
Noting how systems can work well at not working—either at the societal level (the 
revolving door) or at the more intimate level of individual interactions (transactional 
analysis)—is important for the ‗what works‘ genre because it reveals what ‗payoffs‘ (to 
use Berne‘s slightly problematic language) players will be asked to relinquish if they 
are to move from one system of play to another.  These clockwork interpretations can 
also be useful in exploring why interventions may not work (in sense 23 of the word) 
or why transitional stages, for example, moving into paid employment after a long 
stretch out of work, may be particularly challenging.  Indeed, as central to transactional 
theory, Berne explains how the ‗psychiatric improvement‘ of one individual can often 
lead to rapid deterioration in the others who had been playing with him—a scenario 
seen clearly with both Elaine and Jake (Berne, 1964, p. 55).  ‗Dr Phil‘ (Phil McGraw, 
US celebrity psychologist and daytime TV star) became famous in the late 1990s with 
his catchphrase, targeted towards various neurotic behaviours, ‗so how‘s that working 
for you?‘—upon which guests were encouraged to confess that their current way of 
living fell short from the true American dream.  Perhaps the greater trick Dr Phil 
missed was that these clockwork repetitions of apparently dysfunctional behaviours are 
often working in all kinds of strange and wonderful ways.    
 
* * * 
If this chapter has been long, it is because it has needed to be.  What it means to 
declare that something is working in sense 23 of the word is complex and 
contradictory—even before we take into account matters of how this will be 
investigated or what we will do with the information once we have it.  Already, I have 
shown how the ‗what works‘ literature leans on simplistic notions of intervention and 
outcome as well as an exclusively instrumental world view, and how the natural 
polysemy of work itself reveals one route to a subtler means of reading outcomes.  
Through my discussion of Hippocrates‘ balance and of Derrida‘s pharmakon, I hope to 
                                                                                                                                             
his experience of akathisia (an overriding feeling of restlessness and anxiety which is a common side 
effect of antipsychotic medication; from the Greek káthisis, an inability to sit still) in which this work of 
attrition becomes literal, ‗I worked holes in my pants! Holes in my shoes!  Worn the carpet to a thread.  
Pacing about, up and down‘.  For more examples of dysfunctional work, see also entry 35 ‗to move 
irregularly or unsteadily so as to become out of gear‘: a bolt that works loose, for example, which in turn 
stops the machine from working.  
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have problematised further the speech act ‗this works‘: to demonstrate that what works 
is always a matter of when and for whom, and in what context.  In my final discussion, 
with curios and gearboards and clockwork automata, I have furthermore taken forward 
this critique of what works to suggest that things can work well at not working—that 
notions of working, process and cumulative outcome (profit, we might say) can operate 
independently of one another.  The ‗what works‘ literature, as it calls itself, has been an 
interesting starting point for this discussion.  It has not been the purpose of the chapter 
to vilify evidence agendas, or to suggest anything foolish or unsound about seeking 
judiciously the best course of action.  It is interesting, however, to observe how the 
strict empiricism of ‗what works‘ agendas—as well as their dispersing influence on 
other areas of the social sciences (the compulsion to have ‗impact‘)—encounter 
difficulties when thinking about ‗what works‘ in more polysemic frames of reference. 
 
Rather than offer lengthier conclusions at this point, for now, I want to move directly 
to the final chapter which should be read primarily as a response to the arguments I 
have made above and as a more developed critique to the ‗what works‘ hegemony.   
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Chapter Six 
 
Magical Happenings 
Thinking Beyond the ‘What Works’ 
Paradigm 
 
 
  
The universe is full of magical things, patiently waiting for our wits to grow sharper.  
(Eden Phillpotts, 1919, p. 173) 
 
 
The subject of this final chapter—which should be read primarily as a response to its 
predecessor—is magic, that is, a series of happenings, experiences and transformations 
which go beyond the mechanical-scientific world depicted by the ‗what works‘ agenda.   
 
In the previous chapter I considered the problematic of evaluating knowledge in the 
‗what works‘ literature, with the intention of demonstrating that the speech act that 
declares ‗this works!‘ is complex and contested.  Throughout the chapter, I argued that 
a ‗what works‘ mentality rests on particular assumptions about knowledge: that the 
world is indeed some way knowable; that the world is regular enough to withstand 
inductive reasoning and generalisations (extrapolation); and that this resultant 
knowledge can be reduced in meaningful ways to draw conclusions about ‗what 
works‘—although it is evident that many researchers in the natural as well as the social 
sciences are themselves fully aware of the pitfalls here.  However, I have also 
suggested that the faith in an evidence-based society also relies on a second set of 
suppositions about the operationalisability of knowledge: that is, the belief that what 
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has been established to ‗work‘ in a specific sample of a population can be reliably 
recreated and reproduced for the benefit of others.  Such belief systems are central to 
‗what works‘ as a genre, separating it from a fanciful ‗pure‘ academic inquiry (which 
we have learned to distrust) and establishing it instead in the realm of practice and 
intervention—and with regard to a theory of knowledge—what I have referred to 
above as techne. 
 
It is this second set of assumptions about ‗what works‘ to which I now turn my 
attention.  The parameters of the argument are simple: in many instances the difficult 
leap from establishing the efficacy of an intervention to ‗rolling it out‘ to others are 
technical matters—and technical matters alone.  In other instances, however, this 
transferability is more seriously problematic.  However well-established the finding 
that falling in love offers relief from the symptoms of clinical depression, or that 
unexpectedly bumping into an old friend improves mood, a system which was able to 
‗prescribe‘ such experiences is difficult to imagine.83  Moreover, in these instances, 
even the thought of prescription seems to damage the integrity of falling in love or the 
spontaneity of an unexpected encounter for the experiences that they are (in a way that 
would not be true for interventions such as a vaccination programme or change in 
employment legislation).  We are approaching romanticism here, but instead what I 
want to conduct in the final part of this thesis is a rational inquiry into these apparently 
non-transferable or non-technical experiences in the context of mental health recovery.  
My argument (or rather, my evidence, since it is primarily an empirical case I am 
making) is that many of the things that work in the context of recovery and back-to-
work are of this one-off, non-transferable and—as I shall later go on to suggest—
‗magical‘ (that is to say, irreducible) kind.  The concerns of the above chapter 
notwithstanding, it is not my intention to dismiss the possibilities for all kinds of policy 
level, highly technical interventions in getting people feeling better, but rather to add to 
the evidence base (albeit in a slightly idiosyncratic manner) some other more 
transcendental and less plannable experiences of recovery, along with some comments 
of how these might relate to the former, more ordinary kind of ‗evidence‘. 
 
                                                     
83 The clinical evidence for the relations between falling in love, serotonin levels and depression are well 
established (e.g. Emanuele et al., 2006).  I am taking the ‗evidence base‘ for the latter claim from 
Keating‘s much-loved The Hug Therapy Book (Keating, 1994), which cites the evidence of unnamed 
scientists. 
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To introduce this topic empirically, it is helpful to reflect back on an earlier research 
project I conducted in 2006–2007 in which I was working with an ‗alternative‘ 
psychiatric self-help group run by and for survivors of mental distress on a quasi-‗anti‘ 
psychiatric basis (Laws, 2007; Laws, 2009).  As I was interested in then, the group 
‗worked‘ (both in the sense of surviving as an organisation and in offering therapeutic 
benefits to its members) on numerous principles: on a shared experience of 
disappointment with conventional psychiatric practices; on friendship and humour; on 
a slightly anarchical structure and mode of practice which contrasted traditional modes 
of therapeutic engagement; and an occasional resort to activism.  A particularly notable 
feature of the group was its non-traditional meeting places—a dilapidated city park and 
a grubby coffee shop amongst others—which again, the group reported as an important 
factor in creating an environment in which they could experience ownership and 
control: a stark finding in contrast to the carefully orchestrated clean and pleasant 
environments which at the time were being recommended as ‗therapeutic landscapes‘ 
for hospital design.   
 
In analysis, one of my prevalent realisations about the workings of this group was its 
inherently non-technical nature.  First (and as I wrote at the time), the group avidly 
defined itself against the highly technical and often formulaic nature of much therapy 
they had encountered elsewhere: the ‗nodding-dog‘ syndrome, or the ‗what I‘m hearing 
you say...‘ clichés that they found overused and inauthentic in formal therapeutic 
engagements (symptoms which, according to them, came from reading too many 
counselling instruction manuals and not enough real listening).  Yet second, many of 
the experiences which they highlighted as particularly significant were of an aleatory 
and unfolding nature which—even if it were not antithetical to the group‘s philosophy 
to do so—would be exceptionally difficult to reproduce or incorporate into any 
professional knowledge-base or policy level strategy (not least because they were so 
intimately tied to the particular histories of individuals and places involved).  A central 
element was surprise: by nature of the group‘s profile, members had generally tried 
numerous conventional interventions before approaching the survivor network, and 
many reported various mixtures of ambivalence, scepticism and lack of faith before 
attending for the first time.  Yet, evidently this intervention worked: members kept 
coming back, people started feeling a little bit better (or at least a little more able to 
cope)—over time, the group even became a little less polemically opposed to 
conventional psychiatry since, with the support of one another, they found it easier to 
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take a ‗pick ‗n‘ mix‘ approach to take what could be useful from conventional medical 
treatments.  Explanations for this almost extraordinary success however were 
somewhat unsatisfactory or unforthcoming: answers came in the forms of shrugs, or 
idioms (‗we clicked‘), or gentle retreats towards mysticism (if you cut up the songbird 
to find why it sings, one member warned me, you stop the bird from singing).  In terms 
of the ‗what works‘ hierarchies of evidence outlined in the chapter above it is also 
apparent that both in terms of the small-scale and transient character of the survivor 
group as an intervention and the kind of research I was able to undertake with them, in 
terms of the conventional, ‗what works‘ evidence-base, the survivor group as a 
potentially efficacious and successful intervention was rendered almost inevitably 
invisible.  
 
What I write here seeks to develop this original argument, both in terms of these 
aleatory and unanticipated moments of recovery, and their adjoining inexplicable 
nature which seems so hard to make visible in the universalising clockwork 
vocabularies of ‗what works‘.   In what follows, I suggest that such experiences might 
best be considered as ‗magical‘—a concept we might select as the antidote to ‗what 
works‘ rationalism—an argument that shall unfold as the text progresses.  Whilst I am 
suggesting the concept of magic to be a comparatively infant study in the context of 
mental ill health (although I have already mentioned my indebtedness to Els van 
Dongen, from whose analysis developed my own framework of magical vocations in 
chapter two) it should be noted that numerous authors in other fields are also using 
magic to re-enchant the social sciences—see, for example, Abram (1997), Bennett 
(2001) and Merrifield (2011)—and this discussion should be seen to interact with and 
feed into such existing debates. 
 
Magic is best demonstrated empirically and so I shall begin this chapter by working 
through a series of ethnographic examples on the theme of ‗what works‘.  It is my 
contention that magic is everywhere, but it so happens that many of the stories I have 
selected here are from those considered ‗hardest to help‘ in my research: those with 
very long-standing histories of mental ill health, complex diagnoses, long-term 
disengagement from the labour market, concurrent problems with drug or alcohol 
abuse, contact with the criminal justice system—or simple inability to gain relief or 
cure from more mainstream psychiatric interventions.  As such, this forms part of the 
argument—that for people who appear most challenging to service-providers or 
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policies—recovery might be particularly dependent on the right kind of magical touch.  
In the second half of the chapter, I turn away from the empirical sciences to the literary 
genre, magical realism, in search for some clues about how a magically-informed 
social science might progress.  At the end of the chapter, some comments about the 
sometimes magical nature of recovery and the possibilities for a magically aware 
evidence base will be made.    
 
A Catalogue of Magic 
 
There are two kinds of reason for including a section on magic at this last point of the 
thesis.  First is a response to the empirical aspect of this research project—that is, in 
considering what works in helping people to get better from mental distress, the kind of 
non-technical happenings that I here describe as magic constitute an interesting part of 
recovery narratives which broaden the current evidence-base.  Second, in 
demonstrating how magical events both inhabit and surpass the world described by 
‗what works‘, such illustrations develop my arguments from earlier in the thesis, both 
in terms of the limitations of the ‗what works‘ literature and the idiographic and 
unexpected nature of many stories about madness.  Due to the rather miscellaneous 
nature of magic, I have divided the following examples into three kinds: (a) The 
significance of magical people who have profound and lasting effects in supporting 
recovery; (b) Non-human actors (the weather, the non-human animal world and the 
natural and built environment) and the presence of particular spiritual or religious 
interventions; (c) The role of chance, coincidence and ‗Road to Damascus‘ encounters 
in getting better and getting back to work.  It is clear from the outset that this 
‗catalogue‘ is incomplete and playful; nevertheless some themes arising from this 
evidence base will be explored towards the end.   
 
(a) Magical people 
 
I would‘ve dropped out again, if it wasn‘t for Pauline.  I was going to be kicked out my 
[college] course, I had loads of crap coming down on me.  I don‘t know what she did, 
she did something magic because she just made some calls and made it all go away.  
(Kelly) 
 
204  ‗Working Through‘: An Inquiry into Work and Madness  
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Kelly is in her early twenties and has spent most of the last years in and out of mental 
health services, specialist drug centres and prison.  During this time, Kelly has been 
provided with various caseworkers (community psychiatric nurses, probation officers, 
named support workers, etc.)—relationships which have appeared only marginally 
beneficial.  In recent months however, she has (as she puts it) been ‗doing really well‘ 
with the support of Pauline, a mentor from the Women‘s Education Centre, with whose 
help she has cut down on her drinking, started two college courses and moved from a 
friend‘s sofa to stable accommodation.  Pauline, as in the quotation above, does 
‗magical‘ things: she (re-)ignites a desire in Kelly to train as a beautician; she 
negotiates a second chance for Kelly at the college after she is threatened with 
expulsion; she mysteriously finds Kelly a place in one of the project‘s transition homes 
despite a long waiting list.  Yet the relationship between Pauline and Kelly also 
appears magical: Kelly can get along with Pauline in a way that didn‘t appear possible 
in previous relationships (‗they all talk at you the same‘); therapeutic outcomes seem to 
flow gladly without force; the relationship has a quality of the personal as well as the 
professional.  Pauline is ‗good‘ with Kelly and ‗good things‘ seem to happen when 
they are together—yet the mechanics of this relationship or indeed even the words to 
describe just why it is so efficacious are difficult to find.
84
   
 
Kelly is not alone in her experience of magic.  Magical people and magical 
connections are evident in many of the recovery narratives collected in this research 
project: sometimes as fleeting and fortuitous encounters; at other times as long and 
slow and endlessly forgiving relationships in which magic is revealed through its sheer 
depth and strength.  Marcus cites his pastor as a magical person (like Kelly, Marcus 
used an explicitly magical vocabulary to describe this relation: Marcus‘s pastor has 
‗magical‘ abilities in helping him clarify his thoughts prior to making a decision and in 
discerning between Marcus‘s delusions and the true word of God).  Nicola describes a 
counsellor who goes ‗above and beyond‘ to meet with her at 07:45 in the morning 
during her first weeks of returning to work.  Stuart, in a story somewhat reminiscent of 
Mitch Albom‘s The Five People You Meet in Heaven, cites several magical people: a 
mentor at Alcoholics Anonymous who stayed with him on the telephone until 6am on 
                                                     
84 Business has not missed the magic of mentoring either.  Hipsky and Armani-Bavaro, for example, share 
an appreciation of magic which is not dissimilar to mine: ‗a wizard waves his wand, a magician produces a 
rabbit, a fairy godmother casts her spells; the magic of mentoring comes from connections!‘ (2010, inside 
cover).  For others, the transcendent qualities of successful helping relations fit awkwardly with competing 
demands for reliability and efficiency.  The title of Mango Murray‘s (2001) Beyond the Myths and Magic 
of Mentoring: How to Facilitate an Effective Mentoring Process is indicative. 
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his forty-second night of abstinence; an old school friend who mysteriously came back 
to town the night that Stuart was heading to the Tyne Bridge to kill himself and took 
him to a late night farmers‘ market instead; in another story involving the Tyne, a 
counsellor who helped Stuart to forgive his abusive father by releasing letters that they 
had written together into the river; finally, in the most recent example, Shamina, the 
manager of Walter House, who showed Stuart his ‗brain on a map on the wall‘—a 
giant mind-map on a whiteboard in her office which laid out for Stuart his next steps to 
move away from mental health services—and all of the ways in which his self-
destructive habits might intercept. 
 
Such experiences, as I put them together here, are magical in their unexpectedness, in 
their superfluous helping capacity, their indebtedness to chance and attraction and 
intuition and other suprascientific determinants; in the marvellous and wonderful felt 
experience of being part of a magical relation.  Calling them magic (as do some of my 
participants) seeks to celebrate this specialness and emphasise their irreducible 
qualities.   
 
Several things can thus be said about magic as I am using the term here.  First, in what 
echoes an earlier argument in the thesis, magic is a strictly relational phenomenon, 
arising not from the powers or capacities of a particular individual (the shamanistic 
reading of magic, for example) but from the connections and relations that emerge 
between individuals.  Deville‘s (1980) distinction between ‗directed magic‘, in which 
one agent does something to another by virtue of a spell or similar, and ‗world magic‘, 
which encompasses the ‗native beauty‘ of the sublime, is insightful here, with our kind 
of magic residing firmly in the latter (cited in O‘Keefe, 1982, p. 188).  Relatedly, 
magic is an inherently non-technical phenomenon, without confines to particular 
professions or therapeutic models.  An evocative example is found in Tom Hooper‘s 
The King s Speech, which explores the relation between King George VI (Colin Firth) 
and the man who helps him overcome his speech impediment (Lionel Logue, played 
by Geoffrey Rush).  In a key moment in the film, the King‘s advisors, who distrust 
Logue for his unconventional methods, reveal to the King that Logue is not a qualified 
speech therapist—a revelation which is intended to reveal a serious fraud and scandal.  
However, the quiet twist to this story is that Logue had never made claims to 
professional accreditation and thus is not guilty of deception, revealing instead the 
advisors‘ (and audience‘s) naivety in equating wisdom and talent with professional 
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certification.  Developing this point about the non-technicism of magic, we might also 
say that the qualities that contribute to a magical relation can neither be taught in any 
easy sense nor directed (for instance by those governing the overarching direction of an 
organisation).  Comparable examples might be qualities such as wisdom or charisma 
(emotional intelligence, even) which might be highly valued within an organisation but 
which are particularly difficult to capture or reproduce—at least in any simple sense of 
run-of-the-mill staff development.
85
  Thirdly, magic is particular and non-fungible: the 
person who I myself find to be magical cannot be substituted for another with similar 
temperament or qualifications (if this is sounds ridiculous, then it should be stated that 
in many formal care settings primary caseworkers, health professionals and sometimes 
even therapists attending to a particular client are changed quite frequently according 
to shift patterns, caseloads and staff turnover).  Finally and most importantly, as a 
result of all the aforementioned qualities of magic, magic is something lived rather than 
something bureaucratic, and something that rises organically from within situations (or 
else magically appears) rather than being prescribed or deployed from above.  As such, 
there is something also always aleatory or chancy about the spark or timing of magic 
relations—whilst it is not ordinarily with comfort that matters of personal attraction are 
discussed in professional therapeutic contexts, it is nevertheless this presence of 
attraction, of chemistry, of ‗clicking‘, that we are discussing.86  An example based on 
staff/service-user interactions at the Plumtree Project is useful to illustrate these points 
and more.  
 
Like many mixed-funded organisations, Plumtree is staffed by a combination of 
permanent employees, volunteers and subcontracted specialists from external 
organisations.  On arrival, a new service-user will be formally allocated a named 
caseworker to oversee their progress; in addition, service-users are likely to develop 
various informal relations with numerous other ‗helpers‘ in and around the project.  
Among the permanent workers is Trish, the young full-time support worker with boots 
and dyed hair who heads off on a motorbike each night with a helmeted boyfriend.  To 
collate some comments made about Trish: ‗Trish will tell it to you straight‘; ‗She‘ll 
                                                     
85 Of course organisations may in all kinds of ways engage seriously with developing and nourishing 
wisdom and I suggest later that this can be extended to magic also.  However, whilst accepting these 
points, I maintain that the qualities of wisdom and magic—which surpass book learning alone and which 
are deep and embedded rather than shallow sets of skills or competencies—are likely to remain un-
amenable to standardised modes of didactic training.  Wisdom is a useful example here because i. there is 
a well-established case in philosophy for problematising the acquisition of wisdom, and ii. wisdom, like 
magic, reveals a relational quality: in positive psychology, for example, one of the four key measures of 
wisdom is that others ask wise people for advice (Peterson and Seligman, 2004). 
86 See Bueno (2011) for a practising therapist‘s perspective on therapeutic magic. 
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keep lip‘; ‗She will come out for a tab break with you‘; ‗She will help you if you are 
stuck‘.  For many, Trish is a magical person.  Two stories support this description: one 
comes from an interview with Lizzie, a younger attendee at the work programme.  
Lizzie is on ‗last warnings‘ from the centre about her self-harming behaviour and is 
threatened with losing rights to attend the scheme if incidents continue.  After a family 
argument, Lizzie turns up at the Project with a stomach full of paracetamol, having 
overdosed at her parents‘ house earlier that day.  Trish, ‗scraping the truth out of [her]‘ 
invents a reason for them both to leave and takes Lizzie to Accident and Emergency 
before anyone can find out.  The second evidence was Trish‘s constant, protective, 
defensive modifications of the Project‘s rules to help avoid upsets in the community.  
For members on attendance-based contracts with the service, Trish would often 
‗tweak‘ registers for miscreants who had turned up late or failed to attend a compulsory 
session (provided she was pacified enough by their apology, that is—‗I‘ll let ‗em have 
it, this time!‘, she‘d often say—but as far as I can tell this rarely happened).  In mid-
January snow, Trish could be found running down the street in house slippers to chase 
after a participant on the IT skills course, after they had stormed out saying they had 
quit; in another incident (of which I only really caught the second half), Trish appeared 
to have personally replaced a packet of cigarettes that one of the users had stolen from 
another.  ‗You‘ll fucking pay me back for those‘ she was yelling at him—who despite 
a long relationship with the criminal justice system was looking pretty scared at this 
outpouring of emotion.  It is doubtful that the police would have been particularly 
interested in the missing cigarette packet, although its absence would certainly have 
been noted by the rightful owner come 11am break.  But Trish‘s actions would have 
saved the user from almost certain expulsion from the Centre and in keeping (binding) 
the user in contact with the service may just have held the doors open for long enough 
for more recovery moments to happen.  
 
For others, Bill was a magical person.  Bill worked on the allotment project; he knew 
about gardens and he knew about the neighbourhood.  He had worked through each of 
the changes to day services in successive governments; he knew a lot of people.  He 
was a good gardener and a good listener.  People commented on both, regularly.  Bill 
had little in common with Trish.  Trish challenged, bullied, got under people‘s skin in 
order to help.  Bill waited.  His approach with the users was one of almost apparent 
indifference.  Frequently workers would disappear from the work project, allotted tea 
breaks turning to a longer kick around with a ball or an early departure.  Sometimes 
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service-users (Bill called them ‗volunteers‘) would disappear for longer periods of 
time—for a hospital admission or a prison sentence perhaps, or most often just into 
some unknown world beyond the reach of service provision where time and occupation 
didn‘t seem to be accounted for in the same way (such absences differed qualitatively 
from those where members had progressed into ‗real‘ employment or where users were 
no longer deemed ill enough to warrant using the service).  It didn‘t seem to matter to 
Bill whether users had been gone twenty minutes or four months.  He never asked and 
he never chastised.  Work began and ended with whoever was there in the gardens at 
the time.  And whenever the person came back up to the allotments—the current front 
between cultivation and scrubland—he would just start off, ‗now that you‘re here, can 
you...‘ and the user would be back in the world of the garden and the current task at 
hand.  I don‘t think it is true to imagine that Bill was unaware of the programme‘s 
broader philosophy of ‗nurturing a work ethic‘ in its labour-disengaged members.  
Rather, Bill simply left accountability to those in the management of the Centre—to 
those who kept the records and made decisions about people‘s lives.  People would 
make mistakes and they would have to answer to others in terms of their whereabouts 
and duties.  But Bill was just there to garden and to let other people garden with him 
where possible.  And in a sense that was about the extent of Bill‘s involvement with 
members and with the therapeutic programme of work at the Project—and for many of 
the service-users at the project, it was this quietness and unassumingness which were 
exactly the qualities which drew them to Bill.  Trish was ‗hands on‘: she hugged, she 
squeezed hands, wiped tears—and on at least one occasion I witnessed the (playful?) 
slapping of someone who was giving up on his or herself too readily.  Bill didn‘t do 
these sorts of things.  But Bill also had his followers and, when watching him for 
example with Tano, a Sudanese asylum seeker with limited command of English, as 
Bill placed his hands over Tano‘s, guiding his arms into the right position to tie rakes 
sturdily or whatever, there was nonetheless intimacy.  
 
What is interesting in this examination of Trish and Bill in the context of magical 
relations is the idiosyncrasy of their relations with service-users.  Whilst caseworkers 
were selected carefully for service-users (based on a combination of users‘ 
occupational interests and caseworkers‘ expertise) magical relations seemed almost 
entirely independent of such bureaucratic measures and it is significant that in all the 
stories described above, only the cigarette thief was formally affiliated with the staff 
member in question (indeed, in the instance of Lizzie and the overdose or the missing 
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gardeners at the gardening project, that Trish and Bill were not the named caseworkers 
perhaps benefited magic—by removing the relation from the demands of record-
keeping or progress-monitoring which might have constrained the kind of therapy they 
were practising).  Such informal magical relations could be seen among other staff at 
the centre also.  There was Helen, the manager, whose weekly visits to the work units 
were always a mix of panic and excitement; Graham on the employment project who 
spoke the ‗language of motivation‘ and also took responsibility for the day-to-day 
liaising with carers and support agencies; Andrea who supervised the kitchen teams for 
the catering project and who also arranged the in-house catering for members‘ 
mealtimes.  For the majority of my months of fieldwork, Andrea exhibited an 
intriguing laissez-faire governance in the kitchens, necessitated primarily by the fact 
that she herself was confined to crutches after an unpleasant fall at a community sports 
day.  In this sense, meal preparation in the Project gained—albeit accidentally—many 
of the qualities of the anti-psychiatric communities described by Foudraine in chapter 
one: if members did not keep to task in terms of chopping, stirring, serving, etc., then 
lunch would either be late or would have to be replaced with cold sandwiches.  
Occasionally if output was especially low, Andrea would grudgingly hop through the 
kitchen from hob to counter, speeding up progress with the crutch-free hand whilst 
members awkwardly watched on.  Usually this would have the desired effect and the 
kitchen team would get back to the cooking.  And then there was the woman known 
most often as ‗Mother Theresa‘.  No-one, staff besides, seemed to really know what 
‗Ma Ta‘s‘ formal relation with Plumtree was—a relation which owed itself partly to 
her position on the steering group (which few people knew) and partially again to her 
own past experiences as a user of the service (which was known by fewer people still).  
Ma Ta would turn up, often on open days at the Project, or sometimes ‗out of the blue‘.  
She had followers—a discrete number of them who had given her this name—and if 
someone needed some special time, she would take them to the Reflection Room 
upstairs and Plumtree etiquette ensured they would not be disturbed.  No-one seemed 
particularly forthcoming about what happened in Mother Theresa‘s private sessions 
and I always had the impression that these conversations were both very personal and 
highly significant to the members who confided in her.  Someone told me once that 
they involved peppermint tea.  
 
As I have described it here, the success of the Plumtree Project, then, depended to a 
large degree on ‗magic‘ connections between helpers, workers and work.  In the paper-
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based life of the organisation (client records, staff rotas, case notes, name badges), 
therapeutic relations were based on formal links between caseworkers and service-
users.  However, a much truer description of relationships in Plumtree were that the 
‗real‘ relationships—those I have called magic—where they were to happen, found 
themselves.  Caseworkers and magical people performed different functions, even 
when they were one and the same (which was not uncommon).  Caseworkers filled 
forms, kept track, took responsibility for medium-term care planning and would 
assume particular managerial responsibility in times of transition or crisis.  Magic, on 
the other hand was lived—sought-out and voluntary—and conducted through contact 
and events and adventures.  Caseworker relationships were not rejected by members 
and indeed were often reclaimed by a playful joke or comment (to a caseworker who 
has just returned from annual leave, for example: you are my caseworker and you 
haven t even said hello to me this week!).  Yet they were abstractified: only in a 
caseworker relationship could the relation be said to exist even if the individuals never 
spoke.  Magic existed sometimes in the immediacy of connection and sometimes 
through the beauty of a slowly blossoming relationship (Bill‘s relationship with Tano 
embodied both of these in different ways—the former through the here-and-now of the 
gardening, accentuated by Tano‘s lack of conversational English; the latter through the 
ways in which both Tano and Bill seemed to unfold to one another as months and years 
progressed).
87
  Of course not everyone reported this magical kind of connection, but for 
those who did—as Tano or Lizzie confirm—effects could be truly transformational.   
 
(b) A Magical world 
 
Having taken magical (human) relations as the starting point for my first subsection, 
my second series of catalogue entries mark the intrusiveness of the non-human world 
also: a world alive with places and objects and animals and spirits.  Authors such as 
Curtis (2010) have already drawn links between the unusual (magical) sense of space 
experienced in states of psychosis and their frequent conditions of horror (quoting a 
schizophrenic individual describing his delusional experiences: ‗My eyes met a chair, 
then a table; they were alive too, asserting their presence [...] I attempted to escape 
their hold by calling out their names.  I said ‗chair, jug, table, it is a chair!‘, but the 
                                                     
87 When I met Tano a year later whilst ‗writing up‘ the thesis, Tano‘s English had improved noticeably 
and he had taken on additional work responsibilities at Plumtree.  Bill and Tano remain close and the 
relationship has turned into a friendship beyond the Project: they are both beer drinkers and Bill has taken 
Tano to get to know the local ‗cuisine‘.  Tano enjoys the gardening and hopes to work as a self-employed 
gardener at some point in the future, if a UK work permit is ever granted. 
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words echoed hollowly, deprived of all meaning‘ (Schehaye, cited in Curtis, 2010, p. 
157).  Yet a world in which objects and places are alive can be transformative in a 
positive sense, too.   
 
Tracy has recently started working in the warehouse of a clothing retailer—her longest 
spell in paid employment yet—and discusses the ‗buzz‘ she gets from the materialities 
of her workplace (which opens onto the rooftop car park of a 1970s shopping arcade): 
 
My favourite bit of the day is the start, 6:30am.  The platform [where deliveries are 
unloaded] is empty.  The morning sun is coming through the top windows.  I like to 
get there first so I can be the one to flick on the lights—there are twenty light switches 
or more all on one panel.  [...] It is like a dance stage.  I wanted to be a dancer once.  
The lights say, ‗yeah, cummon Tracy!‘ and there is a round of applause.  [laughs]  I 
have literally done a big cartwheel all across the floor once.  And my own little dance 
show.  You know, before the delivery comes.  But it puts me in a good mood for the 
day and nothing has ever got me up early before!  Yeaaaaah, Tracy!  
 
In a more natural setting, Howard describes his first day volunteering at the allotment 
project, where he has now been working for seven months: 
 
When I got to the allotments for the first time, it was July when it was really hot and it 
had been raining all morning and the soil was all kind of cracked and the sunlight—the 
way the sunlight was shining on the ground after this big storm had happened, the 
water seemed to be steaming out of the soil.  It was very quiet because we were out in 
this wasteland but it was actually quite noisy with all the water dripping off the 
tarpaulin shelters.  I didn‘t really notice the other people.  I was just stood watching 
this steam rising out the soil and watching the soil made me see all these big crusty 
cracks, ripe for digging.  I thought I think I can see myself here.  Like the soil needed 
me. 
 
Again, as with the magical human connections above, such examples—which I have 
selected for their quasi-magical status: certainly we are not dealing with Schehaye‘s 
florid psychotic here and yet somehow the world is no less magical—develop 
arguments I have made earlier in this thesis about relationality and to what I clumsily 
described as a ‗relational relation‘ to stress the agency of the world, both organic and 
built (compare Howard‘s soil ‗needing him‘ and Carlyle‘s ‗an Earth all round, crying 
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come till me, come reap me!‘ [chapter three, p. 90]).  On the one hand, such magic 
appears as an excess topophilia in which places to particular individuals at particular 
times acquire the properties of magic (and we note that this may on occasions be 
wrapped up in all kinds of notion about psychiatric morbidity also—Philo (2006), for 
example, highlights the point that analysis of images of places as perceived by people 
with mental illnesses to gain insights into their state of mind has a long history).  Yet 
on the other, such magic appears as a marvellous intensification of therapeutic 
landscapes theory in which places come alive with therapeutic sentience or intent—as 
Tracy puts it, places which ‗reach out and grab you‘ as agents of recovery.  (Whilst, 
with the exception, for example, of certain assemblage theories such as Actor Network 
Theory this appears odd to our accepted understanding of things and places, it is 
noteworthy that in other times and cultures such ideas about places have been the 
norm: see Gesler‘s work on Asclepius‘ temples [1993; 2003], for example.)  Another 
interesting point to make about such ‗placed‘ narratives of recovery is the weather, 
which appears in both of these extracts as well as in several more respondents‘ 
accounts (some of which I shall introduce shortly).  First, it is interesting in and of 
itself to note the importance of the weather in many individuals‘ accounts of recovery 
as part of a wider discourse about environmental determinants of health and wellbeing.  
Yet, it is even more interesting to observe that such weather experiences are not always 
picture-postcard sun and blue sky: Howard (above) describes the exciting experiences 
of rain and cloud and mud and steam; in two stories I introduce later, the appropriate 
weather for magic is a storm.  Again, such comments accentuate the point made in the 
previous section about the idiosyncrasy and individuality of many magical recovery 
moments.  They also demonstrate vividly the way in which magic differs from the 
technical and operationalisable world described by ‗what works‘, for clearly we cannot 
‗roll out‘ weathers proven to work well in recovery, or prescribe more sunlit clouds or 
steaming soil to individuals in need of magical inspiration in the same way that 
sunshine cannot really be pre-booked for vacations.
88
  
 
                                                     
88 Such thoughts on storms and clouds are probably best imagined as tackling the weather issue from a 
different angle to more biological accounts of sun, serotonin and happiness (for example, interest 
surrounding seasonal affective disorder [SAD]).  I have developed my points about the literary 
connections of imperfect weather and personal growth elsewhere (Laws, 2009).  In response to a potential 
critique of my argument about the non-prescribability of weather, whilst such weather-experiences 
themselves cannot be directed, it is acknowledged that people may be encouraged through various ways 
(mindfulness training, for example) to notice and appreciate moments of magical inspiration from the 
weather-world as and when they arrive.  Such comments will be developed in the conclusion to this 
chapter. 
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Beyond place and weather, such examples from the non-human world as I have 
collected them here also incorporate various notions (conventional and less so) of 
spiritualism, animalism and divine intervention.  Marcus (above) was led to his church 
by direct instruction from God (who gave him a diabetic collapse in order for him to be 
admitted to hospital where he was then introduced to the chaplain who took him to 
church for the first time when he was finally discharged).  Ian (chapter three), who 
works at the railway station, both imagines and cannot resist imagining the 
locomotives having sentience or spirit that ‗keep him on track‘ (another railway pun).  
Ian points out that among train enthusiasts such fantasies are not unusual and yet that 
the trains‘ rhythms and energies have had an ‗intriguingly‘ important role in his 
psychic recovery.  Kate is a volunteer at an animal shelter, where she is trained to 
groom and care for the animals.  The animals have a calming effect on Kate (a well-
evidenced finding—see Barker, 1998; Becker, 2002).  They also have a curious 
‗mirroring‘ effect.  Kate self-harms and self-neglects, her own hair often tangled and 
her skin scrubbed raw.  Whilst it is something she finds difficult to articulate, nurturing 
the abandoned animals seems to awaken something more self-nurturing in her (or 
rather, as she puts it, there is a ‗triangle‘ whereby she gives the creatures the care that 
she cannot offer to herself and which, in return, the animals reciprocate with licking or 
snuggling which then enables her caring-self and animal-self to get along).  For Kate, 
animals are mixed into all kinds of magical modes of thinking.  At the shelter, the 
warden tells her that her second name, Gattrel, means cat s tail.  Kate (Kitty) Gattrel is 
thus a kitty-cat, a double cat.  Cats are Kate‘s favourite animals—she says that they are 
her totem (another idea she has gained from the warden).  Her ambition, when she 
moves out of the sheltered accommodation is to get her own black cat, which she will 
call Lucky.  This magical belief in cats is instrumentally fortuitous: cats are known for 
looking after themselves; acquiring a feline totem (an unexpected outcome from a 
work placement!) encourages Kate to do the same.  Yet this kind of magical thinking, 
which again I stress is common among lots of people in the population as well as just 
people with mental health difficulties, is to a large extent coincidental to the point I am 
making.  The point I make is that the shelter, the connections with animals and the 
sudden, unexpected, blissful peace Kate manages to find in her work is something 
entirely unplanned for and in some very real-world way otherworldly (‗I feel in a 
different time and place at the shelter [...] feel in a different body at the shelter‘).  
Whilst conventional notions of transcendentalism are not quite ‗right‘ for 
understanding such experiences, nevertheless, some notion of the more-than-bodily or 
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extra-psychic seems necessary.  The reader is reminded of Iris Murdoch‘s sight of the 
kestrel, taking her out of the ‗veil‘ of ordinary existence:  
 
I am looking out of my window in an anxious and resentful state of mind, oblivious of 
my surroundings, brooding perhaps on some damage done to my prestige.  Then 
suddenly I observe a hovering kestrel.  In a moment everything is altered.  The 
brooding self with its hurt vanity has disappeared.  There is nothing now but kestrel.  
And when I return to thinking of the other matter it seems less important... (Murdoch, 
1970, p. 84) 
 
Again, such experiences and inspirations from the non-human world—so often lost 
into the background of ‗what works‘ studies—are unexpected and personal, led by the 
world itself and highly resistant to modes of technical reasoning or individualism in 
which recovery is somehow perceived to be located inside an individual.  Yet in the 
idiographic narratives of recovery, trains and cats—along with voices from God and 
particular assemblages of nature and weather—for these individuals at least, are 
efficacious and powerful dynamics of recovery.  
 
(c) Magical Interventions  
 
The final form of magic which I shall discuss in this chapter is the tendency for the 
world to interrupt—that is, a series of magical happenings which (in contrast to the 
planned nature of service delivery) occur ‗as if by magic‘, or else with meaning or 
consequence which simply could not have been predicted.   
 
A first example of such interventions constitute ‗Road to Damascus‘ experiences or, to 
use another cliché, ‗wake-up calls‘, in which the direction of life events were changed 
by occurrences so small or subjective that in other situations they might never have 
been noticed.  Pete has been suffering from depression and problematic drinking since 
the late 1990s and in 2003 was prosecuted for benefit fraud which had a severe and 
lasting effect on his self-esteem (ironically, the fraud in question was a failure to 
disclose that he had got back together with his ex-girlfriend and was now living with 
her—however when she found out about the prosecution, she broke off the relationship 
for a second time, leaving Pete back in the bedsit on which he had been fraudulently 
claiming).  The incident in question occurs six years after the conviction on the way to 
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a day‘s cash-in-hand labouring for a friend in the building trade, when Pete steps out to 
cross a road but has to stop suddenly when a prisoner transport van unexpectedly pulls 
out from a side road and nearly crashes into him.  
 
I was feeling really shit but it just hit me when I saw that van and the little blacked out 
windows and them inside not knowing where they‘re going and I thought ‗well, at 
least I‘m not in that—at least I‘m not locked up somewhere‘.  It was a wake-up call.  I 
suddenly felt I was really lucky.  I never went to the site [...] I went and got a coffee, 
[...] I got myself a newspaper and I started looking for a proper job.  
 
For others, magical happenings took the form of new unexpected powers to overcome 
difficulties, or moments of growth which take place in a ‗flash of inspiration‘.  
Vanessa, a student teacher who has battled with voices in the head for a number of 
years, reports such a moment on her teaching placement when she successfully exerts 
authority over a pupil who is being difficult in class:  
 
I said something like, ‗you can either sit down and join in with the rest of us or you can 
leave. I‘m not having you at the back heckling us‘.  And I had been getting very 
agitated because the Voices were being particularly disruptive that day also and so for 
some reason I said to them in my head, ‗and that goes for you too!‘ [...] I was very 
surprised because I have never been particularly assertive before, but the guy came and 
sat down and to my astonishment I felt the Voices slope out of my head and disperse 
[...] some of them sitting down at the empty desks and being quiet [and others] 
shuffling outside the classroom and waiting for me outside.  
 
Like Pete, this sudden ability to (non-aggressively, calmly) control the voices—at least 
in the specific context of the classroom—was to Vanessa a ‗quite remarkable feeling‘, 
and the start of a slow process of gaining a healthier relation with the various 
characters who lived in her head.  
 
The kinds of events I draw together here as magical differ from the focus of more 
traditional research into life events (marriage, divorce, bereavement, etc.) in several 
respects.  First they differ in scale (being small rather than large) and intimacy (being 
highly personal and gaining most of their significance from subjective experience 
rather than culturally expected responses).  Such events also differ from the subjects of 
more traditional life events research by sitting outside of traditional scientific modes of 
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explanation, for example, through appealing to the sentimental rather than the rational, 
by appearing ‗strange‘ or ‗spooky‘, or by arriving somehow ‗without an 
explanation‘—factors which I suggest together might account for the somewhat 
underrepresentation of magic in the conventional evidence bases.  In three more 
weather related stories, Eleanor describes her ‗magical moment‘ (which as it happens 
is how she described it) on a rainy day at the Plumtree enterprise project in the run up 
to Christmas whilst the team were packing stockings to be sold for charity at the Mall 
on Christmas Eve.  Eleanor had at first been quite reserved around other workers at the 
project, reluctant to admit that she was ‗like them‘ (i.e., a mental health service-user) 
but at that moment, with the rain beating on the roof panels offering an extra feeling of 
camaraderie, she looked around and saw these people had become her friends—and to 
her amazement caught the eye of another who seemed, in her view, not only to know 
how she was feeling, but to forgive her for her previous snootiness.  Sonya, who was in 
her late thirties and in the midst of a painful divorce from a controlling husband, found 
magic on the York-Darlington train when a power-cut in a lightning storm left her 
stuck in the countryside for nearly an hour.  Bored, she inspected a book which had 
been left in her carriage by an earlier passenger—a book which turned out to be Anne 
Dickson‘s self-help text, A Woman in your Own Right—now comically dated but 
cringingly relevant to Sonya.  Curiously, a handwritten inscription on the inside cover 
revealed Sonya‘s maiden-name, and the page holder—a folded leaf from a local 
magazine—advertising plots available for starter homes at a new-build estate in exactly 
the location and price range for which she had been looking as a place to start afresh.   
 
Finally, there were stories like Hannah‘s.  One afternoon in May, shortly after 
returning from holiday in Spain, Hannah became suddenly quite tired and went to bed 
in the afternoon.  When she realised two hours later she was still too tired to collect her 
daughter from nursery, she phoned her mother, who fetched the doctor when two days 
later Hannah hadn‘t got up.  A week later, Hannah was diagnosed with severe, 
delayed-onset postpartum depression and was admitted to hospital after a month when 
her lack of appetite had rendered her dangerously weak.  Nearly two years passed, 
during which time Hannah almost continuously slept, her husband and mum taking 
care of the child, who would visit Hannah at her bedside.  And then, as Hannah 
described: 
 
I woke up.  It was May again, same date as I had gone to bed the first time [...] 
Something was different.  The world was brighter.  I noticed the breeze tugging the 
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curtains.  It was light and sunny outside.  [...] I felt different.  I felt like I had had a 
really nice afternoon nap.  I stretched [...] stood up [...] I couldn‘t remember why I felt 
so dizzy until I remembered.  I was hungry.  And I really, more than anything else 
ever, was ready to see my daughter.  
 
In all three of these stories, we are faced with a mysterious, unknown and almost 
unspeakable joy and sadness.  Sonya‘s discovery of the book just is: whether we are 
inclined toward theories of fate or divine intervention, or simply of chance 
coincidence, the facts are just what they are.  Eleanor‘s magic is clichéd perhaps—
sentimental, we might say—the weather-world providing the setting and scenery as if 
being acted in a heart-warming film.  And yet this magic is powerful and intuitive and 
yet strangely inexplicable in the sense that we would struggle to say why such event 
should be experienced at this particular moment, or to recreate it in any sense.  
Hannah‘s long sleep is a mystery, as is how she eventually wakes up feeling better.  
Leader (2008) writes about how memories and losses can be stored in the unconscious 
rhythms of the body which keeps its own, impeccable magical timekeeping, and so 
maybe we can speculate that something about that May afternoon and Hannah‘s exact 
two years of sleep were triggered by some forgotten sadness.  Yet any such explanation 
remains buried both to Hannah and to us as researchers.  
 
Moments of magical recovery and redemption seem very different from 
intervention/intention in their un-programmed qualities.  Pete‘s ‗road to Damascus‘ 
was an awakening—uninvited and unworked for (indeed Pete explained that he hadn‘t 
even realised how ‗bad‘ his life and lifestyle had been before the near-miss with the 
prison van).  Eleanor and Sonya were working hard towards recovery—in therapy, as 
well as by taking medication for their depression—yet these moments of realisation 
(and the scales fell) seemed unexpected and (for different reasons) inexplicable.  
Hannah‘s sleep and her magical awakening have the qualities of a fairytale.89  The 
story progresses with near-faultless presence of beginnings and endings, and the 
listener must just accept on account of the happily-ever-after that this strange magic 
made sense (this narrative quality of magic is something I shall come to in the next 
section).  To return briefly to Deville‘s distinction between directed magic and world 
                                                     
89 For the magical properties of sleep, again consider Asclepius‘ temples (And sleep, my various and 
conflicting/ Selves I have so long endured/ Sleep in Asclepius‘ temple/ And wake cured‘ [Louis 
MacNeice, cited in Smeyers et al., 2007, p. 171]); also Sleeping Beauty—‗And she awaked, and opened 
her eyes, and looked very kindly on him.  And she rose, and they went forth together, and the king and the 
queen and whole court waked up, and gazed on each other with great eyes of wonderment‘ (Brothers 
Grimm, trans. Margaret Hunt). 
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magic, the magic I have described here owes nothing to spells or sorcerers but rather 
exists as innate and endemic aspects of a rich and wonderful (the latter written in 
entirely non-sentimental senses) world.  
 
Drawing attention to magical experiences like these does not seek to override other 
modes of recovery such as the recoveries made through ‗working on oneself‘, or to 
dismiss the contributions to recovery made by formal mental health care or by changes 
in social and material circumstances (in which ‗back to work‘ programmes might be 
included).  Rather, cataloguing these experiences, as I have put it here, seeks simply to 
widen the evidence base—to include with the same level of authority the magical 
aspects of recovery which unfold besides other manners of getting better.   
  
Magic and the Evidence Base: A Magical Realist Perspective 
 
Magic = the ephemeral, the unexpected, something that ‗sparks‘, divine 
intervention, animalistic and naturalistic suspicions, attraction, inexplicable 
events, falling in love, highly unusual incidents, the incidental, the marvellous, 
transcendental thinking, anything to which the onlooker might say, ‗it was 
magic!‘; combinations of any of the above.  (Dictionary of Magically-Informed 
Social Research, 2011)
90
 
 
I leave the above section with a commitment to a kind of surplus or magic in the world 
which seems ‗in excess‘ of an evidence base or technical knowledge on a range of 
grounds—because it was never the kind of thing that was thought about, or because it 
wasn‘t expressed to the researcher, or perhaps because it was expressed but was later 
dismissed (for all kinds of reason: disbelief or lack of understanding, lack of space in 
academic reports, or simply because it didn‘t ‗fit‘ with the kinds of things that are 
generally discussed in scholarly research).   
 
As I have phrased it here, such events have an experiential quality of magic (the 
experience of the ephemeral, like Murdoch‘s kestrel) although commitments to a 
supernatural ontology are not necessary to accepting them.  From the point of view of 
                                                     
90 Copies of this text are rather hard to find.... for an alternative, see Lefebvre, ‗Magic plays an immense 
role in everyday life be it in emotional identification and participation with other people or in the thousand 
little rituals and gestures used by every person, every family, every group‘ (cited in Merrifield, 2011, p. 
19). 
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application, such events are highly resistant to technicism or operationalisation, at least 
in their ‗raw‘ status—which I shall comment upon later—although, from the 
perspective of ontology, I will sustain that there is no a priori reason why such 
experiences could not be incorporated into a mainstream catalogue of evidence (as 
such, their epistemological status is the same as most other bits and pieces we think we 
know).  My arguments are threefold:  
 
1. The evidence base, as it currently stands, is impoverished by lack of a full 
appreciation of magic (the epistemological argument). 
2. That magic, as here phrased, is an ordinary part of the human world, particularly 
where concerning matters of breakdown and recovery (the ontological argument). 
3. And that, as such, social inquiry should expect to encounter magic and should 
design itself where possible to see magic and the prosaic together (the 
methodological argument).  
 
Despite the preference in this thesis towards poststructuralist forms of knowledge 
which are more associated with a withdrawal from representational thinking it is 
noteworthy that this is to an extent an appeal towards some notion of realism—to 
describe the world as it is, or as it has revealed itself, or as I have found it to be.  
(Certainly these are notions of ‗soft‘ philosophical realism, or perhaps more accurately 
the kind of realism that we observe in art or literature—but I shall come back to this 
point later).  To advance these ideas, in the remainder of this chapter I want to step 
finally into another genre of magical writing—that which has become known as 
magical realism.  With origins traced as dispersedly as twentieth century Latin 
America and nineteenth century Russia, magical realism is a broad collection of 
fantastic narrative and artistic forms (for examples, see Gabriel García Márquez, 
Salman Rushdie, Angela Carter, Isabel Allende as well as numerous others—Nikolai 
Gogol, Franz Kafka, Will Self, Haruki Murakami, etc.) who variously transgress or 
problematise the conventional division between bourgeois scientific rationality and the 
fantastic or magical.  Highly acclaimed in the academic literature, magical realist texts 
can be read as politicised fairytales embedded not in a land ‗far, far away‘ but in the 
everyday landscapes of the contemporary world.  Often originating from the global 
south, magical realism now has a well established presence in postcolonial studies 
including among scholars in the social sciences as well as the literary disciplines.  With 
encouragement from others (e.g. Hegerfeldt, 2005, p. 281; Aldea, 2011, p. 11; 
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Merrifield, 2011, p. 12), I believe a journey into magical realism is also helpful in the 
context of mental health and the magical encounters I have described in this chapter.  
Whilst there are differences between the canonical magical realist masterpieces 
(Márquez‘s One Hundred Years of Solitude or Rushdie‘s Midnight s Children) and the 
approach to magic I believe is required for a properly responsive evidence base, in 
what I sketch out below I hope to offer some suggestions of how social research into 
matters of mental ill health and recovery might benefit from a magically realist 
perspective.   
 
It is worth briefly setting out some organising characteristics of magical realism before 
going further.  First and most obviously, magical realism is characterised by the 
presence of magic in otherwise ordinary and realistic settings.  Magic is part of the 
ordinary world—flying carpets wait alongside taxicabs in Mumbai traffic jams, 
circuses and carnivals have as many technologies as the medical clinic, and humans 
share agency with animals and spirits in quite undiscerning manners.  Such events are 
presented realistically and without textual differentiation from more mundane 
happenings (a matter-of-fact, somewhat textbooky style is characteristic of the genre—
a basis for its realist credentials).  The magic portrayed, as in my own examples above, 
is nearly always of Deville‘s ‗world‘ category—i.e., appearing simply in the world and 
not at the fingertips of particular shaman or witches or other magical individuals.  
Similarly (and importantly for our purposes), magical experiences such as 
hallucination, clairvoyance and transfiguration are not symptoms of psychopathology 
but are ordinary human experiences, especially in times of change or transition.   
 
It is not necessary to delve too far into a technical literary analysis of the genre but it is 
useful for our purposes to identify two ontological tactics which are present (often 
simultaneously) in presenting the magic in magical realism.  The first (and most 
obvious to the reader) is what Faris calls an ‗ontological flattening‘ (Faris, 2004, p. 45) 
or what Chanady refers to as an ‗absence of hierarchy between two codes of reality‘ 
(1985, p. 151)—that is, the co-existence of ordinary events and magical events within 
the same ontic realm.  As above, there is no wardrobe door through which the 
characters of magical realist texts exit one code of reality and enter another; rather, 
everything is as real as everything else.  This flattening of hierarchies accounts for 
many of the most noticeable magical realist traits: an almost baroque level of empirical 
detail to authenticate magical happenings (Carpentier, 1997); frequent use of multi-
 ~ Chapter 6 Magical Happenings ~ 221 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
sensory description to triangulate characters‘ narrations (Faris, 2004); the purposeful 
employment of unreal events (dreams, lies, hearsay, etc.) by which to establish ‗truth‘ 
elsewhere.  Yet a second, quieter strain of ontological manipulation is an ‗ontological 
reticence‘ (Aldea, 2011) or as I shall call it later, a withdrawal from questions of 
ontology.  As such, accompanying the baroque insistence upon the realness of events is 
a lack of interest or concern in the real; as Chanady puts it: ‗the narrator does not 
provide explanations about the accuracy or credibility of events described or views 
expressed by characters in the text; furthermore, the narrator is indifferent‘ (Chanady, 
1985, p. 15).
91
  If the two strategies appear opposed then it is fair to say this 
discordance feeds into the aesthetic style of magical realism too, with an often uneasy 
effect on the reader.  However in terms of sense-making (or progressing through the 
story), it is notable that the two strategies of ‗everything is as real as everything else‘ 
and ‗it is uncertain what is real and therefore we shall treat all things equally‘ are in 
practice almost indistinguishable.  
 
A final feature of magical realism which is essential to mention is its (politically and 
texturally) subversive nature.  Through and through, the genre is one for ‗ex-centrics‘: 
written ‗by and for those at the margins‘ (D‘haen, 1995, p. 194).  This subverseness is 
twofold.  First, in displaying what is metaphysically bizarre or unreal in textually 
realistic lights, a new ‗mythical and magical perspective on reality‘ is opened—often 
with the effect of revealing to the reader what is strange and incongruous about the 
real-world as it would normally be conceived (Dombroski in Bowers, 2004, p. 522).
92
  
Yet secondly, the alternative world evoked in magical realism and the ontological 
flattening that produces it are themselves subversive—disrupting the hegemony of 
modernist literature in which the magical and mysterious are peripheralised in relation 
to rational logocentric narrative forms.  As such, exploration of the tensions between 
scientific and suprascientific understandings of the world, between dominant and 
marginalised understandings, and complete and incomplete understandings are also 
central features of the genre.   
                                                     
91 As a side note, these ontological modifications—classed here as a success of the genre—are elsewhere 
taken as evidence of pathology: see, for example, the paper cited in chapter four (note 52, p. 125) about 
the writing style of mentally disordered writers and poets (Thomas and Duke, 2007), which identified 
particular ‗cognitive distortions‘ to include ‗forming conclusions without supporting evidence or in the 
face of contrary evidence‘. 
92 Dombroski‘s quotation concerns Massimo Bontempelli, whose writings served as a sardonic response to 
Italian fascism in the early twentieth century—however, similar comments can be made in the postcolonial 
(or critical psychiatric!) context also.  Concerning D‘haen‘s comments, much of the genre is written by 
people at the margins by nature of geographical location, gender and sexuality.  However, D‘haen also 
remarks that magical realism can be a strategy through which authors of socially dominant identity groups 
disassociate themselves from their ‗power discourse‘ (D‘haen, 1995, p. 195). 
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Most straightforwardly, magical realism is of interest to this chapter because, as genres 
similarly bound with the ex-centric and magical, mad stories and magical realist stories 
frequently cover similar material.  Both engage explicitly with the liminal and 
marginal.  Just as Azaru exists between the spirit world and the living to be called upon 
by either at any time in Ben Okri‘s The Famished Road, Sam, who has appeared on 
numerous occasions throughout this thesis, lives between the worlds of fighter pilots 
and electrifying wars and the more mundane spaces of the mental health daycentres, 
both of which seem to increasingly demand her attention and time.
93
  Both exist in a 
non-human world which is alive with its own agency—just as Tracy and Howard seem 
to be cradled by a living space which lives with them, the occupants of the three-storey 
house in downtown Miami in Brautigan‘s (1972) Revenge of the Lawn seem equally 
alternately encouraged and thwarted by its magical abilities.  Whilst clinical 
conceptions of mental distress are comparatively rare in magical realist writing (a point 
I will expand upon below), themes of downfall and recovery are almost omnipresent.  
As are often the protagonists of mad stories, the characters of magical realist texts are 
in various combinations suffering or disabled, disbelieved or distrusted, fugitive or 
foreigner, or socially, geographical or spiritually isolated—or else in some way 
enriched as a result of their marginalising experiences.  Since magical realism shies 
away from the expressly psychological, it is better to speak about personal than mental 
breakdown here—yet as shall become apparent, these breakdowns tend to collapse 
traditional divisions between mind, body and world.   
 
Magical realism, like many of the narratives in my own research, is also indelibly 
linked with journeys and transitions and disruptions to self and the life course.  Kafka‘s 
Metamorphosis follows the story of Gregor Samsor who wakes one rainy morning to 
find he has been ‗transformed in his bed into a horrible vermin‘ (Kafka, 1915, p. 1), 
apparently a result of his long working hours and stressful occupation as a travelling 
salesman.  Similarly, Gogol‘s The Nose (often considered to be the first instance of 
magical realism) tells the story of Major Kovalev, whose nose falls off his face and 
runs away to lead an independent life without him—an experience which appears to be 
                                                     
93 Similarly, to take a text with another child protagonist, when Alexander Cold is sent to accompany his 
eccentric grandmother on a trip to the Amazon in Isabelle Allende‘s City of the Beasts (2002), he must 
balance a life between his real-world life back in North America and his totemic life as a jaguar which 
becomes revealed to him as he journeys through the jungle.  Indeed with the small difference that Kitty 
Gattrel, the self-harmer in my above section, does not physically transfigurate into feline form, the 
experiences and storylines of totemism appear remarkably similar between the novel and the empirical 
data (see also daemons in Philip Pullman‘s His Dark Materials). 
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a result of the myriad frustrations of Russian bureaucracy (Gogol, 1836).  Irani‘s The 
Cripple and his Talismans (2005) follows another young man who has recently lost a 
body part (this time, an arm) and his journeys across India to try to recomplete himself.  
In Irani‘s text, much more of the moral rehabilitative discourse (as I have discussed in 
relation to case studies such as Pete and Jake in my own research) can be seen: 
throughout the story, the unnamed narrator must make the transition from an ill-
tempered ‗novice cripple‘ to someone who has empathy and wisdom, before he can be 
reunited with the arm. 
 
Whilst madness has been the subject of many artistic genres, we can begin to see 
something in magical realism then that has particular sharpness in capturing the spirit 
of the empirical encounters and philosophic persuasions I have compiled in this 
thesis—and especially in the magical catalogue in the earlier part of this chapter—
which makes it helpful and perhaps even instructive to this campaign.  First, magical 
realism is assuredly non-medicalised in its approach to distress, with characters and 
authors appearing to varying degrees suspicious, indifferent or merely distanced from 
conventional medical expertise (to translate, we might simply say that this is a genre in 
which the medical and psy professions are not indispensable).  In The Nose, Kovalev 
finds the disappearance of his nose a matter for the police rather than the physician; in 
Metamorphosis, Gregor‘s family sends away the doctor when they realise what 
misfortune has befallen Gregor.  Cortázar locates The Night Face Up in a modern day 
hospital as the protagonist recovers from a serious traffic accident; however, the real 
action takes place in an equally real but magical ‗coma-world‘ existence of which the 
doctors and other patients seem futilely unaware.  In the Latino contributions, shamans 
are occasionally consulted for their traditional medical expertise, but as Faris argues 
(2004), these encounters are more easily understood as communal healing processes, 
rather than individualised interventions.   
 
Related to this, the perspective that magical realism adopts towards its characters is 
distinctly non-psychologised (and on occasions anti-psychologised).  The realism of 
magical realism itself makes this point, of course.  Unlike the related genre, surrealism, 
which takes the landscape of the (psychodynamic) psyche as its homeland, in magical 
realism, magic happens strictly in the world and not in the minds of individuals.  (It is 
worth here remembering the tenets of depressive realism: that clinically depressed 
individuals may ‗really‘ be better at judging reality than their non-pathological 
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counterparts: as already stated, magical events really happen).
94
  A phenomenon of 
particular recurrence in this context is the dream.  Metamorphosis begins with Gregor 
waking from a dream (it is when waking from this dream he discovers his insect-like 
condition); the first main section of The White Hotel (Thomas, 1981) starts similarly 
when Frau Lisa is woken by the ticket collector after sleeping in a railway carriage.  In 
The Night Face Up, the bedridden protagonist drifts between consciousness and what 
at first appears a feverish dream-world of Aztec sacrifice—however, the sensual and 
sensuous properties of the apparent dream soon indicate that dream/wake have been 
reversed (‗It was unusual as a dream because it was full of smells, and he never dreamt 
smells‘).  Such dream states serve not as the loci of the action (a Joseph and His Coat 
scenario) but as textural mechanisms to locate real magical events in the authentic 
conscious world.  In the so-consciously satirical The Nose, this is taken further: not 
only does Gogol begin the text with two characters as they awake from sleep, in 
Russian, nose (HOK) is the reverse of dream (KOH)—the opposite of dream or anti-
dream.  The skill of this in preserving Gogol‘s intended political, real-world meaning is 
only fully revealed a century later, amidst numerous attempts by critics to reduce the 
story to purely phallic renditions—the missing nose indicating unconscious castration 
anxiety.  However, since even Freud was clear that castration anxiety belonged strictly 
to the dream-world and noses to the phenomenal world of consciousness, such HOK-
KOH riddle persists as Gogol‘s post-mortem insistence that insanity—if we must call it 
that—exists in the world and not only in the head (Peace, 2008).  
 
Without the constraints of a dominant tradition (the ‗psy‘ or rational, scientific 
discourse, etc.), unhappiness as portrayed in magical realism is thus refreshingly free.  
On occasion, misfortunes occur as a result of loss or trauma (I shall consider two 
examples of bereavement shortly) or as a result of particular social or cultural 
pressures; other times misfortune acquires moral characteristics (as punishments or 
journeys towards self-understanding), acquiring some if not many of the characteristics 
of earlier classical narrative genres: the necessity of anagnorisis (insight) in the tragic 
novel, for example.  However magical illnesses often occur (and end) simply because 
they happen without reason or for reasons unknown or for reasons never disclosed to 
the reader.   
 
                                                     
94 Of course, the evidence is mixed.  The original thesis was published in Alloy and Abramson (1979); for 
a recent overview see Bentall (2003). 
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As such, magical realism contains no essential ingredient with which to explain or to 
cure—an absence that renders any automatically reductive or totalising explanations of 
distress awkward and deluded.  An example of the strength and subtlety of this anti-
reductionism can be seen in Thomas‘s The White Hotel, which documents the fictional 
relationship between Sigmund Freud and his patient, the hysterical and clairvoyant 
Jewess Frau Lisa, in the years and months preceding both of their deaths amidst the 
background of rising anti-Semite hostilities in Germany.  To an extent, Freud is a wise 
and loyal helper who offers Lisa a level of comfort, yet their faith together in an 
Oedipus complex by which to explain her hysterical fantasies and apparently 
psychosomatic pains obscures the truth of Lisa‘s magical clairvoyant abilities, and it is 
not until the end of her life that Lisa realises her neuroses and fantastic injuries have in 
fact been corporal foreknowledge of her execution at Babi Yar.  The White Hotel 
avoids the polarity of true anti-psychiatry due to its lack of anger.  In a reparative post-
death postscript to the novel, Lisa stumbles into a much diminished Freud who has 
now also died and she offers him kindness—concealing the fact that his diagnosis 
wasn‘t quite right in order to save his feelings.  Thomas describes Freud as a ‗majestic‘ 
individual, his psychoanalysis as a great and beautiful myth (author‘s note) and as such 
psychoanalysis itself is spared its own violent execution.  Yet along with all of the 
other ideologies that have harmed Lisa, the totalitarianism of psy must be displaced or 
demoted into something as fragmentary and contingent as the subjects it seeks to 
describe.   
 
As a second means to develop this un-medicalised/anti-medicalised theme, magical 
realist stories problematise the boundary between ‗ordinary‘ responses to life 
experiences and apparently extraordinary or pathological affairs—an effect I have 
consistently sought to achieve in my own writing also.  To take a couple of examples, 
in Kuhlman‘s The Last Invisible Boy and Will Self‘s The North London Book of the 
Dead, protagonists weave between ordinary expressions of (in this instance) grief and 
extra-normal, extra-psychic magical happenings.  In The Last Invisible Boy (a 
children‘s text):  
 
I began disappearing this past June, right after what I call That Terrible Day that 
Changed Everything, the day I lost my dad forever.  That morning I looked in the 
bathroom mirror and I saw that one strand of my black hair had turned milky white and 
that my skin was missing a small amount of pinkness, one of the proofs that I was a 
living kid.  I had lost a little bit of myself.  No, it was stolen.  Nobody noticed but me.  
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Now people notice.  Nearly half my hair has freakishly gone white and my skin is as 
pale as a ghost‘s.  Call me Salt and Pepper Boy, or Frankenstein, or Snow White (if 
you are kind of mean), or Uncle Fester from the Addams Family.  I‘ve heard it all.  
[...]  Dad was taken instantly.  I‘m vanishing in bits and pieces, like a disease that will 
not kill me but will erase me.  First goes my hair and then my skin.  And then the rest 
of me.  Going, going, gone.  (Kuhlman, 2008, pp. 4–5) 
 
Throughout the book, this ‗invisabilisation‘ continues until Finn Garrett, the narrator, 
is scarcely perceptible.  In The North London Book of The Dead, the unnamed narrator 
similarly transits between normal expressions of grief—shock, depression, 
hallucination—into apparently magical affairs (it is worth quoting from this passage at 
length in order to reveal how attention to empirical detail achieves such effect):  
 
About six months after Mother‘s death I entered an intense period during which I kept 
seeing people in the street who I thought were Mother.  I‘d be walking in the West End 
or the City and there, usually on the other side of the road, would be Mother, ambling 
along staring in shop windows.  I would know it was Mother because of the clothes.  
Mother tended to wear slacks on loan from hippopotami, or else African-style dresses 
that could comfortably house a scout troop.  She also always carried a miscellaneous 
collection of bags, plastic and linen, dangling from her arm.  These were crammed 
with modern literature, groceries and wadded paper tissues.  And then, invariably, as I 
drew closer the likeness would evaporate.  Not only wasn‘t it Mother, but it seemed 
absurd that I ever could have made the mistake.  [...] 
All of this made the events that transpired in the winter of the year she died even more 
shocking.  I was walking down Crouch Hill towards Crouch End on a drizzly, bleak, 
Tuesday afternoon.  I‘d taken the afternoon off work and decided to go and see a 
friend.  When, coming up the other side of the road I saw Mother.  She was wearing a 
sort of bluish, tweedish long jacket and black slacks and carrying a Barnes & Noble 
book bag, as well as a large handbag and a carrier bag from Waitrose.  She had a CND 
badge in her lapel and was observing the world with a familiar ―there will be tears 
before bedtime‖ sort of expression.  
The impression I had of Mother in that very first glance was so sharp and so clear, her 
presence so tangible, that I did not for a moment doubt the testimony of my senses.  I 
looked at Mother and felt a trinity of emotions: affection and embarrassment mingled 
with a sort of acute embarrassment.  It was this peculiarly familiar wash of feeling that 
must have altogether swamped the terror and bewilderment that anyone would expect 
to experience at the sight of their dead mother walking up Crouch Hill.  
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I crossed the road and walked towards her.  She spotted me when I was about twenty 
feet off.  Just before a grin of welcome lit up her features I spotted a little moue of 
girlish amusement—that was familiar too, it meant ―You‘ve been had‖.  We kissed on 
both cheeks; Mother looked me up and down to see how I was weighing in for the 
fight with life.  Then she gestured at the shop window she‘d been looking into.  ―Can 
you believe the prices they‘re charging for this crap, someone must be buying it.‖  Her 
accent was the same, resolutely mid-Atlantic, she had the same artfully yellowed and 
unevened dentures.  It was Mother.  (Self, 1991, pp. 4–5) 
 
As Mother goes on to explain, contrary to classic understandings of life after death, 
when people die they in fact just move to another part of London and live with other 
dead people doing dead jobs and dead pastimes.  That few people know about this 
arrangement is not evidence of some meta-theological conspiracy but simply testimony 
to ‗how big and anonymous the city really is‘ (p. 12).  The story concludes with a 
journey by the narrator to visit Mother in her new home at Crouch Hill—the 
eponymous ‗book of the dead‘ acting as a handbook to initiate newly dead incomers.  
In both stories, the ordinariness of grief accentuates the magical element of the stories 
(like the dream strategy above, Self opens the story, ‗I suppose that the form my 
bereavement took after my mother died was fairly conventional‘); however, the 
extraordinary and the ordinary also seem sympathetically aligned.  In The Last 
Invisible Boy, Finn‘s transformations differ from that of other grieving children (the 
doctor has never seen anything like it, we are told in one chapter).  Yet at the same 
time his invisibility seems the most natural reaction a boy could have to the loss of his 
father, as does the feeling that the narrator‘s new feelings towards his mother in The 
North London Book are a natural response to grief.  It is tedious to become too drawn 
into whether Kuhlman or Self‘s characters literally experience the magical events they 
report (consider as comparison the somewhat unimaginative parent looking with her 
child at a picture book and prompting, ‗and do you think a tiger really came for dinner 
or did the little girl just imagine it?‘), although from the tenets of magical realism we 
must accept that such events happen as said.  What is significantly more interesting 
however is to consider the ease with which magical realism eschews the boundary 
between ordinary grief processes and pathological or magical ones.  Again, magical 
realism here wrestles with the same issues that an empirical, socially scientific inquiry 
into mental ill health must face—the magical events of Hannah‘s long sleep or Sonya‘s 
discovery of the book on the train, for example, which seem simultaneously so very 
understandable and yet so very fantastical. 
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It should now be clear to the reader how there are many ways in which magical realism 
can be read as a close ally of critical and anti-psychiatry—and particularly Deleuze and 
his collaborations with Felix Guattari (a statement which can be made for few other 
fictional genres).
95
  I have written elsewhere (Laws, 2009) how Deleuze and Guattari 
consistently demonstrate how ‗madness‘ is in the world and not in the mind: Deleuze 
and Guattari‘s ‗anti-Oedipus‘ (that is, the rejection of psychoanalytic reductionism to 
the Oedipus complex) appears vividly in Gogol‘s HOK-KOH inversion (it is the world 
that has the qualities of a nightmare; not Kovalyov‘s dreamtime) or the metaphysical 
presence of Mother in The North London Book.  However, this critical allegiance 
extends beyond magical realism‘s treatment of psychopathology to a whole (de-
centred) mode of conceiving difference.  To quote from a succinct and somewhat 
incidental passage from the very heart of magical realism, in which Pelayo and 
Elisenda in Márquez‘s A Very Old Man With Enormous Wings have been caring for an 
angel since he crashed in their yard in the rain:  
 
The most unfortunate invalids on earth came in search of health: a poor woman who 
since childhood had been counting her heartbeats and had run out of numbers; a 
Portuguese man who couldn‘t sleep because the noise of the stars disturbed him; a 
sleepwalker who got up at night to undo the things he had done while awake; and 
many others with less serious ailments. (Márquez, 1955, p. 109) 
 
To look at this list of unfortunates, first Márquez provides us with various details of the 
kinds we have explored above: the concerns of these individuals are to be taken 
seriously; that there are many others like them.  Yet there is also a sense of a collective 
individualism incisive of the magical realist genre which exposes a de-centred and 
paradoxical ontology which in any other context would surely be described as 
Deleuzian.  The invalids (who we might see as the mentally ill, the incapacitated) move 
both as a discrete subsection of society (the sick, who parade Márquez‘s worlds in 
search of cures or else who stay at home and work for their recovery) and as the world 
as a singular (‗the world had been sad since Tuesday‘, we are told).  Illness is never 
reduced to the Other since death and madness are in Pelayo and Elisenda‘s house from 
the start—the purpose of the angel‘s visit had first been to collect their dying child who 
is miraculously cured.  And yet madness is never reduced to the collective, either: these 
                                                     
95 To turn this point on its head, there are also elements of Capitalism and Schizophrenia which 
themselves read as rich magical realism although I have not developed this point here. 
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individuals—woefully atomistic in the specificity of their ailments—must be treated 
with the particularity that their concerns demand.  The list—which is primarily how 
this passage is presented—is thus another characteristic trope of magical realism since 
one of the strengths of the genre is to realise how condensing a number of individuals 
into an umbrella term is a problematic strategy.  For Deleuze—a philosopher of 
‗radical self-differing singularity‘ (Hallward, 1997, p. 9) and of the ‗almost impossibly 
plural‘ (Massumi, 1992, p. 117)—this is appropriate, and the lists that I have suggested 
are characteristic of magical realism are in many ways akin to Deleuze‘s own concept 
of ‗series‘ in expressing the resemblance of items one to another whilst expressing also 
the impossibility of collapsing these particulars into something that would then become 
a category.
96
  The implication of this tension between the singular and the that-which-
would-be-a-group is that the reader is trained quickly to understand that individuals are 
always both existent somehow in and of themselves (an effect which approaches 
Deleuze‘s rendition of the singular) and as only relations of each other (Aldea, 2011).  
In terms of raw philosophy, the effect as Hallward has it is that in comparison to ‗high 
postmodernism‘ which has typically struggled with the demands of collective identities 
(gendered, racial, sexual, national, etc.), such rhizomatic theories can weave between 
what he refers to as the specific, the specified and the singular (Hallward, 2000).
97
  In 
terms of the applied context of people living with mental distress, this realisation of 
both the necessity of the individual and of a collective body of madness (the 
collectively injured, the social movement, etc.)—achieved in magical realism through 
the low key strategies of list-making and others—is but one way of addressing some of 
the challenges of representing mad identity addressed in chapter four. 
 
Having set out a number of strengths of magical realism and its seductive applicability 
to the kind of empirical research I have been reporting in this thesis, it is time, finally, 
to return to ontology and the question of realism (assuming we had ever left it).  At the 
level of critique, there is some debate over the success, or intended success, of the 
realism of magical realism.  As a genre, the reader is not entirely convinced (a facet 
which Faris terms ‗unsettling doubts‘ [2004, p. 19]) and for all that has already been 
said, the truth-telling qualities of the genre remain in a state of ambiguity.  At its core, 
magical realism resists allegorical interpretations (which would preclude claims to 
realism) and yet at the same time allegory appears essential for any of the broader 
                                                     
96 The irony of constructing the earlier part of this chapter as a catalogue should thus be apparent. 
97 Hallward implicates authors such as Derrida, Lyotard and Jameson in this ‗high postmodernism‘. 
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critical readings which magical realism appears to invite.  Likewise, regarding the 
relation between magic and the psyche of our characters (a topic I considered briefly in 
my empirical work above), there seems ambiguity.  Certainly magic is, to an extent, 
unrelated to individual psychology.  Yet it seems naive to read magical realism without 
an understanding of its commitment to the human condition (even if we don‘t wish to 
couch this in expressly psychological language): the invisible boy or Kafka‘s Gregor 
experience things both in the world and in the mind; as such, changes are both extra-
psychic (inscribed on the body) and psychogenic (created by the mind) and reflective 
of some greater unhappiness (the recurring theme in magical realism of transfiguration 
is seen by many scholars as a metaphor for broader political or cultural transition): in 
other words magical realism is an and and a because and allegory.   
 
For what it‘s worth, I see this undecidability, this l entre-deux or merging realm 
between not only the metaphysically mundane and the magical (which others have 
identified), but also between realism and surrealism, between allegory and literalism 
and between the personal and the political as one of the successes of the genre.  
Realism, as it appears, is an ironic realism: a puzzling (literary) realism that at times 
appears simply fantasy superimposed in an otherwise ordinary setting, which unsettles 
our faith in ordinary reality to thus make (philosophically) realist claims about what the 
world is ‗really‘ like—what might rather clumsily be termed an allegoric philosophic 
realism.  In trying to talk about mad stories of the kind that have appeared in this 
thesis, this is particularly impressive since it captures the impossible doubleness of 
magical thinking.  In the case study of David (who I introduced in chapter two), the 
compulsion to ‗check‘ (tap) surfaces to assess their integrity is identified by him both 
as a meaningless superfluous action, and as a means of saving the world, and as a 
psychological injury inflicted on him by his previous employers: ‗I think it started 
when I was [employed] at the bus station.  We got wrong for everything if the buses 
weren‘t on time, we were supposed to manage these things that we couldn‘t really 
help—if we were late because there was road-works or because there was snow and we 
couldn‘t get the buses up, we‘d get wrong‘. 
   
However, despite all this talk of ontology (of realistic narration, of magic-as-real, as 
allegoric philosophical realism), as I suggested at the top of this section, what 
impresses me most about the magical realist genre and its potential for a magically 
informed social science is its simultaneous withdrawal from ontology or lack of 
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interest in ontology—for it is true that very rarely is ontology deeply questioned either 
by the characters themselves in magical realist stories or by their authors.
98
  Again, we 
might see this lack of ontological questioning as a defining feature of magical realism 
since it separates the genre both from surrealism with its overflowing eagerness for 
psychological interpretations but also other genres such as science fiction in which the 
reader is painstakingly provided with authorial notes to explain futuristic technologies 
according to standard post-Enlightenment scientific knowledge.  An obvious 
consequence of this withdrawal from questions of ontology is to encounter unusual 
happenings—magical encounters, highly unusual events, psychopathological 
phenomena (delusions and hallucinations), etc.—with an astounding lack of 
differentiation from more prosaic and explicable events.  Yet a second is to be able to 
‗get on with the story‘, both from the point of view of the reader who wants to know 
what happens next (again, the comparison could be the science fiction novel in which 
the plot is interrupted too often with lengthy explanation) and from the perspective of 
the characters who ultimately, whatever the ontological status of the events their 
authors have created for them, must respond to them as they are.   
 
In the right mindset, I believe such aspects of magical realism can be particularly 
instructive both for social science research and for the day-to-day tasks of responding 
to people with unusual psychological symptoms.  First, a withdrawal from or 
suspension of ontology of the kind exhibited by magical realism is one way in which 
we might give ourselves permission (as researchers, as listeners) to take a rest from the 
always already futile activity of interpretation—a pursuit which I suggest can be 
harmful in the instance of mad and magical stories.  
 
In the previous chapter, I explored how a central motivation for the ‗what works‘ 
literature was transcendence by virtue of the weight of scientific evidence from the 
need for interpretation (which, as I argued, was conflated by ‗what works‘ scholars 
with rampant subjectivity or bias).  Yet, as I discuss it here, the creation of ‗best 
evidence‘ (the cornerstone of the ‗what works‘ philosophy) is itself tied inextricably 
with the process of judging or interpreting evidence as either dependable or capricious, 
                                                     
98 Certainly, characters are sometimes puzzled or even alarmed in the immediacy of a magical happening: 
Ivan Yakovlevitch is castigated by his wife for finding a nose in his bread bun, for example (who believes 
he has drunkenly lopped it from one of his clients at the barbershop); likewise Pelayo and Elisenda are at 
first a little afraid of the angel who appears in their courtyard, but ‗very soon overcame their surprise‘ and 
‗in the end found him familiar‘ (p. 106).  However never is the anguish about such happenings in the least 
bit commensurate with the strangeness of the event. 
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thus revealing a circular argument in its own raison d être.  The evidence hierarchies 
described in the previous chapter are one example of this, where particular forms of 
evidence (the epidemiological study, the clinical trial) are judged in high regard 
whereas other evidence-kinds (which may be highly valued in different methodological 
or cultural contents—insights from informal conversations for example, or from novels 
or paintings or tealeaves or delusions) are ranked variously as lower-status evidence 
sources or else are rejected from the evidence framework altogether.   
 
It can therefore not be this kind of escape from interpretation (which is really only a 
different kind of interpreting-commitment) that I am celebrating in magical realism.  
Rather, the kind of withdrawal from interpretation that I advocate is one which 
recognises that making interpretations about truth-status is always problematic.  As I 
have discussed elsewhere in this thesis, making rigid decisions about what is and what 
isn‘t ‗good‘ knowledge is problematic.  However well designed the interview 
methodology, respondents can be wrong, they can mislead, they can not know the 
conditions of their own experience.  Information that may appear suggestive of 
psychiatric symptomatology may in fact be factual reporting of events (just because 
I m paranoid, doesn t mean they re not out to get me...) just as, likewise, psychotic 
delusions appear on a spectrum with other claims and beliefs which are in various 
combinations unverifiable, matters of opinion, or unrepresentative.  And of course even 
in the scientific community, best evidence is only ever ephemeral (as this chapter is 
written, physicists scratch their heads over findings from Geneva that subatomic 
particles have been travelling faster than the speed of light: ‗Professor Einstein, you 
can relax.  E still equals mc
2.  Probably …‘ writes Guardian s Frank Close [24.09.11].)   
 
The withdrawal from ontology that is seen in magical realism—which as I suggested 
earlier explores the literary compatibility between the statements, ‗everything is as real 
as everything else‘ and ‗it is uncertain what is real and therefore all things shall be 
treated as equals‘—thus offers some route around these interpretative aporia.  In the 
context of already marginal forms of knowledge such as those from mad and magical 
stories, the endless interpretation of truth-claims, and the associated hierarchies of 
evidence cause demonstrable difficulties.  In chapter four I have already explored, for 
example, the challenges of the service-user researchers who felt compelled to ‗edit‘ the 
madder viewpoints of the service-users they represented in order for the research they 
produced to be taken seriously in academic and policy-making circles (to the extent of 
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purposeful data deletion prior to analysis or surreptitiously discouraging particular 
individuals from attending focus groups or consultative meetings).  Similar sentiment 
was expressed by Sonya (above) whose story involved the strange matter of the lost 
book on the train: ‗I feel a bit weird explaining this with the [voice] recorder.... it‘s not 
very scientific, it‘s a bit weird‘.  For a magically informed social science, the first 
benefit of a withdrawal from ontology then as encapsulated by magical realism is an 
inclusive attitude to ‗data‘ which doesn‘t pre-empt the real.  
 
The second potential I see in magical realism‘s ontological strategy concerns modes of 
engagement with people in mental distress.  Pelayo and Elisenda overcome their initial 
alarm at the angel who lands in their yard, just as the narrator of The London Book 
learns to live with his newly acquired knowledge about the ‗world of the dead‘ a tube 
and a bus ride away in Crouch Hill.  As such, Pelayo and Elisenda and the man in The 
London Book demonstrate to the sensitive reader that initial anxieties about magic are 
transient and surmountable and that unusual happenings will soon appear familiar.  In 
The Last Invisible Boy, the therapeutic potential of this acceptance is taken further 
since Finn can only start to get better when he and his family stop worrying about his 
increasing invisibility.  A key moment of healing in the story is thus when Finn‘s 
family stop taking him to the hospital to seek a medical cure for his condition but 
instead bleach their own hair so that Finn no longer feels left out (they contemplate 
dyeing the cat also but decide the cat would rather not be bothered with it).  This ability 
of characters to accept and de-problematise magic indicates to the reader unfamiliar 
with various non-interventionist perspectives on psychotic and magical states of 
consciousness that destroying magical experiences is not the only or inevitable way to 
‗treat‘ psychosis—and that by contrast, learning to live alongside highly unusual 
happenings can provide a highly therapeutic means of growing from psychotic 
experience (in the UK, for example, the Hearing Voices Network has become a leading 
organisation in supporting people to live with voices and visions without suppressive 
medications and to ‗learn and grow from them in their own way‘ (Hearing Voices 
Network Website, 2012).
99
   
                                                     
99 It is interesting how, for the Hearing Voices Network and other similarly disposed organisations, the 
notion of ‗what works‘ differs from its formulation in the evidence-based publications in the previous 
chapter.  To take a couple of quotations from voice-hearing networks: ‗What can help you cope with the 
voices or disturbing beliefs?  In the early days you won‘t know what suits you, but after a time you may 
find out what works for you‘ (Newcastle Voice-Hearing Network, cited in Newcastle, North Tyneside & 
Northumberland Mental Health NHS Trust, 2002, my emphasis); ‗[in group sessions] we will not criticise 
each other‘s contributions but we realise that what works for one person may not work for others‘ 
(Coupland et al., 2004, my emphasis again).  With some atypical exceptions however (e.g., Romme and 
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Suspending questions of ontology (whether that statement is truth or delusion) also 
seems to open a means for engaging seriously and without fuss with the burden of 
unhappiness (the third element of a withdrawal from ontology I have picked out for 
analysis).  Earlier in this thesis I have made much of how mental distress generates 
additional work and responsibility for people with mental health difficulties which 
surpass matters of ‗merely‘ being unhappy—and how this is often forgotten by 
professionals, the academy and people working and living with such individuals (I 
recall Grove and Membrey‘s example of the woman on the Parent and Teachers‘ 
Association who is initially refused permission to leave meetings periodically to talk to 
the voices in her head [Grove and Membrey, 2005, see also my discussion in chapter 
two]).  In magical realism perhaps more than any other genre justice seems to be done 
to this issue.  In that extract from A Very Old Man, the woman who must count her 
heartbeats and the man who undoes all his doings at night are accepted in a way which 
neither romanticises nor trivialises their responsibilities.  Nor are the magical works of 
counting or sleepwalking pathologised or set apart from more earthly forms of 
occupation—indeed the kinds of magical work that are described in the story appear on 
a continuum with all other kinds of fortune which also generate work (for example, the 
cast of crabs which for some reason fills the house each night and leave Pelayo 
spending his days returning them to the sea).   
 
Again, such taking seriously of magical burden in magical realism provides ways of 
thinking about engaging with people with unusual psychological symptoms.  I refer 
again to the case study of David who performs compulsive wall-tapping rituals in order 
to prevent a number of transcendental crises.  Throughout the thesis I have tried to 
offer various explanations for David‘s behaviour in terms of his personal occupational 
history and wider cultural setting, as well as to disrupt other more clinical diagnoses 
that imagine his behaviours as events in neurochemistry alone.  Yet regardless of our 
interpretive commitments, if we are going to keep up with David or help him integrate 
in a mainstream ‗non-tapping‘ world, we must accept that David does tap walls and 
must cease being alarmed by every instance of tapping and checking that David 
displays.  Similarly, it is the case that Deborah, a participant on the ‗broadening 
horizons‘ back-to-work project at the Enterprise Centre, is highly averse to the colour 
green and will not be able to attend a work placement in which any aspect of corporate 
merchandise (logo, uniform, etc.) contains the colour green, or indeed which would 
                                                                                                                                             
Escher, 2009), the efficacy of the Hearing Voices movement has generally been ignored by the traditional 
evidence-based agenda. 
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involve travelling through a place with green nomenclature (Greencroft, Greendykes, 
Greenhill, Greenside are all off limits—as would be Greenacre Business Park, 
Grassmere Arcade or anything involving travel on Newcastle‘s light railway Green 
Line).  If we were working with Deborah we might do well to remember that green is 
an historically unlucky colour (‗And with a green and yellow melancholy, she sat like 
patience on a monument, smiling at grief‘, Twelfth Night, Act 2, scene 4).100  Similarly, 
we might be particularly sensitive to her strict Catholic upbringing in a rural 
community, where the condemnation of lay superstitions as ‗deviances of religion‘ was 
equalled by the incessant superstitions of the Catechism.  Yet explanation does little to 
capture the phenomenological greenness of green or the particular powers which 
prevent Deborah from trespassing onto green vocabularies (Wednesday is a difficult 
day because Wednesday is unlucky in its own right [Wednesday s child is full of woe] 
but also because Wednesday is recycling day and thus the day that the green bins come 
out).  To really work with Deborah then, we simply have to accept that green is off 
limits.  If we are going to integrate Deborah into mainstream work or social activity, 
we must simply equate (neither reduce nor expand) a fear of green with other 
occupational decision-making factors (job security, financial recompense, suitable 
qualifications).    
 
Magic, Pragmatism, Social Research 
 
It is then this suspension of ontological concern or withdrawal from it that appears so 
useful in magical realism in the context of mental health research.  Having started out 
in philosophically realist dimensions (and after travelling through some fairly 
unconventional territory) it is finally then with a pragmatic position I finalise the case 
for magical realism in the social sciences.   
 
Studies of mental distress have for too long concentrated on questions of ontology and 
causation and with establishing what is real.  Both academic psychiatry and anti-
psychiatry fall into this trap in their keenness to persuade us either of the biogenetic 
bases of mental ill health or to disabuse us of such beliefs (we are left with the memory 
that mental illness may or may not be a myth, but with less impression of what this 
means for us).  Freud too, in his almost exclusive interest in the ontogenesis of distress, 
                                                     
100 See Hutchings (1997) for a fuller review of green folklore.  In ordinary clinical contexts, a phobia of 
the colour green is referred to as chlorophobia (from chlorophyll, the pigment in green plant matter).  
However, given that Deborah‘s fear extends only to man-made greens, this term seems not quite apt. 
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seems guilty of not matching his commitment to establishing causation with a forward-
first interest in helping.  By generating hierarchies of evidence in which magical 
accounts feature only dimly, evidenced-based research also occupies itself with 
particular accounts of what can be included in the evidence base (i.e., again, with the 
real or the ontic).    
  
Yet the purpose of these last chapters has been about ‗what works‘ and in the context 
of ‗what works‘ it is pragmatics that are worth pushing forwards.  Magic happens and 
transforms people‘s lives.  Thankfully, we may feel, the current world has a little less 
of the transcendental magic seen in magical realism—yet unexpected events, magical 
connections and interruptions from a magical world shape people‘s lives alongside and 
along with the forces more ordinarily considered by social science research.  Deborah 
really must avoid the colour green and, if we are going to help her, we are going to 
have to accept that.  Similarly, David is going to continue his tapping and David‘s 
life—at least for now—must accommodate tapping routines alongside other more real-
world activities.  We might feel that in the longer term it would be preferable to 
encourage Deborah and David beyond these magical worlds and the entrapment they 
bring, but in the meantime, we are going to have to work with and not against such 
magic.  
 
Pragmatism may seem a strange stopping place for a chapter which has drawn heavily 
on magical realism—especially where we see pragmatism as only an instrumentalist 
theory of knowledge into which magic doesn‘t easily fit—and especially where we see 
realism and pragmatism as irrevocably separated poles of philosophy.  Yet, in the 
analysis I have offered above—that the innovation in magical realism is less its 
experimental engagement with ontology but rather its circumnavigation of or 
withdrawal from ontological angst—it appears that pragmatism, especially of the ‗neo‘ 
kind which has been associated most closely with Richard Rorty, is highly 
commensurate with the remarks I am making:  
 
[Pragmatism] says that truth is not the sort of thing one should expect to have a 
philosophically interesting theory about.  For pragmatists, ‗truth‘ is just the name of a 
property which all true statements share.  It is what is common to ‗Bacon did not write 
Shakespeare,‘ ‗It rained yesterday,‘ ‗E equals mc2,‘ ‗Love is better than hate,‘ ‗The 
Allegory of Painting was Vermeer‘s best work‘.  They doubt this for the same reason 
they doubt there is much to be said about the common feature shared by such morally 
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praiseworthy actions as Susan leaving her husband, America joining the war against 
the Nazis, America pulling out of Vietnam, Socrates not escaping from jail, Roger 
picking up litter from the trail, and the suicide of the Jews as Masada.  They see certain 
acts as good ones to perform, under the circumstances, but doubt that there is anything 
general and useful to say about what makes them all good.  [...]  When they suggest 
that we do not ask questions about the nature of Truth and Goodness, they do not 
invoke a theory about the nature of reality or knowledge or man which says that ‗there 
is no such thing‘ as Truth and Goodness.  Nor do they have a ‗relativistic‘ or 
‗subjectivist‘ theory of Truth or Goodness.  They would simply like to change the 
subject.  (Rorty, 1982a, pp. xiii–xiv) 
 
As Rorty has it then (1982a; 1982b), matters of truth, as of ethics, are less something 
that correspond in any representational sense to reality but are simply ways of thinking 
that allow one to move or to act in particular ways in the world that make sense at that 
time (which is why neo-pragmatism, like its predecessors, can be described as a 
philosophy of action).  In this way, in other words, pragmatism attempts exactly that 
which magical realism does—to do away with a stratified theory of knowledge in 
which particular kinds of truth or evidence are higher than others: the pyramids of 
evidence in which only the tightest clinical trials make top ranks or the traditional 
division between scientific and magical affairs that organise ordinary discourse (we 
remember that had this research not somehow been a magically-aware research project, 
Sonya might not have shared her curious story about the book with her name in it that 
appears in the railway carriage in that moment of need—indeed she says as much, ‗I 
feel silly saying this...‘).  It is this way in which Rorty sees pragmatism as overcoming 
traditional means of dividing the ‗assemblage of true statements‘ (1982a, p. xvi) into 
upper and lower divisions of knowledge (which was of course the traditional task of 
the Platonic tradition).  It is in this same way that Pelayo and Elisenda are able to 
overcome their surprise at the angel who crashes in their garden in A Very Old Man, or 
that the young man in The Cripple and His Talismans can begin the search for his 
missing arm, or that in The White Hotel, Frau Lisa can move to some kind of 
forgiveness after the atrocities at Babi Yar and the conditions of her premonition—by 
setting aside the metaphysical questions of ‗how‘ and ‗why‘ and instead acting only at 
the level of ‗this is the case‘.   
 
Advocating a pragmatic base from which to push forward with a magically-informed 
social science then is a way of i. rejecting hierarchical theories of Truth which limit the 
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kinds of knowledge that are admissible as social science evidence, in order ii. to 
conceptualise the maximum number of dimensions of mental distress and recovery, so 
that we can iii. act in the world in a way which is meaningful to each of these contexts 
in equal regard.  Of course suggesting a way to move forward with pragmatics is not to 
offer some competing new method for the analysis of magical realist or other magical 
narratives, or to deny value in approaches in social science whose objective is to 
consider the reality-status of events and phenomena (for to suggest this would be to 
replicate the very kind of epistemological violence I have critiqued in ‗what works‘ 
agendas).  Rather, it is just—as Rorty has it—to ‗change the conversation‘, to move on 
from the question, to ‗work around‘. 
 
Conclusion: Social Science and Magic 
 
Having suggested some ways in which the literary genre magical realism might inform 
the ways in which evidence-bases are constructed (socially and literally), it is therefore 
the purpose of this chapter to end with some thoughts on how an understanding of 
magic might also be incorporated into the kinds of technical or operationalisable 
knowledge which I suggested at the beginning were the modus operandi of ‗what 
works‘ frameworks (this is what, in some other doctoral theses, might be encapsulated 
as ‗implications for policy‘ although I recognise the obvious differences between the 
following notes and a traditional policy recommendation).   
 
It is perhaps difficult in the first instance to think of ways in which magic can be 
incorporated into the frameworks of ‗what works‘ and technical knowledge: I have 
insisted throughout this chapter that the kind of magical transformation—magic 
connections and magical interventions—listed in my catalogue cannot be prescribed or 
otherwise governed or guaranteed in application (in the examples I picked from the 
weather-world or from the world of spirits and gods this was particularly evident).  
However, this is not a counsel of despair, and what I do suggest is a series of ways 
instead that we might appreciate magic and create space for it in the mainstream arenas 
of mental health care and occupational rehabilitation.  The following is a prototype for 
policy-makers, academic researchers and organisations working with people in mental 
distress for what in a future, more magically receptive social arena, such magical 
manifesto might look like:  
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1. Be aware of magic and its possibilities, both positive and negative. 
2. Take magical experiences seriously, be these magical moments of recovery or the 
(dark?) magic of distress or madness.  Develop magical realist (or magical 
pragmatist) modes of professional practice in which the movements of magic are 
legitimate topics of conversation.   
3. Challenge modes of service delivery or service planning which prevent or prohibit 
magic.  Examples of such practices will include hyper-bureaucracy and micro-
management in healthcare settings which prevent staff from engaging in the kind 
of magic experience described in this catalogue, or highly performative cultures in 
which formal measurements of means and outputs ignore and override magic.  
With regard to the intimate and idiosyncratic nature of magic (both in terms of 
magical recoveries and the magic of distress and psychosis), avoid one-size-fits-all 
modes of delivering services and instead encourage flexibility around the 
individual needs of the service-user and the emerging presence (or lack) of magical 
connections. 
4. Alert people to the possibilities of magic so that they might be better placed to 
notice it and take advantage of it when it arrives.  With regard to the magical 
interruptions from the world and the weather I discussed earlier, perhaps one form 
of this might be interventions such as ‗mindfulness training‘ which seek to 
heighten individuals‘ sensual awareness of the world—interventions which in any 
case have been demonstrated to have numerous other health and wellbeing benefits 
already.  In the context of casework or counselling, another suggestion would be to 
support individuals wherever possible to get out and take part in the world, since it 
is in the world that magic happens (a reviewer of an earlier draft of this chapter in 
which I claimed more vehemently that magical experiences could not be prescribed 
suggested correctly enough that whilst we might not be able to increase the 
chances of a particular intervention having magical impact, by exposing 
individuals in general to a greater number of experiences we can increase the 
likelihood of a magical happening somewhere and somehow).  
5. Open up research to include more magic.  In empirical social science this will 
mean a commitment to research methods which are capable of perceiving and 
analysing magic: research projects like this one in which spaces for participant 
response have been open-ended and unstructured, or research in which magic, 
wonder and the transcendental of everyday interactions form the backbone of 
question-setting and analysis.  At the level of evidence-based practice, this will 
also include doing away with the un-critical exposure of student practitioners to 
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hierarchies of evidence which dismiss mad- and magically-led styles of research 
(or more realistically, providing student practitioners not only with evidence 
hierarchies with which to evaluate the quality of research, but with philosophical 
tools—including an appreciation of magic—with which to evaluate the validity of 
evidence hierarchies and ‗what works‘ metaphors themselves).  Finally, in the 
academy (and notwithstanding current pressures on research priorities and research 
resources) it will also involve developing magic as a recognised and relevant 
concept on the social science agenda (and I have listed already in this thesis 
numerous scholars who are working already in this area: Abram, Bennett, 
Merrifield and van Dongen among others).  In the last weeks of writing this 
chapter, discussion has emerged with colleagues working in different but related 
fields, for example, about proposing a conference panel on magical geographies, 
which will be one of many means of developing a critically informed and peer-
reviewed concept of magic for a future social science. 
6. Finally, be aware and unafraid of what is specific about the mad and magical 
worlds of people living with mental distress.  In the field of employment and 
mental health, in the last years, much progress in securing equality for people with 
mental health difficulties has come from a ‗disabilising‘ agenda which has pushed 
for mental health conditions to be understood as illnesses and disabilities 
equivalent to other physical conditions and handicaps—and equally protected by 
disability-related employment and discrimination law.  Whilst I have no desire to 
discourage such efforts, it is also the case that the very idiographic nature of mental 
distress exceeds discourses of disability or illness alone—Deborah‘s fear of green 
or David‘s tapping requirements again provide evocative examples.  As such, 
where magic and madness appear particularly entwined, reserving space for what 
is mad about madness—and not reframing people with mental health difficulties as 
legitimate actors in society only by virtue of suppressing this fact—will again be 
one way of taking the experiences of mental distress seriously.  
 
In this and the previous chapter, the aim has been to explore a range of limitations and 
possibilities in ‗what works‘ thinking—drawn both from a creative examination of the 
polysemy of ‗what works‘, and from an exploration of some possibilities beyond a 
traditional ‗what works‘ agenda.  In thinking about magic, and the kind of magical 
stories that do not always ‗make it‘ into more traditional social science accounts of 
illness and recovery, a more colourful picture of mad narratives has been offered; in 
finding solidarity with other ex-centric modes of narrative, it has also been explored 
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how these can be brought to complement (rather than negate or destroy) existing 
modes of writing research.   
 
The magical manifesto with which I have concluded this chapter is deliberately 
playful.  However, whilst we may play with traditional ideas about reading and writing 
research papers (including doctoral theses),  such playfulness extends also to ideas that 
magic cannot be incorporated into pragmatic frameworks and that embracing 
mad/magical narrativity must inevitably be a matter for philosophy alone.  An earlier 
title for this chapter was ‗works of magic‘ which seemed one way of highlighting the 
potentials for ‗what works‘ to surpass mechanical rationalism alone.  I have changed 
this to ‗magical happenings‘ to emphasise instead the ways in which magic is always 
already there-present in the world—in need less of work and more, as Eden Phillpotts 
tells us in the opening lines of this chapter, for us simply to notice it when it unfolds. 
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Conclusion 
 
Works in Progress  
 
 
 
This doctoral thesis began with a sketch of a socio-political landscape of work and 
mental health which had become heavily, and in some instances exclusively, occupied 
with questions of ‗back to work‘ or the policy of returning people with mental health 
difficulties to the competitive labour market.  In this sketch, participation in the 
mainstream labour market was venerated above all other forms of occupation and 
going back to work presented as a synonym for recovery.  Based partly on economic 
concerns about welfare dependency but also ideas about what service-users themselves 
desired and needed, individuals living with mental distress were re-branded not as 
passive recipients of care but as active citizens, capable of becoming net economic 
producers in society.  In the context of academic research, a similar and related trend 
was documented: a scenario in which ‗what works‘ research figured ever more 
prominently, and in which health research into back-to-work outcomes constituted the 
primary mode of imagining the links between work and mental (ill) health. 
 
In the discussions that have followed, this thesis has tried to demonstrate how the 
moments of collision between work and madness are radically more complex than 
back-to-work accounts alone.  Whilst the experiences and needs of people re-entering 
the labour market after periods ‗off sick‘ indeed form an important context in which 
work figures in the lives of people living with mental distress, such episodes are 
matched by numerous other interesting and important connections which interact, 
overlay and detract from ‗back to work‘ as a narrative.  Although standalone research 
contributions and personal narratives about ‗back to work‘ are part of this rich tapestry, 
as an overarching discourse, back-to-work can also be charged with reductionism—
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narrowing the ways in which work and mental distress are rendered knowable, and 
failing to recognise the full range of ways in which work has consequence for human 
flourishing.  Through examining a series of different intersects between work and 
madness which feature less commonly in the academic literature, it is hoped that 
throughout these discussions the case for a fuller and more inclusive understanding of 
work and madness has been offered.  
 
Several recurring themes or ideas for a broader study of work have arisen in this thesis 
and it is worth reiterating briefly what I think these and their value might be. 
 
The first concerns the panoramic scale of the philosophic project that comes into view 
when work and madness are freed from highly delineated definitions of paid 
employment, biomedical disease or other reductive modes of definition.  
Metaphorically, this sense of breadth is one—after the painstaking work of hacking 
through tight woodland—of breaking out to open ground and a landscape of undreamt 
scope and vastness.  Yet whilst this ‗discovery‘ describes the experience of this 
breaking free, since such breadth and polysemy has always been ‗there‘ in the world, 
such revelation is only really a reminder or a requisite for seeing.  In attending to the 
philosophical breadth of work—of climbing out of the confines of particular analytic 
gazes—it is hoped that the polysemic power of work in its myriad different 
presentations (recovery work, mad work, back to work, what works) can better be 
appreciated. 
 
A second consequence of this ‗opening out‘ of the terrain of work and madness is a 
decentering of knowledge in which understanding breaks free of any singular 
discipline (anthropology, sociology, any of the psy disciplines) or single level of 
explanation (epidemiological, phenomenological, biomedical, etc.).  (It will be 
remembered that this decentering was one of the major characteristics I found helpful 
in magical realist perspectives.)  An alluring direction for this project would have been 
to attempt a cohesive analysis in which these conflicting perspectives were 
amalgamated into a unitary analytic model; however, in the thesis presented here I stop 
simply at cutting between these traditional arrangements of knowledge—an act which I 
gently suggest was necessitated—not only because of the resource limitations of a 
single-authored doctoral project but also because of the inherently fragmentary nature 
of knowledge in this field.  There are connotations of decentering that differ from 
simply re-centering or re-locating disciplinary boundedness.  The first is to pay 
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particular attention to discord and tension between different ways of looking at the 
world in a way which does not seek to stifle complexity but which (with Winch and 
others) appreciates that moments of conflict and confusion are often the most fertile 
sites of inquiry.  Another is to seek a means of addressing traditional imbalances 
between disciplines or between professional and ‗lay‘ knowledges which avoids an 
equal and opposite reactionary movement.  (A good example is the dialectic between 
traditional psychiatric and ‗anti‘-psychiatry perspectives which, without care, can 
become framed around unnecessary and unhelpful polemical discussions; likewise 
between what might be classed as work-is-good and work-is-bad debates which 
pervade some cruder discussions in this arena.) 
 
Finally, a last concern which stretches across the thesis concerns the radical instability 
of the connections between work and madness: that is, of the contingent and endlessly 
differentiated relations between humans and their work across space and time.  One of 
the repeated ways I have attempted to illustrate this point is through attention to the 
individuality, variability and often esoteric and idiographic character of madness as 
exposed through the minutiae of personal experience.  Again, care is needed with this 
point: as I have argued expressly in the final chapter, such observations are not 
equivalent to a ‗counsel of despair‘ in which the extent of individual difference 
precludes any possibility of collective response to issues such as long-term 
unemployment or mental health recovery.  Likewise, it is important to separate this 
appreciation of difference from classic neoliberal individualism in which the individual 
is aggressively decoupled from his or her environment and community—a vision 
which dramatically underplays the role of the political and the structural in personal 
narratives.  Rather, what might be developed from this point is thus a politics of 
idiography by which recognition of the vibrancy and magnitude of idiosyncrasy 
destabilises both universalistic statements about the properties of work (for everyone, 
at all times) and the universalising tendencies to individualise and yet treat equally 
individuals in need of psychiatric or vocational support. 
 
With these comments in mind, it is helpful to think back through the chapters to 
consider how each of the intersects or narratives introduced in this thesis have offered 
something specific to the project here outlined.  In the first two chapters the chief 
concern was the various constructions of the relation between work and therapy, 
through history and across different contemporary contexts of work and recovery.  In 
the first chapter, the myriad ways in which work has been construed as a kind of 
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therapy were explored, from the earliest conceptions of occupational therapy to 
contemporary visions of the ‗naturally‘ therapeutic properties of ordinary, mainstream 
employment (to include the ‗therapy‘ of getting paid and becoming a taxpayer).  In the 
second chapter, the direction of this relation was reversed to consider how being ill 
with a mental health complaint itself produces forms of work and how therapy and 
getting better are similarly imbued with work and workfulness.  In these chapters, two 
key ideas were drawn out to map the terrain for the later project.  The first of these 
ideas was that of paradox and of the ‗waxing and waning‘ nature of ideas about the 
significance of work for mental health.  The second was what I have called ‗assertive‘ 
description: the project of writing and recording as an ethical endeavour to address 
imbalance in the existing research literature, especially when tackling themes with a 
long history of marginalisation such as the activity and agency of service-user 
populations (another theme which runs throughout the thesis). 
 
In the third and fourth chapters, the primary focus was relationality and the ways in 
which connections between work and worker could be considered.  As a loose template 
for these chapters, Marx‘s four alienations—between worker and the activity of his 
work, worker and the produce of his work, worker and his essence or gattungswesen, 
and worker and the community of workers—were considered against the backdrop of 
contemporary narratives of mental distress.  Whilst value was found in traditional 
accounts of alienation and the alienating potential of paid employment in conditions of 
late capitalism, a series of alternative narratives were also offered to describe different 
ways of being connected or disconnected from one‘s work.  Underlying these chapters 
philosophically, two important ideas were advanced: first was the idea of the 
embeddedness of work in an ‗ethics of relation‘ (a phrase chosen to emphasise the 
multiple work ethics that govern human connectedness to work) and the second to 
stress individuals‘ own capacities for conceptualising and narrating these relations (a 
theme I draw out in the fourth chapter with the specific example of narrators‘ own 
philosophies of putting madness to work).   
 
In the final two chapters, ideas about the polysemy of work were taken to a more 
discursive level—to consider more broadly the unstable pairings between work and 
rationality and madness and ‗breaking down‘; to explore the semantic connections 
between work (as a labour or occupation) and work as a broader state of functionality; 
and to introduce some more magical works of recovery at the edges of ‗what works‘ 
rationality.  In the first of these chapters, developing the Winchean commitments at the 
246  ‗Working Through‘: An Inquiry into Work and Madness  
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
beginning of the thesis, the primary emphasis was what it makes sense to say about 
work, broadening the topic to a more comprehensive exploration of ‗what works‘ 
beyond paid employment alone.  In the final chapter, as a direct response to this 
agenda, focus shifted to the possibilities for a more fully magical understanding of 
connections between work and distress—including a more magical policy/political 
framework. 
 
It is the nature of both the empirical and philosophical commitments of this thesis that 
conclusions will not be easy or linear or directive in their character.  However, one 
facet of this latter concern with a more fully sensitive policy approach to dealing with 
people in distress and disadvantage is the observation how, with just a little more 
listening to the magic and complexity that is already there in the world, space for just a 
little more magic can be found.  
 
Work Undone 
 
It was stated at the beginning of this thesis that this project could make no claims to 
comprehensiveness, and it is worth thinking briefly on what is missing from the thesis 
as it is presented here.  Most obviously, there are sacrifices which have been made for 
the ‗very open-ended‘ research method I have pursued in this thesis, and insights 
which have been lost for want of more systematic geographical, sociological or 
philosophical investigation.  I am mindful that the full significance of gender, age, and 
also physical health and geographical location, do not shine through in this account to 
the extent that some of my empirical material demanded—a significant weakness given 
the potentially depoliticising effects of such omissions (and especially in a research 
context in which disability and illness studies are already critiqued for failure to attend 
properly to intersectionality).
101
  Whilst it has been an explicit point of discussion in 
places in the thesis, a more rigorous discussion of educational background and what 
might be described as ‗social class‘ would also have been profitable: indeed, one of the 
most striking aspects of my fieldwork encounters which was never quite assimilated 
into the text was the high levels of functional illiteracy among participants, especially 
at the Women‘s Project and at the place I have called Walter House, as well as the 
striking number of personal narratives in which occupational disadvantage began its 
                                                     
101 See Hudson Banks and Kohn-Wood (2002) or Mercer (2002) for further discussion.  I have omitted 
ethnicity from this series of identity markers since, beyond the exceptions that have already been 
mentioned in the text, all participants were white and British – a demographic reflective of the wider 
English ‗Northern white belt‘ in which the research was conducted. 
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inscription during compulsory school years.  In the context of occupational 
rehabilitation, these concerns have obvious connotations for both prevention and 
intervention. 
 
Another interesting theme with important ramifications which has not been developed 
fully in this thesis is the intersect between mad work and ordinary work, and between 
the emotional and affective life-worlds of mental health service-users as a ‗special‘ 
population and other groups of workers.  At times, such omissions have been 
deliberate: as with the account of the greenness of Deborah‘s green or Sam‘s imaginary 
aeroplanes to emphasise the rich and wonderful, but also horrific and disabling, 
specificity of mad experiences and their consequences for welfare policy.  Elsewhere, 
however, stories of the workaday world would have constituted a helpful lens through 
which to stress how people living with mental health diagnoses are also always on a 
scale with, as Freud puts it, ordinary human misery—for example, through a greater 
discussion of ‗everyday‘ work-related stress and anxiety—or through a fuller and more 
illustrated account of the ways in which an individual‘s madness can seem less alien 
when viewed against their objective material circumstances (The writer and clinical 
psychologist, David Smail, gives the account of an out-of-work agoraphobic whom he 
eventually visits at home after failing to make therapeutic progress at his office—
whereupon, on seeing the boarded-up houses and litter-ridden streets in the 
neighbourhood in which she lives, discovers that her overriding experience that she 
does not want to go outside suddenly ‗makes sense‘ [Smail, 1984].)  A related link 
between mad work and ordinary work which has appeared at times in the thesis but 
which has not been developed more fully is that of the ways in which late capitalist 
work might itself be considered mad, which would be another rich and interesting 
means of disrupting the image of the unintelligible and workshy mental health patient. 
 
Finally, some words should be dedicated to the ‗missing‘ chapters from this thesis—
half-written but expelled on account of space and time limitations: a creative account 
of madness and megalomania with regard to the ‗new‘ work ethics of ‗celebritydom‘, 
consumerism and, in Oliver James‘ coinage, ‗affluenza‘; a fuller and more 
comprehensive discussion of the philosophy of the active and passive self and its 
relation to work, recovery and mental health activism; and finally, an exploration of 
post-work, anti-work and refusal-to-work perspectives and the understanding they offer 
to mental distress.  It is hoped that each of these strands of inquiry will find outlets 
beyond the doctorate; however, for now, it should be stressed that their omission from 
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the final text (especially with regard to these latter anti-work perspectives) do not 
reflect any greater theoretical or political commitments of the author.  It is also worth, 
just briefly, paying tribute to the individuals who gave their time to this project but 
whose stories have not appeared here.  (How can I not have mentioned the farmhand 
who glued his eyelids shut after moving to a job in the city?  Or the anorexic who takes 
a job as a cathedral tour-guide in order to burn more calories as she climbs the tower 
twice hourly?  Or the three women of a County Durham village who set up their own 
stitching and ironing business after deciding that the lack of quality employment in 
their locality was contributing to their ongoing depressions?)  This problem of data 
reduction and representativeness is, of course, little different to that discussed by the 
service-user representatives in chapter four of this thesis and is an endemic feature of 
qualitative narrative-based social science more broadly (Diefenbach, 2009; Silverman, 
2010).  Again, it is hoped that even whilst these absent participants have failed to 
appear by name in the thesis, the insights they have offered have contributed towards a 
more nuanced understanding as I have approached my tasks of analysis and writing. 
 
I shall conclude this thesis with reference back to the two working metaphors which 
have traversed this thesis—to Freud‘s psychic work of ‗working through‘ and Winch‘s 
reworking of Locke‘s under-labourer concept of philosophical inquiry (introduction, p. 
14).  For Freud, ‗working through‘—the title of this thesis—was an ongoing process in 
which understanding was only ever in progress (indeed, Freud prepares us for a 
‗perpetual struggle‘—although he goes on to tell us the rewards will be worth it [Freud, 
1914, p. 153]).  From what has been said already, it should be apparent that a similar 
‗unfinishability‘ can be observed in the working through that has comprised this thesis 
also.  With Freud, however, I do not see this as necessary grounds for pessimism.  
Rather, to return to that other working metaphor at the very beginning of the thesis—
Winch‘s retrieval of the under-labourer conception of philosophical inquiry—I suggest 
that with the right relation to work we can rediscover value in these struggles: not to 
deny that they are work or labour, but to deny that we should find anything demeaning 
or discouraging about such work or that satisfaction—joy—in work can begin only 
when such conceptual tasks are done.  
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Work involves change—that is, a process of effecting change in the world and in turn 
being changed oneself.  Indeed, according to classic analyses, it is because of this 
notion of change that we search in vain for a joyful understanding of work prior to 
modernity, since before then existed no coherent concept of progress or transformation 
by which to make such judgement (Meakin, 1976).   
 
With these thoughts of change in mind, it is perhaps appropriate to end this thesis by 
reflecting on what has happened to the places and participants described in this 
research project in the sixteen months since the formal period of interviewing and 
ethnography ended.   
 
To start first with the political landscape of back-to-work, the march of progress 
described in chapter one did nothing but accelerate.  The war against social exclusion, 
started by New Labour and continued by the current government, continued to 
prioritise mainstream integration over segregated occupational services for mental 
health service-users.  ‗Buildings-based‘ services remained a particular target for 
critique, and at the end of 2011, the project I have called the Plumtree Centre was 
closed down to be replaced by a series of vocation-based initiatives in integrated 
settings.  Foregrounded by global economic uncertainty, more broadly in the wake of 
the 2008 financial crisis, a cumulative array of rising unemployment figures, industrial 
unrest and increasing hostility towards the latest work schemes for the long-term 
unemployed have brought again the links between work and mental health to the 
forefront of public attention (The Guardian, 26 July 2011; National Audit Office, 24 
January 2012; BBC, 15 February 2012).  With regard to the service-user involvement 
agenda described in chapter four, policy has also changed, amounting not quite to an 
abandonment of the involvement commitment but certainly a retrenchment in its more 
far reaching ambitions (RADAR, 2010).  Against this background, several of the 
involvement projects co-ordinated by the Network disappeared entirely; however, as 
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Benji explains, most of them have come back, ‗phoenix-like‘, with different names and 
funding bodies.  With their always more active outreach philosophies, the Enterprise 
Centre and Women‘s Project have fared better in this time span and indeed in the last 
six months have both expanded.  At Walter House, strangely impervious to the outside 
world, things seem to carry on as they have always done.   
 
It has not been possible to account for all the individuals in the wake of the fieldwork 
but a meeting with Trish, the support worker at the Plumtree Project, Benji, and a 
handful of other participants has helped me to catch up with some of the news.   
 
First, we should start with some ‗back-to-work‘ success stories.  After a few false 
starts, Simon, the ex-worker at the glass factory, found employment as a supermarket 
shelf-stacker and feels his confidence and mood are steadily improving.  Barbara 
returned to practising law at a more women-friendly firm and in June 2011 accepted a 
generous out-of-court settlement from her previous employers for the way she had 
been treated.  Jake, in what is the only success story of a government welfare-to-work 
initiative I have encountered in this project, has been assisted to find work in an 
electrical company after a series of taster sessions in a range of employment sectors.  
The relation between him and his dad remains close and his father continues to 
transport him to work each day, illustrating again the importance of magical people in 
sustaining recovery.  It is noteworthy also how economic downturns have winners as 
well as losers.  Michael, the motorcycle mechanic whose business collapsed when 
repairing old bikes was no longer economical, finds that many of his old contacts are 
coming back to him now that buying a new bike is less affordable, and in recent 
months Michael has developed quite a cash-in-hand industry from helping out his 
friends.  His only gripe, or so he says, is that the current benefits and taxation system is 
so difficult for people who are trying to get back to work after long periods of ill health 
that, for now, this income is ‗under the radar‘.   
 
Other people have been in touch with me also.  Lucy‘s first novel is finished (with 
significantly greater ease than this thesis, apparently).  Kerry called to let me know she 
had returned to university after our numerous chats at the Plumtree project.  June, who 
had just completed a graded return to her office job at the time of our initial meetings 
has had two further periods off sick but feels the strong supportive relationship she has 
with her line manager helps her get back as soon as possible.  Sometime in 2010, 
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Martin—the entrepreneur with the manic business ideas—got in touch to enlist my 
University‘s support to prevent the Cadbury takeover by Kraft, which he felt was an 
almost unbearable loss to British industry and identity.  The word on the street was that 
he spent a sustained spell in hospital after that, having adopted the salvation of the 
confectionary company as his latest magical vocation—although it is apparent that 
both he and his real-world businesses retained their characteristic resilience 
throughout.   
 
Elsewhere, recovery happens more slowly.  Sam no longer believes she is a fighter 
pilot but remains highly disabled by her condition and has been excused from work-
focused benefit reviews on grounds of her health.  Vera, along with several other long-
term members of Plumtree, has been transferred to another day project (ironically with 
less of an occupational focus), although Trish raises concerns for those who failed to 
find a place elsewhere and no longer have any regular contact during the day.  Trish 
now works as a ‗roaming‘ support worker, visiting people in their homes or in 
mainstream community settings.  Bill however took early retirement after Plumtree 
closed.  ‗He‘d had enough, I think‘, said Trish.  Tragically, in the later stages of writing 
this thesis, volunteers at Walter House informed me the person I have here called 
David died last summer (as did Els van Dongen, the anthropologist who had inspired 
me to write about magic and to whom I had promised a copy of the thesis when 
complete, and as did my own father—an event which happened directly after writing 
about the bereavements of Finn Garrett and Will Self‘s fictional narrator—and which 
for this reason acquired its own texture of magical realism).  According to the rumours, 
David was simply found at his home by social services, presumably having committed 
suicide.  It is sad, people tell me, but it is something that happens when you work in 
this field.   
 
Finally, there are updates which disrupt and unsettle my initial analyses as written in 
the chapters—Phil, for example, whose story I used to challenge the necessary 
desirability of liking one‘s work, who I am told is now thinking of returning to his 
former teaching career having had therapy enough from less demanding employment.  
It was tempting on hearing this news to scratch out my earlier commentary concerning 
his beliefs—and yet perhaps it is this ability of real people to go on living after the 
research process has ended that separates the kind of cameos and narratives I have 
relied upon in this thesis from the pure ‗thought experiment‘ or fictional 
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characterisation utilised by philosophy or literature (and perhaps again this is one way 
in which we may draw a soft line between the social sciences or Geisteswissenschaften 
and the arts and humanities). 
 
In drafting out an ending to this thesis, I am reminded again of the warnings of 
Gwyneth Lewis (chapter four) about the danger of using one‘s writing as one‘s therapy 
(a critique which, incidentally, has been directed to several of the great biographers of 
madness to include Freud, Jung and R.D. Laing among others).  For this reason, in 
these spaces of concluding, I shall avoid further ‗working through‘ of my own journey 
as a doctoral researcher or abridged ‗workings out‘ of the research as if they were now 
indelible truths.  To paraphrase Freud, after all, we and the things we do are only ever 
works in progress.  Instead, for want of a better way to finish a thesis, I shall leave with 
the lasting images that stay with me in my final moments of wakefulness: of the empty 
spinning wheels in the curative workshops; of waiting with Michael for two hours at a 
jobcentre to meet an advisor who never once looks at us; of the homemade twist to the 
clichéd sign in the User Network‘s headquarters—‗you really DO have to be mad to 
work here...‘; of the work crew at the gardening project in the back of the minibus, 
dancing and singing to Dolly Parton on the radio on the way to the allotments: working 
nine ‘til five, what a way to make a living... 
 
 
February 2012 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Abridged outline of research participants cited in the thesis to include basic profile and 
summary of research contact.  Summary descriptions use narrators‘ emic vocabularies 
where possible. 
 
 
Pseudonym Summary Research Contact 
Amy, f, 
early thirties 
Graphic designer at a publishing house.  Responded to 
the call for participation for this project, which she 
saw in a local newspaper, because she felt so strongly 
that work was the best therapy for her ongoing voice-
hearing and depression. 
6 recorded interviews and 
1 workplace visit  
(Mar 2009–Jan 2010). 
Recruited via general 
advertisement. 
Barbara, f, 
mid thirties 
Solicitor who lost her job after ‘behaving strangely  at 
work during a schizophrenic breakdown.  Later took 
the case to industrial tribunal for constructive 
dismissal and sexual discrimination after it had been 
proven she had been systematically bullied by her male 
colleagues. 
3 recorded interviews  
(Sep 2008–Mar 2009). 
Recruited via word of 
mouth.  
Becky, f,  
late twenties 
Ex-participant at the Plumtree Project who has 
recently returned to her old job at a school canteen 
after seven months off with depression.  Claims that 
she likes the job but finds the early starts stressful and 
reports that going back to work means she has no 
energy to keep up with her friends or even to cook 
meals for herself. 
3 recorded interviews and 
occasional ethnographic 
contact (May 2008–Oct 
2009).  Recruited via 
Plumtree. 
Benji, m, 
 late thirties 
Co-ordinator of a regional service-user-led mental 
health network.  Benji has himself experienced 
ongoing mental health difficulties including a two-year 
period of hospitalisation. 
4 recorded interviews plus 
regular ethnographic 
contact and ongoing 
follow-up discussions (Apr 
2008–). Recruited via The 
Network. 
Bob, m, 
 mid forties  
Employee in a cake factory, responsible for overseeing 
the industrial dishwashers.  Currently taking part in a 
‘Conditions Management Programme  to help him 
cope with his depression and anxiety at work. 
2 recorded interviews  
(Feb 2009–Apr 2009). 
Recruited via word of 
mouth. 
Brett, m,  
late thirties 
Professional violinist who toured for several years 
with a well-known ensemble.  Now feels that he has 
‘burnt out  and is currently in receipt of incapacity 
benefit.  Brett is an occasional attendee of Plumtree, 
although his overall evaluations of the centre are 
negative. 
3 recorded interviews plus 
occasional ethnographic 
contact (May 2008–Oct 
2009). Recruited via 
Plumtree. 
Carly, f,  
early thirties 
Qualified social worker employed in a supported 
housing project.  Carly experienced mental health 
problems and behavioural difficulties as a teenager 
and finished her compulsory schooling in special 
education. 
4 recorded interviews plus 
2 workplace visits  
(Jan 2009–May 2009). 
Recruited via word of 
mouth. 
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Charles, m, 
late fifties 
A self-professed ‘mad scientist  (professor emeritus in 
particle physics) who took medical retirement after 
‘office politics  became too much to manage alongside 
his schizophrenia.  Charles is a supporter of several 
mental health charities and occasionally offers his 
services to projects orchestrated by The Network. 
3 recorded interviews and 
occasional ethnographic 
contact (Jun 2008–Sep 
2008). Recruited via The 
Network. 
Christine, f, 
late thirties 
A mother of two and librarian by training.  Attempted 
to go back to work after the birth of her second child 
but found that leaving the children in daycare 
aggravated her obsessive compulsive disorder and she 
resigned.  Has no plans to return to work because she 
and her husband can manage without the income. 
4 one-to-one recorded 
interviews and 2 group 
discussions (Sep 2008–Mar 
2009).  Recruited via The 
Network. 
Clive, m, 
mid fifties 
Participant at the Plumtree Project with an 
engineering background.  At the time of the fieldwork, 
Clive experienced delusional beliefs that he was 
(amongst other things) the catering manager at the 
daycentre, a master chef at a restaurant and the 
director of adult psychiatric services for the region. 
Occasional ethnographic 
contact (May 2008–Oct 
2009). Recruited via 
Plumtree. 
David, m, 
 late thirties 
Trained as a bus driver after gaining a Heavy Goods 
Vehicle license, but was transferred to maintenance 
work at the depot after experiencing a psychotic 
breakdown.  Dropped out of work altogether six 
months later due to difficulties with workplace 
bullying.  A regular attendee at Walter House. 
2 recorded interviews plus 
regular ethnographic 
contact (Sep 2008–Oct 
2009).  Recruited via 
Walter House. 
Dawn, f,  
mid forties 
Attendee at the Plumtree computer literacy course.  
Used to work at an airport as a cleaner but quit after 
the 2007 terrorist attack at Glasgow Airport which 
triggered her anxiety.  Has always wanted to be a 
nursery nurse but is frightened about the stigma of 
mental illness preventing her from working with 
children. 
3 recorded interviews plus 
regular ethnographic 
contact (May 2008–Oct 
2009). Recruited via 
Plumtree. 
 
Deborah, f, 
late forties 
Full-time housewife attempting to get back to work 
after a long period of depression.  Deborah has 
agoraphobia and a series of specific anxiety 
disorders—particularly a phobia of the colour green—
which mean that finding suitable work, or indeed 
leaving the house alone, can be very challenging. 
4 recorded interviews 
including one with her 
husband, plus one ‘walk 
about  the neighbourhood 
(Mar 2009–Nov 2009).  
Recruited via the Training 
and Enterprise Centre. 
Eleanor, f,  
late forties 
Former ‘surgeon s wife , which Eleanor describes as a 
full-time job due to the volume of society events she 
was expected to attend (not to mention looking after 
her husband).  Started attending Plumtree after her 
husband left her and her mental health problems 
worsened.  Would like a job but worries about how 
she ll cope. 
3 recorded interviews plus 
regular ethnographic 
contact (Mar 2009–Oct 
2009). Recruited via 
Plumtree. 
Emily, f,  
early twenties  
Recovering anorexic and psychology graduate who is 
currently working as a tour guide at a cathedral.  Has 
been ‘disowned  by her family since she is not in 
professional work and her friends tell her she is only 
still working at the cathedral because climbing the 
tower every hour uses lots of calories—an 
interpretation in which she sees some truth.  
3 recorded interviews and 
ongoing follow up 
conversations  
(July 2008–).  Recruited 
via personal contact.  
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Felicity, f, 
 late twenties 
Mental health campaigner and freelance service-user 
consultant, providing a user voice on developments in 
the NHS.  Became interested in working in the service-
user sector after some highly negative experiences 
during her spell as a compulsory patient in a 
psychiatric hospital. 
5 recorded interviews and 
intermittent ethnographic 
contact (Nov 2010–May 
2011).  Recruited via word 
of mouth. 
Ginny, f,  
late thirties 
Mature student studying to be a qualified occupational 
therapist after a long history of working with older 
people. Ginny finds the academic side of her training 
difficult because of her long-standing depressive 
disorder and the side-effects of the drugs she takes for 
this, which make it hard for her to concentrate on her 
studies. 
3 recorded interviews (Jun 
2009–Aug 2009).  
Recruited via Plumtree 
where she was doing a 
placement. 
 Gwyneth, f, 
early fifties 
Professional writer and the first National Poet of 
Wales. Gwyneth moved from a broadcasting career to 
being a full-time freelance writer after a major 
depressive episode.  In 2002, Gwyneth published a 
‘cheerful  autobiographical self-help book about 
depression. [N.B., Gwyneth has given permission for 
her real name to be used in this text]. 
1 recorded interview and 1 
ethnographic meeting (Nov 
2010).  Purposively 
recruited. 
Hannah, f, 
 late thirties 
Events organiser who described herself as having 
‘loved  her career until one day, on returning from a 
family holiday, she fell ill with catatonic depression 
with extreme hypersomnolence.  Whilst the manifest 
symptoms of her illness vanished in 2008, Hannah s 
consultant encourages her to remain off work ‘for the 
time being  due to the idiopathic nature of her 
complaint and the fear that overwork may have been a 
contributory factor. 
3 recorded interviews  
(Nov 2009–Mar 2010). 
Recruited via word of 
mouth. 
Harry, m,  
late forties 
Bricklayer by trade, now attempting to find work in the 
service sector after the side effects of his anti-psychotic 
medication made him unable to continue with a 
manual job.  Has had to leave several work experience 
placements after experiencing ongoing harassment 
concerning his gender, sexuality and mental health 
condition.   
6 recorded interviews  
(Mar 2009–Nov 2009).  
Recruited via the Training 
and Enterprise Centre. 
Hattie, f,  
mid twenties 
Ex-Cambridge graduate who left after just two terms, 
feeling ‘stifled  by the culture there. Has since tried a 
range of occupations including journalism, voluntary 
work, and selling homemade jewellery.  Hattie is 
supported financially by her parents—but they have 
started to put pressure on her to ‘settle down  and find 
a ‘proper job . 
4 recorded interviews 
(June 2008–Dec 2008).  
Recruited via word of 
mouth. 
Helen, f,  
early fifties 
Counsellor who left her previous career as a human 
relations officer to train as a therapist after 
counselling helped her to recover from her own 
experiences of depression and childhood abuse. 
4 recorded interviews  
(Sep 2009–Dec 2009).  
Recruited via 
advertisement in local 
media. 
Howard, m, 
early sixties 
Participant at the Plumtree Centre who began 
engaging with mental health day services after his 
wife, who had cared for him, had died from cancer.  
Howard had been unimpressed by the support services 
he had initially been offered and chose Plumtree 
instead as a more activity-based alternative.   
1 recorded interview plus 
regular ethnographic 
contact (May 2008–Oct 
2009). Recruited via 
Plumtree. 
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Ian, m,  
late forties 
Railway enthusiast who, after building up investments 
from stocks and shares, bought and renovated one of 
the UK s few remaining independent railway stations.  
Ian finds the railway so important to his mental 
wellbeing that he has arranged with his doctors for, in 
the instance of a hospital admission, to be sent to a 
specific hospital which is located in view of the rail-
tracks so that he can watch the trains. 
6 recorded interviews plus 
1 workplace visit (Sep 
2008–Mar 2009).  
Recruited via general 
advertisement. 
Jake, m,  
late twenties 
Participant on a government-run ‘pathways to work  
scheme who was diagnosed with schizophrenia as a 
teenager.  Lives with his father who has a physical 
disability and both care for one another. 
4 recorded interviews plus 
a series of tips together 
from his home to Walter 
House on public transport 
(Oct 2008–Feb 2009). 
James, m,  
mid thirties 
Business advisor by training who gave up salaried 
employment after a series of hospitalisations at the 
time of his first wedding.  Is now employed on a 
sessional basis at several Northern universities to offer 
a ‘service-user perspective  on medical and nursing 
degrees. 
2 recorded interviews plus 
occasional ethnographic 
contact (Mar 2010–April 
2010).  Purposively 
recruited. 
Jed, m,  
late forties 
Previous owner of a taxi firm in a rough 
neighbourhood.  Sold the company after a nervous 
breakdown, triggered in part by his increasing 
exposure to and involvement with crime and violence.  
Now works as a support worker with social services. 
2 one-to-one recorded 
interviews and 5 group 
discussions (June 2008–
Jan 2009).  Recruited via 
word of mouth. 
June, f,  
early forties 
Administrative assistant in the public sector.  
Underwent a lengthy battle with the help of her trade 
union to arrange flexible working hours on grounds of 
her panic disorder.  Now has a new line manager with 
whom she gets on well, and is also involved at a 
national level with her union s disability team. 
5 recorded interviews  
(Oct 2008–Mar 2009). 
Recruited via word of 
mouth. 
Karen, f,  
late fifties 
Dental nurse who lives and works a small village.  
Whilst experiencing obsessive compulsive disorder 
since a young adult, Karen had her first 
hospitalisation in the early 2000s when she 
experienced psychotic withdrawal effects from the 
controversial Seroxat anti-depressant.  Attributes her 
‘back to work  story to the close relation she has with 
the dentist she works for—and to her need to ‘get out 
the house  during the day to distract herself from the 
obsessions. 
2 recorded interviews plus 
4 unrecorded interviews 
and ongoing follow–ups 
(Nov 2008–).  Recruited 
via personal contact. 
Kate, f,  
late teens 
Participant in the ‘under 25s  project at the Women s 
Centre.  Experiences depression, voice-hearing and 
self-harming, and has been sectioned several times.  
Kate is currently volunteering at an animal shelter, 
which is a direction she thinks she might like to 
develop her future career.  [N.B., Kate has given her 
permission for her real name to be used in this text]. 
3 recorded group 
interviews  (Sep 2008-Dec 
2008).  Recruited via 
Women s Centre. 
Kelly, f,  
early 
twenties 
Another participant at the ‘under 25s  project at the 
Women s Centre who is ‘on parole  after a series of 
committals to psychiatric hospitals, drugs facilities 
and, most recently, prison.  Kelly has recently started 
some vocational courses in beauty and is taking 
literacy classes at the Women s Centre, made possible 
largely due to the support of Pauline, her mentor in an 
innovative multi-agency support programme for 
troubled young people.  
3 recorded group 
interviews (Sep 2008–Dec 
2008).  Recruited via 
Women s Centre. 
282  ‗Working Through‘: An Inquiry into Work and Madness  
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Kerry, f,  
early thirties 
Participant at the Plumtree project, where she first 
started attending as a service-user after withdrawing 
from her architecture course, but where she now 
attends as a volunteer tutor in the literacy and 
computer classes.  
2 recorded interviews plus 
regular ethnographic 
contact (May 2008–Oct 
2009). Recruited via 
Plumtree. 
Kev, m,  
mid forties 
Long-term sufferer of depression and participant in the 
therapeutic activities programme at Walter House.  
Kev lives alone and would like to get a job as he gets 
lonely, but hasn t worked since the early 1990s when 
he was made redundant from one of the last coal mines 
in the region.  ‘But who d want to employ me?  he 
says.  
3 recorded interviews plus 
regular ethnographic 
contact (Sep 2008–Oct 
2009). Recruited via 
Walter House. 
Lizzie, f,  
early 
twenties 
Participant at the Plumtree Project diagnosed with 
personality disorder and bipolar depression.  No paid 
work history.  Lizzie lost many of her disability-related 
benefits in a review to her benefits as she was judged 
able to work.  However, during the time span of the 
research, Lizzie has been on a waiting list for a back-
to-work scheme and has been unable to find 
employment on her own. 
1 recorded interview plus 
regular ethnographic 
contact (May 2008–Oct 
2009). Recruited via 
Plumtree.  
Lucy, f,  
late twenties 
Drama graduate and participant at Plumtree who has 
recently received an arts enterprise grant to establish 
herself as a full-time author and playwright.  Lucy 
feels her experiences of depression and bulimia 
provide useful insights into the human psyche which 
she can use in her writing.    
4 recorded interviews plus 
one workplace visit and 
occasional ethnographic 
contact (May 2008–Feb 
2010). Recruited via 
Plumtree. 
Marcus, m, 
late thirties 
Jamaican-born rail-worker who hears voices in his 
head and struggles with paranoid delusions.  Marcus 
has had long periods out of work and intermittent 
contact with the mental health services for years.  He 
is now taking part in a job-seeking course at the 
Training and Enterprise Centre after complications 
with his diabetes brought him back into contact with 
health services. 
1 recorded interview, plus 
regular ethnographic 
contact (Mar 2009–Oct 
2009). Recruited via the 
Training and Enterprise 
Centre. 
Margaret, f, 
mid fifties 
Promotions manager for a national mental health 
charity.  Worked in a management background prior 
to the birth of her children in the 1980s but after a few 
years working for a chain of charity shops for a 
homelessness charity, moved to the mental health 
sector as she felt her firsthand experiences would be 
useful. 
3 recorded interviews  
(Sep 2008–Feb 2009).  
Recruited via Walter 
House. 
Marie, f,  
mid twenties 
Student welfare officer in a support department at a 
northern university, providing one-to-one study 
support for students with mental health difficulties and 
acting as a referral point to the university counselling 
service and other facilities.  Marie has bipolar 
disorder but does not currently use mental health 
services. 
5 recorded interviews  
(Aug 2010–Jan 2011).  
Purposively recruited. 
Martin, m, 
early fifties 
Manic depressive, millionaire, entrepreneur and 
partner in several independent businesses in the travel 
and tourism industry—as well as the owner of an 
internet site selling and trading retro clothing, inspired 
by his own obsessions about collecting nylon shirts. 
6 recorded interviews  
(Feb 2009–Oct 2009).  
Recruited via word of 
mouth. 
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Maurice, m, 
mid forties 
Decorative glassworker and artist renting a workshop 
and gallery space at a visitor attraction, with business 
support from the Training and Enterprise Centre.  
Turned to a full–time career in the arts after the last of 
the shipyards closed down, when he decided to pursue 
a more creative lifestyle that was more in keeping with 
the ‘mad side of himself . 
1 recorded and 4 
unrecorded interviews plus 
3 workplace visits  
(Oct 2009–Jun 2010).  
Recruited via the Training 
and Enterprise Centre. 
Meghan, f, 
 late thirties 
Service-user researcher employed in a traditional 
university.  Meghan s primary tasks are to provide a 
service-user s perspective on a large, research council 
funded mental health research project, to coordinate 
service-user volunteers in data collection, and 
(occasionally) to contribute to research methods 
training for graduate students.  
2 recorded interviews  
(Apr 2010–Jun 2010).  
Purposively recruited. 
Michael, m, 
early forties 
Owner of a motorcycle repair business until a change 
in the economy made the enterprise unfeasible.  Now 
on benefits having struggled to find alternative work 
(despite engagement with several back-to-work 
schemes) and having experienced a prolonged period 
of depression following the collapse of the business. 
6 recorded interviews  
(Sep 2008–Mar 2008).  
Recruited via word of 
mouth. 
Nick, m,  
early forties 
Coordinator of a mental health involvement project 
with which he became engaged when his son was 
diagnosed with schizophrenia.  Nick has mental health 
problems himself (depression and anxiety) which he 
links to his family situation and to the insecurity of his 
‘rolling contract  with the involvement project, in 
which job security is low. 
3 recorded interviews and 
1 week ethnographic 
contact at a service-user 
involvement training 
course (Oct 2010–Jan 
2011).  Purposively 
recruited. 
Pete, m, 
 early thirties 
Construction worker with depression and drink 
problems.  Had previously spent several years ‘on the 
dole  without any regular occupation but in 2008 
started attending an alcoholics  support group at 
Walter House and later in the same year acquired a 
two-year labouring contract on a new build estate. 
1 recorded interview, 3 
recorded group discussions 
(Jan 2009–May 2009).  
Recruited via Walter 
House. 
Phil, m,  
mid thirties 
Work history as a PE teacher but currently employed 
as a delivery driver after several failed attempts to get 
back into teaching after a period off with anxiety and 
depression.  Phil reports missing the teaching but that 
he is most suited to work where he can ‘switch off his 
mind . 
4 recorded interviews 
(Nov 2008–Mar 2009).  
Recruited via word of 
mouth.  
Ryan, m,  
late twenties 
Ex-soldier with post-traumatic stress disorder and 
substance misuse issues.  Found participation in the 
Walter House therapeutic activities programme helpful 
in overcoming some of his problems.  Ryan is a 
member of the Walter House alcohol support group 
with Pete and Stuart.  
2 recorded group 
discussions plus regular 
ethnographic contact  
(Sep 2008–Oct 2009). 
Recruited via Walter 
House. 
Sally, f,  
late twenties 
Part-time worker diagnosed with stress, dissociative 
disorder and anxiety—symptoms which she attributes 
to trying to hold down five different jobs (a 
supermarket cashier position, two cleaning jobs, 
catalogue delivering and a shift per week in a bar).  
Continues to work three of these positions because she 
cannot find a full-time job to support herself.   
3 recorded interviews  
(Sep 2008–Feb 2009).  
Recruited via Walter 
House. 
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Sam, f, 
 mid twenties 
Participant at the Plumtree project on ‘day release  
from a local psychiatric hospital.  Sam s ‘delusions  
include that she is a fighter pilot for the Ministry of 
Defence and, when she is talking to me, that she is 
doing a University degree (a claim which is apparently 
fictitious).  No known paid work history. 
1 recorded interview plus 
regular ethnographic 
contact (May 2008–Oct 
2009). Recruited via 
Plumtree. 
Sheila, f,  
mid fifties   
Ex-housewife who has recently started working as a 
support assistant at the Women s Centre, which 
constitutes her first paid job since leaving secretarial 
work as a young adult.  Was in hospital for several 
weeks with ‘empty nest syndrome  but hopes that this 
job will give her a new identity now that her children 
have grown up.   
2 recorded interviews plus 
regular ethnographic 
contact (Aug 2009–Oct 
2009). Recruited via the 
Women s Centre. 
Simon, m,  
mid thirties 
Work history in the North East s glassmaking industry 
as a glass cutter in the factory where both his father 
and grandfather worked.  Had great pride in his work 
but lost his confidence after witnessing a serious 
industrial accident on the factory floor and was 
eventually fired after failing to turn up to work in the 
mornings.  Now looking for work elsewhere as he feels 
he can t have a girlfriend until he has a job. 
3 recorded interviews  
(Oct 2008–Jan 2009).  
Recruited via Walter 
House. 
Sonya, f,  
late thirties 
Speech therapist and a victim of domestic abuse who 
experienced a return of the voice-hearing and anxiety 
symptoms she had had as a child when the relationship 
with her husband deteriorated.  Enjoys her job but 
raises concerns about ‘not looking professional , 
especially after an occasion where she went to work 
with a black eye. 
3 recorded interviews  
(Jan 2009–Apr 2009).  
Recruited via general 
advertisement. 
Steph, f,  
late twenties 
Service-user research assistant who works as a 
research writer in a service-user led research 
organisation in partnership with a traditional 
university.  Steph has a doctorate and worked very 
briefly in mainstream academia before taking this role.  
She enjoys it, but expresses frustrations that it is so 
much more poorly paid than comparable research 
assistant posts elsewhere. 
2 recorded interviews and 
2 workplace visits plus 
subsequent unrecorded 
discussions (Apr 2011–).  
Purposively recruited. 
Stuart, m, 
 late thirties 
Recovering alcoholic and participant at Walter House, 
especially for the ‘afternoon walking group  and the 
alcohol and drugs group.  Has suffered from 
depression for years leading to a disrupted working 
life and several hospitalisations.  Most of his work 
history is in outdoor work and he has applied for 
several grounds maintenance positions—but has yet to 
be invited to any interviews.   
2 recorded interviews and 
regular ethnographic 
contact (Sep 2008–Oct 
2009). Recruited via 
Walter House. 
Sue, f,  
mid forties 
Employment history as a bank clerk but has been 
claiming incapacity benefits for several years after a 
depressive breakdown.  Says she would like to go back 
to paid work ‘for a rest  as her family leave her with so 
much work to do around the house and in looking after 
her grandchildren—a situation which she feels 
exacerbates her health condition.  Has recently started 
an assertiveness course at the Women s Centre. 
4 recorded interviews  
(Jul 2008–Nov 2009).  
Recruited via the women s 
centre. 
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Tano, m, 
 mid thirties 
Sudanese asylum seeker who worked in various cash-
in-hand jobs before being admitted to hospital with 
psychosis.  Is ‘building up his life again  on the 
Plumtree allotment project.  Says he would like to 
work in a paid capacity as a gardener one day, if his 
immigration papers are ever granted. 
Regular ethnographic 
contact (May 2008–Oct 
2009). Recruited via 
Plumtree. 
Tim, m, 
late forties 
Teacher who moved from mainstream to special 
education after finding that his own experiences of 
mental distress made him particularly attuned to the 
children s difficulties.  Tim has recently taken part in a 
national teaching union s campaign to highlight the 
mental health challenges of teaching in the 21
st
 
Century. 
4  recorded group 
discussions and 2 visits to 
Union meetings  
(Nov 2008–Jun 2009).  
Recruited via word of 
mouth. 
Tom, m, 
mid sixties 
Long-term participant at Plumtree, who has spent most 
of his life in residential care, with the exception of a 
few years at sea with a cargo ship.  Is shortly to 
‘retire  from the Centre s work programme and be 
transferred to a specialist older adults  day service.  
2 recorded interviews and 
regular ethnographic 
contact (May 2008–Oct 
2009). Recruited via 
Plumtree. 
Tracy, f, 
early 
twenties 
Participant in the ‘Under 25s project  at the women s 
centre, currently employed through a work experience 
scheme in the warehouse of a clothes shop.  Reports 
having had no stable routine through most of her life 
and thus her surprise regarding the positive effect a 
routine has had on her lifestyle and mood. 
3 recorded group 
interviews (Sep 2008–Dec 
2008).  Recruited via 
Women s Centre. 
Vanessa, f, 
early 
twenties 
Student teacher, who has been working with Tim on 
the Trade Union report on teachers  mental health.  
Finds teaching beneficial to her health and an 
important source of confidence and esteem.   
3 recorded group 
interviews and 2 visits to 
union meetings (Dec 2008–
Jun 2009).  Recruited via 
word of mouth. 
Vera, f,  
mid sixties 
Participant at Plumtree who organises the bingo and 
lottery syndicate but refuses to participate in any of the 
other work projects.  No paid work history.  
1 recorded interview and 
regular ethnographic 
contact (May 2008–Oct 
2009). Recruited via 
Plumtree. 
William, m, 
mid twenties 
Farmhand with little formal education.  Ended up in a 
hostel in Newcastle after the death of his parents and 
sale of the farm, whereupon he ‘super-glued his eyes 
shut . Recovered through being returned to an 
agricultural setting and is now embarking on a 
farming course at a local agricultural college. 
3 recorded interviews and 
occasional ethnographic 
contact (May 2008–Oct 
2009).  Recruited via 
Plumtree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 286   
 
